Chapter 1
Youth work, radicalization, and Islam
Forming empathic spaces for young Muslim people to engage in discussions of so-called radicalisation and extremism of religious ideology, identity, and foreign policy
Stuart Wroe
âSerious concernsâ were raised by a human rights organisation regarding the âeffect on education and studentsâ human rightsâ of the UK governmentâs statutory Prevent duty on schools, implemented under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. In closing down spaces to articulate personal beliefs and opinions in schools and the public arena, it stood accused of driving children to discuss issues related to terrorism, religion, and identity âonline where simplistic narratives are promoted and go unchallengedâ.1 Rather than pushing young Muslims, âOut of public space and into private space where it is a lot more difficult to challenge and refute ideas,â2 we should be enabling âspaces for wide-ranging discussions of religious ideology, identity and foreign policy, particularly among young people who feel excluded from mainstream politics.â3
This chapter assesses the extent to which youth workâs informal education processes and approaches can create empathic spaces for young Muslim people to engage in such wide-ranging discussions. Drawing on Fine,4 Chambers,5 Freire,6 and a reflexive critical consciousness in Pakistan Punjabi Sufic practice and tradition,7 this chapter adopts and builds on the authorâs experience of global youth work processes as a form of informal education for social change. It assesses the potential of youth workâs informal education processes to enable Kundnaniâs âspaces for wide-ranging discussions of religious ideology, identity and foreign policy, particularly among young people who feel excluded from mainstream politicsââspaces to facilitate young Muslimsâ dialogue and practical solutions to contest socially demonising discourses by asserting and self-defining their own identities; by drawing upon Islam as a meaningful category by linking past and present within a British context. Commentators within Muslim Youth Work, too, are calling for âspaces that feel welcoming; spaces which young Muslims can identify with, where they are neither demonised nor idealised and where struggles and contradictions are allowed to ensue in the emergence of identitiesâ8; and âwhere debate is open, however controversial or sensitive.â9 As Margaret Ledwith (nd) maintains, â⌠reclaiming the radical agenda begins by creating critical spaces for dialogue.â
Whilst there is a growing body of research highlighting the threat from right-wing extremism, the focus of this chapter will be on young Muslim people. The primary basis of the authorâs global youth work is that of education for social change, working towards making change in individuals, nations, and our global society. With over 17 years global youth work experience working with some of the most marginalised young people in the UK and globally, and with the support, guidance, and friendship of local Senior Youth and Community Worker Mashuq Hussain OBE (Order of the British Empires), the author has worked for over eight years with young people from the third-generation Pakistan Punjabi diaspora in East Lancashireâcommunities in the âlong shadow of exclusion and humiliation cast by national policies designed to protect âusâ, and to ask who is (and is not) âusâ.â10
With a focus on change, principal features of youth workâs informal educational approaches are the centrality of dialogue11 and the voluntary participation of young people.12 We seek to âliberateâ participants, for them to have a greater awareness of their situation in order to promote activism, thus seeking to turn young Muslimsâ feelings of âfrustration, stigma and angerâ13 into peaceful and peaceable actions and a stake in society.
There is recognition of youth workâs ability to â⌠connect with young people who are in danger of exclusion or are already excluded from more structured social institutions.â14 Youth work informal education approaches provide opportunities to discuss, debate, and challenge. The work requires an inherent understanding of young peopleâs perspectives and of their multiple identities and experiences. Trust and the ability to communicate at street level is also fundamental, involving an inclusive approach that seeks to work with young people in their own spaces and environments.15 Yet, in, âworking with young people at the very margins (sites of possibilities that are exciting and âon the edgeâ [where] cultures are created and reshapedâ),16 the most pertinent issues are often those most problematic in relation to the state and law, especially as in this case, the UK governmentâs dominant macro-discourses on terrorism.
Macro-discoursesâmicro-impact
The UK governmentâs dominant macro-discourses on terrorism have a micro-impact on young Muslim people. For them the external world structures their internal world and their sense of self as young Muslims. They construct their identities in context-dependent ways, drawing on such discourses.17 The post 9/11 âinvention of âradicalisationââ18 is institutionalised at the heart of the governmentâs âofficial narrative on the causes of terrorismâ19 and in effect is a âpolitical shibboleth,â20 âthe master signifier of the War on Terror.â21 Drawn up in a hurry22 and âheavy footprints of policy,â23 the UK governmentâs Prevent strategy is considered a âtoxic brandâ24 relying upon the counterfactual invention of âradicalisationâ and related unstable knowledge about transitions to âterrorismâ to undertake governance of communities rendered suspicious, risky, and at risk.25
âRadicalisationâ is mentioned 186 times in the UK governmentâs Prevent strategy.26 Its ubiquity in the document, in terrorism discourses, and in wider media and public usage is not matched by any clarity or precision regarding its definition. In a two-line entry in the Reviewâs glossary, it is said to refer â⌠to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism ⌠,â27 a definition that lends itself to the accusation of being a simplified politicised label that conceals complexity.28
Some commentators regret a misappropriation or distortion of a term which has also engendered much more positive connotations (i.e. to be âradicalâ being to be âprogressiveâ).29 At the time, Mahatma Gandhiâs radical views were viewed as extreme by the British government, but were also non-violent. So, the notion of radical has been degraded through the dominant UK governmentâs discourse, from an understanding associated with peaceful activism and ââŚthe principles and demands [that] often provide the backbone of tomorrowâs mainstream thought and attitudes âŚâ to â⌠code for the brainwashing of young Muslims to commit violent acts.â30
According to Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, former Minister of State for Faith and Communities in her 2017 book, The Enemy Within: A Tale of Muslim Britain, âdiscussions around the âroot causesâ of terrorism became a difficult area for policymakers. In the glare of a 24-hour international media circus, there was a hurried move to the how of terrorism without sufficiently understanding the whyâa political need to find a quick and easy answer to what makes a terrorist.31 Following the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bomb attacks, experts and officials in discussing the underlying factors leading to the attacks started referring to the idea of radicalisation, â⌠whenever they wanted to talk about âwhat goes on before the bomb goes offâ.â32
Within the public realm and mainstream media, âradicalisationâ was used intercha...