Youâre back on a plane. Youâve just tucked away your laptop in an overhead compartment after finally finishing some important work during the flight. Unknown to you, the pilots have just detected a serious mechanical problem--one that the pilots know will force a crash landing of the plane. The pilots intend to alert the passengers so that they can prepare themselves for the landing. However, in order to avoid the potential chaos of a mass panic, they intend to hold off on alerting passengers until the last possible second. After a successful, though frightening landing, all of the passengers escape the planeâthough not with enough time to retrieve their belongings. Here again, you didnât choose to leave your laptop because you were never offered the choice to retrieve it. And yet the pilotsâ decision to withhold information from passengers in this case seems very different than the flight attendantsâ decision discussed in the previous case. In this situation, the pilots only compromised passenger autonomy in order to secure passenger safety. Philosophers call this paternalism. A paternalistic action is one that interferes with an individualâs autonomous decisions for that individualâs own good. Although employing paternalistic actions may have clear benefits with regard to health and safety, it is not clear that doing so also âholds paramountâ public welfare. Consider the following case submitted to the NSPE BER.
Duty to Report Unsafe Conditions/Client Request for Secrecy
Case 98-9
Year: 1998
Facts:
Engineer A, a structural designer of a large commercial building, incorporates new and innovative design concepts. After construction is complete and the building is occupied, he finds an omission in his calculations that could result in its collapse under severe, but not unusual wind conditions. The collapse would not only jeopardize the occupants and their immediate surroundings but could possibly cause a âdominoâ effect threatening a much larger area.
Engineer A advises the architect and client of the problem. After consultation with the architect, the client, and the city engineer, all agree upon remedial construction, which can be accomplished over the next few months. A storm monitoring system and contingency evacuation plan for the building and surrounding neighborhood are developed for the time before construction is complete.
Both the client and architect strongly agree that the situation should be kept secret, with construction accomplished during the evening hours when the building is unoccupied. Engineer A is confident that the construction will completely rectify any structural concerns and that the evacuation plan has a reasonable chance of success.
Engineer B, the city engineer, has concern for the public, especially the office workers in the building and their right to know, but the architect and the client maintain that right is superseded by the consequences of a possible public panic resulting from any notification.
In this case, community members werenât forced to stay despite the danger. However, they did not choose to stay either. And thatâs because they werenât aware that there was a choice to be made. So clearly, members of the public would suffer a violation of autonomy should Engineer B decide to keep the project a secret.
Ordinarily, members of the public have a right to know if they might be at risk. And it would take a great deal to suspend this right. Letâs assume there is a strong possibility that giving them that information may ultimately compromise their safety (for instance, perhaps the instigation of a mass panic could cause injury or delay the remedial construction). Even so, it is difficult to imagine that risks would be grave enough in this case to justify such a serious compromise of autonomy. In that case, the suggestion to employ secrecy, though perhaps driven by paternalistic motivations, is not morally justified. However, itâs not difficult to imagine a case in which acting to fully inform the public could generate serious risks to health and safety. In these cases, itâs an open question, morally, whether paternalistic actions might be justified. There are cases in which paternalistic action seems much more acceptable from a moral point of view. For example, the creation and enforcement of seatbelt laws, though not uncontroversial, are arguably examples of the justifiable use of paternalism.
But âmore acceptableâ instances of paternalism such as seatbelt laws are, again, not totally uncontroversial. This is particularly true in situations in which the individual or group subject to the paternalistic interventions places a high value on freedom. Itâs hardly surprising, for instance, that paternalistic laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets face much more pushback than seatbelt laws. Part of the draw of riding a motorcycle for some is the idea of the freedom that comes with it. For some riders, the risk involved with riding a motorcycle itself is part of its appeal. In such cases, itâs not clear whether politicians have the moral authority to restrict autonomy by passing helmet laws.
Engineers, however, are not typically policy makers in the same way politicians or the heads of corporations are. Politicians often directly influence peopleâs choices via legal directives while, more often than not, engineers indirectly shape the publicâs choices through design. How so? Itâs not usually within the purview of an engineer (as an engineer) to create a law that restricts an individualâs freedom âfor her own sake.â However, an engineer can design a product that accomplishes the same end. Consider, for instance, a cell phone that is designed to block incoming and outgoing texts while inside a moving vehicle. This kind of technology might be more effective at curtailing distracted driving than a law that banned texting on the road. And yet the public, in cases in which their choices are being shaped indirectly through design, are probably far less cognizant that their choices are being âmanipulated.â This brings us to the nex...