Burden-sharing in NATO

Simon Lunn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000261899
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the debate around burden-sharing in NATO, where the main issue is the distribution amongst the allies of the burden of maintaining the security arrangement. This raises problems of defining, measuring and comparing the defence efforts of the various countries. This book examines the issues, and argues for the need to address directly the fundamental problems concerning the Cold War security relationship between the United States and Western Europe.

1
Introduction

Over the past three decades, the question of burden-sharing has made regular appearances on NATO’s agenda. At issue is how the resource burden of NATO’s security arrangement should be calculated and distributed fairly among the allies. The issue has normally been put on the agenda by the United States in the belief that it is carrying a disproportionate share of the burden, and this has been the case in recent years. On close examination the problem of burden-sharing soon moves beyond specific questions of how to measure and compare the defence expenditure of the various countries, and on to much more fundamental questions. How is the burden to be defined? Does it include just the allocation of forces to the NATO commands, or does it also comprise efforts to promote Western interests outside of the NATO area? And, in a wide definition, should foreign aid be included as well as more military-related activites? To what extent should West Europeans feel obliged to pay for the exercise by the United States of what it takes to be its global role, and to what extent does the size of the US contribution reinforce its position of leadership within NATO? Is the burden-sharing issue essentially a surrogate for a much more difficult argument over American doubts about the loyalty and determination of its allies and allied doubts about the widsom of recent American policy?

As will be seen in this paper, burden-sharing has been about much more than who pays for what in NATO. In consequence the debate has been frustrating, because the wider issues have often not been recognized, and inconclusive, because the particular question of burden-sharing, with all its specific complexities, is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with these wider issues. As will be argued in this study, it will only be by addressing directly the basic security relationship between the United States and Western Europe that the issue of burden-sharing can be laid to rest.

NATO was founded in April 1949. It was set up to provide a system of collective security for its members and to guarantee a condition of stability in the North Atlantic area. Initially the nature and scope of ‘the burden’ involved in ensuring North Atlantic security was clearly identifiable: it combined a counter to the perceived menace of Soviet military power with the rebuilding of an economically devastated Europe. But there was a question of means and priorities. Europe could not recover economically and at the same time devote the resources to defence that were considered necessary to counter Soviet military strength. The immediate solution to this dilemma was found through the Atlantic partnership and the harnessing of American military and economic potential to Europe. The United States provided economic assistance through the Marshall Plan, and military protection through its participation in NATO.

hi the early years of the transatlantic partnership, the United States shouldered a large proportion of the burden of Western security. For Americans, the weight of this burden was somewhat lightened by the knowledge that an economically sound and military secure Europe was in their interest: it would provide markets essential for America’s expanding economy, and it would constitute a vital bulwark for the containment of communism. From the outset, however, the commitment wavered uneasily between the realization that assisting in the defence of Europe was in America’s own interest and a deep-rooted apprehension that America’s effort in this respect should not allow its allies to contribute less than they should for their own defence.

As Europe has become more prosperous, this instinctive suspicion of European ‘free riding’ in the defence of alliance interests has intensified. Many Americans criticize the fact that European economic growth has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in the resources that the European nations allocate to defence, a criticism that has led to the accusation that the United States cares more about defending Europe than the Europeans themselves. This perception provides the basis for the burden-sharing debate and explains why the issue is mainly an American preoccupation.

While American dissatisfaction on this issue has surfaced sporadically throughout the history of the alliance, it has normally been contained within the reconciliatory nature of the alliance framework. However, during the last two years Congressional frustration with its allies has intensified, and the question of burden-sharing has re-emerged with considerable force. It now represents a major divisive factor in alliance politics. Yet, as a problem, the issue of burden-sharing is insoluble. No matter how comprehensive the analysis, comparisons that depend on selected economic indices or static force levels can do no more than describe a part of the total picture.

The most appropriate comment on the usefulness of the burden-sharing exercise is the fact that despite the conclusion of thoroughly researched Pentagon reports to the effect that the allies are contributing their fair share of the collective burden, Congressional criticism continues, as if the reports did not exist. From this, it is evident that such criticism represents an instinctive and subjective reaction to the unbalanced nature of the Atlantic relationship, rather than a rational and balanced assessment of the totality of that relationship.

Despite the intractability of the burden-sharing issue, it remains a fact of alliance life. The politics of the Atlantic relationship necessitate that efforts are made to assess and compare the defence efforts of member countries. This exercise can serve a constructive function in that it provides a general benchmark against which individual members can reassess their respective contributions in relation to the total effort. Given the pressure for defence to assume a lower priority against competing social demands, there is a certain value in a degree of gentle prodding in order to ensure continuity of effort.

However, an excessive preoccupation with burden-sharing can have negative consequences. It can encourage nations to concentrate on areas that provide visible proof of burden-sharing but little in the way of additional collective capability, rather than on more mundane measures which may lack visibility but contribute to general effectiveness. Most important, however, an attempt to apply common standards of performance runs counter to the diversity which is inherent in the structure of the alliance. NATO is a voluntary association of free and independent states. Countries can be encouraged and cajoled into making greater efforts for the collective good, but, at the end of the day, defence expenditure is a national responsibility based on the support of national electorates. This support can be generated only from within; it cannot be mandated from outside.

The debate over burden-sharing is a product of the structure of the Atlantic relationship. A recurring irritant, it has never by itself proved decisively damaging to the cohesion of the alliance. But it has provided a convenient foundation of criticism on which other disputes can flourish. The residual resentment over burden-sharing exacerbates, and is exacerbated by, disagreements in other areas, In this respect, the importance of burden-sharing as a transatlantic issue is directly related to the prevailing climate in the Atlantic relationship.

There has rarely been a period when NATO has been free from some kind of transatlantic friction. The geostrategic differences between the United States and Europe have provided fertile ground for dissent and disagreement. In this sense, the history of the alliance is a study in the continuity of diversity. The same issues reappear with monotonous regularity:, the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee for extended deterrence, the need for better conventional forces, the levels of American troops in Europe, American urgings to do more and European pleadings of budgetary constraints, the perennial emphasis on doing better with existing resources, differences over economic relations with the East, and European regional preoccupations as opposed to America’s global interests.

Whenever serious disputes have occurred, these have been reconciled by an alliance decision-making process in which a willingness to compromise has been the predominant characteristic. Agreement in principle has generally been produced, even if implementation has later been found wanting. The flexibility of the alliance structure and its ability to ‘fudge’ difficult and controversial issues has allowed NATO to accommodate very different national views and preoccupations. This process has also been helped by the fact that for many years NATO has operated in the shadows. A lack of public attention has allowed governments greater latitude in dealing with politically sensitive questions and in accepting compromises which could create domestic problems.

Within this decision-making process, the United States has always played a dominant role. It has been in the forefront of most alliance initiatives, both nuclear¹ and conventional. Since most of these initiatives have involved doing additional tasks or spending more money, their reception by the Europeans has normally been one of caution and, not infrequently, opposition. European reticence towards new initiatives has a variety of causes: an unwillingness to move away from the status quo, or to find more resources, or to change longstanding force plans. For Europeans, continuity in force-planning has always been an extremely important factor. Defence-planning cycles in most European countries are well-established, and changes of government in Europe rarely produce major changes in defence policy. Moreover, European parliaments normally play little more than a oversight role and rarely affect defence policy in a meaningful way. In the United States, by contrast, not only does Congress wield a significant influence on defence decisions, but incoming administrations frequently feel obliged to assert their own particular brand of leadership on the alliance and consequently seek corresponding adjustments in alliance policies. The desire to provide distinctive leadership can result in suggested shifts in policy which, to say the least, are disruptive.

American leadership in NATO stems not only from America’s military contribution, but also from the sheer weight of analytical resources that the United States can muster for the solution of any problem. Mere quantity of expertise does not guarantee quality of analysis. But it does afford the United States an advantage in the alliance decision-making process. This aspect, and the dynamics of the NATO decision-making process, explain why allied reactions to American initiatives are frequently ambiguous. The consensus principle of NATO meetings exerts a strong pressure on countries not to break ranks. Within the collegiate atmosphere of ministerial meetings, it is often easier for smaller allies to acknowledge new proposals or endorse them ‘for further study’ rather than object or criticize. Occasionally allied opposition or criticism of a specific proposal is muted because the Atlantic agenda of disagreement is already overloaded, and defence may be the least painful decision to give way on. However, decisions taken within the spirit of collectivity are inevitably exposed to the realities and constraints of domestic politics. Consequently there is a tendency for Europeans to endorse American initiatives, but to implement these initiatives only where they are consistent with existing national plans.

The flexibility of the alliance decision-making process has enabled NATO to survive a number of crises. This resilience has led many veteran alliance-watchers to conclude that the common needs and mutual interests that underpin the Atlantic relationship will always prevail over spasmodic tensions and differences. Yet there are signs that this presumption may be losing its validity. During the last two years, transatlantic tension between the United States and Europe has increased to the extent that many observers now question whether the United States and Europe continue to share the same interests and objectives. Indeed, many predict that the current differences represent the first stage of a change that is historically inevitable—the disengagement of the United States from Europe and a major transformation in the structure of Western security.

This study examines some of the factors that have contributed to this interpretation of the state of the Atlantic relationship. It begins by demonstrating that the issue of ‘burden-sharing’ is inherent in the structure of the alliance and has been a source of conflict from the start. The role of the crisis over how to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the issue to the fore with renewed intensity. It took on a new dimension with the growing preoccupation with a Soviet challenge outside of Europe, and this placed further strains on NATO’s decision-making process. The resultant disagreements, which have become particularly intense during the Reagan Administration, are then described before moving on to an analysis of how the alliance has attempted to cope with this divergence in perspective. The study concludes by considering a number of alternative approaches to bridging the gap that currently exists between the United States and Europe concerning Western security arrangements.

2
The historical background

The early years

From its origins, the North Atlantic Alliance was faced with the almost insuperable task of accommodating within a single framework of collective security basic asymmetries in geography and power. This meant, in turn, reconciling different attitudes to global and regional security. Reconciliation of these differences was effected through a framework which, because of its loose structure, appeared to offer a high degree of insurance at relatively low cost. Right from the start, however, there was no agreement either on how much collective insurance was needed, or on how its payment should be apportioned. As this brief history will show, many of the problems that occurred in the early years still test the alliance. The lines remain the same even if in certain instances the characters have changed roles.

The Atlantic partnership was initially conceived for the dual purpose of ensuring the economic restoration of a war-ravaged Europe and protecting Europe from the perceived threat of Soviet military power. The American leadership of the time saw grave military and political implications in the formation of communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe following the war, and was concerned lest economic and social chaos in Western Europe should lead to communist infiltration. Its immediate concern was for economic recovery rather than military security. Economic assistance was channelled through the European Recovery Programme, and security assistance through the formation of NATO in conjunction with a military assistance programme. American motives for these policies were mixed. The reconstruction of the European economies was necessary before they could take up the role of trading partners for the United States. Also, as the only country to have emerged from World War II better off, there was a sense of moral obligation to assist the recovery of those allies who had borne the brunt of the fighting and suffering. Enlightened self-interest and altruism apart, America’s leaders recognized that it was in America’s interests that Europe should become economically viable and remain outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Yet there was also a strong determination that any assistance, whether economic or military, should be relatively temporary. Americans saw their assistance as an eventual contribution to a strong, preferably integrated, Europe that would be able to look after itself. American credit would put Europe back on its feet in order that American involvement could be reduced to a minimum.

In the initial years, therefore, the major burden was economic recovery. Although the military potential of the Soviet Union constituted a serious threat, few considered that an invasion was imminent. Thus, American policy emphasized the primacy of economic recovery: ‘Economic recovery is a prior necessity: therefore, the size of European forces must be such that they do not interfere with recovery. And it looks as though they will continue to be quite small for some time.’¹ If there was an implicit acceptance that the Europeans’ contribution to their own security would be constrained by the economic situation, there remained nevertheless in American utterances more than a hint of the traditional American suspicion of Old World commitments and a desire to ensure that the Europeans would eventually look after themselves. Even when the outbreak of the Korean war had convinced American planners that a Soviet conventional attack on Europe was a possibility, Congressional voices cautioned the extent of any additional military commitment to Europe.

The announcement by President Truman in late 1950 that he intended to make ‘substantial increases’² to American forces stationed in Western Europe was a significant development, unprecedented for the United States in peacetime, and it provoked a major controversy in the United States. Former President Herbert Hoover voiced his strong opposition to the American policy of aid to Europe. Arguing that the continental allies were mainly responsible for their own defence, he asserted that the United States, rather than concentrating on Europe, should strengthen its air and naval power, rearm Japan and stiffen its Pacific Front. The issue was vigorously debated in Congress during the early months of 1951, and joint hearings on the subject were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, an unusual combination which signalled the gravity of the question before them. Simultaneously, an extended discussion began on the floor of the Senate which has become known in US history as the ‘Great Debate’. The end product of this Senatorial exercise was Senate Resolution 99, approved on 4 April 1951.³

Resolution 99 approved the initiative taken by the executive branch in regard to the dispatch of substantial additional armed forces to Western Europe and for the appointment of a US Supreme Allied Commander. It also manifested the belief of the Senate that the West European allies of the United States should make their fair and substantial contributions to the allied defence effort, that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify that the European allies were making a realistic effort on behalf of European defence, that European ground forces should make the necessary contribution to allied ground forces, and provision should be made to utilize the military resources of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain.⁴ Congress was already signalling its concern that there should be no ‘free ride’ in Western defence.

European concerns during this period were similar to those of the United States but with different degrees of emphasis. There was common agreement that economic recovery should come first. However, European governments tended to place greater emphasis on the scale of the Soviet threat. Concerned over the implication for their economies of providing adequate security against Soviet military power, they were anxious to secure a permanent American commitment, particularly the protection of American nuclear weapons. American military strength offered the protective mantle under which they could repair their economies, and the formation of NATO provided the guarantee of this involvement. From the beginning, perceptions of the need for the North Atlantic Alliance were somewhat different. Americans saw it as a means to create a more viable and independent Europe which would mean a diminished American inv...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The historical background
• 3 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
• 4 The alliance dilemma
• 5 The Reagan Administration
• 6 Burden-sharing
• 7 Problems and prospects
• Tables
• Notes