Spare Not the Brave

The Special Activities Group in Korea

Richard L. Kiper

• Publisher: The Kent State University Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781612778563
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia militar y marítima

The Special Activities Group (SAG) and its subordinate companies have received little attention from historians, despite being an elite combat unit and participating in highly classified and dangerous missions in Korea. Rarely receiving more attention than a footnote, their story usually begins and ends on the night of September 12, 1950, with an amphibious raid near Kunsan. Until their inactivation on March 31, 1951, SAG simply disappears from most Korean War histories. Spare Not the Brave corrects this omission.

Spare Not the Brave tells the story of the extraordinary missions carried out by this group of extraordinary soldiers. Recruited primarily from the Far East Command headquarters, these men received six weeks of training and then were thrust into combat in Korea. Boarding rubber boats in the Yellow Sea and paddling to shore far behind enemy lines, they conducted a diversionary landing near Kunsan, then landed at Inchon, and sailed to the Wonsan area of North Korea. There, SAG was augmented with a battalion of South Korean soldiers. Together they conducted counter-guerrilla operations until overwhelming Chinese intervention forced all Allied units to withdraw from the North. Those critical missions continued into the difficult fighting of early 1951.

Much of this volume is based upon the words of the participants themselves. Using previously obscure primary sources, oral histories, and official records, author Richard L. Kiper tells this unit's riveting tale. Wherever possible, first-person accounts have been verified and supplemented with official reports, maps, and documents. Drawing on his twenty-six years of infantry and special forces experience, Kiper brings critical analysis and insight to this previously untold story. Spare Not the Brave fills a gap in the historiography of the Korean War and adds a valuable chapter to the history of U.S. Army special operations.

1

Land of the Morning Calm

Where the mighty ragged mountains Rip the guts out of the sky …

—Ian E. Kay, Poems of the Korean War: The Hermit Kingdom

Korea, hermit nation!

—Martha J. Opie

Myth declares that the first Korean kingdom was founded by Tan-gun, the son of the union between a divine creator and a bear who became a woman. Korea’s creation myth includes dragons, bears, and tigers becoming humans, as well as humans being born from eggs that may have been fertilized by the sun. In 2333 B.C., Tan-gun united various tribes in the northern part of the Korean peninsula into the kingdom of Choson (which means “Land of the Morning Calm”). Troops of China’s Han dynasty invaded in 109 B.C. and established an economic and cultural presence in the peninsula for more than four hundred years. Eventually the Chinese outposts were overwhelmed by native Korean tribes, which led to the establishment of the Three Kingdoms. This period lasted until 668, when the kingdom of Silla overthrew the other two and united under its control the Korean Peninsula south of Pyongyang.¹

Over the course of the next three hundred years, the once-united kingdom was torn asunder as bandits, invasions by China and Japan, and rebellions destroyed central authority. Only the strongman Wang Kon was able, by force of arms, to reunite the peninsula under the Koryo dynasty, from which comes the name Korea. Across the dynasty’s northern border, the short-lived Chin dynasty was fighting for its life against the Mongols. In 1231 Mongol armies crossed the Yalu River, the border between present-day China and North Korea. Thus began a forty-two-year war that led to the incorporation of all Korea into the Mongol Empire. Not only would the Mongols exploit Korean resources, but also they would draft thousands into the armies that attempted unsuccessfully to conquer Japan in 1274 and 1281.²

Events in China continued to affect Korea. In 1356 a peasant, Zhu Yuanzhang, led a rebel band against the Mongols; within three years, the rebels overthrew the Mongol regime and established the Ming dynasty. During the turmoil, Chinese Red Banner rebels invaded northern Korea and seized territory south of the Yalu. Korean general Yi Song-gye saw his opportunity and in 1392 defeated the Mongol army, seized the throne, and established the Yi dynasty, which would last until 1910. His kingdom became known by the ancient name of Choson.³

During its existence of more than five hundred years, the Yi dynasty was beset by invasions from Japan; invasions from the Manchus, who in 1618 attacked the Ming dynasty and in 1661 firmly established the Ching dynasty; peasant rebellions; and the influence of Catholic Christianity. Emperors throughout the existence of the Yi dynasty attempted to maintain a rigid isolationism and eschewed contact with the West in order to preserve the kingdom’s culture. In his 1882 book, William Elliot Griffis coined the term “The Hermit Kingdom” for “Corea.” That reluctance to embrace outside influences led to what noted scholars John King Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, and Albert Craig described as “cultural stagnation, political immobility, and social friction.”⁴ When the winds of global change finally blew, Korean leaders would be no match for the hurricane that followed.

The roots of Korean-American relations began with the ginseng plant. Touted as a remedy that could boost libido, relieve stress, increase energy, and stimulate blood circulation, ginseng was used for medicinal purposes in China for thousands of years before Leif Erickson landed at L’Anse aux Meadows in Newfoundland or Columbus set foot in the Caribbean. While the United States was still a collection of colonies, Canadian fur trappers learned of the market for ginseng in China. Soon, John Jacob Astor was involved in growing ginseng domestically and selling it to the Chinese. Daniel Boone may have taken part in the trade as well. Unfortunately for the Korean growers who had previously held a monopoly on providing the plant to China, the influx of North American ginseng undercut their prices and their markets, while causing Westerners to turn their market-hungry eyes toward Korea. Congressman Zadoc Pratt of New York proposed in 1845 that an American mission be sent to Japan and Korea “for the extension of American commerce”; few of his colleagues were interested. Not until January 1853 did American sailors visit Korea, and that was on the occasion of the USS South America sailing into the harbor at Pusan to deliver two Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked and then rescued.⁵

In the aftermath of Commodore Matthew Perry’s 8 July 1853 foray into Tokyo Bay, the United States and the Tokugawa shogunate signed the United States–Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1858, which opened several ports to U.S. trade. Korea, however, remained closed to U.S. trade. The only visits were made by Americans who had been shipwrecked, rescued, and deposited in Korea. From there they were sent overland to China, which returned them to U.S. officials.⁶

U.S.-Korea relations took an ugly turn on 29 July 1866 when the U.S. merchant ship General Sherman became stranded in low water in the Taedong River near Pyongyang. The crew brazenly seized a local official, stole from the local population, and carried off women to the ship. Incensed, the people attacked and burned the ship and killed the entire crew. In response, Cdr. Robert W. Shufeldt sailed the USS Wachusett from the U.S. Asiatic Squadron to investigate the situation. When he received unsatisfactory answers from a Korean official, he threatened to return in force. In June 1871 Rear Adm. John Rodgers, with a fleet of five ships and a strong contingent of marines, landed on Kanghwa-do at the mouth of the Han and Imjin Rivers. After killing about 350 Korean defenders, he withdrew as reinforcements began to gather. There was no further American military action.

Under the threat of Japanese power, Korea’s king, Yi T’aewang, concluded a trade agreement with that increasingly militant nation in 1876. Six years later, the United States concluded the Chemulpo Treaty with Korea, which pledged that “Corea and the United States of America hereby establish everlasting amity and friendship between the two peoples.” Thus began a period during which missionaries and merchants poured into Korea to save souls and make money.⁷

Over the next several decades Korea would be the scene of rebellions, attempts by China to dominate the peninsula nation, fighting between Japanese and Korean soldiers, and eventually the domination of Korea by the Japanese following the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War. Because U.S. trade with Korea was of little significance, the Americans stayed out of the fray.⁸

Growing antagonism between Russia and Japan erupted into war between the two nations in 1904. Korea proclaimed its neutrality and mistakenly believed that the profession of friendship between the United States and Korea in the Chemulpo Treaty would guarantee that neutrality. Instead, President Theodore Roosevelt made clear that he had little regard for Korea and believed the Korean people would be better off under Japanese rule. During the ensuing nineteen-month war, the Japanese captured Port Arthur on China’s Liaotung Peninsula and destroyed the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Straits between Japan and Korea.⁹

In late July 1905, Japanese prime minister Katsura Taro and U.S. secretary of state William Taft agreed to “the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea,” with Japan’s assurance that it “does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines.” Japan’s exhibition of her naval prowess in the Tsushima Straits, coupled with her army’s triumphs in Manchuria, caused Roosevelt grave concerns over the future of his “Open Door” policy in China. In 1898 he had made clear the high value he placed on trade relations with China. Echoing the president’s position, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge stated explicitly the following year that U.S. policy in the Far East regarded the Philippines as vital to ensuring that the “vast market” of China “is not closed to our trade and commerce.” In his view, possession of those islands “gives us authority and standing in the East.” One way to advance that agenda of economic gain was to negotiate a peace treaty that would maintain Russia as a viable factor in the balance of power in the region.¹⁰

With that understanding in place, on 5 September 1905 Russian and Japanese diplomats concluded the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ceded control of Korea to Japan: “The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea.” Furthermore, the Japanese agreed “to evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.” For his efforts to negotiate the treaty, President Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize.¹¹ The stage was set for future events that would embroil the United States in the Far East much more deeply than the president could have envisioned.

Rioting broke out in Korea following news of the treaty. The emperor of Japan violently suppressed the resistance, forced the Korean emperor to abdicate the throne, disbanded the army, and took control of the police and judiciary before formally annexing Korea in August 1910 and placing it under the control of a military governor. The Japanese called the nation Chosen. From that point until August 1945, Korea would be an integral part of the Japanese agricultural and industrial base. Additionally, during World War II the Japanese inducted more than forty-five thousand Koreans into the army and navy, while others were assigned primarily to serve in construction and service units and to guard prison camps.¹²

“Free and Independent”

At Cairo in November 1943, British prime minister Winston Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met to discuss Allied plans for postwar Japan and its possessions. In addition to stripping Japan of Pacific islands it had obtained as a result of World War I, the Allies would return portions of China that Japanese forces had seized since the Mukden Incident of 1931. A third provision held that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” At the Tehran Conference attended by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin later that year, the future of Korea again was raised. Stalin, who had not attended the Cairo meeting, agreed that Korea should be independent, but he later added that Korea would not be ready for independence for another forty years.¹³

Although the future of Korea was not on the formal agenda of the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Truman was prepared to discuss the matter with Stalin and Churchill. The State Department proposed a trusteeship to be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain. For the U.S. military, Korea had little if any strategic value in the war against Japan. The State Department, however, recognized that the entrance of the Soviets into the war would inevitably result in the presence of Soviet troops in Korea. For that reason, State advocated a “centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones.” Both Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that no foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. In May of that year presidential advisor Harry Hopkins met with Stalin in Moscow, where the subject of Korea again arose. Stalin reiterated his agreement to a four-power trusteeship. Despite Stalin’s commitment, the State Department still had reservations. In preparation for President Truman’s trip to Potsdam, the department warned that “the Soviets, however, may attempt to set up a ‘friendly’ government” in Korea.¹⁴

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Soviet defense minister Aleksander Vasilevskii proclaimed to the Korean people that “the dark night of slavery over the land of Korea lasted for long decades, and, at last the hour of liberation has come.” He called upon the Korean people to “organize yourselves into partisan detachments” and “rise for a holy war” against the Japanese oppressors. Two days later, the first Soviet forces entered the Korean Peninsula in a series of amphibious landings on the east coast while ground forces swept south across the Yalu. Within two weeks they had reached Pyongyang and Wonsan. In their zone of occupation, the Soviets quickly sealed off the southern border of their occupation zone and prevented the transfer of coal, food, and electricity to the south. Nevertheless, approximately 1.6 million people from Manchuria and northern Korea were able to cross into the south during the fall of 1945.¹⁵

On 10 August, the day the Soviets landed in Korea, Col. Charles Bonesteel, chief of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Policy Section, was given approximately thirty minutes to draw a line on a map. Although the geography of the line itself had “virtually nothing to commend it,” a demarcation line at the 38th parallel would recognize the reality of the Russian military advance while allowing the Americans to obtain Seoul, both the capital and the most populous city. His recommendation quickly was approved by his boss, Brig. Gen. George Lincoln, who then delivered it to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. On 15 August President Truman approved the plan. The next day Stalin accepted the proposal. Historians Kathryn Weathersby and Sheila Jager have speculated that Stalin agreed because of his concern that “a Korea under Japanese rule would be a constant threat to the Far East of the USSR.” A U.S. presence on the peninsula could “help in neutralizing Japan.” Twenty-six days later, MacArthur issued General Order Number 1, which stated: “The victorious military forces of my command will today occupy the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude.”¹⁶

Landing at Inchon on 8 September, six days after the surrender of Japan was finalized on the deck of the battleship Missouri, were soldiers from Lt. Gen. John Hodge’s XXIV Corps, which was designated U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). Russian troops reached Kaesong, approximately two miles south of the 38th parallel and thirty-eight miles northwest of Seoul, where they halted. The Americans began the process of disarming the remaining Japanese military in Korea, establishing law and order, caring for thousands of Korean refugees, and, moving their former enemies to an embarkation point at Pusan. Within days of landing, Hodge established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea under the command of Maj. Gen. Archibald Arnold.¹⁷

Neither Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, nor planners within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated the need to conduct operations in Korea until after Japan had been defeated. Not being privy to the development of the atomic bomb, these military planners could not have foreseen the rapidity with which Emperor Hirohito would reach the decision to surrender; thus, they had planned to invade Japan, not accept its surrender. Consequently, they were caught somewhat off guard when they suddenly found themselves having to determine a suitable demarcation line between Russian forces that had already landed in Korea and American forces that were no closer than Okinawa.¹⁸

In his memoirs Truman wrote that designation of the 38th parallel as an international dividing line in Korea “was never the subject of international discussions.” Nevertheless, he wrote, “the Russians … began to treat the 38th parallel as a permanent dividing line.” At a December 1945 conference in Moscow, secretary of state James Byrnes proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union construct a peninsula-wide economic and transportation system that could be a first step toward unification. The Soviets countered that first a Joint Commission in Korea should be created, with a charter to create a unified Korean government. Only then should the two nations discuss economic issues and future withdrawals of military forces. Byrnes agreed to the counterproposal.

Soviet intransigence began manifesting with the first meeting of the Joint Commission in Seoul in January 1946 and continued through the commission’s final meeting of 1946 in May. Northern Korean leaders who disagreed with the proposal and favored rapid unification were quickly arrested. In the south protesters marched, at least one dissident political leader was killed, Communists were denounced, and the media reported that the people had no desire to submit to a United Nations trusteeship ...