Population and Development

The Demographic Transition

Tim Dyson

• Publisher: Zed Books
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781848139138
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Emigration & Immigration
• Index: Social Sciences

The demographic transition and its related effects of population growth, fertility decline and ageing populations are fraught with controversy. When discussed in relation to the global south and the modern project of development, the questions and answers become more problematic. Population and Development offers an expert guide on the demographic transition, from its origins in Enlightenment Europe through to the rest of the world. Tim Dyson examines how, while the phenomenon continues to cause unsustainable population growth with serious economic and environmental implications, its processes have underlain previous periods of sustained economic growth, helped to liberate women from the domestic domain, and contributed greatly to the rise of modern democracy. This accessible yet scholarly analysis will enable any student or expert in development studies to understand complex and vital demographic theory.

PART ONE

Introduction

1 · Introduction

This book addresses the central role of the demographic transition in the creation of the modern world. It considers how the major processes involved in this transition have unfolded during the modern era. And it examines the immense – and often unrecognized – impact that these processes have had on many key aspects of life.

At the start of the twenty-first century, every country in the world is being affected by the demographic transition. Indeed, most countries are still experiencing it to varying degrees. The transition is a phenomenon that will continue to transform human society for many decades to come. So an appreciation of its major causal processes, and their principal societal effects, is important.

The demographic transition is a global phenomenon – one that, at its heart, involves the movement of all human populations from experiencing high death and birth rates to experiencing very much lower death and birth rates. Essentially, these are the processes of mortality decline and fertility decline respectively. As populations go through the transition, they always increase in size. That is, they experience a period of population growth due to natural increase. And they always undergo two fundamental changes in composition: they move from being predominantly rural to being predominantly urban (i.e. the process of urbanization); and they move from having young age structures to having old age structures (i.e. the process of population ageing). These are the five main processes of the transition.¹

These demographic processes are causally related to each other. As a result, they always occur in a similar order. In brief: mortality decline is the crucial initiating process – it causes population growth; in turn, population growth leads to stresses and strains in society which eventually bring about fertility decline; urbanization is in large part the result of mortality decline; and fertility decline is the main cause of population ageing.

These five processes usually unfold over very long periods. Indeed, even in its swiftest manifestations the movement of a society from having high death and birth rates to having low death and birth rates can take almost a century to occur. And because they involve changes in population composition, the processes of urbanization and population ageing are usually even slower. Therefore, viewed from the perspective of our own individual lives, the transition’s constituent processes happen very slowly. In fact, they may be so gradual that they go virtually unseen. This helps to explain why their wider effects are often missed by social scientists – in favour of more immediate, but often shallower, explanations.

Viewed in historical terms, however, the demographic transition is a phenomenon that has occurred – and is occurring – with remarkable speed. The changes involved are huge, and so are their societal effects. But to appreciate this it is necessary to stand back and examine how the processes unfold over the very long run. It is also important to realize that the transition’s processes affect other dimensions of life in remote (i.e. underlying) rather than in proximate ways. This is another reason why the transition’s influence in bringing about social, economic and political change is often neglected.

Notice that the logic of the argument put forward here is that provided mortality decline occurs in a population – i.e. provided the death rate falls from high to low levels – then all of the transition’s other major demographic processes will happen. That is, there will be a period of population growth, the birth rate will fall from high to low levels, urbanization will take place, and the population will become markedly older in its age composition (as the transition draws to a close). Of course, these statements are made other things equal. As we shall see, it is possible for ‘third factors’ to intervene and delay the occurrence of these basic causal relationships. As we will also see, however, experience suggests that the delaying influence of any such factors is usually limited – at least if things are viewed in relation to the very long run.

Naturally, the processes of the demographic transition do not happen in exactly the same way in every population. The phenomenon varies a lot in its details. The overall context – historical, geographical, institutional, socio-economic, political, cultural, etc. – is important in this connection. Clearly, we would not expect the experience of, say, Poland, to be identical to that of Chile, Egypt or Vietnam, for example. Therefore the transition’s main processes – including their timing and speed – are influenced greatly by the circumstances in which they unfold.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the demographic transition has occurred – and is occurring – in every kind of context. For example, it has happened in populations with widely varying cultures and religions. It has happened in societies with very different political systems. It has happened in rich countries, and it has happened in poor countries. There is no reason to believe that a major rise in per capita income is required for the constituent processes of the transition to unfold. Ultimately, the central demographic chain of cause and effect appears to be both reasonably self-contained and inexorable over the long run. Although most countries are still at some stage of the transition, there is every reason to think that we are dealing with processes that will eventually be completed everywhere. And the same may well be true of the transition’s principal societal effects.

Turning to these effects, the influence of the demographic transition on general development processes has often gone unnoticed. Yet the phenomenon provides a unique framework for studying many aspects of development, and in an integrated way. The falls in death rates and birth rates which in many ways define the phenomenon are a key part – indeed, arguably they are the most important part – of whatever is meant by the term ‘development’. Surely, no aspect of human progress is more precious than the banishment of death rates that are capricious and high – circumstances which mean that people’s very hold on life is full of great uncertainty. Moreover, the fall in fertility that is integral to the transition allows women, in particular, to be freed from lives that are otherwise usually dominated by childbearing, childcare and related concerns of the domestic domain.

Insofar as the influence of the demographic transition on general development processes has been considered, it has commonly been in relation to whether population growth has a positive or a negative effect on economic growth. While this is an important issue, it is also a relatively narrow one – in that it focuses on the aggregate economic effects of just one of the transition’s major processes (i.e. population growth). The consequences of urbanization and population ageing for development have also received some attention – although the transtion’s role in causing these processes is often unacknowledged.

This book, however, is written from the position that the effects of the demographic transition on general societal development have been, and are, both broad and profound. Taken together, the transition’s processes lead to a complete transformation in the nature of human society. For example, mortality decline means that people can think about the future with much greater confidence. Death becomes a relatively rare and distant event. The circumstances in which people live become increasingly stable, and in these new conditions it makes increasing sense to save and invest. The acquirement of formal education becomes increasingly important. The transition also brings about major changes in family institutions. It operates to make marriage both a more flexible and a weaker institution. Fertility decline allows women to lead lives that are much less constrained by household affairs – lives that gradually become more like those experienced by men.

The concentration of people in towns which arises from the demographic transition produces societies that are unprecedentedly varied, complex and mobile. The division of labour increases, and so does the extent of competitiveness. There are reasons to believe that the emergence of modern democratic institutions is related to urbanization and population ageing. Urbanization itself has been a key engine of economic development. And in many ways, and in many places, the transition’s constituent processes have had beneficial economic effects. That said, the influence of rapid population growth (i.e. growth at 2 per cent per year or more) for long periods on the economic welfare of people in poor developing countries appears to be decidedly negative. The book will also touch on the implications of the transition for the environment – and here the most important outcome is probably the increase in the size of the human population that has been caused by the world demographic transition.

It should be clear that matters of context are also important when considering the transition’s effects. And, again, other considerations – third factors – can intervene to complicate and delay what happens. Moreover, in accounting for fundamental changes in the nature of society it can be difficult to disentangle the influence of the transition from the influence of other major phenomena – such as modern economic growth. That said, the view taken here is that no other force has had greater consequences for development than has the demographic transition. And, with respect to several key dimensions of societal development, it will be argued that once the transition gets going then certain consequences are sure to follow – other things equal, and in the long run.

Conventional explanations of the transition emphasize the role of socio-economic processes – such as industrialization, economic growth, and more recently the spread of mass education – in bringing the transition about. These socio-economic processes have often accompanied those of the transition sufficiently closely to encourage the idea that they are its cause. Indeed, processes like industrialization and economic growth feature prominently in conventional versions of demographic transition theory.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the core ‘theory’ contained in this book is not of that kind. The explanation of the transition put forward here is overwhelmingly demographic in nature. And, to reiterate, it is largely self-contained. Thus, provided there is mortality decline then all of the remaining demographic processes will occur, eventually. Moreover, none of these processes – including mortality decline – is nowadays very dependent upon the occurrence of much economic growth.

The book has four parts. The first is introductory. The next chapter sketches the central argument regarding the role of the demographic transition in the creation of the modern world. And it is followed by a chapter that outlines the current state of the transition in the world. The second part of the book focuses on the major processes and causal dynamics of the transition. It shows that while the details of the phenomenon vary greatly, essentially we are dealing with something that is uniform. The book’s third part addresses the transition’s principal societal effects. For simplicity, these are dealt with under three broad heads – the social, the economic and the political. The book’s final part addresses some of the points that may be raised in relation to the argument, and it concludes with some remarks on the future.

One of demography’s strengths is that, for large populations and time horizons of just a few decades, it allows some relatively firm forecasts to be made. Thus the world’s population – which has already grown hugely as a result of the demographic transition – will grow quite a lot more in the coming decades. It will also become increasingly urban and increasingly old in its composition. To repeat, the transition is something that will continue to shape human society for a long time to come.

In general, and other things equal, the argument promises some good things as humanity proceeds through the demographic transition. But the phenomenon has its problematic side too – particularly as regards the unprecedented scale of population growth resulting from the transition. Moreover, in the future, especially with climate change, other things may not always be equal. With this as background, we turn to an outline of the argument.

2 · The demographic transition – origins, processes, effects

This chapter is concerned with the major causal processes of the demographic transition and their principal societal effects – social, economic and political. These processes and effects are considered in greater detail in later chapters. However, some of them are brought together here in order to provide a taste of the book’s central argument.

In many ways, what is proposed here is a partial theory of world development.¹ The argument is that a sizeable fraction of what we now regard as constituting ‘development’ has its origins in the processes of the demographic transition. This is not to say that all of the transition’s consequences are beneficial. Nor is it to deny that other phenomena have made major contributions to world development.

The chapter has three parts. The first considers the demographic transition and its processes. The second addresses the phenomenon’s principal societal effects. The third part discusses several qualifications to the central argument, and it concludes with a few remarks about the implications of the transition for the future.

The transition and its major processes

Figure 2.1 helps to illustrate the argument. It sketches some – though not all – of the relationships that will be examined here. The general direction of flow is from left to right. In broad terms, the figure addresses fundamental changes in the structure and nature of human society. Clearly, it is a highly simplified representation – for example, it is very selective, and it shows no feedback mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is helpful in presenting the case.

The nature of pre-transitional and post-transitional societies Figure 2.1 lists certain ‘start’ and ‘end’ conditions. These conditions relate to pre-transitional and post-transitional populations respectively. In many ways, what is revealed by comparing them is the difference between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ worlds.

Until quite recently in human history, all societies were subject to relatively high death rates and relatively high birth rates, i.e. high mortality and high fertility.² Average life expectancy at birth would usually fall somewhere between 20 and 40 years, and women might have an average of between 4 and 7 births each during the course of their reproductive lives (i.e. between about ages 15 and 50). All pre-transitional societies were young – meaning that a comparatively large proportion of the total population consisted of children and young people. Somewhere between 35 and 45 per cent of the population would usually be aged under 15 years. All such societies were predominantly rural in their composition. In other words, only a small proportion of the population – commonly less than 10 per cent – lived in anything resembling a town. As a result, when people moved – for example, to get married or find work – this would generally involve them moving from one rural location to another (i.e. migration was mainly rural to rural). In pre-transitional societies most people were engaged in farming, or work that was closely related to farming. It would be rare for more than 20 per cent of the labour force to be engaged in other forms of employment. In such circumstances, few people received much formal education. Most individuals led lives that were similar to those of their parents – usually involving farm work, domest...