Chapter 1
The Great Cranberry Scare and Ecocide
By November of 1962, when Gaylord Nelson won election to represent Wisconsin in the United States Senate, the phrase âenvironmental pollutionâ had entered the American vernacular. Three years earlier, with Americans glued to their new black-and-white televisions awaiting news on the Quiz Show scandal and baseball fans paid their respects to Claude âLeftyâ Williams implicated in fixing the 1919 World Series, a front-page headline grabbed the publicâs attention in The New York Times just days before Thanksgiving 1959. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur S. Flemming stepped to the dais warning at a press conference that food and drug agents had detected traces of aminotriazole in the cranberry crop harvested that year in Oregon and Washington state.
Aminotriazole, it was discovered, caused cancer in laboratory animals when exposed to it. With Thanksgiving just days away, housewives fretted on what they planned to serve on the menu for the big meal. This despite assurances from cranberry growers the contaminated Oregon fruit was safe. The first report appeared in The New York Times on November 9, 1959, and in Oregon just prior to that date. Any reference to the possibility of a chemical which caused cancer reverberated throughout American society as a whole. What caused the federal government to act was an obscure add-on to a federal law; traces of aminotriazole in food violated the Delaney amendment of the Food and Drug Act passed by Congress and signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt. The amendment declared no additive to be considered safe if it caused cancer in laboratory test animals or humans.
The publicâs reaction to a known carcinogen in the food supply can not be understated. Not since Orson Wellesâs Mercury Theatre radio broadcast of The War of the Worlds, had there been such a reaction from pundits and the American public. The great cranberry scare of 1959 given the popularity of the fruit near a traditional holiday grabbed Americanâs attention by the shirt collar and apron strings lifting the consciousness of a people to a higher level. Washington Post journalist Milton Viorst in The Nation examined the formidable obstacles facing the Food and Drug Administration in screening the food supply and protecting the public from chemical contamination in this case herbicides used by agriculture to eliminate noxious weeds. Viorst made the case the HEW director had no ulterior motive in warning the public and calling for an investigation. Instead he argued Flemming used his press conference to serve notice on cranberry producers who undoubtedly were guilty of excessive herbicide use, a potential health hazard.
Viorstâs article, more importantly, warned of how agribusiness use of chemicals had inconspicuously worked their way into Americaâs food supply affecting unsuspecting consumers. For his outspoken criticism, Viorst would eventually appear on President Richard M. Nixonâs enemies list. Nevertheless, at the dawn of the decade of the 1960s, Viorst drew public attention to a problem, âthe kind that kills or lays its victims low as dinner goes through the digestive processâŚthe kind that lies concealed in the diet and spreads its damages over a lifetime.â
Viorst went to great lengths to determine where to cast blame. With his thumb on the pulse of the Beltway and public opinion, he identified the cause of the problem. Consumer advocates in the United States Congress lobbied for FDA research funding: the Budget Bureau then ârefused to assign the funds to test new products in the chemical pipeline awaiting approval.â That and cranberry growers used the herbicide improperly applying it to control weed infestations before the harvest rather than after the fruitâs harvesting as proscribed by FDA regulations. Viorst called Flemmingâs announcement âenforcement by press conferenceâ in recalling the cranberries now on grocery store shelves. Viorst went even further. He called FDA. the âstepchildâ of the federal regulatory bureaucracy. Congress âassumed that agricultural products needed little policing, while manufactured drugs and foods were so uniform that sampling was good enough.â The reporter drew the obvious conclusion: âThis thinking established the âspot-checkâ tradition in FDA enforcement.â Complicating matters, the Congress and the Eisenhower administration cut the regulatory agencyâs funding. By the fall of 1959, three hundred FDA inspectors inspected four hundred thousand pill and food manufacturing facilities and at least two hundred thousand food growers nationwide. Viorst cited more evidence: only two inspectors covered an area stretching from Maryland to North Carolina. Their job made more difficult by the lack of adequate laboratories to test the cranberry samples they believed suspect.
Viorstâs warning did nothing to dissuade presidential candidates Vice President Richard Nixon and Massachusettsâs Senator John F. Kennedy from consuming cranberries on the campaign trail. Campaigning in Wisconsin Rapids, Nixon devoured four bowls of cranberry sauce at a single setting during a photo-op; Kennedy, in aristocratic style, sipped cranberry juice from a glass at a campaign fundraiser in Marshfield, Wisconsin, shadowing Nixon less than an hourâs drive from his opponentâs campaign stop. This despite Flemmingâs press conference warning the public to avoid eating the fruit until lab techs had tested samples to determine the fruitâs toxicity. Not surprisingly, the FDAâs dragnet in the process occurred on an unprecedented scale: Berries from Oregon, Washington state, Massachusetts, and New Jersey were also tested. All regional offices of the FDA bureaucracy reported their findings. Tests on cranberries took place in Atlanta, Georgia, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, and Los Angeles. All total testing occurred in at least seventeen regional offices around the country. And 3 percent of the time, the 1959 cranberry crop tested positive. A total of 325,800 pounds and had to be disposed of. That the sale of canned cranberries plummeted more than 60 percent and raw cranberries nearly 75 percent that fall, reflected the reaction of American consumers. And public opinion sided with Secretary Flemmingâs decision to pull cranberries from the shelf to be tested.
Letters on behalf of concerned citizens addressed to HEW, primarily housewives, ran overwhelmingly in favor of Flemmingâs decision by a margin of seven to one. The names and addresses of concerned letter writers were withheld from the public. Of the 295 letters the department received, the majority supported Flemmingâs decision, expressing gratitude that he had taken action to protect the public; only thirty-nine opposed it. Those supporting Flemmingâs decision wanted information on other contaminated foods consumers were exposed to. Typical was one health care professional who expressed their gratitude while trying to grasp the enormity of herbicide and chemical contamination in food. The letter read, âFar more important than the use of aminotriazole on cranberries is its use on other crops. We know it has been used on pasture lands, apple and pear orchards, in wheat fields and presumably many other fields. There are a lot of unanswered questions. Is it present in meat of the grazing animals? Is it on pears, apples? Doesnât the average consumer ingest a significantly higher amount of chemicals than anyone realizes?â Presidential candidates doing a taste tests for the news media to bolster public confidence during the 1960 presidential campaign did not have the intended effect. Fears persisted.
Half a world away in a country most Americans in 1959 had never heard of, the use of herbicides would take centerstage. Like something lifted from the plot of an Ian Fleming spy thriller, the Kennedy administration embarked on a counterinsurgency strategy using herbicides. With the exception of the Reclamation Bureau and Army Corps of Engineersâ dam construction in the United States, this was the greatest scheme to alter the natural environment in American history. The thought of herbicides contaminating the food supply was one thing. The thought that the American government with the blessings of the Pentagon putting herbicides to use to fight a Communist insurgency in Vietnam exposing American military personnel and unsuspecting Vietnamese civilians to the hazardous chemicals another. By the end of the decade, every American had been affected in some way by the Vietnam War and the use of defoliants was no longer a secret.
Agent Orange it was called. It had been developed in the laboratory at the University of Chicago by botanist E. J. Kraus and his assistants prior to Pearl Harbor. Kraus was convinced herbicides could be an effective aid to reduce and eradicate the dense jungles on Japanese occupied islands in the South Pacific. Though never used during World War II, Krausâs idea remained in the US military files and held sway in the Pentagon and with certain politicians seeking an advantage over the Japanese military during World War II. Kraus even provided insight into his work in theory in a position paper entitled âPlant Growth Regulators: Possible Uses.â Test trials of the chemical 2, 4-D, Agent Orange, by the military in the jungles of Panama and Malaysia proved to be an effective ...