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1 Introduction
Conceptual conundrum and the approach of the book
Muhammad Shoaib Pervez
Radicalization, counter-radicalization, terrorism, countering violent extremism: these have been some of the buzz words in contemporary politics since 9/11. The rhetoric of globalization for peace has finally given way to dark forces of radicalization. This can be ascertained from the surge in far-left racial nationalism in Europe, religious fundamentalism in Asia, and the rhetoric of white supremacy in America. All this has a devastating impact on world peace today, resulting in a great increase in the suffering of common people, caught in the crossfire of these contrasting ideologies. At the epicenter of all this chaos and mayhem is the state of Pakistan, which, in her chequered history, has suffered greatly, first, by playing the role of a proxy state for the USA in the Cold War and, second, by becoming the closest ally of the USA in its war against terrorism in the post-9/11 era. The geostrategic location of Pakistan has played a pivotal role in global politics but at the popular level it has turned out to be a geostrategic curse for Pakistani society. The state is now facing its worst existential crisis in the wake of a faltering economy, bad governance, and growing indicators of societal radicalization. At an empirical level, or historically speaking, the seeds of radicalization were sown precisely at the time of the movement for an independent Pakistan.
The aim of the movement for an independent Pakistan was for a piece of land where Islam could be practiced; however, since independence only half-hearted efforts have been made in this regard. There is no implementation of any Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Islam was used instrumentally by the founding fathers of Pakistan to rally the Muslims of the subcontinent around the flag of an independent Pakistan. For the millions of common Muslims who emigrated to Pakistan on its birth in 1947, this was the promised land where they would be able to order their lives according to Islamic Shariah law. However, that did not transpire, especially after the early demise of the founding father, Jinnah, in 1948, barely a year after Pakistanâs independence. Interestingly, a majority of the Ulema were against the formation of Pakistan as an independent entity; however, once it became a reality, they unanimously demanded an Islamic form of government. The polarization of society began at an early stage: the religious elites, with lot of street power, were clamouring for an Islamic form of government while the liberal elites, with effective representation in parliament, resisted such changes and clung to the colonial state apparatus for governance. This was the common fate of the majority of post-colonial Muslim states who achieved independence in the 1950 and 1960s, remaining as they did, attached to the vestiges of the old, neo-colonial economic order. There is no new world out there for the majority of hapless people who dreamt of such a place after having thrown off the colonial yoke. This is the point at which radicalization in third-world Muslim societies such as Pakistan is born; there is a clash between the liberal-minded minority and the Islamic-minded majority clamoring for change by labeling their state elites stooges of the colonial masters of the past. Radicalization in Pakistan moved up a gear in the mid-1980s when the then President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Ziaul-Haq through his practices almost declared Pakistan a Sunni state, which started a decade-long feud between the Sunni majority and Shia minority. Furthermore, the Afghanistan imbroglio began in 1979 and Pakistan became the frontline proxy state of the United States for the defeat of communism. This continued until the death of Zia in a mysterious plane crash in 1988 (various conspiracy theories were hatched, including one that put the blame on the Shia pilot of the C130 aircraft carrying Zia and his top military brass).
As a result of the disparity between Pakistanâs foundational ontology and its epistemological practices, a dilemma exists in the minds of Pakistanis as to how to make a distinction between what they perceive as being their own national identity and the acquired identity of the Pakistan state. This confusion has a polarizing affect in society, resulting, on the one hand, in religious fundamentalism and, on the other, ultra-liberal fascism, with no possibility of a dialogue between the two camps. Due to this, terrorist movements such as Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose uncompromising aim was to enforce Sharia law by the use of firearms, were successful in 2008 of getting a foothold in settled areas of Pakistan such as Swat. At the same time, most of the people residing in urban areas considered religion of little relevance to their daily practices. The phenomenon of radicalization is born at this critical junction, as confusion leads to divergent practices which may become violent due to a radical mindset. The simmering tension between the opposing groups lead to violent clashes, such as the one witnessed in the anti-blasphemy movement of Tehreek-e-Labbaik party (TLP) prior to Pakistanâs 2018 general election. Even the statistics of the general election of 2018 are an eye-opener, as this far-right Islamist Party, TLP, was able to get the third-highest number of votes in the populous province of Punjab and was placed in overall fifth position nationally. The question is: How can we understand this polarization of Pakistani society which is leading to radicalization? There is a plethora of books and articles on radicalization in Pakistan, so how can this book add to an already burgeoning literature on this issue? The answer lies in its radically different critical approach.
This book is a critique of how the issues of radicalization in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, are conventionally understood both by policymakers and scholars. For example, in the recent edited volume titled Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approaches, (Dawoody et al. 2016) used the Western constructs of globalization, good governance, and Islamophobia to discuss issues of terrorism in the Middle East. There is nothing wrong in this approach but our emphasis is to apply indigenous constructs for first understanding radicalization and then to prescribe measures for counter-radicalization. It is akin to what Robert Cox describes as the difference between problem-solving and critical theory, with the former merely content to aim for minor alteration of the existing analytical framework while the later considers the existing analytical framework as part of a problem that must be replaced (Cox 1981). Similarly, on the policy side, a recent RAND study titled Deradicalizing Islamists Extremists, a fascinating account of counter-radicalization policies adopted by various countries, explains, using a rational methodological approach, how successful the deradicalization policies of these countries have been (Rand Report 2010). In our book, we have questioned the policies adopted by the state as well as by other actors involved in constructing knowledge through educational curricula in Pakistan. Our approach is evolutionary, with radicalization and counter-radicalization requiring a lengthy overhaul. There is no rationalist model of costâbenefit calculations at work, rather a âlogic of appropriatenessâ better explains Pakistani radicalization (Olsen and March 1989). This logic defines behavior through the binding force of hidden norms working as an institution to prescribe or proscribe behavior. Even the so-called ânew approaches to countering terrorismâ (El-Said 2015) are like old wine in new bottle as the various case studies remain bound to the historical context of what has gone wrong in various countries. For example, in the case study of Turkey scant discussion is made on how and why the polarization of Turkish society into pro-Kemalist and pro-Islamist has made every successive government a firm autocrat ready to quell any form of dissent.
An epistemological reorientation is needed to fully explain many facets of radicalization. This requires shifting the focus of understanding radicalization from an elite centric approach to a popular centric one. The current focus of almost all of debate about radicalization is based on carving out dichotomies of âUs versus Them,â the Muslims versus the Christians and Jews, East versus West, or haves versus have-nots, all constructed from the position of strength (elite perspective). These binaries have blurred the actual fault lines behind radicalization and have proven to be an easy scapegoat in order for powerful actors to solidify their own hegemonic practices. The societal level (people perspective) is missing in most of the scholarship on radicalization in Pakistan. The ontological basis of this book is a post-positivist framework, with reality being socially constructed. The main argument of this book, followed by all its contributors, is based on a presumption that the epistemological reorientation of radicalization requires interpolation by critically examining the practices of the powerful elites in order to deconstruct the motives behind their actions. Radicalization and its antidote, de-radicalization, are both evolutionary processes which are initiated by the authoritative actions of the powerful.
The process of radicalization in a country is generally understood as beginning with the phenomenon of smoldering tensions faced by the state from disgruntled elements as a reaction to its own policies. This is a state perspective of radicalization as the state is generally considered to be the harbinger of peace and prosperity for its citizens. So, any anomic activity inside the state is considered anti-state, legitimately allowed to be dealt with by coercive power of state. This traditional conceptualization of the state has been taken to task in the critical perspective of international relations, which work for the emancipation of people from all realms of oppression and where the state is sometimes also considered to be one of the forms of persecution. This book looks at radicalization in line with this critical perspective, which asks for a popular discourse on radicalization by questioning the established narratives, myths, policies, and practices of the state. A critical radical approach primarily questions the conventional wisdom of existing literature; it is, therefore, pertinent to first mention some of the assumptions of this conventional discourse on radicalization.
Radicalization literature gained momentum after 9/11 due to the shift in US policies of pre-empting terrorism with a specific focus on Muslim societies. Radicalization and Islam became synonymous terms, with a plethora of article and books written in the post-9/11 era defining Muslims as terrorists who are hell-bent upon crushing the dominant Western order. Radicalization is generally attributed to a reaction by discontented Muslims toward the actions of Western governments or toward those of their own governments. Remarkably, in almost all major global events, it is Muslims who are on the receiving end, so generally scholars have attributed their Islamic beliefs to a natural recourse of radicalization. The older version of terrorism has a political motive but in its newer and most virulent form, Islamic fundamentalist ideology is the sole impetus behind it (Walter Laqueur 1998)
Generally, radical tendencies are more rampant in Muslim societies as they have a clear belief system based on a worldview of life after death, and the bad governance of their respective states spurs on this mindset. The burden of radicalization is placed squarely on Muslim shoulders as generally they are the only ones ready to wear suicide vests in their quest to enter paradise.
Muslim ruling elites are inefficient and corrupt and have failed to curb radical tendencies in their societies; radicalization is measured solely as a threat to Western values and the rulers of these Islamic regimes constantly need the financial support of Western governments in order to survive politically. Interestingly, the elites of the Muslim states have also poignantly played a double game: they ask for Western financial support to curb radicalization in their societies and at the same time have also played the victim card to their masses by portraying themselves as helpless against Western aggrandizement. They thus perpetuate their own corrupt rule by using the rhetoric of a danger from the West that is hell-bent upon crushing Muslim states.
The discourse of radicalization is constrained by the donor agencies, which, most of the time, is the hegemonic state or a global financial agency who are involved in constructing recipient state security narratives through policy prescriptions. Most of the time, the policy prescriptions submitted by the epistemic community or intelligentsia are in line with the objectives of their donors.
At the popular level, it is considered that radicalization in Pakistan has only become a global problem because of the stateâs possession of nuclear weapons (weapons of mass destruction or WMDs). Had this not been the case, Pakistan would long have been another Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. It is the global fear that nuclear weapons should not get into the hands of radical elements in Pakistan that has led to the glut of research on radicalization in Pakistan.
Now let me briefly sketch out the critical assumptions of this book.
Radicalization in Pakistan is conceptualized as a phenomenon that has arisen due to the practices of elites being discordant with the aspirations of the people. Radicalization in this book has also been explained as a âthick signifierâ as it privileges dominant norms constructed for countering radicalization and suppresses all forms of dissent. This book has studied these dominant norms and values by arguing that these ways of imposing a worldview are creating more radicalization in Pakistan. It can also be termed an âempty signifier,â its meanings âtemporarily fixed, and continuously contested and rearticulated, in political settings determined by power strugglesâ (Isabel 2017). This explains that there is a deliberate empty space constructed around counter-radicalization policies in order to serve the vested interests of those in power. The large-scale funding of counter-radicalization by various governments of the world also demonstrates a fascinating trend, wherein most academics write tailor-made policy documents to facilitate governmentsâ practices aimed at counter-radicalization (Kundnani 2015: 17). This has resulted in a âsystematic failureâ of the understanding of âpolitical conflicts,â let alone calling for their prognosis or for the re-examination of the radicalization that emerges as a result of these conflicts (Kundnani 2015: 17).
Radicalization is a multifaceted phenomenon which needs not only introspection with a close focus on what is happening inside the state but also extrapolation of the global trends that are influencing the sociocultural makeup of society. A critical perspective on radicalization questions the conventional wisdom used to explain the underlying assumptions, presumptions, as well as the suggested prescriptions for eradicating radicalization (Kundnani 2015).
Radicalization as a phenomenon can be understood if we critically examine and challenge the constructed narrative of state security. Kundnani notes that radicalization âowe[s] more to the aims and objectives of the states that are the primary consumers of their literature, than to an objective study of the subjectâ (Kundnani 2015: 17). Radicalization is a slow process aimed at transforming, through indoctrination, the mindsets or beliefs of citizens who abide by the law into those of mobs who break it; hence, its prognosis through de-radicalization is also an evolutionary process whose steps involve not only isolating the root causes and treatment of the symptomatic causes of radicalization but also the allocation and mobilization of resources for redressing grievances and incorporating disgruntled elements into the mainstream of the body politic.
Radicalization in Pakistan has mostly been studied from the established positional framework of either a state perspective or a global one. In the state-guided discourse, the governmental sector has manipulated radicalization as a deterrent, in order to coerce people into accepting national security policies, with the risk of marginalizing all forms of dissent. Interestingly, the global discourse of the eradication of the menace of radicalization has also been framed in the same confrontational way, with convenient labeling of Pakistan as a radical state on account of its religious identity and the remedy being sought through the imposition of Western values via controlled educational curricula. A critical view of de-radicalization should bring to light the popular perceptions and apprehensions constructed by the majority of the population, not merely those constructed by the elite.
The literature on radicalization was demarcated by Kundnani into two branches: radicalization as a âtheological processâ and radicalization as a âpsychological processâ (Kundnani 2015: 22, 23). In the former variety, a radical individual is purely following their constructed religious belief, which orders them to privilege their own worldview over any prevalent ones and, if necessary, adopt violent means for the fulfillment of their agenda. In the latter, the radical tendencies are the offshoots of the âcultural-psychological predispositionsâ of an individual, which develop radical tendencies and a commitment to carry out terrorist activities (Kundnani 2015: 20). Here the psychological makeup of an individual, or the sociocultural environment, plays a dominant role in the radicalization process (Baker-Beall et al. 2015). Remarkably, it is the psychological explanation that is most often invok...
