1
Lifework
A conversation is staged over three decades in the work of Alexandre KojĂšve, Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, Michel Foucault, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio Agamben, around these thinkersâ shared and often conflicting use of the term dĂ©sĆuvrement: literally âunworkingâ, but also âinoperabilityâ, âthe absence of workâ, and âthe absence of a workâ. Less frequently taken up in scholarship on work than the vocabulary of workâs three âclassicalâ interrogators, Karl Marx, Ămile Durkheim, and Max Weber, the termâs usefulness to the theory of work is in recognising not-working as something more than just a passive withdrawal of effort.1 Instead, not-working is conceptualised as an active, positive, even material quality, and â as we conceive it â one that is increasingly under threat in the lifework regime. As every Humanities undergraduate eventually finds out, Foucaultâs early book, the History of Madness (1961) argued that whereas previous periods in Europeâs history had thought there was some oblique and mystified wisdom in mental illness, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries subjected it to a âgreat confinementâ, applying for the first time a rigorous medical taxonomy â with attendant forced hospitalisations â to the mad. Yet the eraâs authorities were not strict about separating this newly medicalised idea of madness from the confinement of paupers, beggars, and sexual delinquents: all those, in short, it regarded as socially useless because of their inability to work. In this way, Foucault says, âmadness was seen through an ethical condemnation of idleness in the social immanence now grounded on a community of workâ.2
Historians of medicine sceptical of Foucaultâs remarkable association of madness and dĂ©sĆuvrement might well be right to question how âprominent in eighteenth-century discourse the couplings Foucault emphasizes between sanity and work, madness and slothâ really were.3 But to respond to Foucaultâs argument only on this empirical level of historical fact is to overlook part of the playful, philosophical, even literary logic of Foucaultâs own text. For what he later referred to as âa phrase I ventured rather blindly: âmadness, the absence of an oeuvreââ, imposes itself in Foucaultâs History not only as a historical claim about how madness was excluded from a âcommunity of workâ by a particular culture at a particular time. It also represents madness as oppositional to a work, in the sense meant when we refer to a âwork of artâ. Foucault writes of a tradition of modern artists of madness â Sade, Goya, Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, Artaud â whose creations represent âprecisely the absence of an oeuvre, the constantly repeated presence of that absence, the central void that is experienced and measured in its never-ending dimensionsâ.4 When Foucault described a particular historical deployment of the idea of work â of labour â in an earlier epochâs treatment of madness, he did so with one eye on the existence of such a literature, which with every sentence, seems to try to undo the possibility of its totalisation and elevation as âworkâ, a concluded, canonical achievement.
To identify something called dĂ©sĆuvrement hiding in literature is to claim that the problem with âgreat worksâ is precisely that they too readily get âput to workâ: get treated as useful, improving, educational, or otherwise as status symbols, reaffirming hierarchies. And yet they nonetheless contain a certain âmadâ counter-flow that seeks to undermine the process altogether. The re-echoing voice in Foucault here is that of his sometime friend, Blanchot. In The Space of Literature (1955), Blanchot had expanded on an idea established at least since the âart for artâs sakeâ movement of the late nineteenth century: the bohemian doctrine that art is opposed to work because radically useless, free from all utilitarian responsibility of being morally or socially productive. Blanchotâs upgraded version of this idea finds a rather gnomic parable in one of the important myths of the origin of art: that of Orpheus, doomed to sing forever of his love, Eurydice, whom he could have saved from the Underworld had he only resisted the temptation to turn back and check she was still walking behind him. In Blanchotâs retelling, Eurydice is art (the gender implications are not explored), âthe furthest art can reachâ, and is to be brought âback to the light of dayâ, given âform, shape, and realityâ, by the task of the journey from the Underworld it falls to Orpheus to guide, as the work of the artist.
But before Eurydice the work of art can emerge into the light, Orpheus fecklessly abandons his task, unable to resist the temptation to look back at her too soon. Far from regarding this as a moralistic warning, however, Blanchot goes as far as to interpret the failure of Orpheus the worker as, in itself, the entire âproper movementâ of art. True art refuses its own manifesting as âworkâ. In the analogy, Orpheus looks back not merely to Eurydice, still occluded in the night, but to âwhat night hides, the other nightâ: Orpheus shows himself an artist by wanting to see the unending dark, to see his own not-seeing as Eurydice turns away, and his subsequent fate, to sing an unending song of this dark, is in that sense the reward for his refusal of the work of the light of day.5 It is tempting to say that the turning away of Eurydice under the gaze of Orpheus anticipates art withdrawing from its onlooker the instant it is perceived. Art, in this way, is not merely opposed to, but is always breaking with its own status as âworkâ.
All this will seem a considerable distance from our discussions of low pay, precarity, and digital labour elsewhere in this book. As we show a little later in this chapter, it would take Nancyâs development of the idea of dĂ©sĆuvrement to reveal its full social application. But at its simplest, when we say that work is coming to characterise more and more parts of ours lives, what we mean is that it is this space of dĂ©sĆuvrement â that which is opposed to and undoes work â that is facing a greater and greater diminishment. So much so, that it is becoming increasingly difficult to make these thinkersâ imaginative leap to âsomething that is not workâ.
On not being a baker
In 1998, the sociologist Richard Sennett wrote of returning to a large bakery in Boston, whose workers he had first met and interviewed twenty-five years earlier. Previously, Sennett had observed a homogeneously Greek immigrant workforce, tied together by a combination of the local union and family. The bakers did not enjoy their work â it was often extremely arduous and the hours were antisocial â but it was also highly specialised and technically difficult to perform, and the ability to do it well was valued among them. Revisiting the bakery in the 1990s, Sennett found that the work of the Greek bakers was now carried out by a non-unionised and ethnically mixed group of âflexi-workersâ, operating extremely simple and user-friendly modern ovens. The dough no longer required muscle to pound, burning oneâs hands and arms while using the ovens was less likely, the different kinds of bread no longer required years of experience to be able to get right, and the old night shifts had been replaced with flexible part-time schedules, now filled by both women and men.6
As Sennett suggests, what is remarkable about the second group of workers is that it is impossible for them to think of themselves as bakers, or even as particularly or permanently attached to the baking industry. The characteristic actions of their work could just as well be performed in any number of other areas of the service sector. At the time of Sennettâs first visit in the early 1970s, it was becoming common to speak of a âknowledge economyâ to come, where cognitive skills would replace manual labour.7 Yet the second visit demonstrates how technological advances welcomed for making labour more âcognitiveâ in this way can also have the opposite effect: flattening out tasks that once required extremely specialised knowledge, and replacing them with work that could not be less edifying. âIn all forms of work, from sculpting to serving meals, people identify with tasks which challenge them, tasks which are difficultâ, Sennett concludes, âby a terrible paradox, when we diminish difficulty and resistance, we create the very conditions for uncritical and indifferent activity on the part of the usersâ.8
If â as this book argues â we are living through a generalised diminishing of dĂ©sĆuvrement â the becoming-work-like of things that werenât work before â then one of the ironies is that it is taking place precisely alongside the dismantling of labourâs conventional locus: the profession or career. In previous technological revolutions, while blue-collar labour was turned inside out, the middle-class professions retained their integrity, even cementing their position by representing themselves as the crucial overseers of new social realities. As a growing branch of scholarship claims, what is distinctive about the technological transformations of the turn of the twenty-first century is that the white-collar work of âprofessionalsâ, protected in previous eras, is now subject to a rapid automation of tasks, accompanied by precarity or deskilling for those who used to carry them out. In fact, as exponential developments in automation take place, it may be these kinds of white-collar workers who experience Sennettâs âtragedy of not being a bakerâ soonest.9
The examples of workâs new colonisations of various parts of life that we describe in this book are occurring, then, in the context of a kind of capitalism that constitutes an immediate threat to the existence of much of its traditionally hegemonic class: âthe bourgeoisieâ, in which cultural capital and economic capital (the right to determine what is best in the culture and the ownership of property) historically coincide. This class looks back at an immediate past in which its cultural identity has been abandoned, a present where its traditional social and professional privileges have eroded, and a future that has no need of it at all. To take these three âdeathsâ in turn: excepting some âprovincial cities of Europe, and perhaps ⊠certain regions of North Americaâ, the Marxist historian Perry Anderson has observed:
The bowler-hatted fathers of Wendy Darling and of Mary Poppinsâs charges provided both the shocked denouncers and the main audience for the century of avant-garde culture Anderson invokes, before negotiating their surrender to mass culture in the decades following the Second World War. âAs capitalism brought a relative well-being to the lives of large working masses in the Westâ, writes Franco Moretti of this post-war moment, âcommodities became the new principle of legitimation: consensus was built on things, not men â let alone principles. It was the dawn of today: capitalism triumphant, and bourgeois culture deadâ.11
This surrender of the bourgeoisieâs unique claim to âcultureâ preceded the dismantling of its mode of work: the trading of Andersonâs âamphitheatreâ of exclusive professional expertise for the âaquariumâ of continuously floating functions, tasks, and roles. As Richard and Daniel Susskind describe, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen technological challenge to the gatekeeping expertise of bourgeois professionals in health, education, divinity, law, journalism, management, tax and auditing, and architecture, democratising their knowledge, distributing their tasks across several less-elevated workers, and â in some cases â automating their roles altogether.12 If Sennett recognised the tragedy of not being a baker, it is also possible today to be, but not exactly be a teacher, a lecturer, a solicitor, or an architect either, as these professionals complain that more and more of what they used to do uniquely is crowded out by interchangeable bureaucratic tasks and âcustomer facingâ affective labour.
âEmployees are increasingly entreated to take on tasks that their occupation previously did not require â teachers are engaged in health promotion activities, university lec...