Concepts and Case Studies in Threat Management

Frederick S. Calhoun, Stephen W. Weston J.D.

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781466578487
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Computer Science
• Subtopic: Cyber Security
• Index: Computer Science

Professionalization has come to the field of threat management. It has developed a systematic theory unique to the field, recognized authorities have emerged, and it is finding its own ethical code of conduct. It is also beginning to grow its own culture, complete with a vocabulary of its own. Although the field has a way to go, it is well along th

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New Concepts Emerging From the Professionalization of Threat Management

Professionalization has come to the field of threat management. It has developed a systematic theory unique to the field. Recognized authorities have emerged. The community has sanctioned its legitimacy as a profession and it is finding its own ethical code of conduct. Threat management is beginning to grow its own culture, complete with a vocabulary of its own. As is common to all other professions, threat management now offers training for the uninitiated.¹ Although the field yet has a way to go, it is well along the path to becoming a profession.

One product of this ongoing professionalization is the discovery of certain key concepts that, until now, have not been identified or defined. In the following pages, we identify several of those concepts, define them, and then illustrate them with real-life case studies. For example, one concept that has emerged is the recognition that assessing a potential threat situation requires knowing certain information inherent in the situation. This information, which we call the need-to-knows, gives a measure for each assessment and informs future fact finding. Identifying what is known leads to the threat assessment, while recognizing what is unknown guides the fact finding. Internalizing the need-to-knows allows the threat management team to make sound threat assessments and to gauge how informed each threat assessment is by comparing what is known about a particular situation against the complete set of need-to-knows.

The concept of case dynamics posits that the interaction between the subject, the target, and the threat manager is constantly changing. Actions the subject takes cause reactions by the target and the threat manager. The reverse also holds. Actions the threat manager takes—or does not take—cause a reaction by the subject. Applying a threat management strategy changes the chemistry of the relationships. Proper threat management requires understanding the dynamics and the synergism and using that understanding to inform how the situation is handled.

Understanding the power of inhibitors, including the influence of missing inhibitors or recently lost inhibitors, must inform the choice of the most appropriate threat management strategies. Assessing what the subject has to lose by using violence can give great insight into the subject’s intent, motive, and ability. Conversely, discovering which inhibitors are lacking or, worse yet, which inhibitors the subject may have recently lost can signal how imminent the violence may be. Individuals who believe that they have nothing left to lose are more likely to resort to violence compared to individuals who perceive that they have value in their lives.

Recognizing the differences among the different venues of violence helps pinpoint the subject’s possible motive, evaluate the innate security of that venue, and assess the nature of the relationships within that particular venue. Those factors help determine the potential for violence targeting that venue. While the subject always has to traverse the path to intended violence, regardless of venue, the differences inherent in the various venues profoundly affect the subject’s motives. Domestic violence differs from public figure violence—not in the process of violence, but rather in the subject’s motive and goal. Workplace violence has its own unique attributes, as does violence toward gathering places and violence toward representative targets. Exploring those differences gives a whole new perspective to the nature of violence.

Certain of these concepts have a negative effect. Threat managers must avoid building information silos caused by not sharing information with other agencies, organizations, and involved individuals. Similarly, threat managers must also refrain from bunkering down in their own organization or agency, seeing only their problems rather than understanding that potentially violent subjects may target other agencies, organizations, involved individuals, or society at large. Solving the threat manager’s organization’s problem with the individual may risk transferring the problem somewhere else.

Instead, the threat manager should see beyond his or her own organization and work with other involved entities to ensure that the problem is resolved all around. Finally, falling into the temptation of holding fast to myopic management strategies is shortsighted. Applying threat management strategies has to be seen within the overall context of the situation and the changes and synergy that inevitably occur. Applying a strategy and failing to assess its effectiveness continuously risks making the situation worse. The only way to avoid silos, bunkers, and myopic management strategies is to be aware of their existence and their dangers.

Concepts and Case Studies in Contemporary Threat Management analyzes these concepts in detail. It also illustrates each point with realistic case studies and real-life examples. The book explores in depth the current state of the threat management process. It aims to enhance the profession’s understanding of that process. Readers of this book will come away from it with a fuller understanding of the concepts undergirding the profession. Enhancing that understanding will improve our approach to the challenge of identifying, assessing, and managing individuals who pose a risk of violence.

Finally, we append a first attempt at compiling a glossary of terms used in the emerging profession of threat management. The glossary is a joint effort between us and researchers at the University of Nebraska’s Public Policy Center. We do not claim this glossary to be exhaustive or definitive. It is, instead, a first stab at identifying and defining a set of terms common to the profession. By compiling this new vocabulary, we hope to move the professionalization of threat management a bit farther down the road. It is a start, at least.

Presenting a Practical Approach to Threat Management

Our previous books on contemporary threat management addressed different aspects of the threat management process. In those books, we detailed our view of the most appropriate methods for identifying, assessing, and managing potentially violent situations; defined the paths to impromptu and intended violence; and drew a sharp distinction between hunters, who intend to commit violence, and howlers, who seek only to frighten or connect emotionally with their target. The books first hypothesized about the intimacy effect and then confirmed its validity. We looked at the findings of the research and explored how that research could be applied in practical ways to real-life situations. With each book, we strove hard to provide very practical strategies and tactics for implementing our approach. We tried to present these strategies and tactics in such a way that they could be readily understood, easily remembered, and immediately implemented.

We also illustrated each point and concept with actual, realistic case studies. Some were drawn from today’s headlines, some were based on our own case experiences in running threat management programs, and some were derived from the experiences of other threat assessment professionals. These carefully chosen examples helped substantiate the point under consideration by showing how that point actually applied in real-life situations. The illustrations also animated the concept. They took the point beyond dry definitions to vibrant example. If nothing else, the case studies helped prove that what we offered was not some pie-in-the-sky intellectualizations, but, rather, a pragmatic, workable approach.

Our aim has always been to arm threat managers with realistic ideas and approaches that they could keep fresh in their minds and immediately implement in their day-to-day work. We also framed our discussions in such a way that they did not require an advanced degree in psychology or criminology to understand or put into practice. Indeed, we went to great lengths to provide sensible, straightforward advice. We shunned jargon and obtuse language in favor of simplification—a kind of blue-collar approach to the challenge of identifying, assessing, and managing potentially violent individuals.

Fortunately, each of the books was well received. That positive reception, we believe, resulted directly from the practical approaches we took and the myriad case study illustrations we presented. The approaches provided reality; the case studies brought our points to life. Concepts and Case Studies in Threat Management plays, again, to those strengths. We offer here a set of useful concepts, each illustrated with case studies to show how the concept applies within the reality of the contemporary threat management process. Each is framed and exemplified as practically and realistically as possible.

Scope of the Book

This book goes beyond our previous works by introducing various concepts that directly impinge—for well or ill—on the threat management process. Some of these concepts, such as the effects of case dynamics and the impact of intervention synergy, are as often detrimental to the process as they are beneficial. Yet, the threat manager or, better yet, the threat management team, needs to be aware of the existence of these effects and impacts. Such awareness offers the only viable way of channeling the effect or impact toward an enhanced response. Ignoring them is always at the threat manager’s peril.

Other concepts come more under the control of the threat manager or management team. Keeping in mind that the importance of proportionate responses and flexible strategies resides well within the control of the threat manager. They represent crucial concepts in controlling the only thing the threat manager absolutely controls: his or her response to the developing situation. As Gavin de Becker wisely pointed out some years ago, anything the threat manager does or does not do might

• make the situation better
• make the situation worse
• have no effect on the situation

Keeping the response proportionate to the subject’s behavior and being ever mindful of the need for flexibility in applying any of the threat management strategies help the threat manager gauge whether or not the situation is better, worse, or unchanged. Obviously, if things grow worse or remain unimproved, the threat manager needs to consider applying a different strategy or combination of strategies. Threat management is a dynamic process of assessing, responding, reassessing, and revising the response.

Not only is the protective response necessary for ensuring target security, but it is also a crucial step in managing the target’s response to what often is a frightening or disturbing situation. One of the certainties of contemporary threat management is that if a target is not offered a protective response, he or she will surely develop one. Doing so can put the target at odds with the threat management response. It also takes control of the response away from the threat manager or threat management team.

The protective response, then, becomes personal rather than objective and, possibly, inflated rather than proportionate to the actual situation Protective responses can also be minimized by the target or ignored altogether due to fiscal, organizational, political, media image, convenience, or personal issues. These considerations have little chance of improving the situation. Therefore, taking the response away from the target helps advance the overall response.

Some of the concepts, such as the effect of inhibitors on the subject’s personal life and the impact of the intimacy effect, are profound influences, again for well or ill, on the outcome of the situation. Every individual has in his or her life certain influences that hold the balance between taking violent action or not resorting to violence. We call these influences inhibitors. They are such things as family ties, financial resources, holding down a good job, religious beliefs, mental and physical health, comfortable living arrangements, self-worth, and dignity. When inhibitors are strongly in place, most people are inclined not to do anything that would put them at risk. But when inhibitors start to fall—and when they do, it is usually like dominoes toppling—then individuals become at greater risk of turning to violence as a way to solve their problems.

Consequently, threat managers need to find out what inhibitors are in the subject’s life and how those or other inhibitors can be put in place and strengthened. Thus, knowing about inhibitors is crucial to any threat assessment, while manipulating or taking care not to disrupt the subject’s inhibitors is an effective tactic for defusing the risk of violence.

Inhibitors can be overruled by the intimacy effect. In our previous book, Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: Identifying Howlers and Hunters, we appended a research paper written by Debra M. Jenkins that validated our hypothesis that the more interpersonal or intimate the relationship between subject and target is, the greater is the value of threats as pre-incident indicators of future violence. Here, we take that effect and show how the threat manager must always address it when conducting a threat assessment and evaluating the strength of a subject’s inhibitors. It is a practical, easy test to incorporate in each assessment. Further, it helps remind us that every potential target, no matter how presti...