Religious Television and Pious Authority in Pakistan

Taha Kazi

• Publisher: Indiana University Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9780253052230
• eBook ISBN:
  9780253052261
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Indian & South Asian History
• Index: History

In Pakistan, religious talk shows emerged as a popular television genre following the 2002 media liberalization reforms. Since then, these shows have become important platforms where ideas about Islam and religious authority in Pakistan are developed and argued. In Religious Television and Pious Authority in Pakistan, Taha Kazi reveals how these talk shows mediate changes in power, belief, and practice. She also identifies the sacrifices and compromises that religious scholars feel compelled to make in order to ensure their presence on television. These scholars, of varying doctrinal and educational backgrounds—including madrasa-educated scholars and self-taught celebrity preachers—are given screen time to debate and issue religious edicts on the authenticity and contemporary application of Islamic concepts and practices. In response, viewers are sometimes allowed to call in live with questions. Kazi maintains that these featured debates inspire viewers to reevaluate the status of scholarly edicts, thereby fragmenting religious authority . By exploring how programming decisions inadvertently affect viewer engagements with Islam, Religious Television and Pious Authority in Pakistan looks beyond the revivalist impact of religious media and highlights the prominence of religious talk shows in disrupting expectations about faith.

ONE

A BACKGROUND OF RELIGIOUS PROGRAMMING IN PAKISTAN

IN A GRIPPING ACCOUNT ENTITLED “It Fell from the Heavens,” Paracha (2010) attempts to identify the defining moment in Pakistan’s television history that instigated the trend of politically motivated religious programming in Pakistan. Paracha situates this moment in the sensational coverage from PTV (state-owned channel) of the events surrounding the imminent fall of NASA’s (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Skylab satellite, in July 1979. NASA had warned the Pakistani government of the possibility of the satellite falling into the Indian Ocean or onto Australia. According to Paracha, who recalls the “somber tone” and exhortations to prayer characterizing PTV’s regular updates of the satellite’s position, the state-owned channel’s deliberate amplification of the danger the satellite posed to Pakistan provoked a rise in Pakistani religiosity as many viewers turned to their faith for solace. Haque and Zaidi (1981, 162) make a similar association in their study on the psychological ramifications of the Skylab incident, when they attribute the rising Pakistani concern for religious conformance, and the surge in number of mosque goers, to the widespread sense of “hopelessness and senselessness” that prevailed in Pakistan just prior to the satellite’s crash. In Paracha’s (2010) opinion, the heightened concern for salvation that PTV’s apocalyptic imagery aroused in Pakistani viewers implicitly benefited the military dictator, General Ziaul Haq, by allowing him to enlist some support for his military coup against the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. On account of PTV’s sensational coverage, Zia’s Islamization agenda suddenly held greater appeal for the distraught and more religiously inclined Pakistanis. Following these observations, Paracha speculates about the government’s potential culpability in encouraging PTV to deliberately exaggerate the danger the satellite posed to Pakistan.

Even though the Skylab episode presents a compelling example of Zia’s employment of religion for political propaganda, its role in paving the way for future manipulations of Islam by the ʿulamā and religiopolitical parties, and in rendering the Pakistani viewership more susceptible to religion-coated political propaganda, needs to be duly acknowledged. As Paracha laments, although the Pakistanis soon forgot the Skylab episode, “the apocalyptic outlook that it had triggered lingered.” Moreover, instances of Islam’s political manipulation in the region can be found even prior to Zia’s leadership, during the colonial era, when the Muslim elite employed the discourse of Muslim nationalism to simultaneously justify the partition of the Indian subcontinent and precipitate Pakistan’s subsequent creation in 1947. While Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was successful in garnering support for the creation of a separate Muslim homeland, he failed to elaborate the shape and form that Islamic ideology would take in the newly formed Pakistani nation. Many scholarly accounts since then have highlighted that Jinnah’s failure led to equivocation regarding Islam’s role in Pakistani society and polity (Iqbal 1984; Hassan 1985; Korson and Maskiell 1985; Faruqi 1991; Metcalf 2004; Mandaville 2007). The ambiguity surrounding Islam’s role also influenced Islam’s subsequent manifestations on television, as these came to vary greatly with the political agenda of successive governments. Therefore, even though General Ziaul Haq easily stands out as the most notable proponent of Islam’s political manipulation in Pakistan, an exclusive focus on Zia’s Islamization program may be limiting when examining contemporary trends in religious programming in Pakistan. What follows, then, is a history of religious programming in Pakistan, from its earlier configuration as a subject of state control to its subsequent reconstitution as a consumer good under the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf. I employ a historical understanding of religious programming in Pakistan to contextualize my subsequent analyses in this book and my claims regarding the contemporary aspects of religious programming in Pakistan.

THE PERIOD BEFORE MEDIA LIBERALIZATION

Virtually all scholarship detailing the history of Pakistani television, prior to the liberalization of Pakistani media, reads out as a narrative on Pakistan’s political history (see Akhtar 2000; Hasan 2000; Shaikh 2007). These scholarly works cover little of the developments that took place within specific genres of television programming, such as within entertainment and religion. Instead, they emphasize the various instances when television’s political instrumentality, or its control by various governments, became more manifest. In the following sections, I tease out some historical moments that demonstrate television’s susceptibility to governmental influence. Because of the paucity of indigenous scholarship and official documentation on Pakistan’s television history in general, and religious programming in particular, in many places in this chapter, I revert to my field-based interactions with religious television presenters in order to compensate for the gaps left by existing media literature. In these instances, the narrations of my scholarly interlocutors, which are rooted in their long-term association with religious broadcasting—starting from the introduction of religious programming on the state-owned channel, PTV, and leading up to the more recent appearances of these scholars on private satellite channels—have allowed me to present a more comprehensive overview of the key developments that took place on television under different Pakistani governments. In tracing these developments, I demonstrate how the differences characterizing the political agendas of various Pakistani governments favored the proliferation of extremely diverse and differentiated modes of religious representation on television.

AYUB KHAN (1958–69)

Television was first introduced to Pakistan in 1964, under the military dictatorship of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The government envisioned that television would aid the ruling military elite in instituting social, economic, and educational reforms within Pakistan (Hasan 2000, 32). Hasan informs us that this move was part of a larger government plan to use the media to efface Pakistan’s regional diversity, through the proliferation of images of unity and homogeneity (34). Therefore, while scholarly histories of television programming pay due credit to Ayub’s government for introducing this “new” technology to Pakistan, they simultaneously also highlight Ayub’s culpability in setting the stage for television’s political manipulation by future Pakistani governments (see Hasan 2000; Shaikh 2007). The first instance of television’s political deployment under Ayub Khan was PTV’s celebration of the military government’s decade of development. As noted by Shaikh (2007, 20), PTV deliberately highlighted this celebration at the behest of the military dictator in order to counter his waning popularity among the Pakistani masses. However, PTV’s efforts in this context not only misfired but also generated widespread skepticism regarding the political neutrality of broadcast content. The Pakistanis’ mixed response to PTV’s initiative prompted an already vulnerable government to undertake substantive reforms regarding the autonomy accorded to television producers. On account of these reforms, in 1972, PTV was transformed into what ostensibly promised to be a more professionally managed and autonomous Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. However, Shaikh notes that these reforms were primarily cosmetic in nature, and governmental influence and control remained a salient feature of PTV’s transmissions throughout Ayub Khan’s tenure in government (70).

While Ayub Khan was not averse to using television to further his political career, he was extremely wary of deploying religion for this purpose. Khan alludes to Ayub Khan’s wariness of religion when comparing him to his successor, Ziaul Haq. Khan notes that, if “for Zia, mullaism was a desired state of being,” for “Ayub Khan mullaism represented an ill that had to be wiped out” (2003, 55). Metcalf (2004, 223–24) makes a similar observation while noting that Ayub’s preferred understanding of the economy was “wholly divorced from moral considerations” and entailed a view of it as “subject to its own laws.” In Metcalf’s opinion, it was not so much that Ayub did not use Islam to further his interests but rather that he conformed to a more “modernist” approach when it came to Islam’s political deployment. For Ayub, therefore, unlike Zia, Islam did not so much act as the “blueprint” for state-mandated policies but rather constituted the ultimate interest that was served as a consequence of following state policies (Metcalf 2004). Metcalf’s suggestion also sheds light on why the influence of religious leadership in economic and governmental policies remained marginalized under Ayub’s governance.

ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO (1971–73 AND 1973–77)

The precedent of media control set by Ayub Khan’s government was continued by the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, which despite its popular mandate was not averse to enacting the “repressive press laws” introduced by the previous military dictator (Hasan 2000, vi). Hasan (123) reminds us how these laws were “mercilessly” deployed against several newspapers and their editors to curb the printing and broadcast of anti-Bhutto rhetoric. On television, Bhutto wielded his political influence mainly through his cronies, whom he placed in upper-level management positions at PTV (Hasan 2000). However, despite his political savviness, Bhutto, much like his predecessor, was also disinclined to employ religion to further his political career. When I met with the renowned Barelwi religious scholar and television presenter Allama Kokab Noorani, he confirmed to me that during Bhutto’s term in government, religious programming had been severely neglected on the state-owned channel. This included PTV’s deliberate disregard for the precedent set by the former Ayub government to initiate television transmissions with the name of Allah and the recitation of khuṭbā (a Qurʾānic verse used to mark the start of an event). While speaking of the more general measures undertaken by the government to tailor PTV’s programming ethos to Bhutto’s religious preferences, Allama Noorani, whose association with PTV dated back to the channel’s fledgling run under Ayub Khan’s governance, additionally drew my attention to the government-imposed ban on any mention of, or reference to, the word sharāb (alcohol) on the state channel. He was of the opinion that the ban had been mandated by the government to avoid drawing public attention to Bhutto’s drinking habit. However, if the veteran religious presenter faulted Bhutto’s government for not giving religion its due importance on television, equally he opposed giving credit to Ayub’s government for promoting religious programming in Pakistan. This was despite the fact that Baseerat (Insight), the first religious program to air on PTV, in 1969, was initially broadcast during Ayub’s time in government. Instead, the religious presenter firmly maintained that it was only during Zia’s political tenure that religion had been accorded its proper place on television. Allama Noorani acknowledged Zia’s role in this context in spite of his misgivings about the military dictator’s dubious, and distinctly political, motives for promoting Islam on television.

GENERAL ZIAUL HAQ (1977–88)

In his book Uncensored, a revealing exposé on the Pakistani state’s manipulation and control of the state-owned television channel, Hasan (2000) provides a detailed account of Zia’s obsession with controlling television. Hasan cites many occasions when Zia’s simultaneous fascination with, and wariness of, television manifested with his greater control over featured programming content. For example, when speaking of the Khabarnama, a name given to the news bulletin telecast on PTV every day at 9:00 p.m., Hasan recounts that a daily recording of the Khabarnama was sent to Zia for review. In fact, Zia was so concerned about his projected image that even minor deviations from the state guidelines would disturb him and provoke his censure. The president’s “extraordinary interest” in the Khabarnama also included regular visits to PTV’s National News Bureau by his information secretary to ensure that the channel complied with the president’s wishes (199). Hasan also recalls that Zia’s compulsion to deploy the state-owned channel to further his own agenda was not limited to news. In fact, Zia was equally open to employing religious programming as the means of countering his waning credibility. The general had made repeated promises to the Pakistanis to hold new elections within ninety days of his takeover of government from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In his first address to the nation, on July 5, 1977, Zia declared, “I want to make absolutely clear that neither have I any political ambitions nor does the army want to be detracted from its profession of soldiering. I was obliged to step in to fill the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have accepted this challenge as a ‘True Soldier of Islam.’ My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections, which would be held in October this year. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule” (quoted in Hasan 2000, 167).

However, a change of heart intervened, in large part prompted by Bhutto’s increasing popularity among Pakistanis. Thus, despite his repeated assurances to the nation regarding the interim nature of his government, Zia failed to deliver on his promise. The mantra of Islamization, for which PTV’s support was also enlisted, aided Zia in averting his fall from grace. Hasan notes that Zia, with the support of “some hired Ulema from the Council of Islamic Ideology,” was able to depict the democratic system of governance as un-Islamic (187). Islamization, therefore, in Hasan’s view, simultaneously provided Zia a way out of holding the promised elections and the means by which to win back popular support. Zia’s desire for political ascendancy, and his corresponding employment of Islam as a means to placate his primary supporters, the religiopolitical parties, also prompted a salient reconfiguration in PTV’s goals, transforming its main purpose from providing entertainment to promoting Zia’s political and ideological agenda (Shaikh 2007, 71). In tandem with this agenda, Zia also gave a “psy-war specialist of the army,” General Mujibur Rehman, complete control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, with a view of curbing free media expression and promoting journalists with “rightist” orientations (Hasan 2000, 183). Zia viewed the latter as more supportive of his regime and thus enlisted those journalists’ aid in realizing his dream of a theocratic state, including the elimination of all “‘un-Islamic institutions’ such as the political parties and democracy” (183).

Zia’s Islamizing mandate specifically extended to broadening the scope of religious programming on the state-controlled channel. According to the religious presenter Allama Noorani, prior to Zia’s arrival, religious programming had been accorded limited transmission time (thirty minutes) and had been confined to a daily show and occasional references to specific Muslim occasions, such as ʿĀshūrāʾ (commemoration of the martyrdom of Ḥazrat Ali’s [RA] family¹), Ramaḍān (the holy month of fasting), and ʿĪd Mīlād-un Nabī (the celebration of the Prophet’s [PBUH] birth anniversary). However, under Zia’s leadership, PTV introduced three new religious programs and increased the duration of religious broadcasts. Two of the newly introduced programs, Farman-e-Elahi (Decree of God) and Fahm ul Quran (Understanding of Qurʾān), focused primarily on pedagogical content or exegetical commentary on select Qurʾānic verses. However, the third program, Tafheem-e-Deen (Understanding Dīn), also established a new precedent in religious programming in that it also incorporated audience participation as a central feature of its format. The producers did this by eliciting queries in writing from members of the viewing public. In Allama Noorani’s opinion, the written queries elicited by the former show constituted a much better form of viewer participation than live viewer call-ins, which are the favored mode of viewer participation for contemporary religious talk shows. Allama Noorani’s preference for written queries drew on his assessment of this mode of viewer participation as one that allowed producers and directors greater discretionary control over featured religious content. Alternatively, I demonstrate in the next chapter that despite the incorporation of viewer call-ins and the shift toward live broadcasting, production control remains a salient feature of contemporary religious programming. This is because the calls coming in during live transmissions are carefully screened by production assistants before being forwarded to the host and scholarly presenters.

On the initiatives undertaken by PTV at Zia’s behest, such as the allocation of airtime to religious programming, Allama Noorani informed me that both Tafheem-e-Deen and Fahm ul Quran, which were initially broadcast biweekly, became regular Friday features on PTV during Zia’s tenure in government. Hasan (2000) and Paracha (2010) have made similar observations, both acknowledging a substantial increase in the duration of religious programming subsequent to Zia’s takeover of government from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. PTV’s increased mindfulness regarding the promotion of Islamic values also extended to other avenues of programming and involved a concerted focus on the observance of important Islamic events and occasions such as Muḥarram (the mourning period for Ḥazrat Ali (RA), who was martyred during the Battle of Karbalā) and the Prophet’s (PBUH) birth anniversary. In recalling the sobriety of PTV’s transmissions, especially on the ninth and tenth of Muḥarram, Ali (1986, 2171) observes that the occasion was commemorated with the marked absence of comedy shows and the elimination of all musical content, including the removal of “signature tunes of regular” programs such as the Khabarnama. The visible observance of religious events was, on the one hand, aimed by the government at instilling in the minds of the viewers the importance of Islam to their everyday lives and, on the other, directed toward reminding the viewers of the restrictions Islam, and by extension the ruling government, imposed on their lives.

The government’s interference in television programming was not limited to encouraging increased Islamic content on television. In this context, Ali reminds us that the government also sought to dictate the types of religious content that would be featured by the state-owned channel. One particular incident narrated by Hasan (2000) serves to illustrate Ali’s argument. Hasan recalls that one of the many measures adopted by PTV in support of Zia’s government included the daily telecast of a select quote from the Prophet (PBUH), which informed the viewers of their divinely ordained obligations in their quest for a heavenly abode in the afterlife. However, the Prophetic quotes to be broadcast were not decided on independently by the channel’s producers but rather were dictated by the producers’ expectations regarding the government’s response. For instance, PTV, on the advice of the Ministry of Information, tactfully removed a frequently telecast quote (167). As the quote exhorted the believer to fulfill a promise, Hasan believes that it pricked Zia’s conscience by reminding the military dictator of his unfulfilled promise to the nation. In Hasan’s view, Zia may have been concerned that the quote’s repeated telecast would draw att...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Note on Transliteration
• Introduction
• 1. A Background of Religious Programming in Pakistan
• 2. The Production, Ownership, and Control of Religious Television Shows
• 3. Doctrinal Activism and Religious Television
• 4. Religious Authority and Control over Religious Knowledge
• 5. Self-Styled Scholars and Religious Show Hosts: Emerging Sources of Religious Authority
• 6. Changing Viewer Assessments of Religious Authority
• 7. Redefining the Boundaries for Critical Deliberation in Islamic Public Debate
• Conclusion
• Glossary of Arabic Terms
• References
• Index
• About the Author