A Reinterpretation of Linguistic Relativity

From the perspective of linguistics

Guohui Jiang

• Publisher: Books on Demand
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9783752627145
• eBook ISBN: 9783752681970
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Linguistics
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

As a vital issue not only of linguistics, but also of cognitive sciences, psychology, neurosciences, philosophy etc., engaging in the study of the relation between language, thought and reality, the doctrine of linguistic relativity (LR) went through upsurge-downturn-renaissance during more than 80 years, yet remains still unsolved puzzle for researchers of all these academic areas. Numerous treatises with valued ideas about this issue are continuously contributed to this theme; nevertheless, the study of LR has been stagnant up to nowadays. The reason is that, in my opinion, the study has deviated from the right direction, and this deviation might be boiled down to three basic concepts: The expository scope of LR. LR cannot and should not concern with (a) human speech-thinking action at the level of human biological-physiological traits, (b) human behaviours in all fields of his everyday life and (c) human spiritual activities in the areas of science, literature, philosophy, art etc. LR will explain that, constrained by the language, ordinary people are not aware that the reality they talk/think about does not coincide with the outside world they physically experience. The relativity. We should ponder the language-thought-reality relation in line with the original intention of Whorf when he proposed the principle of LR, i.e. the relativity should not be interpreted as the discrepancy between customs, modes of thinking and patterns of behavior of different linguistic communities on the basis of comparing peculiarities of their languages. The language. The doctrine of LR should concern with the human language as a complete and comprehensive system, but not with a set of sporadically observed phenomena and certain random interpretation of them. The linguistic intermediated world is eventually construed by the entire system of language, rather than an assembly of peculiar language items.

1 The Expository scope of the doctrine of LR

All current objections to LR and suspicion of it might approximately be summed up to three sets of questions (Nauta, 2006):

1) What exactly does one understand by the phrase “a formative influence of language?” Does it mean that language fully determines thought or only that it exerts some influence on it? Moreover, “formative” suggests a causal connection between language and thought, but does language play indeed a causal role in establishing thought patterns or is it merely an external verbalization of an independent mental content, or something in between these views?

2) Next, we may ask: a formative influence on what precisely? Do linguistic categories determine our concepts with which we categorize the world or do they also shape our visual perception of the world? Do they influence our beliefs and feelings? Or do they bring about all of these?

3) Further, which linguistic features are held responsible for shaping our thought? The vocabulary of a language or also its morphological and syntactical features, e.g. whether it makes use of number, gender and case tense? What about style and genre?

The questions in (2) could be simplified as: if language has formative influence on mode of human thinking, then which (linguistic or nonlinguistic) facts can vividly reveal this influence, i.e. the causal relation between language and thought? This issue concerns the expository scope of LR. We cannot expect, for instance, that the doctrine of LR might explain us how people sensorially or emotionally experiences certain situation of reality with or without language, what they are inclined or are able to do with their language skills in their everyday life, which themes will interest them when they communicate or think. Therefore, under the notion of the expository scope of LR I mean the adequate determination of human phenomena which are indeed relevant to LR, i.e. those human mental activities which could be involved in the scope of thought influenced and constrained by language.

Researchers have been launching into to this issue from various points of view. The most common approach is to survey linguistic data in which might be embodied LR principle at the layers of morphemes, words and sentences, e.g. grammatical gender, grammatical number; verb tense, etc. (Brown et al., 1961; Brown, 1967, 1976, 1986; Slobin, 1996; Malt et al., 1999; Sera et al., 2002; Даниленко, 2003; Barner et al., 2007; Lupyan et al., 2007; Погосова, 2006; Dessalegn et al., 2008; Boroditsky, 2009; Clark, 2010; Imai et al., 2010; Malt et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011, inter alia). Lucy (1996) has defined the expository scope of LR in his consideration by suggesting a general approach of LR study by extending the observation to all possibly relevant language phenomena and dividing LR into semiotic relativity, linguistic (or structural) relativity and discursive (or functional) relativity. Ideas of these researchers might be justified for their purpose and intention of research, I will not discuss them further. My discussion is on account of certain objections, addressed to LR unreasonably just due to distorted understanding of the expository scope of LR.

Even if one intends to disprove LR, the starting point of his attempt should be clarification of the range of phenomena LR should account for with respect to the language-thought-reality relation, only then he can further question about the adequacy of postulations of LR and unfold his critique of LR. As any other linguistic theories, LR does not set a purpose to observe and to explain all human phenomena concerning with the language-thought-reality relation, it cannot a fortiori account for issues of other scientific areas, e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, cognitive science etc., whose topics of research include also speech actions and human mental behaviors which might be beyond the authentic language-thought-reality relation, explainable from the point of view of relativity effect. Discussing LR, scholars, especially opponents of LR, usually neglect the proper scope as a precondition of their discussion, or even might not be aware of such scope; consequently, their critique on LR in many cases appears to be irrelevant and aimless, as Lucy pointed out that (2014) cognitivist position of language-thinking-reality is “another form of violate the expository scope of LR”, because “they require instead evidence for effects on ‘non-linguistic representations’” such as perceptual processes, simple memory, and elementary cause-effect reasoning which LR cannot and ought not explain. Hence, a rational definition of the expository scope of LR is premised by drawing at least two clear demarcation lines between research field of LR and that of other scientific researches.

1.1 The demarcation line between linguistics and biological-physiological research

The first demarcation line should be drawn between the linguistics and scientific disciplines, e.g. neurobiology, neurophysiology etc., investigating biological-physiological traits of central nervous system of human brain which perceives and processes sensory information from the environment. The distinction between such neural activities and speech-thinking activity seems to be self-evident, some researchers, however, tried to attack LR from this position, neglecting this distinction.

Researchers (e.g. Keller et al., 1996; Турчин, 2000), criticizing the postulation of LR, argue that the flux of impression from the outside world is not arranged directly and exclusively by language. The information from the environment is organized first of all by neurons of relevant sensory organs; the nervous system responsible for speech activity can receive the “semiproducts” afterwards from sensory neuronal systems and process them further. In other words, the physical stimuli from outside enter into central nervous system of human brain via neuronal systems, but not via language; all that language is and can be responsible for is to deal with the “second-level information”, the output of neuronal systems. Hence we cannot dissect reality directly in virtue of language; the role of language in information processing is merely to package (to encode) the ready information about reality processed previously by sensory organs and neuronal systems.

The description of the entire procedure of information processing from physical stimuli to sensory organs and neuronal system prior to speech-thinking activity might be appropriate from the perspective of neurosciences. However, from such description one cannot draw any conclusion, serving as argument for either proving or refuting the formative influence of language on mode of thinking postulated by LR, for, on the one hand, certainly we cannot deny that the perception of information from outside by means of sensory organs occurs in neuronal systems, yet the neurobiological- neurophysiological traits and their function are not uniqueness of human species. This kind of information can also be perceived and stored by animals who have the same or similar sensory organs and neuronal systems as human beings do, thus even if one insists on including the phenomena at neuronal level in the discussion of the language-thinking- reality relation, he can achieve little, because the mentioned procedure will turn to totally different direction when language is involved, unless relevant science can prove that human and animal experience the outside world in the same manner. Hence, the demarcation line between linguistics and biological-physiological researches is to certain extent the gap between human and animal.

On the other hand, even in line with the viewpoint that human speech-thinking mechanism can only receive and further process “semi products” from neuronal systems, one thing is clear according to contemporary neuroanatomy: sensory neuronal systems and speech-thinking mechanism are separate functional systems in human brain. LR, as other linguistic disciplines, can concern only with those issues which are related to language, yet not all human neurobiological-neurophysiological activities are related to language. Even those kinds of neurobiological-neurophysiological activities which are to certain extent related to speech-thinking activity, will not necessarily be the objects of linguistic study because no linguistic discipline ought to account for the biological and physiological process at the level of sensory neuronal systems, occurring prior to the activation of speech-thinking mechanism. Some researchers have properly pointed out (e.g. Barner et al., 2010) in this case that “languages differ in how they express thought without affecting how the world is perceived non-linguistically.”

Discussing issues of color terms, Wierzbicka criticizes researchers who confuse the topic of neurobiological-neurophysiological research and the topic of linguistics; she opposes to “study our concepts (of color) using conception and terminology of physiology” (Вежбицкая, 1996b). The function of human brain, according to Wierzbicka, might (indirectly) reflect these properties (color discrimination, color memory, etc.), yet the conceptualization should concern only such function of human brain which deals with the formation of thoughts. Wierzbicka’s assertion seems to be echoed by researchers studying and demonstrating recently that there could even be converse causality: the language is able to overlay the output of neuronal systems processing the sensory information from the outside world (for discussion see also Cole et al, 1974; Wierzbicka, 1990; Goldstone, 1998; Roberson et al, 2002; Roberson et al, 2005; Roberson et al., 2007; Regier et al., 2008, Regier & Kay, 2008; Li et al., 2009).

How human speech-thinking mechanism is connected to human sensory neuronal systems, what is the visual, auditory, gustatory etc. information perceived via sensory organs and transferred from neuronal systems to speech-thinking mechanism after preliminary processing, how human brain can deal with this kind of information without language (e.g. the most possible reaction of a hungry man, seeing food, should be immediately rushing to eat without any delayed reaction on the stimulus) and so on – are unrelated with LR hypothesis. The doctrine of LR is not to deal with human cognitive abilities at the level below human language faculties.

Experiments, carried out by neurophysiologists and experimental psychologists with respect to the cognition of color and the formation of color category, revealed that there is no immediate causal link between the output of neuronal systems processing the sensory information from the environment and the concept as the result of speech-thinking activity, the outputs at the level of visual nerve cells (neurons) processing light waves is not the colors we are able to see. Investigations of neurophysiological process of discriminating spectrum and rainbow (e.g. Gage, 1978, 1993; Campbell, 1983; Duck, 1987; Kidder, 1989), for instance, have explained and confirmed one scientific fact that visual nerve cells are not able to resolve unique hues, although it seems that we are capable to separately see single color. Experimental reports (Paritsis et al., 1983:109) claim that the vision and discrimination of colors is not a neurophysiological process carried out solely at the level of neurons, “at the cortical level colours are classified into seven classes of cells is nonsense.” Ordinary people believe that they are able to distinguish a colored rainbow into seven (or several) colors and can see each of them separately only due to the conception preconceived by the language, i.e. from theoretical presuppositions and prejudices diagrams, “[…]in current textbooks depicting the opponent pairs as red/green and yellow/blue must also be considered rhetorical.”

The categorical perception, an active topic of recent investigation , is another argument revealing the possible “overlaying effect” of language on human perception. Although the “overlaying effect” is still to be tested and proven, such experiments and observation might at least convinces us that the human speech-thinking action is not merely and totally dependent of “semiproducts” processed by sensory organs and neuronal systems.

Further, the proposed “overlaying effect” does not mean that LR would profess the dominance of language over human biological and physiological traits. Undoubtedly we cannot abandon a fundamental and self-evident fact of human knowledge of physical world, i.e. sensory organs and corresponding neuronal systems are the “first gateway” via which human physically contacts the environment and obtains primary perception of reality. LR does not suggest any refutation of this scientifically confirmed empirical fact, does not impose any proposals and opinions on investigation and explanation of phenomena at neurobiological-neurophysiological level; all that LR postulates is that human beings, as “linguistic species” (as to “linguistic species”, I do not think that LR study should anf could go so far as some researchers suggesting that language is organisms of nature such as human being’s shape of nose or color of hair (e.g. Schleicher,1863; Alter, 1999), or the components of language would be the equivalent to genes, “a unit of linguistic structure, as embodied in particular utterances, that can be inherited in replication” (Croft 2000: 239; see also Lightfoot,1999; Mufwene, 2002)), do not experience the world merely physically and physiologically as other animals do. Language cannot block or release human sensory organs and neuronal systems, but language can affect human sensory perception and, beyond human consciousness, make human experience of reality other than pure sensory perception.

The dominance of language over biological basis of human mental activities might be thus appropriately understood as pointed out by Whorf himself (1942): “There is a yogic mastery in the power of language to remain independent of lower-psyche facts, to override them, now point them up, now toss them out of the picture, to mode the nuances of words to its own rule, whether the psychic ring of the sounds fits or not.” Also (Whorf, 1936b) ‘‘Thinking may be said to be language’s own ground, whereas feeling deals in feeling values which language indeed possesses but which lie rather on its boundaries. These are Jung’s two rational functions, and by contrast his two irrational functions, sensation and intuition, may fairly be termed non-linguistic’’

To put Whorf’s idea more “modernly” we might be sure that how native speakers of a language will grasp and describe their sensory experience is independent either of biological-physiological traits, preconditioning their ability to physiologically sense reality, or of thinking activities in the form of electro-chemical process in the human cerebral cortex, universal for all human beings.

There is another suspicion we have to face when excluding the phenomena of biological level out of the expository scope of LR. This suspicion can be in short attributed to a discourse of Russell (Russell, 1983:85): this kind of relation (the daughter calls her mother “mama”) is not created by the language, it exists prior to language. The role of language in this relation is limited to making it transmissible.

No doubt it is not language that stipulates us to call the one who has given us life father or mother; however, it is an inappropriate expansion of the expository scope of LR if Russell’s statement will be used for critique on LR. This type of human kinship is certainly not created or determined by language, it is a relation based on biological feature of any animals. Nevertheless, Russell’s statement cannot provide any counter-argument against the proposed formative influence of the language on the mode of thinking: Although this type of kinship is not created by the language, but the knowledge of such relation one can obtain only by means of language, no matter he is or is not in this kinship. It seems that we could not take it for granted that an infant, seeking mother’s nipple in hunger or throwing himself into father’s arms in fear, has the concept of “mama/papa”. He knows “mama” is mama and “papa” is papa only when he has acquired these words. What LR should account for is the role of language in formation of such concepts of kinship, but not the biological sense of blood relationship. In this sense I would even say that in Russell’s statement is actually included a viewpoint which LR attempts to prove: If the role of language is limited to expressing kinship and to conveying it to other people, then we should not forget that only the thought (of certain relation including kinship, but not any relation itself) can be explicitly conveyed to other people in the normal daily communication. There is thus no any “thought-out” relation beyond language, because the thought, but not feeling of blood kinship or emotional experience of this relationship, does not come from anywhere beyond language.

1.2 The demarcation line between language phenomena and human spiritual activities

To begin with, it is worth mentioning certain distinctive proposals of LR study. Clark (1996:324-325) claimed that Whorf’s principle of LR cannot cover all aspects of language and language use, “What about other aspects of thought, such as mental imagery, social skills, technical know-how, and memory of music, poetry, places, or faces?” In this regard “linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism are not two monolithic theories, but rather two families of hypotheses about particular aspects of language and thought. It is not the doctrines per se that are true or false, but only the member hypotheses, some of which may be true and others false without contradiction.” In this sense it would unsurprising, according to Clark, that LR, by its very nature, can currently be neither admitted nor refuted, because any supports or objections might be concerned with only certain parts of this doctrine, meanwhile LR, as a collection of hypotheses, cannot be verified or falsified in its whole.

Levinson (1996b:139. See also Enfield, 2015) holds a similar opinion, suggesting that LR can be seen as “a corollary of a more general attitude to the study of different social and cultural system, namely cultural relativity,” because a social system is a complex interacting whole, where the role of each part, e.g. each social institution, can only be understood on the background of culture in whole.

Similar view is held even by some unyielding advocates of LR, although in favor of the hypothesis. Boroditsky (2009), for instance, proposed that LR study should concern how languages shape the way we think about space, time, colors, and objects; and the way people construe events, reason about causality, keep track of number, understand material substance, perceive and experience emotion, reason about other people's minds, choose to take risks, and even in the way they choose professions and spouses.

This position can even be traced to Sapir’s claim that (1949: 162) “[…] language is a guide to ‘social reality’ [...] [That] powerfully conditions of all our thinking about social problems and processes.”

It might be interesting to point out that Clark’s definition of LR – though it is in principle a cr...

Table of contents

• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• 1 The expository scope of the doctrine of LR
• 2 On the comparative approach
• 3 Relativity vs. determinism
• 4 Linguistic relativity and linguistic universalism
• 5 Vygotsky, Piaget and LR
• 6 Intuitive experimental data
• 7 “Circular reasoning” and valid arguments
• 8 Several advantageous observations
• 9 The doctrine of LR in linguistics
• 10 Translation, worldview and “thinking in foreign language”
• 11 Bilingualism and LR
• 12 Linguistic worldview
• Postscript
• References
• Copyright