Feuding and Warfare

Selected Works of Keith F. Otterbein

Keith F. Otterbein

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780367609405
• eBook ISBN: 9781000258936
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Originally published in 1994, the late Keith F. Otterbein's scholarship had followed an overall design since 1962, when he began conducting comparative studies of warfare using both ethnographic and cross-cultural methods. Through a conceptual framework derived from systems theory, he made signal contributions to our understanding of the role of warfare in human social evolution. He formulated a Fraternal Interest Group theory, utilizing it to explain not only feuding and warfare but also rape and capital punishment. Believing that armed combat is learned behaviour, he posed questions about its learning process that had yet to be answered. He acted as a major synthesizer of the growing literature on warfare and led attempts among anthropologists to apply their knowledge of war and peace to current events. This volume will serve both as a useful introduction to the anthropology of war and as a needed compendium of Professor Otterbein's ideas.

Chapter ONE

Why the Iroquois Won: An Analysis of Iroquois Military Tactics

Iroquois military success has been attributed to several factors. These include a strategic position between the western fur supply and the eastern market, a political organization superior to those of their neighbors, access to guns and ammunition, and high morale.¹ In recognizing the importance of these factors, scholars have overlooked the fact that the Iroquois achieved victory at critical times during the 17th century through the use of superior tactics. An explanation of why the Iroquois were a military success will be provided by analyzing their tactics in terms of three variables — weapons, armor, and mobility — which are commonly used by military analysts.

This paper was delivered at the American Anthropological Association meetings in San Francisco on November 22,1963.1 am indebted to Allen W. Trelease of Wells College for critically reading an earlier draft.

The approach used in this paper is based upon Tom Wintring-ham’s study of the evolution of European battle tactics from ancient to modern times.² The development of European military methods is characterized by alternating periods of armored and unarmored warfare. The shifts from one period to another were caused by changes in either the striking power of weapons, the protection of armor, or the mobility of the armies. When weapons became so powerful that they could penetrate armor, protection was abandoned and mobility became an important element. Until armament improved or tactics based on high mobility were devised, the side with the most effective weapons would be the victor. Eventually the pendulum would swing back when armor once again could efficiently stop the firepower of weapons. Wintringham’s analysis is useful in studying the military system of the Iroquois because it provides a means of determining which side had tactical superiority at a given time.

The Iroquois possessed superior weapons and tactics at various times in their intertribal conflicts, a point which has not been made by scholars of Iroquois warfare. In fact they take an opposing point of view. George T Hunt argues that they had little superiority in firearms.³ George S. Snyderman states that “in the formation of the war party, so in the war journey and encounter, the practices of the Iroquois were virtually identical with those of their neighbors.”⁴ Raymond Scheele also draws the same conclusions: “The instruments and weapons of war used by all the tribes were similar... Actual fighting tactics were the same for all the tribes”⁵ If attention is focused on differences in weapons and tactics at various points in time, it will be apparent that the Iroquois did have superiority during certain periods. The following analysis pertains primarily to the Mohawk, the easternmost Iroquois nation, because the sources for the early part of the 17th century deal mainly with this tribe.

Prior to 1609 the Mohawks and their enemies wore body armor, carried shields, and fought with bows and arrows. The opposing sides formed two lines in the open and discharged arrows at each other. Champlain put an end to these tactics when he introduced the matchlock to the Algonquins in 1609.⁶ For the next 25 years the Iroquois were at a great disadvantage because they possessed no firearms.⁷ The Algonquins, on the other hand, were reasonably well equipped with matchlocks. This gave them such confidence that they began to increase their attacks upon the Iroquois. In order to cope with the enemy, small war parties of Mohawks would pretend to retreat and thus draw the advancing Algonquins into ambushes.⁸ The dissected Allegheny Plateau and the Adirondack Mountains of upper New York State are ideally suited for hiding war parties and staging ambushes. Tactics consisted of rushing upon the enemy and engaging in hand-to-hand combat before the Algonquins could do much damage with their matchlocks and bows and arrows. In these attacks the Mohawks discarded their shields, but not their body armor; thrusting spears and war clubs replaced their bows and arrows.⁹ However, shields and bows were still carried on the march, but were not used in a charge. The enemy were probably still wearing body armor and would perhaps have chosen to fight in a battle line if possible. Although the Iroquois were on the defensive during this period, they were able to maintain control of their hunting area through what is today known as guerrilla warfare.¹⁰ Wiping out enemy raiding parties was undoubtedly a means of obtaining needed weapons.

By 1641 the Iroquois began to acquire muskets in limited quantity from the Dutch.¹¹ These arquebuses, flint guns with better firing mechanisms than the earlier matchlocks, were adopted to the existing tactics. In 1642 the Iroquois attacked a French fort at Quebec; their tactics consisted of charging up to the walk of the fort and firing through the loopholes.¹² In the open field the arquebuses were likewise used as assault or shock weapons. The Iroquois would charge the enemy battle line, fire their muskets at close range, and fall upon the fleeing enemy who had been dislodged from their position by the onslaught. By 1647 the Huron had developed tactics for coping with such an attack. The Huron warriors would form a crescent; just before the Iroquois would fire their guns, the Hurons would drop to the ground; after the Iroquois had discharged their weapons, they would rise, fire their own guns, and counter-charge the enemy.¹³ The more effective use, however, of the arquebuses by the Iroquois was in laying ambushes along the banks of rivers for canoe convoys laden with furs.¹⁴ Guns loaded with chain-shot could sink canoes whose crews consequently had little chance for defense and none for counter-attack.¹⁵ The captured furs were used to purchase more arquebuses. By 1649 the Iroquois were better armed than the Indians who were allies of the French.¹⁶

The extensive use of firearms resulted in the abandonment of body armor and the scattered deployment of warriors. Armor was useless against bullets; and if men were close together, one discharge of a musket loaded with several balls could kill more than one warrior. When the English took over New Netherlands in 1664, they supplied the Iroquois “with still more arms in order to prevent their defection to the French.”¹⁷ By 1666 Iroquois warriors went into action only wearing a loincloth and moccasins, for in this manner greater mobility could be achieved.¹⁸ Before the end of the 17th century, Iroquois fighting tactics had changed so much that they were no longer efficient in the use of tomahawks and clubs. Sole reliance was placed upon the sniper who fired from behind any conceivable cover. Their enemies, who were not as well armed, had to continue relying upon war clubs and in-fighting, which gave them some advantage in meadows and open fields, but left them greatly outclassed in the forests.¹⁹ The Iroquois battle line was extended as much as possible: “They separate themselves, as far as each can hear the other’s traveling signal.”²⁰ When the battle line advanced, each wing tried to envelop the enemy forces. In order to carry out such tactics, it was necessary to put as many armed men as possible into the field.

The Iroquois were able to put into the field more and larger “armies” than many of the neighboring tribes because they were well supplied with agricultural produce. The Montagnis and certain neighboring peoples depended entirely upon hunting. Other Algonquin groups had some agriculture.²¹ The Iroquois, however, were primarily an agricultural people. Each Iroquois warrior carried a bag of parched corn flour when he went on an expedition.²² “The agricultural people prepared food to take with them on battle forays, whereas the hunters did not.”²³ Not only were they well supplied when traveling in enemy territory, but when operating in Iroquoia they were able to draw upon the agricultural produce of any one of the Iroquois nations.²⁴ Another important factor in maintaining large bodies of warriors in the field was the practice of adopting prisoners into the tribe. Incorporation of captives replaced the casualties in the ranks of the Iroquois army and maintained its size at an average figure of 2,000 warriors for the 17th century.²⁵

In summary, an analysis of Iroquois tactics as compared with those of their enemies indicates three periods in time when the discrepancy between weapons and tactics gave an advantage to the Iroquois. The first period was in the early 1630s when the Mohawks were using armor and shock weapons in conjunction with guerrilla warfare, against archer...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Introduction to the Series
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• Chapter One Why the Iroquois Won: An Analysis of Iroquois Military Tactics
• Chapter Two Huron vs. Iroquois: A Case Study in Inter-Tribal Warfare
• Chapter Three The Evolution of Zulu Warfare
• Chapter Four The Evolution of War (Selections)
• Chapter Five Higi Armed Combat
• Chapter Six Cross-Cultural Studies of Armed Combat
• Chapter Seven A Cross-Cultural Study of Rape
• Chapter Eight Feuding — Dispute Resolution or Dispute Continuation?
• Chapter Nine Confrontation Theory: Capital Punishment in Tribes
• Chapter Ten The Anthropology of War
• Chapter Eleven Convergence in the Anthropological Study of Warfare
• Chapter Twelve The Dilemma of Disarming
• Chapter Thirteen A Unified Theory of Feuding and Warfare
• Index