Charity as Divine and Human Friendship

A Metaphysical and Scriptural Explanation According to the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas

Matthew Kauth, STD

• Publisher: Saint Benedict Press
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781618905840
• Topic: Teologia e religione
• Subtopic: Denominazioni cristiane

The purpose of this work is to explore and explain St. Thomas' curious description of charity as a "kind of friendship of man for God."

This is achieved in two symphonic movements:

1) An investigation into the metaphysical substructure of friendship;

2) Analysis of St. Thomas' commentary on St. John's Gospel from which he takes his understanding of charity as friendship.

In the first part, basic concepts are defined which are employed ubiquitously by the Angelic Doctor whenever he discusses love and friendship. Once a basic lexicon is built, the author distinguishes diverse kinds of love given the anthropology of St. Thomas. This in term is employed in the specific love of friendship noting also Thomas' dependence upon the Philosopher, Aristotle. Finally, charity itself is examined based primarily upon Thomas' treatment in the Secunda secundae of the Summa Theologiae. The second movement of the work engages the text of Thomas' commentary. Aquinas sees the Incarnation as the archetype of all transformation in Christ, namely, that Christ establishes with man a common life upon which friendship is based. This common life must move from the sensible to the spiritual, from human life to Divine. This course is tracked by the author with special emphasis on the means employed by Christ now with His would-be friends, namely, the gift of His Spirit and the Sacrament of Charity.

NOTES

1 II, II q. 184 a. 1 c.

2 II, II q. 23 a. 1 s.c.

3 Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum. Ibid., c.

4 This point was brought to my attention during a lecture given by Professor Stephen Brock.

5 Consequenter, quia adhuc alia cognitio est necessaria, scilicet cognitio mysteriorum humanitatis, ideo subdit scire etiam supereminentem scientiae, et cetera. Ubi sciendum est quod quidquid est in mysterio redemptionis humanae et incarnationis Christi, totum est opus charitatis. Nam quod incarnatum est, ex charitate processit. Supra II, 4: propter nimiam charitatem suam qua dilexit nos, et cetera. Quia vero mortuus fuit, ex charitate processit Io. XV, 13: maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, etc.; infra V, 2: Christus dilexit nos, et tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo. Super Eph. cap. 3 lec. 5. In this passage, Thomas notes that faith consists in the knowledge of two things: the knowledge of God in his divinity and the knowledge of God in his humanity, for salvation is to know the true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent (Jn. 10:9).

6 The phrase “Divine-human friendship” while slightly inelegant, highlights the reality that we are speaking not principally about the friendship enjoyed between the Divine Persons in their perfect communicatio of one Divine nature, nor about natural friendship based upon the communicatio of effect to cause but rather man’s specific participation in Divine beatitude in virtue of the Divine election to communicate his goodness to man in the communicatio of grace which, as will be seen, ushers the recipient into a relationship Thomas will define as friendship. What is intended by “Divine friendship” further in the thesis will denote this supernatural relation while the phrase human friendship will denote simply that which is achieved by our natural powers alone.

7 Sicut enim maius est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari. II, II q. 188 a. 6 c.

8 Ubi notandum, quod omnis doctor necesse habet spiritualiter pascere turbam ad se venientem. Et quia nullus homo habet ex se unde pascat eam, ideo oportet quod aliunde emat labore, studio, assiduitate orationum. Super Ioan., c. 6 lec. 1 n. 849. Thomas has a lengthy discussion of the difference between studiositas and curiositas which speak of the proper and false ends of learning. See II, II q. 166 and 167. Study is not sufficient in itself. Philosophers, Thomas notes, have led many into error. See Super Ioan., c. 6 lec. 1 n. 845; II, II q. 2 a. 4 c. Nevertheless, every truth, Thomas argues, by whomsoever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit. Truth is nothing more than a participation in the light of the One who is truth. See Super Ioan., c. 8 lec. 6 n. 1250.

9 I q. 1 a. 5 c.

10 After Christ, Thomas states, nothing is so fittingly called a door in giving us such access. See Super Ioan., c. 10 lec. 1 n. 1367.

11 Ibid., n. 1366.

12 The analysis by David Gallagher is exceptional in its clarity and profundity and the historical investigation of the terms by Thomas Osborne most thorough. Similarly, the doctoral work by Wojciech Janusiewicz, while I disagreed with his conclusions, was most helpful for an historical analysis of friendship and the possible causes of Thomas’ understanding.

13 I will note each of these authors in turn in the relative sections. This is the most problematic aspect of the literature as no one author seems to agree on Thomas’ delineation of those acts.

14 Most notable among these is the fine work by Daniel Schwartz. While he limits himself to just three of the characteristics of friendship and deals little with what I consider necessary metaphysical notions, his analysis of concord is exceptional.

15 Frederick Crowe, Michael Sherwin and Guy Mansini are notable exceptions.

16 In addition to the manuals employed further in the thesis, one can see in many major moral manuals the remnants or summaries of Thomas’ full treatment of charity as divine and human friendship. Given their comprehensive purpose, however, none proved suitable for a penetrating investigation. Cf. Anselm Günthor. Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia morale v. II, morale speciale. (Milano: San Paolo, 1998); Giuseppe Mausbach. Teologia Morale v. II La Morale Speciale. Roma: Alba, 1954); Dominicus Prümmer Manuale Theologiae Moralis (Barcelona: Herder, 1946); Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Soc., 1938); Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, Collegio Lovaniensi (Bruxellis: Alb. Denit. 1927); Theologiae Moralis: De virtutum exercitatione (Romae: Gregoriana, 1924). Günthor is one example of moral theologians who disagree with Thomas’ emphasis on friendship stating that the Scriptures employ marriage as the prime analogy. This is not contrary to Thomas’ thought, as will be shown, for marriage in his mind is the highest kind of human friendship.

17 Anthony Towey’s excellent doctoral work on the Holy Eucharist and Divine friendship is one exception. That there is a movement from human to Divine friendship is not a common theme. While this is obviously the case for the first disciples, how is this pattern followed in the lives of current disciples?

18 Cf. Sap. 7:27.

19 See I q. 13 a. 1 c. Cf. Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans., Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 228.

20 Cf. Compend., cap. 78.

21 On the angelic knowledge as compared with human knowledge, see I q. 55 a. 2 c.

22 See for example his seminal discussion of charity derived from something “dear” (carus). I, II q. 26, a. 3 c.

23 See Thomas’ discussion of definitions in his II Ex Post Analyt., lec. 4.

24 I q. 79 a. 7 c.

25 Cf. Fides et ratio, § 17 and 90.

26 De Ver., q. 14, a. 5 obj. 4: Praeterea, forma omnis vel est substantialis, vel accidentalis, vel exemplaris. Sed caritas non est forma substantialis fidei, quia sic esset de integritate eius; nec iterum forma accidentalis, quia sic fides esset nobilior caritate, sicut subiectum accidente; nec iterum exemplaris, quia sic caritas posset esse sine fide, sicut exemplar sine exemplato. Ergo caritas non est forma fidei. For our purposes, it is sufficient at present to manifest the various types of form. The way in which charity is the form of the virtues will be discussed in chapter three. Thomas, while never abandoning the exemplary nature of charity as a form (which he inherited from St. Ambrose), nevertheless sharpens his distinctions in the Summa, describing it more in terms of the root, motivator, and efficient cause orchestrating the virtues to their perfection or end. See II, II q. 4, a. 1; II, II q. 23, a. 8. In De Ver., however, Aquinas already acknowledges this emphasis, commenting that charity is not the exemplar cause according to which faith is that which it is (id quod est which would imply species), but rather faith is patterned after charity according to its perfection (secundum hoc quod est perfecta). See De Ver., q. 14 a. 5 ad 4. See also III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a.1, sol. 1; De Car., 3.

27 The modern use of the term, exemplary, bears this connotation. It will be the burden of this thesis to manifest the way in which Thomas sees our Lord as the exemplum to which all the members are patterned. St. Thomas’ discussion of Christ as the exemplum must not be reduced to our current usage of the word “example.” Perfection is diverse as it pertains to nature and as it pertains to charity. See Super Matt., cap. 5 n. 558.

28 Ad septimum dicendum, quod actus fidei qui caritatem praecedit, est actus imperfectus, a caritate perfectionem expectans; fides enim, quantum ad aliquid est prior caritate et quantum ad aliquid posterior, ut dictum est. De Ver., q. 14 a. 5 ad 7.

29 I, II q. 1, a. 3; I, II q. 18, a. 6. Thomas employs an analogy to natural things, which take their species from their form. Analogously, the form of any voluntary act receives its species from the end, to which end that act is directed, whose mode of action should correspond proportionately. The act of faith, which is commanded by the will, is related thus to the object of the will, i.e., the good or end as well as to the object of the intellect as truth. See also II, II q. 4 a. 1 and 3.

30 This is analogous to man attempting to know and love God with the power of his nature alone. The specification of his nature and its good as ens naturae, is not sufficient without the operations being perfected by the aid of grace.

31 The measure of a thing’s perfection is in so far as it is adequate to the exemplar in the mind of the artisan who made it. Si qua vero scientia est quae est causa rei scitae, oportebit quod sit eius mensura. Ut scientia artificis est mensura artificiatorum; quia unumquodque artificiatum secundum hoc perfectum est, quod attingit ad similitudinem artis. Et hoc modo se habet scientia Dei respectu omnium. In X Meta., lec. II, n. 23. See also I q. 21 a. 2 c. This understanding of “exemplar” will play a prominent role in St. Thomas’ discussion of redemption as will be shown in section two of this thesis.

32 As Lawrence Dewan comments: “Both matter and form are difficult to know as they are at the very apex of speculative thought.” Lawrence Dewan, Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 66.

33 Idea enim dicitur ab eidos, quod est forma; unde nomen ideae, quantum ad proprietatem nominis, aequaliter se habet ad practicam et speculativam cognitionem; forma enim rei in intellectu existens, utriusque cognitionis principium est. I Sent. d. 36 q. 2 a. 1 c. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. I q. 15 a. 1 c.

34 This question is the famous but often exaggerated dichotomy between Plato and Aristotle. For a fine analysis and summary of the history of this question, see Lawrence Dewan, St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 2007). See also Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008); Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995). The primary concern, it seems, for Aristotle is that the Ideas in the doctrine of Plato are not causative, but merely potencies. While Plato seems to bridge this gap between the Ideas and things that exist through the demiurge (cf. Timaeus), Aristotle finds such an explanation unsatisfactory, and accounting for both the perdurance and the knowability of the individual existent, demands the substantiality or the hylomorphic constitution of creatures. See Metaph. VIII (1050b35-1051a2). By perdurance I mean why one being remains that being while undergoing many changes. By knowledge I am referring to the universal or the common. Aristotle poses the question that if all the things that exist are individual things, and these are of infinite number, how can one arrive at knowledge of infinite individuals? We know things insofar as they have unity and identity, and as such we also know them in their universality. See Metaph. II (999a24-28). For Aristotle’s analysis of Plato’s understanding of Ideas, see Metaph. I (987a29-993a27) in particular starting from 991b1. For commentary on Aristotle’s assessment of Plato see Lawrence Dewan, Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, ed. Jude P. Dougherty, vol. 45 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), in particular page 6, note 30.

35 I q. 15, a. 1 ad 1. On God acting by will and not by necessity to create that which is an idea in the Divine intellect, see II ScG, cap. 23.

36 Forma autem alicuius rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. I q. 15, a.1 c. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

37 In omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse e...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• SECTION ONE: THE METAPHYSICAL SUBSTRUCTURE OF FRIENDSHIP
• SECTION TWO: INCARNATE FRIENDSHIP AND DIVINE FRIENDSHIP
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Notes