The Correspondence of Spinoza

A. Wolf

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367178048
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429614132
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1928, The Correspondence of Spinoza is deeply interesting in many ways. It presents a pageant of the leading types of seventeenth-century mentality. It affords contemporary glimpses of important scientific researches and discoveries. It brings us into touch with some of the social and political events and tendencies of the period. This book includes correspondent letters containing things of first-rate importance for the correct interpretation of the philosophy of Spinoza.

THE LETTERS OF CERTAIN LEARNED MEN
To B. D. S.
AND THE AUTHOR’S REPLIES
CONTRIBUTING NOT A LITTLE TO THE ELUCIDATION OF HIS OTHER WORKS.

LETTER I

HENRY OLDENBURG

TO THE VERY ILLUSTRIOUS MR. B. D. S.

VERY ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, HONOURED FRIEND,

So reluctantly did I tear myself away from your side recently when I was with you in your retreat at Rhynsburg, that no sooner am I back in England than I strive, as far as possible, to rejoin you at least by an exchange of letters. Solid learning combined with humanity and refinement of character (with all of which Nature and Industry have most amply endowed you) provide such charms of their own that they win the love of all men who are open-minded and liberally educated. Come, then, most excellent Sir, and let us join our right hands in unfeigned friendship, and let us diligently cultivate it with every kind of devotion and service. If anything from my slender store can be of service to you, consider it yours. As to the gifts of mind which you possess, allow me to claim a share of them, since this can be done without detriment to you.

At Rhynsburg we conversed about God, about infinite Extension and Thought, about the difference and the agreement of these attributes, about the nature of the union of the human soul with the body; also about the Principles of the Cartesian and the Baconian Philosophy. But as we then discoursed about problems of such moment as through a lattice and only in a hurry, and they continue to crucify my mind, let me venture to plead with you by right of the friendship begun between us, and to ask you very cordially to set forth your ideas on the above-mentioned subjects somewhat more fully, and especially not to mind instructing me in the following two points, namely, first, wherein you place the true distinction between Extension and Thought, and secondly, what defects you observe in the Philosophy of Descartes and of Bacon, and how you consider that these defects may be removed from their midst, and sounder views be substituted for them. The more freely you write to me on these and similar subjects, the more closely will you bind me to you, and you will strongly put me under an obligation to render equivalent services, if only I can.

Here there are already in the press Certain Physiological Essays, written by a certain English Noble, a man of excellent erudition. They treat of the nature of air and of its Elastic property, established by forty-three experiments; also of Fluidity and Firmness, and the like. As soon as they are printed I will see to it that they are delivered to you by a friend who is probably crossing the sea shortly.

Meanwhile farewell, and keep in memory your friend who is

Yours in all love and devotion,

HENRY OLDENBURG

London, 16/26 August 1661.

LETTER II

B. D. S.

TO THE VERY NOBLE AND LEARNED

MR. HENRY OLDENBURG

Reply to the Preceding.

VERY ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

How pleasant your friendship is to me you will be able to judge for yourself if only you can prevail upon your modesty to allow you to consider the excellent qualities which you have in abundance, and although, when I consider them, I seem to myself to be not a little bold because assuredly I dare to enter into friendship with you, especially when I consider that all the possessions of friends, particularly those that are spiritual, ought to be shared, yet this step will have to be attributed to your humanity and benevolence rather than to me. From the height of this humanity you have been willing to lower yourself and to enrich me with the abundance of your benevolence to such an extent that I do not fear to enter into that close friendship which you steadfastly offer me, and which you deign to ask from me in return, and I will make it my earnest care to cultivate it diligently. With regard to my mental endowments, if I possess any, I should most willingly allow you to make a claim upon them, even if I knew it would be to my great detriment. But lest I seem in this way to wish to decline what you ask of me by right of our friendship, I will try to set forth what I think about the subjects of which we spoke, although I do not think that this will be a means of binding you more closely to me without the intervention of your kindness.

I will begin, then, to speak briefly of God, whom I define as a Being consisting of infinite attributes of which each is infinite, or in the highest degree perfect of its kind. Here it should be noted that I understand by attribute all that which is conceived through itself, and in itself; so that its conception does not involve the conception of some other thing. For example, Extension is conceived through itself, and in itself; but not so motion. For it is conceived as in something else, and its conception involves Extension. That this is, indeed, the true definition of God is clear from the fact that we understand by God a Being supremely perfect, and absolutely infinite. That such a Being exists, it is easy to prove from this definition; but, since this is not the place for it, I will omit the proof.

But what I ought to prove here in order to satisfy your first enquiry, most illustrious Sir, are the following. First, that in nature there cannot exist two substances, unless they differ in their whole essence. Secondly, that a substance cannot be produced ; but that existence pertains to the essence thereof. Thirdly, that every substance must be infinite or supremely perfect of its kind. When these points have been proved you will easily be able, most illustrious Sir, to see my trend of thought, if only you will also pay attention to my definition of God, so that there is no need to speak more clearly on these matters. But in order to prove these points clearly and briefly I could think of nothing better than to submit for your consideration such proofs after the manner of Geometry, and so I send them^* here separately, and await your verdict on them.

You ask me, secondly, what errors I observe in the Philosophy of Descartes and of Bacon. In this matter, although it is not my custom to expose the errors of others, I am nevertheless willing to gratify you. The first, then, and greatest error, is that they have strayed so far from the knowledge of the First Cause and of the origin of all things. The second is that they did not know the true nature of the human Mind. The third is that they never arrived at the true cause of Error. The extreme necessity of a true knowledge of these three things is only ignored by those who are utterly destitute of learning and training. That they have strayed from the knowledge of the First Cause and of the human Mind is easily gathered from the truth of the three propositions mentioned above: wherefore I turn to the demonstration of the third error alone. I will say little of Bacon who speaks quite confusedly on this subject, and proves almost nothing, but only makes assertions. For, first, he supposes that, besides the deception of the senses, the human intellect is fallible by its very nature, and imagines everything after the analogy of its own nature, and not after the analogy of the universe, so that it is like an uneven mirror [turned] to the rays of things, which mingles its own nature with the nature of the things, etc. Secondly, that the human intellect on account of its peculiar nature is prone to make abstractions, and imagines things to be stable which are in flux, etc. Thirdly, that the human understanding is unquiet, it cannot stop or rest. And such other causes as he assigns can easily all be reduced to the single one of Descartes, namely, because the human will is free and wider in scope than the intellect, or, as Verulam^* himself more confusedly says (Aphorism 49), because the intellect is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will. (Here it should be noted that Verulam often uses Intellect for Mind, in which respect he differs from Descartes.) Therefore, taking little notice of the other reasons which are of no moment, I will show that this reason is false, a fact which they, too, would easily have seen if they had only paid attention to this, namely, that will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness differs from this or that white thing, or humanity from this or that man; so that it is just as impossible to conceive that will is the cause of this or that volition as that humanity is the cause of Peter and Paul. Since, therefore, will is nothing but a thing of reason and cannot be said to be in any way the cause of this or that volition, and particular volitions, since they need a cause in order to exist, cannot be said to be free, but are necessarily what they are determined to be by their causes, and, lastly, since, according to Descartes, these very errors are particular volitions, it necessarily follows that errors, that is, particular volitions, are not free, but are determined by external causes, and in no way by will. This is what I promised to prove. Etc.

* See Ethics Part I, from the beginning up to Proposition IV.

* See Novum Organum, Book I, Aphorisms 48-51.

[RHYNSBURG, September 1661.]

LETTER III

HENRY OLDENBURG

TO THE VERY ILLUSTRIOUS MR. B. D. S

Reply to the Preceding.

EXCELLENT SIR, AND DEAREST FRIEND,

Your very learned letter has been delivered to me, and read with great pleasure. I warmly approve your geometric method of proof: but, at the same time, I blame my own dullness in that I do not so promptly grasp what you so accurately teach. Permit me, I pray, to present the evidence of this stupidity of mine, as I put forward the following questions, and seek from you their solutions.

The first is, do you understand clearly and without doubt that from the mere definition which you give of God, it can be demonstrated that such a Being exists ? I, indeed, when I consider that definitions contain nothing but conceptions of our Mind, moreover that our Mind conceives many things which do not exist, and is very fruitful in the multiplication and augmentation of things once conceived, I do not see yet how from the conception that I have of God I can infer the existence of God. To be sure, from the mental store of all the perfections which I observe in men, animals, vegetables, minerals, etc., I can conceive and fashion some single substance which may fully possess all these excellences, nay more, my Mind is capable of multiplying and augmenting them to infinity, and so of feigning by itself some most perfect and most excellent Being; yet the existence of such a Being cannot by any means be inferred from that.

The second question is, have you no doubt that Body is not limited by Thought, nor Thought by Body? since it is still an open question what thought is, whether it is a corporeal motion, or a certain spiritual act entirely different from the corporeal.

The third question is, whether you hold those axioms, which you communicated to me, as indemonstrable Principles, recognised by the light of Nature, and standing in no need of proof? It may be that the first Axiom is of such a kind; but I do not see how the remaining three can be included in the number of such principles. For the second axiom supposes that there exists nothing in Nature besides substances and accidents, whereas many assert that time and place have the character of neither. Your third Axiom, namely, that Things which have different attributes have nothing in common, is so far from being clearly conceived by me that the whole universe seems rather to prove the contrary. For all the things known to us both differ in some respects, and also agree in certain respects. Lastly, the fourth axiom, namely, Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other is not so obvious to my dull intellect as to need no further light for its illumination. For God has nothing essentially in common with created things, yet is He held by almost all of us to be their cause.

Since, then, these axioms do not seem to me to be placed beyond all risk of doubt, you will easily conjecture that your Propositions which are based on them cannot but be shaky. And the more I consider them, the more I am overwhelmed with doubts about them. For against the first proposition I submit that two men are two substances, and have the same attribute, since both are endowed with reason; whence I conclude that there do exist two substances with the same attribute. With regard to the second, I consider that, since nothing can be the cause of itself, it can hardly be grasped by us how it can be true that a substance cannot be produced, not even by any other substance.

For this Proposition declares that all substances are causes of themselves, and that they are all and sundry independent of each other, and thus makes them so many Gods, and in this wise denies the First Cause of all things. This conclusion I willingly confess that I cannot grasp, unless you do me the favour of disclosing to me somewhat more clearly and more fully your opinion on this high subject, and of teaching me the origin and production of Substances, the dependence of things on one another, and their mutual subordination. I adjure you by that friendship into which we have entered, to deal with me freely and faithfully in this matter, and I beg you most earnestly to be fully persuaded that all these matters which you deign to impart to me will remain inviolate and safe, and that I will not do anything to let them become public so as to cause you harm or injury.

In our Philosophical Society we indulge, as far as our powers allow, in diligently making experiments and observations, and we spend much time in preparing a History of the Mechanical Arts, feeling certai...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Half Title
• Frontispiece
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Preface
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Table Showing the Present Number and Former Number
• Introduction
• Correspondence
• Annotations
• Index