Washington's Partisan War, 1775-1783

Mark Kwasny

• Publisher: The Kent State University Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781631010040
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: American Civil War History
• Index: History

"This solid, workmanlike monograph, based on impressive research and laced with first rate maps… gives the reader a greater appreciation of the performance of the states and their leaders in the northern theater of the war. And it shows that Washington was flexible in his use of the militia, which at times surprised him with its turnout and its performance."-Reviews in American History"Everyone knows that George Washington distrusted the militia….He has been quoted so often on the topic that even specialists do not realize that Washington also saw virtues in militiamen and used them with real skill." -Mark V. Kwasny

CHAPTER ONE

Initial Plans and Preparations
for the Use of the Militia,
1775–1776

THE FIRST CLASH at Lexington, Massachusetts, in April 1775 ignited a war that pitted the colonial militia against the might of the British Empire. The American colonies contained no standing military forces of their own at that time. The colonists relied instead on their internal militia organizations for immediate security needs, and on the British army and navy for meeting larger and longer-term threats. Thus, when the fighting started in Massachusetts, the American rebels immediately turned to their colonial militia forces for their defense, and “the best troops in the royal army, were seen, to the surprise and joy of every lover of his country, flying before the raw, inexperienced peasantry.”¹

The proper use of these citizen soldiers was a complex issue that challenged the rebels, or Whigs, throughout the war. The Whigs could use their militia forces as the basis for a united field army, or avoid a national army altogether and use the militia as independent armies within each colony. On the other hand, the rebel leaders could create a national army of full-time soldiers and rely on the militia organizations as local security forces within the individual colonies. While deciding these issues, the Whigs also had to improvise a workable system for controlling the militia. Company and regimental officers, colonial governments, and the emerging national Congress and Continental officer corps all had claims on the militia, and the American rebels had to forge a working relationship among these different levels of authority. By the spring of 1776, the American leaders had established the basic principles concerning the control and proper functions of their militia forces. Though these principles received many challenges during the long war, at least the rebel leaders had established a basis of understanding and agreement from which to work.

The British were not overly concerned about these rebel preparations to employ the militia. Except for General Thomas Gage, who warned that the battle near Bunker Hill showed the Americans could be effective soldiers, and perhaps except for Lord Jeffrey Amherst, commander in chief in England, British military and political leaders held the colonists in contempt. British army officers who had served in North America prior to the outbreak of war dismissed American military abilities and argued that the colonists would make the worst possible soldiers.²

Much of this negative attitude toward colonial military prowess came from the experiences of the French and Indian War. British military leaders from that earlier war saw the colonists as cowardly, sickly, selfish deserters. A British surgeon in Boston in 1775 had several other criticisms: Americans were “a drunken, canting, lying, praying, hypocritical rabble without order, subjection, discipline, or cleanliness,” and their army would “fall to pieces of itself.” The consensus was that the militia could not stand up to British regulars. William Howe, who later succeeded Gage in command of the British army in North America, believed a British soldier was worth two American soldiers. The song “Yankee Doodle,” sung later by Americans in praise of the country people who made up the militia, was at first popular with the British soldiers, who sang it in derision of the American militia.³

Despite this contempt, some British leaders seemed to understand the nature of the war they faced in 1775. Henry Clinton, who would become the third British army commander in North America, and William Howe both saw the wider dimension of the war that made this contest different from the typical European wars of territorial conquest. As Clinton said in 1776, the British had to persuade the American people to return to their former allegiance by winning their hearts and minds, to use a modern phrase. Sir James Murray, a Scottish officer, recognized a key problem for the British when he described the colonists in 1775 as “3,000,000 exasperated to the last degree and enflamed to the highest pitch of enthusiasm; we have too many instances of what that enthusiasm has been capable of producing not to be very doubtful of the event.” This enthusiasm, combined with a country one thousand miles long, worried Murray, notwithstanding the general contempt for colonial soldiers.⁴

The British who criticized the militia, however, misunderstood the colonial soldiers and what they had become by the 1770s. Though the praise the militia received in 1774–75 from rebel leaders was as exaggerated as the British contempt, the militia organizations of the colonial era had evolved during the previous wars. By the time the fighting started in 1775, the colonists could turn to what was, in effect, a semiprofessional military institution and not just a loosely controlled rabble of local militiamen. Even as George Washington tried to turn this semiprofessional force into a professional army, the colonial governments had available these local militia units to serve within and outside of the individual colonies. In effect, each colony had its own provincial army that could help defend it and its neighboring colonies, as well as control the people residing within those colonies.⁵

Whether these rebel militia forces would be effective or not, obviously, was a matter of great concern to the Whigs, but the colonial leaders had little choice. They had to turn to the militia in the spring of 1775. The colonial governments, however, which officially controlled these militia forces in April 1775, were not all safely in the hands of the Whigs. The colonies of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, in particular, provided three contrasting examples of the stability and political leanings of the colonial governments in 1775, and therefore of the ability of the Whigs to employ the militia.

Connecticut’s colonial government proved to be the most stable and easily converted to the Whig side, due mainly to the fact that its colonial governor, Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., supported the Whig cause against the British government. Trumbull’s patriot leanings and the firm Whig control of the General Assembly made it unnecessary to form new legislative and executive branches. In fact, Connecticut was the only colony of the thirteen able to shift from peace to war without restructuring its political system, government, governor, or committees.⁶

As the only colonial governor who joined the rebellion, Trumbull deserved much credit for the calm political transition in Connecticut. This sixty-four-year-old governor had opposed the earlier actions of Parliament and possibly had been involved in the early activities of the Sons of Liberty against British authority. After his election as governor by the Assembly in 1769, he had worked to avert an armed clash with the British, but when news of the fighting at Lexington and Concord arrived at his home in Lebanon, Connecticut, he immediately began to take measures to support the armed colonists against the British military. The first Connecticut militia troops ordered to Boston received their supplies from Trumbull’s personal stock of goods. Throughout the war, his home and store were his war office, from which he issued his executive orders and met his Council of Safety. In recognition of his unique status, the British king, members of Parliament, and current British periodicals all denounced Trumbull as the “Rebel Governor of Connecticut.” Tories had a special hatred for Trumbull, and after receiving death threats and warnings of a possible kidnapping, he had to accept a guard detail around his Lebanon house.⁷

The actions of this “Rebel Governor” and the legislature enabled Connecticut’s government to begin immediately to prepare for war. In fact, the General Assembly had ordered improved efforts at organizing and training the militia forces in December 1774. On April 26, 1775, just six days after Trumbull received word of the fighting in Lexington, a special session of the General Assembly met and the members passed an act providing for one-fourth of the militia, about six thousand troops, to be equipped and readied for the immediate defense of the colony. The legislators appointed David Wooster as the colony’s major general of militia and Israel Putnam as brigadier general. Putnam, a stout, burly man with a head of bushy white hair, was a favorite among the militia.⁸

At the same time, the relationship between the legislative and executive branches concerning the control of the militia clarified quickly in Connecticut. In May, the Assembly created a Council of Safety to aid the governor when the Assembly was not in session. Trumbull was to meet with the council whenever necessary. Altogether, the council met 913 days during the war, and Trumbull attended every session. The Assembly also declared it would command the militia being mustered; when it was not in session, the governor and the council would command the troops.⁹

The Connecticut Assembly also recognized the need for some freedom of action at a more local level. The legislators directed that the militia officers be prepared to muster and lead their men on their own initiative in case of a sudden British attack. When the British raided the coast later in the summer, the militia responded as desired, spontaneously, without waiting for orders from the colonial government.¹⁰ The Whig-run government of Connecticut provided well for the immediate, short-term defense of the colony.

New Jersey’s government did not make as smooth a transition as that of Connecticut. William Franklin, son of Benjamin Franklin, had received his appointment as governor from the king in an effort to gain favor with his father. As a Tory who fully supported the royal authority in the colonies, William tried to circumvent the rebel activities but steadily lost influence to the Whigs. In February 1776, militiamen commanded by Colonel William Winds briefly held Franklin under armed guard, but he was soon released. Franklin assumed that the Whigs wanted him to flee so that they could proceed to create a new government unhindered, as already had been done in New Hampshire, but he refused to leave. Later, hearing that British commissioners were on their way to Staten Island, Franklin called the General Assembly to meet in June 1776. The Whigs then made their move, and a detachment of militia commanded by Colonel Nathaniel Heard arrested Franklin. The Whig-controlled Provincial Congress sent Franklin to prison in Connecticut, where he remained a prisoner until 1778. After his release, Franklin resided in New York until the end of the war.¹¹

Despite Franklin’s efforts to maintain his authority, the Whigs slowly took power and organized the Provincial Congress in the summer of 1775. Particularly conspicuous in this movement were William Alexander, a future general of the Continental Army, and William Livingston, the future governor of New Jersey. Alexander, better known as Lord Stirling, was a good-looking, hard-drinking fifty-year-old Whig leader who helped energize the Whigs throughout 1775 and early 1776. The Provincial Congress began to usurp the powers of government, including command of the militia, and the Committees of Correspondence and Observation ran the local county governments. Finally, after the old General Assembly met for the last time in November 1775, the Whigs had a firmer control of New Jersey’s political machinery.¹²

While this power struggle occurred at the upper level of New Jersey’s government, initial preparations for war began at all levels. New Jersey inhabitants held town and county meetings, where they decided to muster and ready their militia for any emergency. Quickly, local militia units stopped communication between New Jersey Tories and British officials outside the colony. The new Provincial Congress began to exert its control over the militia in June 1775. The Congress adopted regulations and instructed four thousand of the enrolled militia to hold themselves as Minute Men in constant readiness to take the field in New Jersey or a neighboring province. These Minute Men were to stand ready for four months and then be relieved by other militiamen. In addition, two brigadier generals were appointed. One of them, Philemon Dickinson, was a conspicuous leader of the New Jersey militia throughout much of the war. The Congress also drafted a plan to regulate the militia, issued a call for the people of New Jersey to arm themselves and prepare to defend their liberty, and urged that command of the militia be entrusted only to known patriots who supported the Whig cause.¹³

In addition, the New Jersey Congress recognized the need for local initiative, and ordered the militia and Minute Men to assemble at their respective captains’ homes in case of a sudden alarm or invasion. The officers nearest to the source of the alarm would immediately lead their men to oppose the enemy while they sent warnings to their superior regimental officers. The regimental officers would inform their general officers and then march all or part of their regiments to support the local officers.¹⁴

The Whigs of New York had the most difficulty gaining control of their colony. In January and February 1775, the New York Assembly had rejected the authority of the First Continental Congress and had refused to appoint delegates to the Second Continental Congress. These actions had shocked many American patriots. Despite this political hesitancy, the news about Lexington and Concord increased the influence of the Whigs. In New York City, the Sons of Liberty already controlled the streets, and when news of the fighting in Massachusetts arrived, they unloaded ships destined to carry food to the British in Boston. The Whig patriots then announced the port was closed, seized 550 arms from the royal magazine in the city, and distributed the guns to volunteers, who began to drill and march through the city. These armed citizens then placed control of the city government into the hands of the Committee of 100. The Loyalists, as the Tories were also called, remained quiet in the face of this armed threat. By May 1 the immediate danger of violence had calmed, and the Whigs were firmly in control of the city. In early June, the Committee of 100 ordered the one hundred British soldiers in the city to leave.¹⁵

At the same time, the Whigs were gaining power throughout the entire colony. The rebel Committees of Correspondence helped establish a new Provincial Congress, which began to exert its authority over New York as it recommended that the people arm themselves. Meanwhile, Alexander McDougall, a key Whig leader and a member of the Provincial Congress, took command in New York City. A tall, handsome, hot-tempered Scotsman, whom George Washington called a “brave soldier and disinterested patriot,” McDougall spent the month of May organizing seven companies of militia in case more British soldiers came to New York.¹⁶

This promising beginning for the Whigs received its first check after May 26, when a British warship, HMS Asia, entered New York harbor and its captain trained its guns on the city. Matters became more complicated for the Whigs when the royal governor, William Tryon, arrived June 25, 1775, the same day that the newly appointed rebel commander in chief, George Washington, rode through New York City. Tryon wisely waited on board his ship until Washington’s welcoming ceremonies had finished. A former governor of North Carolina with a harsh reputation, Tryon had received the appointment as governor of New York in 1771, and in June 1775 was returning from England, where he had recommended reconciliation with the colonists. Upon his arrival in New York, however, he immediately began to rally the Tories, and with the Asia in the harbor lending force to Tryon’s actions, the Whigs had to move more cautiously. Tryon also moved carefully because he did not have the military force on hand to stop the Whigs, who were raising five thousand troops for their defense, and he believed that the Provincial Congress had for the moment wrested away most of his political power. Tryon decided against issuing a call for the old colonial Assembly to meet because he felt it was better to sit quietly than to take action and be rebuffed. In addition, he lived in fear of the actions of the mob in the city, unaware that Washington had left orders with Philip Schuyler, the Continental general in New York, to leave Tryon alone unless he tried to take forceful action. This uneasy truce lasted through the summer.¹⁷

Despite this forced truce, the Whigs increased their power by regulating a...