Introduction
When speaking about the purposes of teacher education the words, âknowledge, skills and (professional) dispositionsâ flow easily off the lips, having long settled comfortably into the parlance. Sockett (2009) reviews some of the pertinent history of the place of dispositions in teacher education thought and practice: âTeacher education scholarship was preoccupied in the late 1980s and 1990s with the endeavor to characterize the knowledge base of teacher education.. Scholars in the last two decades had a different [and broader] foci of interestâ (p. 293). A key shift came with growing interest in the âmoral centerâ of teaching, ânot a mere dimension of the teacherâs adaptive expertise .. but the heart of the enterpriseâ (p. 293). In producing this shift, probably no one was more influential than John Goodlad and his colleagues who focused much of their work on the âmoral dimensions of teachingâ (2004), comfortably using the term âmoral,â despite its âsocial volatilityâ (Sockett, 2009, p. 293). The underlying concern was with the character of teachers, although, as Sockett notes, that word was generally avoided for a variety of reasons. Less loaded, an anodyne term, disposition, emerged in part because of its flexibility and soft edges.
Efforts to determine what a disposition is have filled the pages of many professional journals. When one reviews descriptions of programs, what counts as a disposition ranges from the simple to the complex, from âturns in work promptlyâ to âdisplays characteristics of a life-long learnerâ (Bradley & Jurchan, 2013, p. 99). Some kinds of knowledge count, such as âsocial-political awarenessâ (Rodriguez, Monreal, & Howard, 2018) or âequity awareness,â what is also described as a âdesire for equityâ (Williams, Edwards, Kuhel, & Lim, 2016, p. 23) or âthe disposition to teach all students equitablyâ (Villegas, 2007, p. 375). Beliefs are included: âAll students can learnâ (Choi, Benson, & Shudak, 2016, p. 89). Personality traits often appearâbeing enthusiastic and creative (Bair, 2017)âas well as character traits, such as integrity (Choi et al., 2016). Dispositions have also been thought of as virtues. Sockett (2009), for example, offers three clusters of virtue: virtues of character, intellect and care. Clustering makes some sense, as Choi et al. (2016) argue: âconceptualizing dispositions to be a single, global dimension, rather than a set of distinguishable dimensions, may be a good starting point when developing a dispositions measureâ (p. 83).
Scanning the literature, Sockettâs (2009) conclusion is warranted: âTrying to develop constructs for assessment of dispositions looks .. to be a highly complex matterâ (p. 295). Given such complexity, underscored by their own findings of âno significant correlation between our teacher candidatesâ dispositions ratings and their ability to engage students in learningâ (p. 85), Choi et al. (2016) pose a troubling question: âIs it necessary to assess something as elusive as dispositions?â (p. 85). They conclude, âunless the term dispositions is clearly understood and defined, it cannot be reliably and validly assessedâ (p. 85), yet teacher education accrediting agencies generally require disposition assessment and reporting.
This article explores some of the complexity of empathy, which is widely understood to be a desirable teacher disposition that is sometimes included under the general category of âcaringâ, along with compassion and kindness (Bair, 2017, p. 227; Sockett, 2009, p. 299). A central reason for focusing on empathy is that extraordinary claims have been made for its redemptive powers, including as a key educational resource for achieving social justice aims, and the strong expectation among many teacher educators that empathy ought to be taught and increased.
On empathy: expectations, origins and elements
Empathy has become a topic of significant research interest in many fields including psychology and philosophy (Coplan & Goldie, 2014; Lipari, 2014; Maibom, 2014a), medicine (Jamison, 2014; Penprase, Oakley, Ternes, & Driscoll, 2015) and teacher education (Bullough, 2019, pp. 131â144). There has been a great deal of speculation about the role of empathy in learning and development (Iacoboni, 2008; for a critical assessment, see Hickok, 2014). Noddings (2010) argues that empathy is a key component of teacher caring, of ââfeeling withâ and being moved [by others]â (p. 9) Peck, Maude, and Brotherson (2015), speaking of preschool teaching, argue that âsincere empathyâ ought to be taught âbeginning in the preservice years [as] one way to help teachers increase job satisfaction and potentially remain in the teaching profession longerâ (p. 175, 177). In education and teacher education an additional and very important influence has been the persistent moral and educational challenge presented by increasing student diversity and the pressing need for teachers to connect across student differences. Writing to teacher educators, McAllister (2000), for example, concludes the data gathered for her study of empathy when teaching culturally diverse students underscored âthe importance of designing teacher education programs that develop and nurture dispositions, like empathetic connections with culturally diverse populationsâ (p. 442). Empathy, for McAllister, and for many other educators (see Rice, McCall, & Ogden, 2017; Warren, 2014), is an essential teacher disposition, one that ought to be encouraged and developed within teacher education for the well-being of children and of the wider society.
Enthusiasm for the promise of empathy seems to be unbounded. Baron-Cohen (2011), for example, asserts that empathy is âone of the most valuable resources in the world (italics in original)âŚWith empathy we have a resource to resolve conflict, increase community cohesion, and dissolve another personâs painâ (p. 183). Yet, Baron-Cohen sadly asserts, empathy has been âtaken for grantedâ (p. 183) and, given the state of the world we live in, needs somehow to be âturned onâ (p. 182).
Making sense of what empathy is, what needs to be âturned on,â has proven difficult. Different from sympathy that often brings with it feelings of pity and sorrow, empathy is generally understood to be the product of the evolutionary need of humans to âpromote in-group cooperationâ (De Waal, 2009, p. 221) and hence has a species survival value. As such, empathy is a means for building âsolidarityâ (p. 223) and, when lacking, thought to be a source of anti-social behavior. Assumed to have both genetic and environmental groundings, empathy is frequently assumed to be an emotion but it is not: As Maibom (2014b) argues, empathy is, rather, âa way of feeling emotionsâ (p. 9). Empathy is the âability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotionâ (italics in original) (Baron-Cohen, 2011, p. 16). From a general agreement on the evolutionary origins of empathy and emotional loading, definitions diverge.
Coplan and Goldie (2014) provide a picture in broad strokes of the range of definitions of empathy which suggests just how complex a concept it is. Differences arise across fields depending upon research interest and content, whether, for example, that content involves responses to literature and art or culture (see Geertz, 1983, p. 59), the supporting brain structures studied in neuroscience, morality, ethics and prosocial behavior, or conceptions of human nature and development. A key source of difference is found in the relative emphasis placed upon the affective and cognitive elements of empathy which raises serious questions for education.
In her definition, Coplan (2014) emphasizes cognition: âempathy is a complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another personâs situated psychological states while maintaining clear self-other differentiationâ (p. 5). By âcomplexâ she means that empathy has both cognitive and affective dimensions; by imaginative, she means that empathy âinvolves the representation of a targetâs states that are activated by, but not directly accessible through, the observerâs perceptionâ (pp. 5â6). Finally, her use of the term âsimulatesâ suggests âthat the observer replicates or reconstructs the targetâs experiences, while maintaining a clear sense of self-other differentiationâ (p. 6). Hence, for Coplan, empathy involves âaffective matching, other-oriented perspective-taking, and self-other differentiationâ (p. 6).
The second and third elements of Coplanâs definition in particular have proven contentious. Respecting replication, the second element, Hoffman (2000), among others (Maibom, 2014b), offers a more generous standard, that what is felt (or thought) need only be similar to rather than identical with what is felt by a target. The greater the differences among persons, the greater the difficulty of approximating what another person is feeling or thinking, a point of considerable importance to the work of teaching as student diversity grows. The third element, self-other differentiation, also is important for teaching. A teacher must not forget she is a responsible adult and not a studentâs parent or friend when facing an emotionally charged situation. In these situations, she must act in such a way so as to respond ethically to a wide range of sometimes conflicting and often not well-understood moral claims. If, for example, in trying to be helpful she enters into a childâs hurt or needs fully and forgets for the moment she is the teacher, justice may suffer as her concern narrows on that particular child as she understands his need and perhaps forgets other, seemingly more distant, interests, including those of other children. As Bloom (2016; see also Hoffman, 2014) observes, when a targetâs needs come to dominate, empathy may lead to unjust results.
To comprehend what another person is feeling or thinking requires perspective taking and perspective taking involves imagination. The place of imagination in empathy underscores how beliefs, what is believed is being felt or thought by a target, are of central concern and beliefs may be biased and even false (see Kauppinen, 2014, p. 101).
Cognitive Control
Focusing on the cognitive elements of empathy is important in part because it helps distinguish empathy from âemotional contagionâ (Coplan, 2014, p. 7). Emotional contagion involves automatically mimicking what are sensed to be othersâ feelings and behavior, when one âcatches the spiritâ and gets swept up in the moment (Cantril, 1941, explored some of the dangers that may follow such moments). Contagion is sometimes thought of as a form of empathy, but a low, mostly Affective, form: âit seems that what transforms emotional contagion into other-related emotions is cognitionâ (Maibom, 2014b, p. 5). The relative importance placed on affect and cognition has led to important distinctions between lower and higher forms of empathy. Representing a folk theory of empathy, the former is thought to be more affective, immediate and preverbal; the later more cognitive and regulated, more mature, hence higher. Kauppinen (2014) nicely makes the point: âThere are different mechanisms whereby the feelings of others are transmitted to us. Some are cognitively undemanding (low level empathy) and can be found in other species⌠and others [such as âepistemic empathyâ (see Jaber, Southerland & Dake, 2018)] involve inference or associationâ (p. 100) and emphasize cognition.
With high level, mature, empathy, self-regulation (SR) holds a central and important place. Nigg (2017) makes a helpful distinction when describing two families of SR processes, one âtop-downâ, the other âbottom-up.â Top-down processes (or competencies) are âdeliberate,â and involve âvoluntary or limited-capacity regulation of the self by the selfâ which includes âboth simple processes like response inhibition, and complex processes like preparatory planning to regulate future behaviorâ (p. 375). Involving complex cognition, some forms of effortful control (EC) or cognitive control, which can be taught, support reasoning and planning necessary for successful adaptation. Eisenberg, Smith, and Spinrad (2004), speaking of EC, for example, argue that âawareness of oneâs planned behavior and subjective feelings of voluntary control of thoughts and feelings .. come into play when resolving conflict (e.g., in regard to discrepant information), correcting errors, and planning new actionsâ (p. 264). In contrast, bottom-up processes are âreactive,â when behavior or cognition are interrupted and the interruptions become regulating (p. 276). Related to low level empathy, â[r]eactive control pertains to aspects of control (or the lack thereof) that are relatively nonvolitional and usually automatic, and difficult to modulate effortfully; reactive control is viewed as less flexible and often less adaptive than volitional self-regulationâ (Spinrad & Eisenberg, 2015, p. 3). Importantly, while it appears that SR is heritable, it is also influenced by culture and experience and can be improved through a variety of interventions (see Veronneau, Racer, Fosco & Dishion, 2014 on EC). For example, as models of appropriate social behavior, teachers must purposefully regulate their emotions (Sutton, Mudrey-Camno & Knight, 2009). Hence, true âempathy [is] an intentional capacityâ and is ânot a simple resonance of affect between the self and other. It involves an explicit representation of the subjectivity of the other. It is a consciously experienced phenomenonâ (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p. 93).
Considerable research exists on emotional regulation of importance to the influence of empathy on teacher behavior. Jiang, Vauras, Volet, and Wang (2016), for example, describe several strategies teachers use to regulate their emotions and stay balanced: situation selection (âapproaching or avoiding certain people or situations to modify their emotional impactâ, p. 27); situation modification (altering or redirecting actions); attention deployment (âfocusing attention on or moving attention away from a situation to change the impactâ, p. 28); cognitive change (âmodifying oneâs evaluations of a situation or oneâs ability to manipulate a situationâ, p. 28); and suppressio...