CHAPTER 1
The Question of Theory
As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory.
āVladimir I. Lenin1
RĆ©gulation theory and Soviet-era Marxist scholarshipāthese two form the primary and perhaps unexpected theoretical groundwork of this study. Both are parts of a large and rich Marxist tradition of economic analysis that has a pedigree of well over a century and a half. I am up front about this basis, since I feel it is better to be transparentāat least as far as one is ableāconcerning oneās heuristic framework, rather than leaving it unexamined. All manner of tactics are used to avoid such examination: a claim to get on with the task at hand rather than bother with theoretical matters; a suggestion that the data are too thin for any larger models; the assumption that āeconomicsā is a universal and neutral discipline that may be applied in all places and time; a dismissal of āideologicalā elements in the name of āscience.ā2 Obviously our frameworks are all the stronger for us the more we leave them untouched. No doubt the reflex of some to my preferred framework will be negative, for a range of articulated and unarticulated reasons. Those who live under the long shadow of the anticommunist witch hunts of the US senator Joseph McCarthy (1908ā57) may, on purely partisan political grounds, resist the deep engagement of my reconstruction with Marxist, Soviet, and indeed communist theories and terms. So too may those who see (mistakenly) that the āfallā of the Berlin Wall symbolizes the collapse of the socialist project. That is the topic of another debate, one that I have undertaken elsewhere and see no need to reprise here. In this work, I take a minimal position, holding that the analytical power of Marxist approaches remains at least unabated, if they have not been developed with greater sophistication in the last couple of decades (for instance, see Wickham).3 The proof is, of course, in the execution, but I also suggest that the framework I deploy in this work raises new questions and opens up new vistas. The value of a new proposal is not that it says the final wordāimpossible for the limited creatures that we areābut that it may generate new questions and areas of investigation that have not been considered earlier.
In light of all this, a question needs to be asked: what is the dominant framework or economic model in recent work on ancient Israel within the context of ancient Southwest Asia? As I will show in the next section, since the last decade of the twentieth century, it has been largely a neoclassical model, as that particular tradition of economic study has been appropriated by what is sometimes called neoliberalism. The theoretical analysis that follows should therefore be seen as a challenge to the obvious inadequacies of a neoclassical approach, an intervention in the best sense of the word. As will gradually become clear over the course of this book as a whole, it seems to me that the theoretical framework I develop here is best able to make sense of the available data, as well as the scattered insights from other approaches.4
I begin the following analysis by examining the inadequacies of neoclassical approaches. These will be familiar to the majority of scholars who have worked on economic matters relating to ancient Southwest Asia and ancient Israel. For that reason, I begin with such approaches, but I also do so to provide a springboard to the more fruitful approaches provided by Marxist methods. Thus, following the treatment of neoclassical economics, I discuss the key schools of Marxist economics that have provided or may provide viable resources for a study of ancient Southwest Asia: world-systems theory, the work of Karl Polanyi, Soviet-era Russian scholarship, and RƩgulation theory. I close with two further methodological issues: the need to deal squarely with the inescapable anachronism of any study of the past, and the vexed issue of how textual materials relate to their historical context.
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
[There] is ... a certain propensity in human nature, ... the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
āAdam Smith5
I do not deploy the theoretical framework of neoclassical economics, despite the fact that it provides the resource for most of those who work on ancient economies, let alone for biblical societies.6 Yet deeply flawed is the neoclassical approach. Why? The reason may be found in what is called economics imperialism, in which neoclassical economics, through a process of chronic reductionism, attains the status of a false universal applicable to all human activity.7 The telltale sign of this economics imperialism is the tendency to describe it as āmainstreamā economics, if not, by mutual consent, to drop the epithet and quietly universalize it as simply āeconomics.ā In their landmark study,8 Fine and Milonakis speak of a triple reductionism crucial to economics imperialism: to the individual as the basic unit of analysis, an individual that is rational, self-interested, and focused on utility; to the āmarketā without any social basis; and to a āmarketā that is devoid of history. That is, the establishment of neoclassical economics is a process of individualizing, desocializing, and dehistoricizing economic analysis. I add that this process also involved detheologizing or even debiblicizing economics. Such reductionism provided the dialectical basis for economics imperialism: having excised social concerns, class, institutions, history, and religion, this redefined neoclassical economics then engaged, and continues to do so vigorously today, in colonizing these and every other area of the social sciences and humanities. Particularly from the 1980s onward, with the āfallā of communism, the extraordinarily narrow principles of rationality and equilibrium became a āuniversal grammarā for analyzing human behavior, institutions, history, geography, neural networks (neuroeconomics), and even religion.9 The imperializing pretensions are breathtaking. Here theology is at its most pernicious, for the assumption of theological absolutism is transmuted into a discipline that has overtly dispensed with its theological concernsā now without the traditional checks of theology.
In light of this development, it is not difficult to see how neoclassical economics might be applied to the ancient Levant, ancient Southwest Asia, or indeed any ancient society. But let me outline a couple of the key moments in a much larger account, for they reveal that the relation between reductionism and imperialism is dialectical, already embodied in the work of one Adam Smith.
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith offers the following well-known myth:
For Smith, this perfectly ānaturalā process is both the origin of the division of labor and reveals the natural propensity for human beings to ātruck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.ā11 This distinguishes us from the animals, for who ever saw a dog offer a bone as a fair and deliberate exchange with another dog? A little later, Smith goes on:
We are all capitalists at heart, it seems, for we are natural merchants, constantly exchanging things with one another. Smith can be somewhat long-winded, so let me summarize the remainder of this myth. Once our primitives have all busied themselves with their natural propensity to produce and ātruck,ā they soon find that others have enough of whatever is on offer. I may have made plenty of toe ticklers, but now that the tribe or village is full of toe ticklers, I have nowhere to hawk my wares and get what I want. The solution: stockpile items that I am sure everyone will want: salt, sugar, dried cod, dressed leather, sex toys.... So when I want something, I can simply use these items in exchange. At last one of us happens upon the idea of using precious metals, weighed, then standardized, minted, and so on. Eventually, in our wisdom, we come up with credit, or virtual money.
In various forms, this myth has been repeated countless times in economics textbooks, in online forums, and in classes on economics. For economists, it is āthe most important story ever told.ā13 Its narrative from a natural division of labor, to barter, to money, and then in our sophisticated modern era, to banking and creditāthis account has become so pervasive that it is regarded as common sense. The problem is that it is pure fantasyland. Where is this mythical village? Among North American Indians? Asian pastoral nomads? African tribes, Pacific Islanders, Australian Aborigines? A small Scottish town of shopkeepers? Or among Homo erectus, Homo heidelbergensis, Neanderthals, or Homo sapiens? Often in the same myth it moves from one place to the other, or indeed one species to the other. But the simple fact is that this village never existed. No such village has ever been found, nor will it be. Although it is necessary to point out the mythical status of this story and counter it with empirical evidence, that is insufficient to overcome the myth. No amount of āfactsā will dent the power of the myth, as Sorel showed so well many years ago.14 Instead, it is more worthwhile to ask what truth the myth expresses, given that a myth is always split between fiction and a deeper and not always pleasant truth (part of the mixed heritage of the very sense of myth).15
That truth is that Smith, in resuscitating and refining the myth, had a distinct agenda: he needed to create a new being, āthe economy.ā The definite article is crucial, for ātheā economy was to be a distinct entity, with its own rules, its own dynamic, which is distinct from politics, the state, and above all religion. What better way to do so than to concoct a myth in which ātheā economy arose as a natural expression of human nature? But why did Smith and those who followed him wish to create such a being? A...