1 White slavery and trafficking as political myth
I donât know anything about the so-called white slave trade, for the simple reason that no such thing exists ⊠it was left for the enlightened twentieth century to create the Great American Myth. âWhite slavery is abroad in our land! Our daughters are being trapped and violated and held prisoners and sold for fabulous sums (a flattering unction, this) and no woman is safe ⊠the belief in this myth has become a fixed delusion in the minds of many otherwise sane persons. â Madeleine, an early twentieth-century prostitute and madam (quoted in Connelly 1980: 132)
The parallels between the manipulation and misrepresentation of statistics in the campaigns against white slavery and in todayâs anti-trafficking campaigns are easy to draw. However, to see all white slavery campaigners, and, by analogy, all anti-trafficking campaigners, as deliberately exaggerating to achieve political goals is to impute an undeserved cynicism. With the exception of newspapers eager to increase circulation through sensationalism, or perhaps politicians ready to hop on a bandwagon for political gain, we cannot assume that most of these dedicated campaigners, then and now, were/are deliberately spreading falsehoods. While exaggeration may at times be a political strategy, the depth of commitment among todayâs campaigners and their historical counterparts attests to their belief in the existence of trafficking/white slavery on a vast scale. Why did so many people believe in white slavery? And if records of the time show so little evidence, how are we to account for white slaveryâs political potency?
Similar questions might be asked of todayâs trafficking narratives. In this chapter, I draw on some of the theoretical resources that may be useful to make sense of the phenomena of white slavery and trafficking. Drawing on the work of historians of the white slavery era, and particularly that of Grittner (1990), I suggest that the concept of myth offers a useful starting point for an analysis of trafficking. It can move us beyond an empirical focus to an examination of why and how certain groups in society, including feminists, are so invested in the myth. If, as Grittner argues, white slavery was a cultural myth with repressive consequences for women, especially prostitutes, and subaltern men, what are the implications of this for the current campaign against âtrafficking in womenâ? This chapter argues that an understanding of the ways in which myth is informed by ideology can help us understand not only the reasons for the appearance of the white slave in history, but also the reappearance of her mythical successor, the trafficking victim.
Myth and ideology
Current accounts of âtrafficking in womenâ vie with âwhite slaveryâ stories in their use of sensational descriptions and emotive language, though the âvictimsâ are no longer white, western European or American women, but women from the Third World or the former Eastern bloc.
Trafficking Cinderella features gut wrenching testimonies of broken dreams, withered illusions, rape and humiliation from six Eastern European girls sold as prostitutes throughout the world. This film was made on behalf of all these lost girls; confused by the crumbling post-communist reality they became an easy prey for pimps, procurers and sex-traffickers.1
Think of it. Youâre a young girl brought from Burma, you have been kidnapped or bought. Youâre terrified ⊠if you havenât already been raped along the way (or sometimes even if you have) youâre immediately brought to the âRoom of the Unveiling of the Virginâ. There you are raped continuously â until you can no longer pass for a virgin. Then you are put to work. (Mirkenson 1994: 1)
It is possible to see in these stories the reworking of several of the motifs identified in the Introduction: innocence; youth and virginity; deception and violence. Looking at Grittnerâs use of the notion of âcultural mythâ can begin to provide some first clues towards an explanation for the similarity in white slavery and trafficking narratives. According to Grittner, a myth does not simply imply something that is âfalseâ; rather, it is a collective belief that simplifies reality. Grittner explains his conception of myth as follows:
As an uncritically accepted collective belief, a myth can help explain the world and justify social institutions and actions ⊠When it is repeated in similar form from generation to generation, a myth discloses a moral content, carrying its own meaning, secreting its own values. The power of myth lies in the totality of explanation. Rough edges of experience can be rounded off. Looked at structurally, a cultural myth is a discourse, âa set of narrative formulas that acquire through specifiable historical action a significant ideological chargeâ. (Grittner 1990: 7, quoting Slotkin 1985)
In this conception, myth is seen as more than a simple distortion or misrepresentation of facts. Slotkinâs (1985) definition points to the ways in which myth is connected to ideology. This broad notion of myth â as a narrative or story which carries ideological overtones â moves us beyond a search for the simple factuality of white slavery and trafficking narratives. Floodâs 1996 study of political myth argues that an understanding of ideology is essential to understanding how myth functions in the political process.2 Flood defines political myth as âan ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social groupâ (1996: 44). Floodâs comprehensive review of theorists of political myth demonstrates the ways in which different conceptions of ideology in turn influence how theorists conceptualize myth. One of the most famous examples of this is Sorelâs idea of the syndicalist general strike as a utopian social myth which embodies in its totality the idea of socialism:
The question whether the general strike is a partial reality, or only a product of popular imagination, is of little importance. All that it is necessary to know is, whether the general strike contains everything that the Socialist doctrine expects of the revolutionary proletariat ⊠general strike ⊠is ⊠the myth in which Socialism is wholly comprised, i.e. a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society. (Sorel 1908 [1999]: 5, emphasis added)
Contemporary theorists of myth, as examined below, have retained these ideas of political myth as images or stories that are able to promote a collective response, the notion of myth as a reflection of how society should be. These theorists view myth as the expression of ideology. However, to define myth in terms of its relationship to ideology begs the question of what exactly âideologyâ is.
DO WE NEED IDEOLOGY?
The notion of ideology is anything but uncontested: Eagleton (1991) lists sixteen ways in which âideologyâ might be approached. Thus it comes as no surprise that distinctions between myth and ideology often blur in studies of political myth. For example, Tom Brassâs (2000) study of the âagrarian mythâ of peasant societies both equates myth with ideology â âthe agrarian myth is an essentialist ideologyâ (p. 11) â and argues that the agrarian myth âby itselfâ is powerless: only âdeployed as part of wider ideological struggle is it capable of exercising a political impactâ (p. 313). Eagleton states that the relationship between myth and ideology is not clear, and indeed, he himself is not clear, arguing both that the concept of myth is more and that it is less inclusive than ideology. For the purposes of this study, I wish to avoid an overly schematic and ahistorical search for âideal typesâ. The concept of ideology is important for the study of the myth of white slavery/trafficking for the light it can shed on important questions relating to the origin, validity, function and power of the myth, rather than as an abstract theoretical construct. I will thus leave fluid the boundaries between myth and ideology, as well as definitions of them. As Eagleton says:
the term âideologyâ has a whole range of useful meanings ⊠to try to compress this wealth of meaning into a single comprehensive definition would thus be unhelpful even if it were possible. The word âideologyâ, one might say, is a text, woven of a whole tissue of different conceptual strands ⊠it is probably more important to access what is valuable or can be discarded ⊠than to merge them forcibly into some Grand Global Theory. (1991: 1)
Nevertheless, it is helpful to review some of the most prevalent conceptions of ideology in order to determine just what is âvaluableâ and what can be âdiscardedâ for the purposes of this study.
Though the term âideologyâ is still very much in use in everyday speech, it has gone rather out of fashion in academia, replaced by the more capacious âdiscourseâ. Ideologyâs traditional concern with âtruthâ and distortion seems decidedly old-fashioned when faced with the body blow dealt to notions of ahistorical, transcendental âtruthâ by post-modernism. And if ideology is out of fashion, myth is the academic equivalent of love-beads and peace-sign necklaces. Myth was a central concept in the work of the standard-bearers of high structuralism, theorists such as Barthes and LĂ©vi-Strauss, but like âideologyâ was outshone by the âdiscourseâ and âdeconstructionâ of the hot young designers of post-structuralist haute couture.
Terry Eagleton, in his 1991 book Ideology: An Introduction, argues that the academic and progressive-left abandonment of âideologyâ for âdiscourseâ ended up throwing out the baby with the bathwater. For Eagleton, the diffuseness of power as diagnosed by Foucaultâs (1975 [1991]) âdisciplinary mechanismsâ leaves us with no centre to fix our analysis upon. This centre can be found, he suggests, in the notion of âideologyâ. This view is linked to his condemnation of what he views as the relativism of post-modernism. For Eagleton (2003), the notion of a superior, or even an âabsoluteâ truth is not an anathema but the cornerstone of ethical political and cultural life. Eagleton argues that focusing on âideologyâ can help bring questions of truth to the forefront, banishing the spectre of the post-modern scenario of a bunch of commensurate truths.
Ernesto Laclau (1997) looks for the âresurrectionâ of ideology in a different area. Rather than arguing against the post-modern attack on truth, Laclau pushes the post-modern case against ideology to the point that it collapses under its own inherent contradictions.3 At this point of collapse, ideology emerges transfigured (if marked by the resurrection). Thus we see that the lack of a centre identified by Eagleton as a reason to reclaim ideology from the morass of post-modern relativism is for Laclau the cornerstone upon which ideology is resurrected, âa starting point for a possible re-emergence of a notion of ideology which is not marred by the stumbling blocks of an essentialist theorisationâ (p. 300). Rather than distort an original truth, the function of ideology, according to Laclau, is in giving the illusion that this truth ever existed. Ideological distortion exists even in the absence of an original truth to distort.
Laclau achieves his resurrection with Althusser playing Lazarus. Dead and staying dead are Althusserâs notions of the strict separation between science and ideology. Alive again and rolling away the stone from the tomb are Althusserâs ideas about the indispensability of ideology, ideology as a ânecessary illusionâ, and in particular the idea of interpellation â of a necessary misrecognition in the constitution of the individual subject. Althusser, in his essay âIdeology and Ideological State Apparatusesâ (1971 [2001]), stated that: âIdeology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existenceâ (p. 109). This misrecognition takes place through âinterpellationâ, in which individuals are turned into ideological subjects.4 Laclau retains Althusserâs idea of ideology as a necessary illusion, but moves the grounds of illusion from the individual to the very idea of society itself. If for Althusser it is the subject that is interpellated through ideology, for Laclau it is society â the community as a whole.
Laclau turns Eagletonâs argument on its head: it is because there is no centre, no ultimate truth, that ideology is necessary. Ideology is thus also, of course, impossible, for no distortion can occur without something that is undistorted to begin with. This impossible âconstituent distortionâ of ideology is a necessary condition of society, making society the âimpossible and necessary objectâ. The dialectics between the antimonies of impossibility and necessity is the process of ideology.
Laclau gives the following example of how ideology works:
Let us suppose that at some point, in a Third World country, nationalisation of the basic industries is proposed as an economic panacea. Now this just a technical way of running the economy and if it remains so it will never become an ideology. How does the transformation into the latter take place? Only if the particularity of the economic measure starts incarnating something more and different from itself: for instance, the emancipation from foreign domination, the elimination of capitalist waste, the possibility of social justice for excluded population, etc. In sum: the possibility of constituting the community as a coherent whole. That impossible object â the fullness of the community â appears here as depending on a particular set of transformations at the economic level. This is the ideological effect strictu sensu: the belief that there is a particular social arrangement which can bring about the closure and transparency of the community. (1997: 303)
Ideology and trafficking
The value of Eagletonâs arguments for this study lies first of all in the refocusing on truth, on questions of epistemology. In the study of white slavery as myth, we return time and time again to the question of truth. The word âmythâ connotes falsehood, and this is how the myth of white slavery has largely been understood by historians. To deal with the questions regarding the falsehood of myth means that we also need to deal with its postulated opposite. As reviewed below, attempts to distinguish the truth about white slavery from the myth preoccupy historians. Similarly, research on trafficking today is dominated by empirical studies. The questions policy makers and NGOs want answered is how many women are being trafficked? From where? I hope to show that these questions cannot be answered by a straightforward review of empirical evidence; that the problem is not one of inadequate definitions or statistical shortcomings (as has most often been argued), but a matter of differing ideologies.
Second, ideology as theorized by Laclau inspires a focus on community and conflict. Ideology effectively captures the idea of political struggle, of winners and losers, of strategies and compromise, of power given and taken: it foregrounds conflict in a way that the rather bloodless âdiscourseâ does not.5 This is important for trafficking, as meanings about what trafficking is have been the site of major political conflicts between feminists, sex workers and states. Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on this political struggle, showing how different groups have wielded their ideologies in the international policy arena in the discussions around the 2000 Trafficking Protocol. Combined with Laclauâs (1990) own earlier theorizations about the role of myth in society, examined in Chapter 3, analysis of these discussions enables us to begin to answer the question of why the myth of trafficking is powerful again at this point in history.
Ideology, truth and power
These aspects of ideology â epistemology and political struggle â w...