Towards a just Europe

A theory of distributive justice for the European Union

João Labareda, Paul Tobin, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Kathryn Simpson

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781526152602
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This highly original book constitutes one of the first attempts to examine the problem of distributive justice in the European Union in a systematic manner. João Labareda argues that the set of shared political institutions at EU level, including the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU, generate democratic duties of redistribution among EU citizens. Furthermore, the economic structure of the EU, comprising a common market, a common currency and a free-movement area, triggers duties of reciprocity among member states. The responsibilities to fulfil these duties, Labareda argues, should be shared by the local, national and supranational levels of government. Not only should the EU act as a safety net to the national welfare systems, applying the principle of subsidiarity, but common market and Eurozone regulations should balance their efficiency targets with fair cooperation terms. The concrete policy proposals presented in this book include a threshold of basic goods for all EU citizens, an EU labour code, a minimum EU corporate tax rate and an EU fund for competitiveness. Labarada argues that his proposals match the political culture of the member states, are economically feasible, can be translated into functioning institutions and policies and are consistent with the limited degree of social solidarity in Europe. This book is a major contribution to the understanding of what a just Europe would look like and what it might take to get us there.

Introduction: The problem of distributive justice in the EU

I. Robert Schuman revisited

Robert Schuman famously predicted that economic integration in the European Union (EU) would be followed by social integration.¹ Yet has this been the case? In recent years, distributive claims at the EU level have become more stringent than ever. In contrast with the so-called convergence thesis, the socioeconomic gap between centre and periphery in the EU shows no tendency to decrease substantially. Levels of material deprivation are, indeed, very high in a number of member states. More strikingly, the dramatic deterioration of the social outlook in certain member states is at least partially related to EU-led policies. This is most notably the case with the conditionality clauses of the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese adjustment programmes. The public debate on these matters has revealed strong divisions in Europe regarding the desirability and feasibility of social justice beyond national borders. Therefore, a number of questions need to be addressed. Do wealthier member states have the moral duty to assist distressed member states? What if socioeconomic inequalities result from poor policy choices? Is there any minimum level of assistance that should be regarded as necessary for EU citizens? What policy instruments would fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of European integration? Under what conditions would these be feasible? In short, what duties of justice are linked to EU membership, and how can they be realized?

This book will advance an account of distributive justice for the EU that aims to be both plausible and feasible. In this introductory chapter, I set the grounds for achieving these goals. The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by presenting three tensions that lead me to believe that the current distributions of wealth and income in the EU are unjust. Then, I list a number of familiar objections against distributive justice at the EU level, claiming that none of them is strong enough to prevent a more comprehensive debate on the matter. Subsequently, I introduce the research questions, and I show that the latter have not been satisfactorily addressed by the sub-fields of global justice and citizenship studies. I also identify a number of helpful insights advanced by the few existing publications on the topic. In a subsequent methodological section, I discuss the subject and scope of political theory, and I explain why it can help in addressing the research questions. Then I outline a step-by-step strategy to engage with the research questions. I conclude this Introduction by sketching the main arguments of the book.

II. The research puzzle

Three tensions in the European Union

This project stems from three tensions that, I shall argue, can be found in the EU today. These tensions are the following: (i) a discrepancy between the degrees of political integration and social integration in the Union; (ii) the existence of legal grounds for shared principles of justice, such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, with a contrasting lack of mechanisms to provide and enforce them; and (iii) the fact that, under the principle of non-discrimination, EU citizens are entitled to the same set of social rights, but only when they live in the same member state. I shall discuss each of these tensions in turn.

The first tension lies in the gap between political and social integration in the EU. The key idea is that the extensive set of institutions, norms, and practices shared by all member states is at odds with the minimalistic social dimension of the Union. The Eurostat figures on poverty help to illustrate the point. In 2017, the governments of the Union – which altogether account for 24% of the world’s wealth – were unable to meet the basic needs of 33 million EU citizens.² Yet deprivation levels vary dramatically across member states. In fact, in 2017 the percentage of individuals suffering from severe material deprivation in the EU ranged from 1.1% in Sweden to 31% in Bulgaria. Even if the three youngest member states (Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia) are excluded from our analysis, differences in the incidence of poverty across the Union are astonishing. In fact, in the three best performing countries (Sweden, Luxembourg, and Finland), deprivation rates were lower than 2.5%; in turn, in the three countries showing the poorest performance (Lithuania, Hungary, and Greece), severe deprivation affects at least 12% of the population, with a figure of 21% in Greece. If the EU has integrated so many of the core competences of the nation-state, why should social policy be left behind?

I have implied that a divide between centres of political decision making and responsibilities for social provision is normatively problematic. Yet why is this the case? As Chapter 1 shall elaborate, individuals who are part of an institutionalized system of cooperation, which is simultaneously coercive and democratic, have duties of social justice towards each other. These obligations emerge from two interrelated concerns. First, having a real chance to participate in civic life presupposes a set of material conditions which generate social inclusiveness, time availability, and access to information. For example, in the absence of basic goods such as housing, healthcare, and education, the right to politically participate may become merely formal. Secondly, deprivation fosters the threat of arbitrary rule. In democracy, the ability to resist arbitrary power seems to be contingent on the availability of material means to either contest, or call for, the enforcement of the law, through the existing legal channels. Chapter 2 will show that coercion and democracy are key features of the present-day EU. EU institutions enact an extensive body of legislation, enforced by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and by the domestic courts, with EU law having primacy over domestic law. In addition, the EU comprises a set of key democratic institutions, a citizenship status, and multiple demoi. Hence, if the link between coercion, democracy, and distributive justice is sound, the current “constitutional asymmetry” of the Union will have to be addressed.³

The second tension lies in the fact that, although EU treaties have established a number of social rights for EU citizens, they failed to assign corresponding duties to member states and EU institutions to bring them about. As a result, EU social rights lack any effective mechanism of enforcement. The foremost illustration of this ambivalence is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 33 of the charter establishes that the family shall enjoy not only legal but “economic and social protection”.⁴ In turn, Article 34 recognizes “the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources”.⁵ Article 35 adds that “[a] high level of human health protection shall be ensured” to every EU citizen.⁶ However, Articles 51 and 52 state that the charter does not extend the competences assigned to the EU by the previous treaties, where social policy was defined as being a matter of member states’ business. Hence, “for the EU institutions, the Charter creates an obligation to promote each of the enumerated rights, but denies them the capacity to extend their powers or tasks to secure its objectives”.⁷ In other words, the social rights prescribed by the charter do not generate any positive duty that may be invoked in court.⁸ As a result, the binding effects of this document (as far as social rights are concerned) are mainly about deterrence: neither EU nor domestic institutions are allowed to promulgate laws and regulations that actively contravene the charter.

The current state of affairs is, therefore, problematic. On the one hand, member states seem to recognize that the Union should comprise a distributive dimension. This is patent not only in the charter, but in a considerable number of other political and legal documents produced throughout the history of the EU.⁹ More stringently, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifically states that the EU “shall aim to eliminate inequalities”, emphasising “the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health”.¹⁰ On the other hand, the reluctance of the EU to use the language of social rights when it comes to concrete policy actions “reflects precisely a fear of giving strong legal recognition and priority to particular social values in the face of competing economic interests”.¹¹ In fact, most member states insist that social policy should remain within national borders, refusing to pay the costs of a just Europe. This mismatch between goals and means at the disposal of EU political institutions remains a source of contention. Crucially, any appeal to social rights will be effective “only if combined with arguments to show who should act, and what they should do”.¹²

The third tension refers to the paradoxical implications of the EU principle of non-discrimination as far as social rights are concerned. Under this principle, a Spanish individual will benefit from similar social rights as a Dutch citizen if they move to work in the Netherlands – but not if they stay in Spain. This result is problematic for a number of reasons. First, by establishing a strong link between social rights and national job markets, this conception excludes people who are not in a physical condition to work or to cross the border – most notably, children, the elderly, and severely disabled people. This dramatically raises the moral risk of having first- and second-class EU citizens. Secondly, it is not necessarily true that a mobile Spanish worker enjoys the same social rights as local Dutch citizens. In fact, EU mobile workers are typically exposed to greater risks, particularly when it comes to contributory schemes, which are only activated after a given period of time. In addition, a few member states have recently increased the evidentiary requirements demanded from non-nationals to access social benefits, making the application process longer and harder. This suggests that, if non-discrimination is truly to apply, citizens of the EU polity should enjoy a level playing field of social rights.

The inadequacy of non-discrimination as a paradigm to achieve social cohesion in the Union is starkly revealed by the contrasting economic opportunities for citizens of different member states. For example, the GDP per capita and the level of unemployment vary greatly across member states.¹³ It has often been argued that the disparities regarding the level of wealth can be explained by national policy choices. Yet, even if there is some truth in this argument, it fails to account for the transnational nature of the common market. Given the intensity of economic exchange and specialization within the EU, non-Dutch EU citizens make a major contribution to the prosperity of the Dutch market – even if they do not work in the Netherlands. Therefore, there is a moral problem of distribution of the benefits of integration. One cannot do away with this problem by simply referring to freedom of movement. Not every EU citizen can move to the Netherlands even if they wish to, given not only the physical constraints already mentioned, but also barriers such as language, family, and legal requirements for certain professions. Thus, the “poverty gap” seems to hide behind an “opportunity gap”, which makes social convergence very hard. For all that has been said, the status quo “tends to create a category of European people excluded from the full benefits of European Union”.¹⁴ This suggests that non-discrimination must be complemented by additional distributive principles.

The three tensions presented in the previous paragraphs suggest the need to reassess the nature and scope of distributive duties in the EU. However, alternative views have challenged the claim that furthering social justice in the Union is both desirable and feasible. In the next section, I identify three types of concerns typically raised by the subscribers to these views.

Three objections against social justice in the EU

At least three types of objections may be raised against a comprehensive understanding of distributive justice in the EU. First, critics may claim that the EU is just an intergovernmental association; for this reason, distributive debates, as well as other dimensions of the so-called EU democratic deficit, are entirely misplaced.¹⁵ The EU lacks a unified demos, as well as a widespread sense of social solidarity, which, so the argument goes...