Bombs in the Backyard

Atomic Testing and American Politics

A. Constandina Titus

• Publisher: University of Nevada Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780874179620
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

On January 27, 1951, the first atomic weapon was detonated over a section of desert known as Frenchman Flat in southern Nevada, providing dramatic evidence of the Nevada Test Site's beginnings. Fifty years later, author A. Costandina Titus reviews contemporary nuclear policy issues concerning the continued viability of that site for weapons testing. Titus has updated her now-classic study of atomic testing with fifteen years of political and cultural history, from the mid-1980s Reagan-Gorbachev nuclear standoff to the authorization of the Nevada Test Site Research Center, a Desert Research Institute facility scheduled to open in 2001. In this second edition of Bombs in the Backyard, Titus deftly covers the post-Cold War transformation of American atomic policy as well as our overarching cultural interest in all matters atomic, making this a must-read for anyone interested in atomic policy and politics.

1

From Atomos to A-Bomb

A Brief History of Nuclear Development

Although it is common knowledge today that the world is composed of tiny particles known as atoms, scientific acceptance of the existence of atoms is of relatively recent origin.¹ First suggested around 450 B.C. by the Greek philosopher Leucippus, the atomic hypothesis was rejected for some two thousand years on the authority of Aristotle, who taught that matter consisted of continuous elements rather than separate atoms. It was not until the Renaissance, when experimentation began to replace metaphysics, that the atomic theory again attracted interest. Once reconsidered, however, it was pursued with vigor, and over the next three hundred years most of the scientific inquiry conducted throughout the world contributed in some degree to its development. The prevailing view during this period can be summed up in this statement by Isaac Newton from his work Opticks: “It seems probable to me that God in the Beginning form’d matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles.”²

Newton’s theory of impenetrability was to be proven wrong as several major breakthroughs occurred during the nineteenth century that added significantly to the understanding of atomic phenomena. In 1803 the British chemist John Dalton determined that every chemical element is composed of atoms which are identical and which can be distinguished from the atoms of other elements by their weight. He further theorized that the smallest unit of a chemical compound is an entity composed of a specific combination of atoms of various elements; this entity is known today as a molecule. Thirty years later Michael Faraday, while studying the effects of electricity passed through chemical compound solutions, concluded that atoms yield definite amounts of electricity. This finding in turn led to the discovery of the electron, one of the components of the atom itself.³

By the end of the nineteenth century it had become evident that atoms have a structure of their own that can be penetrated. Research emphasis then shifted as a result of several major findings which showed atoms of certain heavy metals to be radioactive. This shift began in 1895 when the German scientist Wilhelm Röntgen discovered that, as cathode rods strike the walls of a glass tube in which a gaseous discharge is occurring, a radiation is emitted which is capable of penetrating opaque objects. Röntgen called this radiation X-rays, X meaning unknown. Because the equipment for producing X-rays was readily accessible and the technique fairly simple, researchers rushed to experiment with the new phenomenon.⁴

Interest in X-rays was not limited to the scientific community. The public’s response to this amazing new discovery was also enthusiastic.⁵ Thomas Edison arranged for the first demonstration of X-rays in the United States to be held at the National Electric Light Association exhibition in New York City in May 1896. Immediately thereafter, X-ray exhibits became popular events at county fairs across the nation as people lined up for a chance to “see their bones.” Personal X-rays were soon considered a status symbol, and the titillating possibility of using the rays for naughty purposes permeated even polite conversation, as illustrated by the following poem, which appeared in a popular photography magazine:

X-actly So!

The Roentgen Rays, the Roentgen Rays,

What is this craze?

The town’s ablaze

With the new phase

of Xray’s ways.

I’m full of daze

Shock and amaze;

For nowadays,

I hear they’ll gaze

Thru cloak and gown—and even stays

These naughty, naughty Roentgen rays.⁶

The real significance of X-rays in the development of atomic energy is that their production resulted in another crucial discovery made later that same year. The observation that production of X-rays is accompanied by fluorescence of the glass walls of the discharge tube led scientists to examine other materials known to be capable of fluorescing, to see if they also would emit penetrating radiation. A French investigator, Henri Becquerel, was particularly interested in the element uranium. He soon found that uranium emits radiation which, like X-rays, will penetrate cardboard and blacken a photographic plate. At first he assumed the radiation was a consequence of fluorescing, but he later determined it to be an intrinsic property of the uranium itself.⁷

Becquerel’s discovery attracted the attention of Marie Curie, who began experiments of her own in radioactivity, as she named the phenomenon. She made a systematic examination of all known elements to determine which ones were radioactive. She found only one, thorium. However, her continued research on uranium-bearing materials led to the identification in 1898 of two new elements, polonium and radium, both of which were radioactive.⁸

The luminous quality of radium soon produced a popular craze even greater than that caused by X-rays. “Radium roulette” was played in New York casinos on a spinning wheel which glowed in the dark, luminescent clothing was the rage in women’s fashions, and an elixir containing radium was successfully peddled by Dr. W. J. Morton as “liquid sunshine,” the cure for diseased organs. Radium was also considered a beneficial additive for fertilizer and a therapeutic way to induce menopause artificially. Indeed, the potential uses of the new element seemed boundless.⁹

Meanwhile, Ernest Rutherford, a young physicist from New Zealand working at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, found that the rays emitted by the various radioactive elements were of two kinds, which he called alpha and beta. A third kind, the gamma ray, was discovered a year later by Paul Villard in France.¹⁰ And so, by the dawn of the twentieth century, scientists had established the existence of radiation and had determined that atoms were not indestructible, but experimentation thus far had been intermittent and inconclusive about the implications of these discoveries.

Many of the mysteries were soon to be unraveled, however, as an international network of the world’s greatest physicists, all involved in atomic research, evolved during the first few decades of the new century. As one famous scientist wrote later:

Our understanding of atomic physics . . . had its origins at the turn of the century and its great synthesis and resolutions in the nineteen-twenties. It was a heroic time. It was not the doing of any one man. It involved the collaboration of scores of scientists from many different lands . . . It was a period of patient work in the laboratory, of crucial experiments and daring action, of many false starts and many untenable conjectures. It was a time of earnest correspondence and hurried conferences, of debates, criticism and brilliant mathematical improvisation. For those who participated, it was a time of creation.¹¹

Personnel, notes, and equipment were exchanged freely across international boundaries. Even during World War I the physicists remained much closer to one another than did their intellectual counterparts in other disciplines. In one instance when James Chadwick, who later discovered the neutron, was interned at Ruhleben, near Berlin, at the outbreak of the hostilities, his German teachers, Walter Nernot and Heinrich Rubens, helped him set up a small laboratory in the prison camp. In May 1918 he wrote to Rutherford: “They were extremely willing to help and offered to lend us anything they could. In fact, all kinds of people lent us apparatus.”¹²

As soon as the fighting ended, these physicists resumed full-scale international collaboration. At that time there were three recognized centers of atomic research: Cambridge, where Rutherford ruled “like a sharp-tongued and easily irritated monarch”; Copenhagen, where Niels Bohr “guided, restrained, deepened and finally transmitted the enterprise”; and Göttingen, where the triumvirate of Max Born, James Franck, and David Hilbert “instantly asked questions about each new discovery made in England and supposed to have been correctly explained in Denmark.”¹³ It was not long before Robert Oppenheimer of the United States, who was to become known as the “father of the atomic bomb,” Enrico Fermi of Italy, who would design the first uranium reactor, and several others joined the ranks of these distinguished participants in the race to unchain the atom.

Internationalism continued to rule in science up until the very eve of the Second World War. Discoveries were shared by Germans in Nazi-controlled Germany; by German, Austrian, and Italian émigrés; and by Frenchmen, Danes, Americans, and Soviets. Even as late as February of 1939, when a small group of American scientists attempted to restrict the publication of information of potential military significance, there was considerable opposition worldwide. Then, in September of that same year, two events occurred that made continued international cooperation among the scientists impossible: Germany invaded Poland, bringing England and France into war, and Niels Bohr and J. A. Wheeler published a paper that described nuclear fission, the process that was to become the key to building an atomic bomb.¹⁴ These events changed the character of atomic research. From being open and international, work on the atom suddenly became secret and linked to national defense. This shift would profoundly affect the nature of the atomic weapons testing program in the United States.

The extremely significant discovery of nuclear fission resulted from experiments begun by Fermi in which he bombarded uranium atoms with neutrons. It was found that when fission, or splitting, of the uranium atom occurs, some free neutrons are released in addition to the two newly created massive fission fragments. These free neutrons are then capable of bombarding other atoms, causing more fission to occur and thereby creating the possibility of a self-sustaining chain reaction.¹⁵ When scientists announced that this process could produce enormous amounts of energy, three million times greater than that released by burning coal and twenty million times more powerful than TNT, the inevitable question arose: Could this energy be harnessed for making a super bomb?¹⁶

In the United States, the first attempt by scientists to bring the possibility of building an atomic bomb to the attention of the military was met with little enthusiasm. In March of 1939 Enrico Fermi, then a professor at Columbia University, advised Admiral S. C. Hooper, director of the Navy’s Technical Division, of the latest developments in atomic science and their potential effects on the techniques of battle. At that time, although the European situation was tense, the war had not yet broken out, and the United States seemed far removed from the threat of involvement in the emerging conflict. Consequently, the government’s response to Fermi’s information was a polite Thanks, but don’t call us, we’ll call you.¹⁷

Ironically, on the same day that Fermi met with Admiral Hooper, Hitler’s troops marched into Czechoslovakia and within one week had halted all further sales of uranium from the Joachimsthal mines, Europe’s richest source of the mineral. This occurrence, reinforced by news of a full-scale uranium project being conducted under the auspices of the German Army Weapons Department, caused increasing concern among many British and American scientists, especially those who had recently fled Europe after having experienced life under Hitler. Led by Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, and Edward Teller, these refugees were determined to bring their fears to the attention of President Roosevelt. Albert Einstein agreed to lend his support to the effort and on August 2, 1939, signed a letter to the president that emphasized that studies of uranium fission foreshadowed the development of atomic power for both driving ships and making bombs. The letter went on to point out that the Germans were aware of and actively working toward the development of these possibilities.¹⁸

Einstein’s message did not reach the president until some ten weeks later, after the war in Europe had begun. The letter was finally delivered on October 11 by international financier Alexander Sachs who was a longtime friend and advisor to FDR. After listening to Sachs, the president called in his military aide, Brigadier General Edwin M. “Pa” Watson, and said to him, in words which have since become famous, “Pa, this requires action.”¹⁹ Despite these words, however, little was accomplished during the year following the exchange.

President Roosevelt’s first act was to appoint the Advisory Committee on Uranium chaired by Lyman J. Briggs, director of the National Bureau of Standards. It was further composed of one member from the army and another from the navy. In addition, the paltry sum of six thousand dollars was appropriated to support the study of uranium fission in the upcoming year. Nonetheless, research continued in a piecemeal, scattered fashion and no coordinated affort was made to develop an atomic weapon. Five months later, in March of 1940, Einstein wrote a second letter to FDR, again urging his support of atomic fission research. The following June, the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) was created to mobilize scientific endeavors for military purposes. Under the direction of Vannevar Bush the agency pursued two objectives: increasing the uranium stockpile and stepping up experimentation with the chain reaction. Again, however, efforts were intermittent and underfinanced.

Two events in the summer of 1941 finally spurred the American government into action: Britain’s prestigious MAUD (Military Application of Uranium Detonation) Committee issued its report concluding that an atomic bomb was possible, and Emilio Segre and Glenn Seaborg made a crucial discovery at Berkeley which solved several problems Fermi was having in his attempts to create a chain reaction. They isolated an artificial element, later to be known as plutonium, that would fission better than uranium. Finally, on December 6, 1941, just a day before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt made the decision to apply substantial financial and technical resources to the construction of an atomic bomb. He convened a special committee, dubbed the S-1 Section, and charged it with determining whether, and at what cost, the United States could make the bomb.²⁰

Reporting back to the president six months later on June 17, 1942, the S-1 Section recommended an “all-out” effort of unprecedented magnitude. The report went on to state that the project would initially cost upwards of $100 million; would involve the construction of production plants for preparing fissionable material, as well as for building the bomb itself; and would likely, granted adequate funds and priorities, produce something soon enough to be of military significance in the current war. President Roosevelt approved the report and America’s...