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Clinical necropoetics: medical and ethics writing of death and transplantation
In 1875, Francis Gerry Fairfield invoked period understandings of neurology to offer a striking view of the human nervous system. Experiments at the time indicated that white and grey nervous tissue have different functions, the former governing movement and sensation, and the latter involving higher thought. â[T]he physiologist thus finally encounters a gray nervous spectre that thinks and feels and longs, wills and determines and controls ⌠a thin and filmy ghost ⌠matterâs final Doppelgängerâ.1 While the science of that passage is flawed, it foreshadows more recent medical thought in differentiating neurological functions and seeing consciousness wholly as a function of the body rather than the function of a separate spirit. Yet the language of this materialist vision is spectral: the subject is haunted by the material body, the âthin and filmy ghostâ of nerves themselves, âmatterâs final Doppelgängerâ.
A kind of materialist haunting can also be discerned within the medico-legal redefinitions of death that have accompanied the progress of the transplantation project. While haunting usually connotes disembodied spirits, here the term implies that bodies themselves can be recalcitrant and mysterious, not quite explained by a diagnostic label. This chapter explores affective and epistemological challenges posed by the novel diagnostic entities of âwhole-brain deathâ, âbrain-stem deathâ, and âcontrolled circulatory deathâ as they developed in transfer milieux in the US and UK. As life-support technologies progressed, cardiopulmonary functions could be maintained despite catastrophic neurological damage. New states of being emerged, cyborg hybridities of machine and flesh dependent on machines for oxygen but still breathing, sweating, growing, sighing, and â sometimes â even weeping.2 My goal is not necessarily to challenge the validity of these criteria, or to question that these states indicate irreversible decline. Rather, I want to address how Gothic imagery, intertextualities, and narrative strategies are marshalled to variously express uncertainty or unease or, by contrast, to manage doubt and normalise. As described in my Introduction, Gothic can facilitate contradictory meanings, dis(re)membering to communicate troubling affects or to elide that very strangeness.
Reading the dead
Of necessity, a significant proportion of this interdisciplinary chapter will review the new deaths and their controversies, conventions of scientific communication, and theories of diagnosis. Diagnosis is historically and culturally specific, in that social factors shape how symptoms are understood; it is also always an enacted practice, an assemblage, as discussed in my Introduction, a network of human and nonhuman entities and forces tangible and intangible.3 Death diagnoses are enacted by assemblages of diverse elements â a body, cotton ear-buds, cardiac defibrillators, EEG machines, nurses, neurologists, anaesthesiologists, ventilators, thermometers, legal criteria for death, death certificate documentation, ice water poured into an ear. Each era has its own methods for enacting such diagnosis.
Thanatological uncertainty is hardly new, and has been especially prevalent at periods when new resuscitation technologies increased uncertainty about boundaries between life and death, notably 1740â1850 and the 1960s onwards. I will briefly review the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century context since it influenced the way these questions played out in the late twentieth century. In 1740, Leander Paget and Jacques-BĂŠnigne Winslow wrote a short book in Latin, The Uncertainty of the Signs of Death. Expanded by others and translated into many languages, this text spawned a vast literature of thanatological doubt.4 By 1850 books and articles on the difficulty of diagnosing death âcould be counted in the hundredsâ.5 Societies were founded dedicated to resuscitation, especially of the drowned, such as Englandâs Humane Society founded in 1773. Considered as assemblage, early resuscitations drew on human and nonhuman actants including blankets, massage, and sal volatile. Electricity joined the paraphernalia of resurrection in 1774, and in 1803 Aldini used electricity to make a hanged man twitch, later to influence Mary Shelleyâs Frankenstein (1818). By 1796 the London Society claimed over two thousand successful resuscitations.6 The Societyâs work increased uncertainty over deathâs finality, one of its Societyâs founders arguing in 1780 that only bodily decay was a reliable indicator and some physicians contending that even that could be confused with gangrene.7 When the physician Charles Kite listed signs of death in 1788, he added that âthese signs will not afford certain and unexceptionable criteria, by which we may distinguish between life and deathâ; likewise, Mathieu Orfilaâs influential work on poison lists many signs of death but concludes that âno one of the signs, taken singly (except decided putrefaction) is sufficient to ascertain, positively, that an individual is deadâ.8 By the end of the nineteenth century, physicians used a list of up to twenty possible signs of death.9 Checklists remain applicable in clinical diagnoses of death today, with some of the same challenges.
Fear of premature burial inspired creative measures such as escapable coffins and waiting mortuaries â âshelters of doubtful lifeâ â and as medical research and training make increasing use of dissection, fear also rose around unwitting vivisection.10 Uncertainties around death were exacerbated by popular awareness of other deathlike states, including those induced by trance, poison, or chloroform anaesthesia.11 Scientific innovations like the stethoscope and thermometer seemed to offer the possibility of simplifying death diagnosis, but instead added even further confusion by indicating that organs cease functioning at different times.12
At the same time as the corpse was brought under such scrutiny, death also became more hidden. Public-health reforms shifted to the margins of towns, and mourning conventions changed. There are risks in generalising about cultural attitudes towards death in particular eras, yet multiple commentators have identified a range in attitudes to death emerging at various moments from the late eighteenth century to the present, ranging from sentimentalising death in a cult of family through to seeing death in terms of prurience and taboo.13 Some critics have suggested that Gothic fiction offered ways to contemplate forms of mourning not socially acceptable at the time, as well as opportunities to muse over the corporeal mysteries of decay. With regard to the former, Dale Townshend speaks of early Gothic offering a socially acceptable expression of ânegated griefâ, mediated by descriptions of âmacabre realities of corporeal decomposition and religious insecurityâ, and Elisabeth Bronfen describes how, at times, art and literature could facilitate a kind of âdeath by proxyâ, an imaginative engagement with this visceral and final experience.14 Carol Davison argues that Gothic writing offers a ânecropoeticsâ, using âdeath-focused symbols and tropes such as spectrality and the concept of memento moriâ to express the complex relationship between the living and the dead, as well as the work of mourning.15 As the nineteenth century progressed, Gothic writing also increasingly imaginatively enacted the inquiry of professional medical discourse in deciphering death processes.16 By contrast with late eighteenth-century Gothic, nineteenth-century protagonists typically respond to the sight of a corpse less with horror than with either grief or quasi-scientific detachment: as Andrew Smith notes, in the late nineteenth century in particular, the dead body âeither elicits empathy or invites forms of scientific understandingâ, rather than terror or dread.17 In a range of ways, then, these fictions pose invitations to contemplate the affective and epistemological challenges posed by the dead.
Gothic fiction and scientific writing differ not only in formal characteristics but also in intended relationship to truth. Scientific writing is an âepistemic genreâ, in Gianna Pomataâs phrase, driven by the goal of âknowledge-makingâ (with the caveat that what counts as knowledge is historically variable).18 The nineteenth century saw professional pressure to move away from eighteenth-century sentimentality and Romantic language of emotional response, which had sometimes characterised elements of scientific writing previously.19 This distancing was informed not only by a need to meet the emerging epistemic virtue of objectivity but also by medicineâs claims on modernity, as Meegan Kennedy says, âdefin[ing] itself in opposition not only to disciplinary others but to its own disciplinary ancestryâ.20 However, traces of the sentimental or Romantic remained, particularly in contexts where physicians were emotionally moved.21 Nineteenth-century medical writing could invoke tenderness or fascinated horror, or emulate Gothicâs âinterest in the supernatural and the unexplainable and its narrative aim of arousing suspense, horror, and astonishmentâ.22 Cliniciansâ writing could also slide into emotional prose characteristic of Gothic fiction, such as James Bower Harrisonâs description of fatal haemorrhage in his book The Medical Aspects of...