Active Hermeneutics

Seeking Understanding in an Age of Objectivism

Stanley E. Porter, Jason C. Robinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780429671463
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teologia e religione
• Subtopic: Filosofia delle religioni

Hermeneutics, as a discipline of the humanities, is often assumed to be in thrall to the same subjectivity of every interpretive method, in direct contrast to the objectivity prized by the natural sciences. This book argues that there is a false dichotomy here, and that ancient and modern ideas of knowledge can be utilized to create a new active form of hermeneutics. One capable of creating a standard by which to judge better and worse models of understanding.

This book explores decisive aspects over which the future of hermeneutics—a future inexplicably tied to a history of hermeneutics—will continue to struggle, namely the limits and possibilities of situated human understanding. This book is located in the middle of a number of major, converging discussions within contemporary intellectual discourse. Drawing upon a wide range of ancient and modern hermeneutical thought, including Aristotle, Bernstein, Heidegger, Kant, and Gadamer, the result is a hermeneutical approach that pushes beyond the traditional limits of human understanding.

This is a bold attempt to move hermeneutics into a new phase. As such, it will be of significant interest to scholars and academics working in General Hermeneutics, Theology, and the Philosophy of Religion.

1Objectivity and the legacy of epistemic-foundationalism

…. alas a scientific man ought to have no wishes, no affections, —a mere heart of stone. —

—Charles Darwin¹

Introduction

This book explores decisive aspects over which the future of hermeneutics—a future inexplicably tied to a history of hermeneutics—will continue to struggle, namely the limits and possibilities of situated human understanding (esp. self-understanding).² We see this as the major purpose of hermeneutics, and so this constitutes a fundamental question not just for hermeneutics but for other disciplines also concerned with the human subject. In that sense, this book is situated in the middle of a number of major, converging discussions within contemporary intellectual discourse. The task of this chapter is to develop a coherent picture of scientific self-understanding that has defined and explained itself through the ill-defined and enigmatic, though frequently invoked, concept of “objectivity” since the early stages of the Scientific Revolution, which began with the rise of the Enlightenment and proceeded especially through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. Historians of science will note that an objective science, or at least what appears to be an object-focused or object-based science, existed as the cornerstone of the development of scientific enquiry long before the unique period called the Scientific Revolution, finding a home most obviously in Socrates, the great observer of human behavior, and then in Aristotle’s examination and empirical taxonomies of the natural world. This is, therefore, one of the first great challenges for those who wish to think about the nature of truth. To which historical era or epoch does one point in order to better explain objectivity? Which of many different and conflicting culturally manufactured conceptions of objectivity does one wish to unravel? The initial answer, perhaps counterintuitively, is that it does not matter much which of them one picks. This present discussion is possible because of historical and cultural change, not the specific changes themselves, in notions of objectivity, science, experience, nature, etc. Of course, the changes are important but only as symptoms of a larger problem to be diagnosed, namely, how an idea (really many ideas) about the highest form of truth may become and be so many different things to different people and yet claim to be universal, necessary, and certain—that is, objective. And why has it persisted across place and time as a belief system that has proved to be consistently problematic and has yet to deliver on its unique and important promises? The fact that we are addressing it here in this book is one more piece of evidence that the notion of objectivity has yet to satisfy its many enquirers.

What this historical and cultural change regarding notions of objectivity means for hermeneutics is intriguing for, as we shall see, there is need to rethink the nature of thinking and to challenge how we understand understanding, much like there has been a need to rethink objectivity from one epoch and culture to the next. The recognition that there is need for re-imagining understanding in a non-reductionist manner is a widely shared belief among hermeneuts, as is evidenced in virtually every serious treatment of the subject written within the modern era of hermeneutical discussion, but nevertheless there is much more work to be done. Such a situation might at first appear to be either hopeless or at best circular—hopeless in that one constantly returns to the same problems without their resolution or circular in that the same posited solutions continue to be debated without commanding general or widespread consent, so that the debate endlessly continues. Rather than simply examine the same posited solutions or immediately pose new ones, there may be another way forward in the discussion. Progress may be possible by first identifying the oppressive ideas and practices that unnecessarily limit understanding. From that vantage point one may begin to describe an active hermeneutics.

In this chapter, we first set the stage for discussion of objectivity, then outline the three major tenets of objectivity, before offering a definition of objectivity, recounting a brief history of it, describing the goal of objectivity in relation to the self, and finding its manifestation in logical positivism, which leads to a final major section on applied scientific reasoning. This chapter provides the starting point for our constructive hermeneutical proposals in the subsequent chapters.

Setting the stage for objectivity

Hans-Georg Gadamer famously and pointedly confronts natural science in his Truth and Method (1960), a text that forever changed hermeneutics because of his redefining the major issues involved and offering description rather than prescription or solution.³ In it Gadamer chooses to focus on understanding (Verstehen) more so than knowledge (Erkenntnis) and as a consequence he had no need to focus narrowly on objectivity, as a concept outside of what it means for the human subject to understand. This chapter explores science in a narrower sense by focusing on a single concept, “objectivity,” that reveals the limits of knowledge, Erkennen (which is really many concepts and practices conflated into the appearance of one), for the larger purpose of thinking about a hermeneutics of understanding. However, to be candid, the distinction between knowledge and understanding seems somewhat forced and artificial, even though it may be found in many conversations about hermeneutics—“knowledge” is typically defined as having to do with objects and “understanding” typically defined as having to do with the subject matter through dialogue and questioning the world. The problem with “knowledge” is its often being equated with the notion of objects and hence with objectivity, that is, attempts to find unmediated means to know objects. As we shall see, such a distinction between the two is more problematic than it at first seems, more because of the notion of objectivity than of understanding.

This fixation on objectivity does something of a disservice to some important earlier hermeneuts like Gadamer and Martin Heidegger,⁴ both of whom purposely step beyond the misleading relationship of object and subject, preferring instead to offer a way of thinking about understanding that avoids talk of both in any sustained way. The moment one begins to use the vocabulary of objectivity one risks becoming entrenched in a specific conversation from which modern hermeneutics is trying to escape. Even so, the weighed risk is merited and ultimately advantageous to imagining the future of hermeneutics—although the bridge from Chapter 1 on objectivity to Chapter 2 that rejects and attempts to displace objectivity is challenging. To help smooth the conceptual gaps between the first two chapters, each chapter will focus on only one main concept. Chapter 2 responds to “objectivity” by appealing to an often misunderstood, or in the very least rarely considered, concept of great importance to hermeneutics—practical reason. Richard Bernstein, in his seminal work Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983),⁵ identified in the early eighties the need to go beyond objectivity and relativism with a hermeneutical description of understanding (including practical reason) but he struggled to clearly articulate his interlocutor’s (objectivity) idiosyncrasies, as have many hermeneuts. Objectivity is often taken for granted in the literature as if it were self-evident. It is far from obvious and yet it contains much of the poison modern hermeneutics wishes to remedy. By clearly naming the toxin, it is hoped that practical reason may then facilitate the healing process.

One sees reference to objectivity in a range of disciplines, from the hard sciences to the softer social sciences and even to various other human sciences. Once one observes how often reference is made to objectivity, it is easy to believe that objectivity is something that exists and, therefore, can probably be ably even if roughly defined. After all, such a widely held notion must, one might think, have a reasonable clarity within the minds of those who regularly invoke the term. So, what is objectivity? That is, in fact, something of a trick question, for there is no such thing as objectivity in the singular—only objectivities and ideals of convenience, stipulative definitions if you will (definitions created in the moment to serve a purpose for that epoch). One of the great claims of modern hermeneutics is that truth claims are relative, so a universal concept is not expected nor even really very engaging. Even so, as one can see in its continuing use, as well as its fundamental importance as at least a concept in a variety of intellectual discussions, such a notion cannot so easily be dismissed. In fact, there is much to be said about objectivity that will help contextualize discussions for the next developmental stage of hermeneutics.

One of the most important observations to make—and one that we will discuss in greater detail below—is that within the sciences, there is a significant disjunction between the claims that are made for objective science, that is, the kinds of claims to objective methods, procedures, and findings, that is not self-evidently commensurable with the practices of scientists themselves, whether in the laboratory or in the field. Scientific results are the products of hypotheses that are filled by assumptions regarding data and method that often build upon previous such hypotheses and assumptions, so that the purported results are often less secure than one imagines. While the claims of objective science may not correlate with what scientists practice in the laboratory or field—an observation that aligns with the claims of hermeneutics, for scientists are human beings who must always think interpretively just like everyone else—this does not free one from the burden of the conversation regarding the claims and aspirations of objectivity. Why criticize an “ideal” (a hope or goal) that very few expect to live up to in real life? This may appear to be a way of creating a straw-person argument, of criticizing scientists for claiming an impossible standard that most realize in practice is unachievable. That is not our intent here. The sweeping and persuasive power of objectivity resides not in its actual fruition (achieving complete and unchanging knowledge), which has so far eluded science of every kind and will no doubt continue to elude it, but in the devotion it demands from its adherents and the unhealthy ways it controls understanding and action, often imposed upon others as a standard by which their judgments must be assessed. The motivation of this chapter is to persuade readers that the power of objectivity is not that it is the means of achieving certainty and accurately describing the world, but that it embodies cultural legitimacy, authority, and power for other reasons, far more human reasons than one should expect of a “god’s eye view of reality” concept such as objectivity.

Objectivity is, however, more than an ideal, at least the way that it is treated in both scientific and non-scientific discourse. It has assumed a much greater place of importance within intellectual debate, to the point that it has become a moral standard by which we (scientists and non-scientists alike) judge ourselves and the world. Whether in the lab, court of law, healthcare, journalistic media, biblical interpretation, business, as just a few examples, objectivity is considered and even propounded and heralded as the gold standard, both as that which is sought and the standard by which everything is judged. Or, rather, the pretense of having the means and desire of achieving objectivity is the gold standard. “Bias” and “prejudice,” to which every human is susceptible, are the great devils of intellectual discourse, whether that occurs in any courtroom or in the political sphere or even in the laboratory, not because participants are interested (as they are) or not able to critically confront such biases or prejudices meaningfully (they are not, at least entirely), but because these are convenient means of dismissing the other as somehow faulty, polluted by contagions that prevent an objective relationship. In other words, “objective” has become a battle cry not for the pursuit of truth but for an emblazoned red letter that marks hostilities toward one’s enemy. The social and political abuse of objectivity will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The initial claim here, however, is a simple one. If scientific objectivity is misguided or dangerous then it is imperative that we revalue its role. To that end, this chapter:

1. 1develops and explains what might be meant by objectivity in the natural sciences;
2. 2traces the historical developments of objectivity since roughly the 17th century;
3. 3identifies reasons from the perspective of the philosophy of science for why there has been a failure to deliver on foundational-epistemic promises;
4. 4considers the main ways in which theory is defined and used today; and
5. 5lays the ground for the next chapter by showing that while objectivity remains the pretext for every scientific investigation, as well as dominant cultural discourse such as journalism, media, politics, medicine, textual interpretation of various sorts, there is a growing and necessary receptivity to a chastened and informed hermeneutic response to objectivity.

Philosophers of science who are by discipline steeped in the history, complexity, and controversy surrounding objectivity are unlikely to find this first chapter to be ground-breaking, except perhaps where hermeneutical connections and challenges to the natural sciences are established. For most other readers, however, this chapter may open up new ways of seeing how intellectual discourse occurs and the aims and goals that govern it. This chapter is not meant to provide a complete history of notions of objectivity, empiricism, and related philosophical concepts. Instead, this chapter is meant to offer a snapshot of history that is often overlooked in conversations about truth and understanding, and one that is most controversial when tackling matters of reason, knowledge, action, and understanding. This chapter is designed to challenge the very notion of credible and authoritative understanding, one currently based on what is for better or worse called objective knowledge.

The trinity of objectivity

There are at least three core claims made today by those who hold to robust notions of objectivity:

1. 1an ontological claim that there is a reality in itself, existing independently of the human mind (there are mind-independent facts);
2. 2an epistemological claim that this reality may be accurately known by the human mind (the mind may connect with said facts without distorting them); and
3. 3a semantic claim that our language or discourse is connected with knowledge of reality in such ...