Coaching Psychology

Constructivist Approaches

Jelena Pavlović

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367860981
• eBook ISBN: 9781000346497
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Animal & Comparative Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Coaching Psychology: Constructivist Approaches presents a comprehensive overview of constructivist approaches to individual, group and team coaching. Jelena Pavlovi? introduces key ideas and explores a variety of models, tools and techniques, setting out a landscape of constructivist psychology as applied to coaching.

Beginning with an overview of constructivism in contemporary psychology, the book elaborates on key processes of discursive and narrative construction of self. A variety of constructivist approaches to coaching, including personal and relational construct, narrative, appreciative, systemic and solution focused, are offered with basic principles, operating models and coaching techniques. Pavlovi? also introduces a constructivist model for coaching teams, illustrated with case studies, and sets out a framework and guidelines for training coaches in this approach.

Coaching Psychology: Constructivist Approaches offers an innovative resource for coaches in practice and in training, particularly those seeking to understand how constructivist approaches can be used to develop individuals, groups and teams.

Part 1
Coaching the self as a construction

1 Constructivist views of self and identity

Introduction: discourse, narrative and construction

Discourse is usually defined as a system of interpretation, a process of meaning creation or a set of images and stories that create a certain version of reality (Burr, 2002; Pavlović et al., 2006). What we have learned from Foucaldian theory is that sometimes discourses produce subjectivity or a version of us as people (Foucault, 1982; Parker, 1992). For example, whether we are seen as a perfectionist or not, may be a matter of perspective, rooted in certain time, space and cultural coordinates. The discourse of perfectionism has created a habit of labelling certain behaviors as overly obsessed with details and the best possible outcomes, while labelling some other behaviors as normal hard work.

Narrative psychologists similarly take narrative or story as a central theoretical concept, pointing to a constructed and sequential nature of our sense of who we are (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; Bruner, 1990; Denzin, 1989; Polkinghorne, 1988). While discourses are usually described as social meaning making processes, which deny us agency in changing them, the concept of narrative was designed to point to a more individual and agentic view of self. We may create a narrative of our self being a perfectionist and keep repeating a similar story in which we have the same positioning. While we cannot change the social meaning production process, we can choose to shift our understanding of our self within the available linguistic resources. We can argue that concepts of discourse and narrative cover a continuum of meaning making processes around personhood, which go from public or social contructions to more private and individual constructions that shape our understanding of self and others.

Both concepts of discourse and narrative produce certain ways of thinking and behaving (Parker, 1992). They direct our attention not to what a certain person really is but to how a certain version of that person has become constructed and how we can help in a positive reconstruction. Discursive and narrative views include a set of theoretical assumptions and research strategies that focus on the meaning making processes in creating our understanding of personhood (Bruner, 1990; Davies & Harre, 1990; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Discursive and narrative approaches treat language not as a neutral and transparent vehicle for expressing thoughts but as a form of practice that has immediate interactional effect. Language helps us present ourselves as a certain kind of persons or position ourselves into the network of social relations in a certain way. Discourse and narrative analysis start with learning about how those interactional effects are created in the way we use language.

Self as a construction

Although self and identity seem to be intuitively obvious or even self-explanatory concepts, it has been pointed to evasiveness and a state of anarchy when it comes to defining them (Bruner, 2001). There has been an overlapping use of concepts such as personality, identity, self and person (Harre, 2001; Leary, 2004). The lack of conceptual clarity can be associated with co-existence of multiple perspectives in the domain of personality psychology.

As Harre (2001) points out, there is M-grammar or essentialist view of self as a substance, and P-grammar referring to the relational view of self as a construction. View of self as an entity or a substance assumes that self is no different from other physical objects, so it is possible to define it clearly and precisely (Harre, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This view also assumes there is one true essence of personality that can be discovered and described. The two perspectives are positioned as antagonist in the personality psychology discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Stojnov, 2005). In other words, conceptual chaos in the definitions come from the evident co-existence of essentialist and relational approaches. According to Harre (2001:73), we need both perspectives to understand the complexity of human nature. In the text that follows, an overview will be offered of the differences in the language use of different perspectives on self and identity.

Personality and the view of self as an entity

In contemporary usage, the concept of personality is related to psychological formulation of the person and is often associated with trait theories and the individual differences approach in personality (Burr, 2002; Stojnov, 2005). According to Stojnov (2005:219), personality as a concept is used to describe individuality that is expressed by observable characteristics that differ one person from another. Potter and Wetherell (1987:97) argued that trait theories are based on the idea of person as consisting of measurable traits, abilities and characteristics. How one behaves is determined by the combination of underlying traits, which can be measured to identify their distribution in the population. Some of the critics of trait theories (Stojnov, 2005) pointed to the failure to acknowledge inconsistencies in human behaviour and the formative role of social context. That is why social constuctionists (Burr, 2002) use the concept of self and identity to avoid the fixed and essentialist connotations in the contemporary usage of the concept of personality.

Erikson’s view of identity as achieved self

It is often said that the concept of personal identity represents an answer to the question who one is (Sarbin, 2000; Stojnov, 2005). Erik Erikson (2008:118), an author who is perhaps best known for his psychological contributions to the concept of identity, anticipated the definitional difficulties, but also unclarities and evasiveness of this term. For Erikson (1970), the question of identity was a strategic question of an epoch, closely tied to a specific social context. As Erikson explains, the question of identity was raised in a social context of achieving American identity in the immigrant population. This biographical note sheds some light on why the issues of personal continuity and sameness were so central in Erikson’s theory of identity (Berzonsky, 2005). In the context of construing new American identities, stability and continuity represented desirable paths of individual development. Challenges of adjustment to a new cultural and economic order were the starting point of Erikson’s conceptualization of stages of identity development. Depending on whether the person adjusts to a social context or not, identity may be achieved, diffused or rejected (Kacerguis & Adams, 1979). Identity achievement, characterized by a sense of sameness and continuity, is considered the basis of healthy personality. In other words, identity was considered as a mechanism of equilibrium creation, holding a person in a state of stability and order (Sampson, 1985). This orderly concept of identity implied adjustment to a social order (Erikson, 1970). According to Erikson (1966:160–161), the crisis of identity was least marked in the segment of youth which was “able to invest its fidelity in an ideological trend associted with a new technical and economic expansion (such as mercantilism, colonialism, industrialization)”. Moreover, identity development in Erikson’s theory is conceived as linear, consisting of a number of developmental stages. This idea of achieved, linear and orderly identity probably represented desirable constructions of immigrant identity in American society of the time.

However, some of the critics argue that Erikson’s view of identity in contemporary societies is not as relevant as it used to be (Berzonsky, 2005; Phoenix & Rattansi, 2005; Schachter, 2005). There are a number of questions that can be raised regarding its relevance in changed social circumstances. For example, critics argue that in contemporary societies stabile and coherent identity may no longer be equally achievable, but also useful (Schachter, 2005). If contemporary societies value ability to disrupt oneself and radically innovate one’s way of thinking and being, then sameness and continuity may no longer be the preconditions of psychological health. In changed social circumstances, Erikson’s theory is mainly critiqued for not fully acknowledging the complex ways of constituting identities (Phoenix & Rattansi, 2005). It is interesting that Erikson himself anticipated that the time would come when his theory would be challenged in more complex systems of economic and political organization (Erikson, 2008:118). In the meanwhile, identity remained a strategic question of this time too, but new ways of theorizing identity at some points started to diverge from Erikson’s classic view of identity.

Self 1, 2, 3

Another view is to treat the concepts of person, self and identity as narratives or constructions we use in different contexts and for various purposes. According to Harre (2001:59), more is comprehended under the polysemic concept of self than under the concept of personal identity. Harre (2001) explored the rules by which the cluster of concepts around personhood and “the self” were managed. These rules were reflected in a mini-formula. Harre (2001:60) proposed P {S₁, S₂, S₃}. In this formula, Self 1 refers to an embodied view of a person as singular in space and time. Usage of Self 1 expresses the qualities of continuity and singularity underlying Erikson’s concept of personal identity. To use Self 1 in talk is to assume a position of identity. Self 2 is used in the context of self-reflection to include various images, feelings and private dialogues. This version of self corresponds to the psychological term of self-concept or definitions of self as a reflective domain of the person (Stojnov, 2005). Finally, Self 3 is used in the context of social interaction to denote ways in which certain aspects of Self 2 are manifested to others in different life episodes. This aspect of self assumes multiplicity and is similar to Gofman’s (2000) view of person as the way people present themselves to others. Person, or P in this model, includes various S’s, which emerge in the flow of P’s activities related to perception, reflection and social interaction.

By introducing Self 1, 2 and 3, Harre (2001) seems to connect Erikson’s classic view of identity, view of self as a reflective domain and Gofman’s (2000) theory of self-presenting in one framework for explaining personhood. What is achieved is a comprehensive view of personhood as created of various self-domains.

Subjectification: “Hey, you!”

Critical social theory (Foucault, 1982; Rose, 1996) has brought attention to the relations between self, identity and power. Being a certain kind of person is seen as being located in a certain discourse position. In other words, critical social theory draws our attention to the way personhood is shaped in social interactions and mediated by power relations.

Two important concepts for describing personhood in critical social theory are subject and subjectification. The term subject implies being dependent on one’s identity and attached to it by forms of self-knowledge. According to Foucault (1982:15), the term subject should be understood as “not the speaking consciousness, not the author of the formulation, but a position that may be filled in a certain conditions by various individuals”. Using this somewhat unusual term for describing persons sheds new light on th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: constructivist coaching psychologies
• Part 1 Coaching the self as a construction
• Part 2 Constructivist coaching psychologies: principles, models and techniques
• Part 3 Constructivist group and team coaching
• Part 4 Training constructivist coaches
• Conclusion: anticipating the future of constructivist coaching psychologies
• Index