Objectivity cannot be equated with mental blankness; rather, objectivity resides in recognizing your preferences and then subjecting them to especially harsh scrutiny β and also in a willingness to revise or abandon your theories when the tests fail (as they usually do).
(Stephen Jay Gould, The lying stones of Marrakech: Penultimate reflections in natural history, pp. 104β105)
TEN YEARS HAS ELAPSED since the last major advance in public policy theory. For it was in 1993 that two key books were published: Baumgartner and Jones' Agendas and Instability in American Politics and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Policy Change and Learning.[. . .] Both attracted a great deal of attention; they were complementary, and they set off research programs in the forms of detailed empirical research, edited collections of studies (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 2002), and extensive commentary in the rest of political science. Important work has emerged since, such as Jones's Politics and the Architecture of Choice (2001) and the collection of essays in Sabatier (1999), but nothing has changed the direction of thinking in the same way that the cluster of books and articles at the beginning of the 1990s did.
[. . .]
Theorizing about public policy
When considering about how to theorize about public policy, there are two things to bear in mind. One is the nature of theory in the social sciences; the other is the character of public policy. For empirical researchers, theory is a body or system of propositions about the causal relations that link together elements of the social, economic, and political worlds. These relations are regularized, having applicability over a range of cases, both in space and time. Theory in social science is usually based on claims about the nature of human action and power relationships, and seeks to provide a coherent and consistent account of reality. [. . .] Theories differ, of course, in their applicability; but they are linked by the aim to generalize, and in themselves they do not yield hypotheses. What theories do is to generate models, which are more restricted assumptions about social and political relationships from which hypotheses can then be derived and tested.
Researchers in the field of public policy want to understand why public decisions and their outcomes change, stay stable, vary from sector to sector, and differ in their consequences for the publics that consume and appraise them. It is a distinctive and problematic area of study, far more inclusive than others. [. . .] Public policy tends to include in its baseline all political activity and institutions βfrom voting, political cultures, parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, international agencies, local governments, and back again, to the citizens who implement and evaluate public policies. In addition, decision making varies vastly from sector to sector, a claim that is the core contribution of public policy studies to political science knowledge, but which complicates the task at hand. The problem is compounded by the absence of a clear chain of causation from public opinion to parties and bureaucracies and back again. As many writers on public policy have lamented (cf. Sabatier, 1999), there can be no "stages" model of the political process to provide a simple map because of the multiple sources of causation, feedback, and the sheer complexity of what is going on. [. . .] Coming up with theory that creates some simplicity or parsimony and that takes account of complexity is quite a challenge. The move to simplicity may simply impose a tautology or overextend a set of plausible and partial models of political action to the whole of the policy process. [. . .]
Importing theory from mainstream political science
One answer to the search for theory is to take ready-made ones already in use in political science, as they often have a policy dimension. The problem is that such theory may not be well adapted to the many faceted character of the policy process; moreover, many of these theories have difficulties of their own.
Institutionalism: old and "new"
The best candidate for such an approach is institutionalism. This is the idea that formal structures and embedded norms have an effect on human action. [. . .] In part, institutions are formal arrangements, such as electoral systems, the division of powers, and the salience of the higher courts; but there are also the practices embedded in formal organizational arrangements, which are sometimes called standard operating procedures. The former sense is better for empirical testing, and comes out with the hardly startling finding that institutions matter for policy outputs and outcomes (Lane & Ersson, 1999). Unless institutions are entirely circumvented by networks and power relations, they generally affect how policy is made as they influence the speed at which political systems attend to public problems, the efficiency with which they aggregate public preferences, and the way in which policies attract rent seekers and principals seek to control their agents (Strom, Milller, & Bergman, 2003). Given that institutions constrain public action and affect the costs and benefits of political participation, such an effect is to be expected. But does institutionalism explain policy change? In part, it does, but institutionalists find it harder to explain bursts of change, such as improvements in policy performance or the imminence of policy disasters, which are some of the crucial issues. Institutions can account for change when they adapt, especially in relation to one set of interests and policy concerns. [. . .] Institutional reform can also promote change, say, between levels of government. Moreover, it is possible that institutions themselves adapt. They may evolve according to their own rules, and so affect the choices of policymakers. In spite of these nuances, it is not certain that institutional approaches offer an all-encompassing theory of policy change, mainly because institutions are better at explaining the dampening rather than the amplifying of political processes. They are generally stable, which means they set out routines and constrain human action.
Socioeconomic change
Socioeconomic changes must play their role in explaining policy change in the form of shocks and influences on the political system. A lot of academic energy was spent on the socioeconomic causes of policy change before the 1980s, but then doubts about macro schemes of politics set in and systems theorists of all sorts fell out of fashion. It is possibly the case that the intellectual reaction against systems theory and functionalism has gone too far, and social science should start examining complex systems again, perhaps through the idea of coevolving social processes. But social scientists do not now accept the basic assumption that there is a transmission belt from society and the economy to the political system and its institutions, as the latter influences the former, and botli are highly variegated. [. . .]
Rational choice theory
Rational choice theory examines policy change, v...