Hannibal, Scipio and the Emergence of Rome

Adolf af Jochnick

• Publisher: Page Publishing, Inc.
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9781643349084
• eBook ISBN:
  9781643349077
• Topic: Art
• Subtopic: History of Art

This book relates Hannibal's campaign against the Roman Republic beginning in 218 BC in which he crossed the Alps with a big force including elephants. The book also covers Scipio Africanus's campaigns in Spain and North Africa and the ultimate confrontation between Carthage and Rome at Zama in 201 BC. There are also descriptions of the history and characteristics of Carthage and Rome and the reasons that Rome emerged as the dominant power in the Mediterranean.

V

BATTLES IN ITALY

1. Ticinus and Trebia
   On his return to Rome, Scipio reported to the Senate about the confrontation with Hannibal’s forces. With the approval of the Senate, a new army was recruited, consisting of Romans and men from allied states and cities. Called up with short notice, they were not well-trained, but most of them had had some military experience While convinced that Hannibal would never succeed in moving a significant force across the Alps to Italy, Scipio promptly moved north with his army.
   In late November 218 BC, Scipio’s troops confronted Hannibal immediately west of the River Ticinus, a northern tributary to the Po. Scipio’s forces advanced with the cavalry at the head. They met Hannibal’s Iberian heavy cavalry in a short intense battle. Hannibal’s Numidian horse circled around the battlefield, chased away the Roman light forces, and then attacked the Roman cavalry in the rear. Faced with new attacks, the Roman cavalry, barely able to withstand the Iberians, retreated any way they could. Scipio was severely injured and for a while unable to exercise command. (He was reportedly saved from the battlefield by his sixteen-year-old son, Scipio Africanus.) The defeated Roman army moved back across the Po River and established a camp west of the Trebia, another tributary to the Po. Hannibal followed across the Po and sought to engage Scipio’s army. Scipio, however, did not accept the challenge and instead moved his troops across the Trebia to higher grounds on the east side of the river. The failure of the Romans to face up to the Carthaginians served Hannibal well in his efforts to recruit warriors from the Celtic tribes. Even some Gauls enrolled with the Romans deserted and joined Hannibal.
   The consul, Sempronius Longue, in charge of forces in Sicily, had been ordered by the Senate to join Scipio. He moved his army to Northern Italy with surprising speed. In the middle of December, he met with Scipio in his camp. In their consultations, Scipio suggested that the Romans go in winter quarters and deal with Hannibal in the spring. Scipio felt such a delay in the fighting would allow time to train some of the inexperienced Roman troops and be frustrating for Hannibal. He needed action to keep his Gaelic allies satisfied.25 However, Sempronius, eager for glory, wanted to confront Hannibal immediately. This fitted well into Hannibal’s objectives.
   Hannibal had scouted the terrain in advance. There were fairly flat fields on the left side (west) of Trebia. Hannibal found a deep valley, a potentially suitable place to hide some troops. He used this area to create a trap, with a force of two thousand cavalry along with some infantry, commanded by his younger brother, Mago. They were hidden in the overgrown depression and positioned to attack the Romans in the rear as they emerged from the Trebia River. Hannibal’s army consisted of eighteen thousand heavy infantries (Iberian, African, and Celtic), ten thousand cavalry, and six thousand light infantries. It was slightly inferior to Sempronius’s force of sixteen thousand legionnaires, four thousand cavalry, and eighteen thousand allied troops.
   Through his spies, Hannibal knew of Sempronius’s impatient nature and need to see action. So once Hannibal had determined the right site for a battle, he sent his Numidian cavalry across the river to harass the Roman troops guarding Sempronius’s camp. Sempronius reacted promptly, as Hannibal had expected, and sent out reinforcements to the border but also alerted his main force. It was early morning in the middle of December. There was snow on the ground and below freezing temperatures. Hannibal had allowed his forces to eat and otherwise get well prepared before sending forth the Numidians. There were few bridges across the Trebia, but the river was fordable. Nonetheless, wading across in the cold water from Sempronius’s camp to get to Hannibal was an unpleasant experience for the Roman soldiers. Once across, Sempronius organized his forces with the legions in the center. The allied troops were positioned on either side of the center and the cavalry advanced furthest out on each flank.
   
   Battle of Trebia 1
   The legions moved at a steady pace against the Carthaginian center, which initially held firm. In the meantime, Hannibal’s cavalry attacked on each wing. They quickly drove the Roman cavalry back across the Trebia and then turned to attack the infantry. Once the Roman infantry had passed his position, Mago moved his mixed cavalry/ infantry forward, attacking the allied infantry from the rear.
   In this confused battle, only the legions held in their push forward against Hannibal’s center, the Celtic infantry. The Roman allies, attacked from both the front and the rear, offered little resistance and fled back toward the river. Most of them were killed or drowned. The legions eventually forced their way through the Celtic warriors, but seeing the allied forces defeated and the cavalry gone, the legions saw little reason to continue the fight.26 They retreated to Sempronius’s camp. Roman losses were close to twenty-five thousand compared to around five thousand in Hannibal’s army, mostly Celtic infantry.
   This big victory further added the flow of Gaelic warriors joining Hannibal’s army. He and his troops spent the winter 218–217 BC in Gaelic villages. Scipio and Sempronius moved farther east to the Roman stronghold, Placentia.
   
   Battle of Trebia 2
2. Lake Trasimene
   Despite the defeats at Ticinus and Trebia, the Romans were not inclined to explore negotiations. Instead, the Senate acted to improve the country’s military strength and reinforce the defeated armies. An additional seven legions were raised, a total of about thirty-five thousand soldiers. Two of the new legions were sent to reinforce the two defeated armies in the Po Valley. Two legions went to Sicily and one to Sardinia. Two stayed in Rome for the city’s defense. Two new consuls were elected for 217 BC, Servilius Geminus and Flaminius. Servilius took charge of the troops previously commanded by Scipio while Flaminius received Sempronius’s reinforced force.
   The defeats in the Po Valley had increased the Romans’ respect for Hannibal. They were determined to prevent any enemy move toward Rome. To threaten this city, Hannibal had to cross the Apennine Mountains. So Flaminius went to Arretium from where he thought he could control the major passages through the Apennines. In the Gaelic villages, Hannibal’s troops had been well taken care of with sufficient food for the men and feed for the animals. Most of the Gaelic tribes were happy with Hannibal’s performance, two victories and plenty of loot for tribal fighters. But there was a certain feeling that the Gauls had taken the brunt of the Roman attack at Trebia and had suffered most of the losses. This came to be a persistent problem in Hannibal’s campaigns in Italy. He was anxious to preserve his Iberian and African infantry, which could hardly be replaced. Hannibal continuously recruited local troops from Gaelic tribes and, later on, from groups located much closer to Rome. Hannibal was eager to move on south as soon as possible. Rome and the Roman allies in Central and Southern Italy were the principal objective of his campaign. He also realized that keeping his army in Gaelic territory for a long period caused relations with the Gauls to deteriorate. So when the weather improved, probably in early May, he commenced his march south.
   Hannibal had learned that Flaminius was blocking the Colline Pass, the major passage of the Apennines, so Hannibal chose the Porretta Pass, smaller and more difficult located farther west. Once through the mountains, the Carthaginian army had to cross the big marshes created by the Arno River, an arduous experience. It took three days and caused substantial losses among troops and animals.
   However, once through this test, the army entered Etruria (today’s Tuscany) among the best agricultural lands in Italy. Here, humans, as well as animals, could be fed and rested. The Etruscans were allied with Rome, so Hannibal caused more destruction than necessary to nearby villages and farms to demonstrate to the Etruscans that the Romans were not able to protect them. These actions also served to agitate Flaminius. Hannibal wanted to engage Flaminius’s army before it could join up with Servilius’s legions, who were moving south along the Adriatic coast. Flaminius’s advisers told him to wait for Servilius before getting involved with Hannibal, but Flaminius was impatient, eager for action. And he had some good strategic reasons. Hannibal’s move into the Etruscan plains had put his army closer to Rome than Flaminius’s troops were. Flaminius felt that he had to c...

Table of contents

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