Doctrine, Dynamic and Difference

To the Heart of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Differentiated Consensus on Justification

Pieter de Witte

• Publisher: T&T Clark
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9780567098504
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Théologie et religion
• Subtopic: Œcuménisme religieux et interconfessionnel

One of the most divisive issues in Western Christianity since the Reformation is the question of how humans are justified by God. In 1999, after many decades of ecumenical dialogue, Lutherans and Roman Catholics have declared that this issue of 'justification by faith' is no longer a cause of division between them. One of the fascinating features of this Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ) is that it expresses a 'differentiated consensus' on justification. The method of differentiated consensus is generally regarded as an important methodological step forward in the ecumenical dialogue. It has been used and referred to in ecumenical documents published after 1999. But what are its meaning and implications? This study attempts to clarify the method of differentiated consensus by (1) investigating the process of doctrinal rapprochement which led up to the JDDJ, (2) examining the way the consensus takes shape in the document itself, (3) analyzing arguments offered by critics and advocates of the official dialogue and (4) reflecting on the concept of doctrinal difference.

Chapter 1

The Joint Declaration on Justification and the Problem of Difference

I. Introduction

The consensus on justification by faith expressed in the JDDJ is a differentiated consensus. It is an agreement that is considered sufficient for overcoming the rejections and condemnations between Lutherans and Roman Catholics on the issue of justification. Still it does not imply doctrinal uniformity. The Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification remain different, and as different doctrinal ‘configurations’, they are said to be open to each other and to give expression to the same theological concerns.

Language, and more particularly the problem of translation, is a helpful model to understand the kind of doctrinal unity-in-difference that one finds in the JDDJ. If one translates the small conversation ‘Thank you’ – ‘You’re welcome’ into German or French, one may get rather divergent results like ‘Danke’ – ‘Gern geschehen’ and ‘Merci’ – ‘Je vous en prie’. Comparing word by word the English sentence ‘You’re welcome’ with its translations can lead to bewilderment. There is hardly a literal connection to the French and the German expressions. Only when one takes into account the whole system of grammar, vocabulary, syntax and linguistic practice of the respective languages, one perceives how similar attitudes of generosity and gratitude are expressed in the three languages. In other words, a fruitful encounter between people who speak different languages is only possible when they avoid making too rash literal comparisons between individual words or sentences. Instead they should take into account the differences between the linguistic systems in their entirety. Similarly, the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue attempts to overcome direct comparisons of individual doctrinal statements (which often seem to contradict one another) by showing how such statements reveal their truth only within the overall structures of Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching. Unity is uncovered only by taking difference into consideration.

The issue of doctrinal difference is fundamental for the dialogue between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. One of the questions that any reflection on the methodology of the JDDJ has to address is: How is a fundamental consensus on justification possible if there are differences that can equally be called ‘fundamental’? This question contains the concepts of ‘fundamental consensus’ (Grundkonsens) and ‘fundamental difference’ (Grunddifferenz), which seem to reflect previous stages in the reflection on ecumenical methodology.¹ The notion of differentiated consensus was coined precisely to overcome some of the ambiguities in these earlier concepts.² Yet, the idea of a differentiated consensus is realistic only to the extent that it takes into account all aspects of the issue doctrinal difference. In order to bring to light these aspects, it can be helpful to reconsider some older methodological discussions. In this chapter, the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ will be analysed in order to get a clearer view on what is at stake in the debates on the differentiated consensus.

II. The Absence of a Fundamental Difference in the JDDJ

In 8 paragraphs of the JDDJ, there is a shared affirmation that is each time solemnly introduced by the formula: ‘We confess together’.³ The first instance (§15) is a special case. I quote it here in full:

‘In faith we together hold the conviction that justification is the work of the triune God. The Father sent his Son into the world to save sinners. The foundation and presupposition of justification is the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. Justification thus means that Christ himself is our righteousness, in which we share through the Holy Spirit in accord with the will of the Father. Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.’

According to the commentary by the Strasbourg Institute for Ecumenical Research, this paragraph can be seen as offering two descriptions of justification: ‘[t]he first . . . from the perspective of the action of the triune God; the second from the perspective of the justified person’.⁴ Although the first perspective – which was absent in the first draft of the JDDJ⁵ – is absolutely crucial for a right understanding of justification, it is clear that the trinitarian-Christological character of justification was never the main focus of the dispute between Lutherans and Roman Catholics.⁶ The really controversial issue was rather the way God’s action in Jesus Christ means salvation for the believer or, in other words, the sense in which Christ can be said to be our righteousness. The confession-formula (‘Together we confess. . .’) of §15 introduces only this second part that concentrates on justification from the perspective of the believer and in which several disputed topics are mentioned: the role of faith, merit, the renewal of the heart and good works.

This ‘confession’, which is a slightly modified version of §14 of the earlier Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue statement All Under One Christ⁷ (1980), can be considered as one of the central statements of the JDDJ.⁸ It is a key phrase in the third part of the declaration, in which the ‘common understanding of justification’ is expressed. How does this statement relate to the other sentences in the JDDJ that are introduced as a joint confession?

The seven other ‘confessional’ paragraphs are all situated in the fourth part of the JDDJ, that is to say in the ‘explication’ (Ger.: Entfaltung) of the common understanding. In this part, the document focuses on seven traditionally divisive topics within the one theme of justification: ‘human powerlessness and sin in relation to justification’ (4.1., §§19-21), ‘justification as forgiveness of sins and making righteous’ (4.2., §§22-24), ‘justification by faith and through grace’ (4.3., §§25-27), ‘the justified as sinner’ (4.4., §§28-30), ‘law and gospel’ (4.5., §§31-33), ‘assurance of salvation’ (4.6., §§34-36) and ‘the good works of the justified’ (4.7., §§37-39). It is in these sections that the method of ‘differentiated consensus’ marks the text of the JDDJ in the most striking way. Each one of them starts with a common paragraph, in which a joint conviction is expressed in the form of a confession, followed by two paragraphs articulating the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic points of view. The differences between both perspectives are recognized as legitimate in the light of the agreement verbalized in the common paragraph.

One could describe the relationship between the joint confession in §15 (part 3) and the confessions in the paragraphs 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34 and 37 (part 4) in two ways. First, the confession in §15, and in fact the whole of paragraphs 15 to 17, can be seen as a basis for the rest of the document. The central idea in these paragraphs is that justification is the work of God. The addition of the theocentric first part of §15 has given more emphasis to this idea. It is on the basis of this joint recognition of justification as a work and an unmerited gift of God that the differences pointed out in part 4 become bearable. As André Birmelé puts it, the JDDJ shows that the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic approach ‘want to witness, in their difference, to the unique divine work on behalf of humankind’.⁹

At the same time, the ‘explication’ of the consensus and the explanations why the differences are no longer church-dividing in part 4 of the JDDJ cannot simply be deduced from the theocentric statement in part 3. The confession in §15 is too concise to fully express the common Lutheran-Roman Catholic understanding of the way Christ becomes our righteousness. Therefore, there is a sense in which the relationship may be reversed: the confessions in part 4 can be regarded as the basis of the confession in part 3. It is only in the further elaboration of the consensus that the ‘common understanding’ reaches its goal: to demonstrate that the existing doctrinal differences on justification need no longer be a cause of division. It is only because part 4 shows that the remaining differences do not call the consensus into question, that §15 remains valid as a joint confession that is more than a shallow generalizing statement.

Parts 3 and 4 of the JDDJ need each other. Their mutual dependence can be stated in terms of language and reference. The emphasis on justification as an act of God in part 3 relates the different Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrinal languages of salvation to their ultimate referent: the saving action of the Triune God. It is in this sense that part 3 is the basis of part 4. Conversely, the ‘common understanding of justification’ in part 3 is itself a linguistic utterance that remains somewhat broad and vague as long as it is not materialized by the reference in part 4 to concrete realities in the life of the believer such as good works, faith, sin and assurance of salvation. In this sense, part 3 is more of a theological summary of part 4.

The idea of a ‘differentiated consensus’, which is not mentioned in the document, but which nevertheless determines the very structure of part 4, implies that the ‘remaining differences of language, theological elabora-tion, and emphasis’ (§40) are essentially part of the consensus. It is notable, however, that the differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teaching on justification are only made explicit in the JDDJ on the level of the ‘unfolding’ of the common understanding in part 4 and not on the level of the ‘basis’ or ‘summary’ in part 3.¹⁰ There is, in other words, no attempt in the JDDJ to articulate the Lutheran and Roman Catholic approaches to justification by means of two differing theological principles or structures of thought that would account for all other differences.

Such an articulation of a difference between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran teachings on justification that brings all other differences concerning justification to a common denominator would have come close to the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ (Grunddifferenz) between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism.¹¹ Especially because of the centrality of the doctrine of justification in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, a recapitulation of all the differences on justification under one heading would have come close to a summary of all the differences between both teachings. One might ask why the drafters of the document have not attempted to add such an articulation of a ‘fundamental difference’ in part 3.

On a preliminary analysis, the answer to this question seems obvious. The very idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ is problematic in this context for at least three reasons. First, ‘fundamental difference’ is an ambiguous notion in ecumenism. On the one hand, it can be used as a hermeneutical key that may be helpful in understanding the interconnectedness of the many doctrinal, spiritual and practical differences that exist between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism.¹² A well-known example, which will be discussed extensively in the next chapter, is the way Otto Hermann Pesch characterizes the basic approach of the respective theological projects of Luther and Thomas Aquinas, namely as ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ theology.¹³ Although, strictly speaking, this distinction is limited to the analysis of the work of two particular theologians, it functions as a ‘fundamental difference’ in the hermeneutical sense of the word.¹⁴ Because of the authority both Luther and Aquinas enjoy within their respective traditions and because of the profound connection between their thinking and the spiritualities and ecclesial practices within these traditions, the characterizations ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ can be seen as interpretative concepts that illuminate a whole series of differences between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. It is in this hermeneutical (and heuristic) sense that advocates of the JDDJ, such as Harding Meyer and André Birmelé, understand the notion of fundamental difference and affirm its validity.¹⁵ They emphasize that every articulation of a fundamental difference remains a useful ‘conceptual construct’¹⁶ and that its purpose is merely descriptive. It is an aid in understanding the relationship between the churches and as such it is ‘ecumenically neutral’ and not an expression of a church-dividing divergence on the level of faith.¹⁷

On the other hand, some authors use the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ in a way that is not at all ‘ecumenically neutral’. According to them, it would point to a radical difference that creates an unbridgeable gap between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic faith. The idea of a fundamental difference is brought into play in order to demonstrate that certain ecumenical agreements present a superficial and merely verbal consensus. These agreements would disregard or repress the deeper truth of a more critical discord that shapes the disturbing background of all alleged poin...