CHAPTER 1 THE LONG MARCH TO A WEST WING CORNER OFFICE
One attraction of being National Security Advisor is the sheer multiplicity and volume of challenges that confront you. If you donât like turmoil, uncertainty, and riskâall while being constantly overwhelmed with information, decisions to be made, and the sheer amount of work, and enlivened by international and domestic personality and ego conflicts beyond descriptionâtry something else. It is exhilarating, but it is nearly impossible to explain to outsiders how the pieces fit together, which they often donât in any coherent way.
I cannot offer a comprehensive theory of the Trump Administrationâs transformation because none is possible. Washingtonâs conventional wisdom on Trumpâs trajectory, however, is wrong. This received truth, attractive to the intellectually lazy, is that Trump was always bizarre, but in his first fifteen months, uncertain in his new place, and held in check by an âaxis of adults,â he hesitated to act. As time passed, however, Trump became more certain of himself, the axis of adults departed, things fell apart, and Trump was surrounded only by âyes men.â
Pieces of this hypothesis are true, but the overall picture is simplistic. The axis of adults in many respects caused enduring problems not because they successfully managed Trump, as the High-Minded (an apt description I picked up from the French for those who see themselves as our moral betters) have it, but because they did precisely the opposite. They didnât do nearly enough to establish order, and what they did do was so transparently self-serving and so publicly dismissive of many of Trumpâs very clear goals (whether worthy or unworthy) that they fed Trumpâs already-suspicious mind-set, making it harder for those who came later to have legitimate policy exchanges with the President. I had long felt that the role of the National Security Advisor was to ensure that a President understood what options were open to him for any given decision he needed to make, and then to ensure that this decision was carried out by the pertinent bureaucracies. The National Security Council process was certain to be different for different Presidents, but these were the critical objectives the process should achieve.
Because, however, the axis of adults had served Trump so poorly, he second-guessed peopleâs motives, saw conspiracies behind rocks, and remained stunningly uninformed on how to run the White House, let alone the huge federal government. The axis of adults is not entirely responsible for this mind-set. Trump is Trump. I came to understand that he believed he could run the Executive Branch and establish national-security policies on instinct, relying on personal relationships with foreign leaders, and with made-for-television showmanship always top of mind. Now, instinct, personal relations, and showmanship are elements of any Presidentâs repertoire. But they are not all of it, by a long stretch. Analysis, planning, intellectual discipline and rigor, evaluation of results, course corrections, and the like are the blocking and tackling of presidential decision-making, the unglamorous side of the job. Appearance takes you only so far.
In institutional terms, therefore, it is undeniable that Trumpâs transition and opening year-plus were botched irretrievably. Processes that should have immediately become second nature, especially for the many Trump advisors with no prior service even in junior Executive Branch positions, never happened. Trump and most of his team never read the governmentâs âoperatorsâ manual,â perhaps not realizing doing so wouldnât automatically make them members of the âdeep state.â I entered the existing chaos, seeing problems that could have been resolved in the Administrationâs first hundred days, if not before. Constant personnel turnover obviously didnât help, nor did the White Houseâs Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes (âwar of all against allâ). It may be a bit much to say that Hobbesâs description of human existence as âsolitary, poor, nasty, brutish and shortâ accurately described life in the White House, but by the end of their tenures, many key advisors would have leaned toward it. As I explained in my book Surrender Is Not an Option,1 my approach to accomplishing things in government has always been to absorb as much as possible about the bureaucracies where I served (State, Justice, the United States Agency for International Development) so I could more readily accomplish my objectives.
My goal was not to get a membership card but to get a driverâs license. That thinking was not common at the Trump White House. In early visits to the West Wing, the differences between this presidency and previous ones I had served were stunning. What happened on one day on a particular issue often had little resemblance to what happened the next day, or the day after. Few seemed to realize it, care about it, or have any interest in fixing it. And it wasnât going to get much better, which depressing but inescapable conclusion I reached only after I had joined the Administration.
Former Nevada Senator Paul Laxalt, a mentor of mine, liked to say, âIn politics, there are no immaculate conceptions.â This insight powerfully explains appointments to very senior Executive Branch positions. Despite the frequency of press lines like âI was very surprised when President Smith called meâŠ,â such expressions of innocence are invariably only casually related to the truth. And at no point is the competition for high-level jobs more intense than during the âpresidential transition,â a US invention that has become increasingly elaborate in recent decades. Transition teams provide good case studies for graduate business schools on how not to do business. They exist for a fixed, fleeting period (from the election to the inauguration) and then disappear forever. They are overwhelmed by hurricanes of incoming information (and disinformation); complex, often competing, strategy and policy analyses; many consequential personnel decisions for the real government; and media and interest-group scrutiny and pressure.
Undeniably, some transitions are better than others. How they unfold reveals much about the Administration to come. Richard Nixonâs 1968â69 transition was the first example of contemporary transitions, with careful analyses of each major Executive Branch agency; Ronald Reaganâs in 1980â81 was a landmark in hewing to the maxim âPersonnel is policy,â intently focused on picking people who would adhere to Reaganâs platform; and Donald Trumpâs 2016â17 transition was⊠Donald Trumpâs.
I spent election night, November 8â9, in Fox Newsâs Manhattan studios, waiting to comment on air about âthe next Presidentâsâ foreign-policy priorities, which everyone expected would occur in the ten p.m. hour, just after Hillary Clinton was declared the winner. I finally went on the air around three oâclock the next morning. So much for advance planning, not only at Fox, but also in the camp of the President-Elect. Few observers believed Trump would win, and, as with Robert Doleâs failed 1996 campaign against Bill Clinton, Trumpâs pre-election preparations were modest, reflecting the impending doom. In comparison with Hillaryâs operation, which resembled a large army on a certain march toward power, Trumpâs seemed staffed by a few hardy souls with time on their hands. His unexpected victory, therefore, caught his campaign unready, resulting in immediate turf fights with the transition volunteers and the scrapping of almost all its pre-election product. Starting over on November 9 was hardly auspicious, especially with the bulk of the transition staff in Washington, and Trump and his closest aides at Trump Tower in Manhattan. Trump didnât understand much of what the huge federal behemoth did before he won, and he didnât acquire much, if any, greater awareness during the transition, which did not bode well for his performance in office.
I played an insignificant part in Trumpâs campaign except for one meeting with the candidate on Friday morning, September 23, at Trump Tower, three days before his first debate with Clinton. Hillary and Bill were a year ahead of me at Yale Law School, so, in addition to discussing national security, I offered Trump my thoughts on how Hillary would perform: well prepared and scripted, following her game plan no matter what. She hadnât changed in over forty years. Trump did most of the talking, as in our first meeting in 2014, before his candidacy. As we concluded, he said, âYou know, your views and mine are actually very close. Very close.â
At that point, I was widely engaged: Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; Fox News contributor; a regular on the speaking circuit; of counsel at a major law firm; member of corporate boards; senior advisor to a global private-equity firm; and author of opinion articles at the rate of about one a week. In late 2013, I formed a PAC and a SuperPAC to aid House and Senate candidates who believed in a strong US national-security policy, distributing hundreds of thousands of dollars directly to candidates and spending millions in independent expenditures in the 2014 and 2016 campaigns, and preparing to do so again in 2018. I had plenty to do. But I had also served in the last three Republican Administrations,2 and international relations had fascinated me since my days at Yale College. I was ready to go in again.
New threats and opportunities were coming at us rapidly, and eight years of Barack Obama meant there was much to repair. I had thought long and hard about Americaâs national security in a tempestuous world: Russia and China at the strategic level; Iran, North Korea, and other rogue nuclear-weapons aspirants; the swirling threats of radical Islamicist terrorism in the tumultuous Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen), Afghanistan and beyond; and the threats in our own hemisphere, like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. While foreign-policy labels are unhelpful except to the intellectually lazy, if pressed, I liked to say my policy was âpro-American.â I followed Adam Smith on economics, Edmund Burke on society, The Federalist Papers on government, and a merger of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles on national security. My first political campaigning was in 1964 on behalf of Barry Goldwater.
I knew senior Trump campaign officials like Steve Bannon, Dave Bossie, and Kellyanne Conway from prior associations, and had spoken to them about joining a Trump Administration should one happen. Once the transition began, I thought it reasonable to offer my services as Secretary of State, as did others. When Chris Wallace came off the Fox set early on November 9, after the race was called, he shook my hand and said, smiling broadly, âCongratulations, Mr. Secretary.â Of course, there was no dearth of contenders to lead the State Department, which generated endless media speculation about who the âfront-runnerâ was, starting with Newt Gingrich, proceeding to Rudy Giuliani, then Mitt Romney, and then back to Rudy. I had worked with and respected each of them, and each was credible in his own way. I paid special attention because there was constant chatter (not to mention pressure) that I should settle for being Deputy Secretary, obviously not my preference. What came next demonstrated Trumpian decision-making and provided (or should have) a cautionary lesson.
While all the early âleading contendersâ were broadly conservative philosophically, they brought different backgrounds, different perspectives, different styles, different pluses and minuses to the table. Among these possibilities (and others like Tennessee Senator Bob Corker and former Utah Governor Jon Huntsman), were there common, consistent attributes and accomplishments Trump sought? Obviously not, and observers should have asked: What is the real principle governing Trumpâs personnel-selection process? Why not have Giuliani as Attorney General, a job he was made for? Romney as White House Chief of Staff, bringing his undeniable strategic planning and management skills? And Gingrich, with decades of creative theorizing, as White House domestic policy czar?
Was Trump looking only for people from âcentral castingâ? Much was made of his purported dislike of my moustache. For what itâs worth, he told me it was never a factor, noting that his father also had one. Other than shrinks and those deeply interested in Sigmund Freud, which I assuredly am not, I donât really believe my looks played a role in Trumpâs thinking. And if they did, God help the country. Attractive women, however, fall into a different category when it comes to Trump. Loyalty was the key factor, which Giuliani had proved beyond peradventure in the days after the Access Hollywood tape became public in early October. Lyndon Johnson once reportedly said of an aide, âI want real loyalty. I want him to kiss my ass in Macyâs window at high noon and tell me it smells like roses.â Who knew Trump read so much history? Giuliani was later extremely gracious to me, saying after he withdrew from the Secretary of State melee, âJohn would probably be my choice. I think John is terrific.â3
The President-Elect called me on November 17, and I congratulated him on his victory. He recounted his recent calls with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and looked ahead to meeting that afternoon with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. âWeâll have you up here in the next couple of days,â Trump promised, âand we are looking at you for a number of situations.â Some of the new Presidentâs first personnel announcements came the next day, with Jeff Sessions picked as Attorney General (eliminating that option for Giuliani); Mike Flynn as National Security Advisor (appropriately rewarding Flynnâs relentless campaign service); and Mike Pompeo as CIA Director. (A few weeks after Flynnâs announcement, Henry Kissinger told me, âHeâll be gone within a year.â Although he couldnât have known what was about to happen, Kissinger knew Flynn was in the wrong job.) As the days passed, more Cabinet and senior White House positions emerged publicly, including, on November 23, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley as Ambassador to the UN, with Cabinet rank, a bizarre step to take with the Secretary of State still unchosen. Haley had no qualifications for the job, but it was ideal for someone with presidential ambitions to check the âforeign policyâ box on her campaign rĂ©sumĂ©. Cabinet rank or no, the UN Ambassador was part of State, and coherent US foreign policy can have only one Secretary of State. Yet here was Trump, picking subordinate positions in Stateâs universe with no Secretary in sight. By definition, there was trouble ahead, especially when I heard from a Haley staff person that Trump had considered her to be Secretary. Haley, her staffer said, declined the offer because of lack of experience, which she obviously hoped to acquire as UN Ambassador.4
Jared Kushner, whom Paul Manafort had introduced me to during the campaign, called me over Thanksgiving. He assured me I was âstill very much in the mixâ for Secretary of State, and âin a whole bunch of different contexts. Donald is a big fan of yours, as we all are.â Meanwhile, the New York Post reported on decision-making at Mar-a-Lago at Thanksgiving, quoting one source, âDonald was walking around asking everybody he could about who should be his secretary of state. There was a lot of criticism of Romney, and a lot of people like Rudy. There are also many people advocating for John Bolton.â5 I knew I should have worked the Mar-a-Lago primary harder! Certainly, I was grateful for the considerable support I had among pro-Israel Americans (Jews and evangelicals alike), Second Amendment supporters, Cuban-Americans, Venezuelan-Americans, Taiwanese-Americans, and conservatives generally. Many people called Trump and his advisors on my behalf, part of the venerable transition lobbying process.
The transitionâs spreading disorder increasingly reflected not just organizational failures but Trumpâs essential decision-making style. Charles Krauthammer, a sharp critic of his, told me he had been wrong earlier to characterize Trumpâs behavior as that of an eleven-year-old boy. âI was off by ten years,â Krauthammer remarked. âHeâs like a one-year-old. Everything is seen through the prism of whether it benefits Donald Trump.â That was certainly the way the personnel-selection process appeared from the outside. As one Republican strategist told me, the best way to become Secretary of State was to âtry to be the last man standing.â
Vice PresidentâElect Pence called on November 29 to ask to meet in Washington the next day. I knew Pence from his service on the House Foreign Affairs Committee; he was a solid supporter of a strong national-security policy. We conversed easily about a range of foreign and defense policy issues, but I was struck when he said about State: âI would not characterize this decision as imminent.â Given subsequent press reports that Giuliani withdrew his candidacy for Secretary at about that time, it could be the entire selection process for State was starting all over again, an almost certainly unprecedented development that far into the transition.
When I arrived at the transition offices the next day, Representative Jeb Hensarling was leaving after seeing Pence. Hensarling, it was reported, was so sure of getting Treasury that he told his staff to begin planning. His not being named matched Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgersâs finding she was not to be Interior Secretary after being told she would, as well as former Senator Scott Brownâs learning he would not become Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The pattern was clear. Pence and I had a friendly half-hour talk, during which I recounted, as I had several times with Trump, Achesonâs famous remark when asked why he and President Truman had such an excellent working relationship: âI never forgot who was President, and who was Secretary of State. And neither did he.â
Trump announced Jim Mattis as Defense Secretary on December 1, but the uncertainty about State continued. I arrived at Trump Tower the next day for my interview and waited in the Trump Organization lobby with a State Attorney General and a US Senator also waiting. Typically, the President-Elect was behind schedule, and who should emerge from his office but former Defense Secretary Bob Gates. I surmised later that Gates was there to lobby for Rex Tillerson as Secretary of Energy or State, but Gates gave no hint of his mission, just exchanging pleasantries as he left. I finally entered Trumpâs office, for a meeting lasting just over an hour, also attended by Reince Priebus (soon to become White House Chief of Staff) and Bannon (who would be the Administrationâs Chief Strategist). We talked about the worldâs hot spots, broader strategic threats like Russia and China, terrorism, and nuclear-weapons proliferation. I started with my Dean Acheson story, and, in contrast with my previous Trump meetings, I did most of the talking, responding to questions from the others. I thought Trump listened carefully; he didnât make or receive any phone calls, and we werenât interrupted until Ivanka Trump came in to discuss family business, or perhaps try to get Trump vaguely back on schedule.
I was describing why State needed a cultural revolution to be an effective instrument of policy when Trump asked, âNow, weâre discussing Secretary of State here, but would you consider the Deputy job?â...