Identity, Culture, and Chinese Foreign Policy

THAAD and China’s South Korea Policy

Kangkyu Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9780367557782
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000261479
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book assesses the role of identity and Chinese face culture in Chinese foreign policy by analyzing China's political and economic retaliation against South Korea's deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system on its soil.

By examining the history and military action of China, Japan, and North and South Korea, the book argues that China's divergent responses were caused by different expectations according to whether states had a perceived identity as a friend or a rival. The author demonstrates that Chinese face culture shapes China's reaction to others through three dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. This book shows how identity and culture have worked in the relationship between China and neighboring countries through three case studies exploring North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006, South Korea's decision to allow the United States to deploy the THAAD around 2016, and Japan's decision to deploy two U.S. X-band radars in 2005 and 2014.

A timely analysis of the importance of identity and culture in international relations, the book will be of interest to scholars of Chinese foreign policy, Sino-South Korean relations, Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-Japanese relations, Korean Politics, Asian Politics, and International Relations.

1 Introduction

On February 19, 2020, while the world was caught in the thick of the novel coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) expelled three Wall Street Journal reporters – Josh Chin and Chao Deng, both U.S. nationals, and Philip Wen, an Australian – over a headline. Earlier in the same month, the newspaper had published an opinion piece that called China the “sick man of Asia” (Mead 2020; Stevenson 2020), which is interpreted by China as a reference to the crippled dragon during the country’s “century of humiliation.” Although it is true that the column blamed China for its failure to prevent the spread of the virus, some people were bewildered by the Chinese government’s overreaction to the headline. The explanation lies in the concept of face in Chinese culture that is characterized by the reluctance to lose face, which may ultimately result in retaliation.

China’s overreaction to losing face, however, is not just limited to journalists.

China’s international behavior has sometimes appeared contradictory to outside observers. And its rise to a great power has only compelled states to examine and understand how China thinks and behaves in the international arena. In particular, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), China’s closest neighbor, has been very concerned about China’s policy toward both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and South Korea, because it is one of the most important variables influencing security on the Korean Peninsula.¹ However, South Korean leaders have failed to develop a clear understanding of China’s behavior, despite almost 30 years of relations with China after diplomatic normalization in 1992.

When South Korean President Park Geun-hye took office in 2013, she began to pursue pro-Chinese policy, unlike her predecessor, President Lee Myung-bak, who was well known for his strong pro-American policy.² China welcomed the shift in policy and eulogized the relationship between the two states as the best period in history. The peak of this “best relationship” was President Park’s participation in China’s military parade on September 3, 2015, which was held to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the victory over imperial Japan. In this event, President Park was seated close to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the platform, as well as in the photo session. China clearly perceived South Korea as a close friend.³

However, this intimacy did not last long. One year later, China began to retaliate strongly against South Korea, economically and politically, in response to South Korean’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. China argued that the THAAD system, especially its X-band radar, gravely infringed on Chinese core national interests and posed a threat to its security: on February 7, 2016, South Korea and the United States announced talks aimed at “the earliest possible” deployment of THAAD, which is “a system designed to shoot down short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles using interceptor missiles, launchers, a radar, and a fire-control unit” (Swaine 2017, 1). After months of subsequent discussions, on July 8, Ryu Jae-seung (the South Korean deputy minister for National Defense Policy) and Thomas Vandal (the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army in South Korea) formally announced that the THAAD system would be deployed in South Korea (Choe 2016). In retaliation for the decision by the South Korean government to deploy THAAD, China immediately suspended all government-level exchanges with South Korea (Swaine 2017, 2). Along with an expression of outrage in the political sector, China also imposed economic sanctions in the private sector. In addition to the pullback of Chinese tourists, the South Korean company Lotte’s business in China took a hit, while sales of Korean restaurants in the Beijing area plunged by a third year-on-year and sales of Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia Motors fell by half (Tselichtchev 2017). Even though Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who was the top official responsible for the Chinese foreign policy, repeatedly assured that China would withdraw major retaliatory measures from South Korea in 2017 and 2018; still, by the end of 2018, no substantive actions were taken by China to reduce the economic pressure (Jo 2018).

Similarly, no one had expected China to cut off oil supply to the DPRK, its so-called best friend, in response to North Korean provocations in 2006: the launch of the Taepodong-2 missile and its first nuclear test. China harshly denounced North Korea for the nuclear test by using the term hanran (悍然), which means “flagrant” or “brazen.” This dramatic term is seldom used in diplomatic and official statements. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “the DPRK flagrantly conducted a nuclear test. The Chinese government is strongly opposed to this act” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2006b).

In contrast to the above cases, Japan’s deployment of the THAAD radars did not lead to any retaliation by China. In recent years, Japan has deployed two X-band radars in Shariki and Kyogamisaki. However, there was no attack by China when Japan announced its deployment of the Shariki radar in 2005 and activated it in 2006. When it came to the radar installation in Kyogamisaki, China simply expressed its concern: “Neighboring countries pushing forward the deployment of anti-missile systems in the Asia-Pacific and seeking unilateral security is not beneficial to strategic stability and mutual trust in the region” (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokespersons Archive 2014).⁴ The reason China gave for its fiercer retaliation against South Korea’s THAAD deployment was that the South Korean radar could monitor and detect China’s territory, including sensitive missile facilities. The truth, however, is that the radars in Japan have a longer detection range than those in South Korea, and theoretically, the former’s system could be a more serious threat to China. These incidents are typical examples of China’s complex behavior, which perhaps appears to outsiders as bewildering (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 China’s Puzzling Behavior at a Glance

Cases	South Korea Case	Japan Case
Relationship to China	Friend	Rival (or potential enemy)
Issue	Deployment of the THAAD system (esp. X-band radar)	Deployment of the X-band radar
Outcome	Excessive retaliation by China	No retaliation

Further, China often attacks other states on the grounds that it is protecting its core interests.⁵ When French President Sarkozy met with the 14th Dalai Lama in 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao removed France from the list of countries during his “journey of confidence” in 2009, and China canceled the contract to purchase 150 Airbus planes from France. Similarly, China canceled many investment plans in the United Kingdom when the latter treated the Dalai Lama as an honored guest in 2012.⁶ Also, China imposed a ban on the import of Norwegian salmon when Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010.

This chapter attempts to understand China’s unexpected retaliation against South Korea following the THAAD deployment; and in doing so it aims to open the discussion on China’s irregular behavior with other states in terms of its face culture. The underlying cause of retaliation is explained using two variables: China’s perception of South Korea’s identity (friend) and China’s face culture (losing face). For this purpose, it compares the three aforementioned cases: Japan’s THAAD radar deployment, South Korea’s THAAD system deployment, and North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The last two sections of this introductory chapter outline the aims and the general structure of the book.

Any insight from existing studies?

Scholars have undertaken numerous studies on the relations between China and North Korea; in contrast, the relationship between China and South Korea has not been widely examined. In particular, there are very few studies on this subject in Western International Relations (IR). The topic is mainly examined by some Korean and Chinese scholars, and focuses on Sino-South Korean relations or the dynamics among the two Koreas, China, and the United States (Zhao 2004c; Chung 2007; Snyder 2009; Lee 2010; Friedberg 2012; Jin and Jun 2012; Nathan and Scobell 2012; Harding 2013; Yu et al. 2016; Ye 2017). Even though such scholarships are very informative, and sometimes insightful, the problem is that they often lack a theoretical base and much focus is directed on great powers such as China and the United States, rather than the two Koreas.

As many scholars pay attention to the matter of identity in IR and foreign policy study, research that explores identity as a factor shaping China’s behavior has also been recently emerging (Rozman 2012; Shambaugh 2013; Boon 2018). South Korean China watchers have paid more attention to the relations between China’s identity and North Korean nuclear crises (Kim 2004; Lee 2013). Although they explain how China’s identity is formed or changed (i.e., how China perceives itself), and how that influences its behavior, they only address one side of identity (namely, the endogenous identity). This book approaches it from two sides, arguing that China’s perception (or definition) of the identity of others influences its foreign policy too. I contend that state identity and national interests are socially constructed (Wendt 1999). Therefore, other states’ identities, as perceived and understood by China, can be changed by social construction and can influence Chinese foreign policy.

Scholars who want to explain Chinese foreign policy through its culture often rely on Chinese views of exceptionalism, nationalism, and traditional values, or such ideologies as Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism (Lai 2012, 191). Similarly, although there are not many works that have taken note of Chinese face culture in foreign policy, some scholars do argue along these lines. For example, Huang and Bedford (2009), Nathan and Scobell (2012), and Ho (2016) all believe that the concept of face is uniquely influential in Chinese society, and important in explaining Chinese behaviors with other nations. In addition, Gries (2004) explains Chinese nationalism and its influence on foreign policy with reference to face culture. He believes face culture is a significant component of contemporary Chinese nationalism, in that it helps to explain the interplay of reason and passion that is essential to nationalism and the way in which Chinese national identity is reshaped by inte...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Identity and Chinese foreign policy
• 3 Chinese face culture and foreign policy
• 4 Case study: Japan’s THAAD radar deployment
• 5 Case study: South Korea’s THAAD system deployment
• 6 Case study: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 launch and the first nuclear test
• 7 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index