Notes
CHAPTER 1
1. A particularly harsh criticism of the failure to predict the events of 9/11 can be found in Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001).
2. Magnus Ranstorp, āMapping Terrorism Studies After 9/11: An Academic Field of Old Problems and New Prospectsā, in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeron Gunning (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: Framing a New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 23. For a similar assessment of the field, see Magnus Ranstorp, Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions (London: Routledge, 2007).
3. Christina Hellmich, āCreating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadistsā, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 2, 2008, pp. 111ā25.
4. For a critical analysis, see Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
5. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 13.
6. For reviews and assessments of the field, see Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988); Ariel Merari, āAcademic Research and Government Policy on Terrorismā, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 3, no. 1, 1991, pp. 88ā102; Andrew Silke, Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (London: Routledge, 2004).
7. Silke, Research on Terrorism, p. 188.
8. Martha Crenshaw, āThe Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Centuryā, Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000, p. 405.
9. For a detailed comment āA Treatment for Radical on this phenomenon, see Juan Cole, Ignorance about Islamic Radicalismā, Chronicle of Higher Education, 3 March 2006, http://chronicle.com/article/A-Treatment-for-Radical/26858.
10. Ted Gurr, cited in Ranstorp, āMapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11ā, p. 20. For a more comprehensive account, see Ted Gurr, āEmpirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How It Might Be Improvedā, in R.O. Slater and M. Stohl (eds), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (New York: St. Martinās Press, 1988).
11. Ranstorp, āMapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11ā, p. 26.
12. Ibid., p. 27.
13. Tom Mills, cited in ibid., p. 27. See also David Miller and Tom Mills, āThe Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: The Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Mediaā, Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 3, December 2009, pp. 414ā43.
14. Muhammad Ally, cited in Ranstorp, āMapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11ā, p. 28.
15. Evan Kohlmann, āAl-Qaāidaās Yemeni Expatriate Faction in Pakistanā, CTC Sentinel, vol. 4, no. 1, January 2011, pp. 11ā15.
16. Ranstorp, āMapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11ā, pp. 28ā30.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. Martin Bright, āOn the Trail of Osama bin Ladinā, Observer, 11 May 2003, www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2003/may/11/society.politics.
19. The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
20. See, for example, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
21. Edna Reid, āEvolution of a Body of Knowledge: An Analysis of Terrorism Researchā, Information Processing and Management, vol. 33, no. 1, 1997, pp. 91ā106.
22. Miller and Mills, āThe Terror Experts and the Mainstream Mediaā, p. 414. While some defenders of traditional terrorism studies deny this characterization (see, for example, John Horgan and Michael Boyle, āA Case against Critical Terrorism Studiesā, Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 1, no. 1, 2008, pp. 51ā64), it is hard to draw any evidentially based alternative conclusion.
23. During the time of the French Revolution, for example, the Grand Jacobins of the Committee for Public Safety declared themselves āterroristsā and made āterrorā, which was perceived as a contingent necessity, part of daily affairs. Since then, the word āterrorismā, which originally qualified the exercise of state power, has come to signify exactly the contrary ā the use of violence in opposition to the state. Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 108ā10.
24. Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 79. For a more comprehensive reading of the liberal state, see social contractarians such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
25. Miller and Mills, āThe Terror Experts and the Mainstream Mediaā, p. 14.
26. James Der Derian, āThe Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States, and Systems of Global Political Violenceā, in James Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Theory (Routledge: London, 2009), p. 69.
27. It was not until 2005 that a collection of bin Ladinās most important statements made between 1994 and 2004 finally became available. While this collection, titled Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Ladin, edited and annotated by Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), provides one of the most useful insights into the rationale of al-Qaeda to date, it has been surprisingly underutilized. In part, this may be due to the assumption that the phenomenon of bin Ladinās global jihad is already sufficiently understood.
28. Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. xiii.
29. Audrey Cronin, āHow Al-Qaeda Endsā, presentation at the IV Jornadas Internacionales Sobre āLos Finales del Terrorismoā, Zaragoza, Spain, 10 November 2010. For a more detailed discussion, see āHow al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groupsā, International Security, vol. 31, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 7ā48.
30. For an excellent discussion of the global jihad and the practice of takfir, see Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadisā Path to Self-Des...