Chapter 1
The Terrible Simplifiers: Common Origins of Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty in Economic Theory and the New â1848 Momentâ
ERIK S. REINERT
⌠soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests,
which are dangerous for good or evil.
John Maynard Keynes, closing words of
The General Theory (1936)
The United Nations recently announced that the number of chronically hungry people on the planet has exceeded the billion mark for the first time. It is extremely unlikely that any of them will ever hold a Swiss 1,000 franc banknote (worth more than 900 dollars), but if they did, they would see the portrait of a man who perceived the essence of the explanation as to why extreme poverty and extreme plenty coexist so naturally on this planet, and of the grim fate of the permanently starvingâSwiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818â1897). Burckhardt coined the term âthe terrible simplifiersâ to describe the demagogues whoâin his dark vision of what the 20th century would bringâwould play central roles in the future (Dru 2001: 230). Events amply fulfilled Burckhardtâs predictions of a cataclysmic 20th century, of the rule of terrible simplifiers, men who were Burckhardtâs colleagues at the University of Basel, Friedrich Nietzsche, called power-maniacs (Gewaltmenschen), and John Maynard Keynes referred to in 1936 as âmadmen in authorityâ.
A key common element in persistent world poverty and in the financial and (real) economic crisis is the âterrible simplificationââa theoretical overshooting into irrelevant abstractionsâthat has taken place in economic theory after World War II. As unlikely as it may initially sound, I shall endeavour to explain in this paper howâin spite of its apparent sophisticationâequilibrium economics became âmathematized demagogueryâ based on an extremely simplistic world view. Joseph Schumpeterâs solution to the late 19th century Methodenstreit (âbattle of methodsâ) of economics had pointed in a very different direction, arguing that the profession needed to have theories at different levels of abstraction. According to the problem posed and the question asked, one should be able to enter the edifice of economic theory at a level of abstraction where one was likely to find an answer (Schumpeter 1908). After World War II, economics experienced the opposite development: only very abstract theory survived. In this process, the main causes of uneven development as well as the cause of financial crises were assumed away from the theoretical edifice. The financial crisis appears to have created a turning point. The July 18, 2009 edition of The Economistânormally a weekly that strongly supports mainstream economic theoryâportrays the crisis in economic theory on its front cover with a book entitled âModern Economic Theoryâ experiencing a meltdown like an ice-cream abandoned on the beach on a hot summerâs day, with the subtitle: âWhere it went wrongâand how the crisis is changing itâ.
WHERE ECONOMICS WENT WRONG: ON ABSTRACTION VS. SIMPLIFICATION
All theories depend on abstractions. When we use the word âleafââlike leaves on a treeâwe are making a sweeping generalization by implicitly overlooking the enormous differences that exist among various types of leaves. However, opening the theoretical box labelled âleafâ, we find that botanical science has produced a very detailed classification system for leaves: sword-shaped (ensiformis), lance-shaped (lanceolata), ovate (ovata), elliptic (elliptica), cordate (cordata), oblanceolate (oblanceolata), etc. Most people eating black-berries would be satisfied with recognizing just one species (Rubus fruticosus), but in my country (Norway) alone, botanists distinguish among a large number of species, for which the main distinguishing factor is the shape of the leaves (Rubus plicatus, fissus, sulcatus, radula, etc.). The apparent simplification of using the word âleafâ is a justified abstraction, not a terrible simplification, becauseâin the spirit of Schumpeter (1908)âit is possible to arrive at a qualitative understanding of leaves through a taxonomy (a classification system) for leaves that exists on a multiplicity of levels, down to a level of detail that far exceeds most peopleâs needs.
In botany, opening the very abstract box called âleafâ, we find a very complete taxonomy at different levels of abstraction. If we pry open most of the theoretical abstractions in economics, we shall find that even these static boxes are empty. Economics hardly contains any taxonomies; in fact, the most salient feature of economics as a science is the âequality assumptionâ; the economic mainstream effectively assumes away all differences among human beings, among economic activities and among nations. One classic example of this is the concept of the ârepresentative firmâ, which equates the giant firm Microsoft with a twelve-year-old self-employed shoeshine boy in a Lima slum (Reinert 2007).
Assuming that qualitative differences do not existâas does mainstream economics in key areasâis a terrible simplification that has extremely serious consequences in terms of lost human welfare. We can only understand why medical doctors make more money than truck drivers if we are willing to observe the differences between the two professions. In parallel fashion, we can only understand the difference in wealth between the United States and Africa by qualitatively understanding the huge differences in the productive structures of the two areas.
The roots of this problem are already found in Adam Smithâs Wealth of Nations (1776), where the author bundled all manufacturing, all agriculture and all tradeâall human economic activityâinto one single category: labour hours. I have previously explained how Adam Smith is at his least convincing when he tries to prove to his readers that all economic activities are alike (Reinert 1999). Building on âlabour hoursâ as the only unit of accounting, David Ricardo (1817) constructed the labour theory of value that provided the origins of international trade theory that essentially conceived of world trade as the bartering of labour hours, void of any quality, among nations. Not even the fact that some economic activities obviously are able to absorb more capital or become more mechanized than others is accounted for.1
Economic theory is cyclical, and this paper argues that crises create turning points when theory is forced to move from a very high level of abstractionâfrom practical irrelevanceâto something more closely resembling reality, and therefore becomes more able to solve the problems facing us.
International trade theoryâs prediction of equalization of wages across countries is, in my view, the key terrible simplification that causes world hunger. Not only are all qualitative differences assumed away, the production process itself is also abstracted away. Assuming away unemployment, as the World Bank traditionally does in its models, only adds another dimension to the terrible simplification on which our world economic order is based. In many countries, 80 per cent of the potentially active population are unemployed or underemployed. Assuming that fact away is a terrible simplification.
Even very simple taxonomies may have strong explanatory power. If we divide human beings into just two different categories, men and women, we can explain procreation. Similarly, as Friedrich List (1841) observed, successful economic strategies have historically been based on the classifications found in King (1721), which have been the basis for all successful strategies of catching up. The core theoretical argument explaining this lies in an equally simple binary taxonomy found in a 1923 paper by US economist Frank Graham (see Appendix 1), arguing that a key point in the career of Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman was precisely the elimination of Grahamâs taxonomy.2
US historian Richard Goldthwaite shows the historical importance of the dichotomy between raw materials and manufacturing in a recent book: what is generally seen as Europeâs âcommercial revolutionâ, Goldthwaite argues, was in fact a process of import substitutionâmanufactured goods, that had previously been imported in the Levant, started to be produced in Europe from the 12th century onwards (Goldthwaite 2009, 6â8). I shall argue that this extremely important distinctionâbetween raw materials subject to diminishing returns, monoculture and perfect competition on the one hand, and manufactured goods subject to increasing returns and a large division of labour on the otherâwas lost in the post-WW II period. Only nations that continued their industrialization strategiesâlike India and China, starting from the late 1940sâhave been successful during the latest process of globalization. If India and China are removed from the sample, globalization is a shambles, even more so in terms of real wages than in terms of GDP per capita (because wages as a percentage of GDP have been reduced across the board).
Todayâs mainstream economics, I would argue, has lost not only a key feature of the Enlightenmentâmaking order by producing classification systems (taxonomies)âbut also the key feature of the Renaissance that preceded the Enlightenment: the immense creativity and innovations, in all aspects of human life, unleashed during that period. Economics lost what Nietzsche refers to as âcapital of will and spiritâ (Geist- und Willens-Kapital). Our qualitative understanding (âverstehenâ in German philosophy) was crowded out by a more mechanical form of understanding (see Drechsler 2004 for a discussion). ...