CHAPTER 1
Ronald Reagan and the Cold War
MELVYN P. LEFFLER
Scholars love debating the role of Ronald Reagan in the Cold War. Some say he aimed to win the Cold War; others claim he wanted to end the Cold War. Some say he wanted to abolish nuclear weapons and yearned for a more peaceful world; others say he built up American capabilities, prepared to wage nuclear war, and quested to destroy communism and the āevil empireā that embodied it. Noting these contradictions and Reaganās competing impulses, some writers claim that he wanted to do all these things.1
The real truth is that figuring out what Ronald Reagan wanted to do, or, more precisely, figuring out what things he wanted most to do, may be impossible. When you read the memoirs and the interviews what impresses, and what surprises, is that many of those who adored him, who worked for him, and who labored to impress his legacy on the American psyche regarded the great communicator as āimpenetrable.ā
Yes, Ronald Reagan was genial, upbeat, courteous, respectful, self-confident, and humble, but he was also opaque, remote, distant, and inscrutable (about many things). Ronnie was a āloner,ā Nancy Reagan wrote in her memoir. āThereās a wall around him. He lets me come closer than anyone else, but there are times when even I feel that barrier.ā2 His advisors agreed. Charles Wick, his long-time friend and head of the United States Information Agency (USIA), acknowledged, āNo matter how close anybody was to him, ā¦ there still is a very slight wall that you donāt get past.ā3 āNo one was close to Reagan,ā said Ken Adelman to an interviewer. āHe laughed, he was a wonderful warm human being, but there was something impenetrable about him. Really, he wouldnāt shareāsome views were out there, but otherwise he just went to a different drummerāa strange person.ā4
Of course, Reagan had a set of strong convictions that he preached for most of his long career as a spokesperson for General Electric, as governor of California, as an aspirant for the highest office in the land, and as president. āHe wasnāt a complicated person,ā Nancy explained: āhe was a private man, but he was not a complicated one.ā5 Everyone thought they knew what Reagan believed in: he loved freedom and hated communism, he revered free enterprise and abhorred big government, he wanted to cut taxes and catalyze private entrepreneurship, he adored the city on the hill and detested the āevil empire.ā6
But things got complicated for his advisors when they learned that he also yearned for peace, detested nuclear weapons, thought MAD was mad, feared that nuclear war would lead to Armageddon, and embraced compromise. When tradeoffs were necessary, when priorities needed reconciling, when complicated options begged for resolution, Reagan was opaque. He āgave no orders, no commands; asked for no information; expressed no urgency,ā said David Stockman, his first budget director. Although Stockman would become a harsh critic, Reaganās admirers did not disagree. Martin Anderson, among his most important economic advisers and a long-time friend, wrote: āHe made no demands, and gave almost no instructions.ā Frank Carlucci, who served as deputy secretary of defense in the early years of the first Reagan administration and then returned as national security advisor and secretary of defense toward the end of the second term, noted that the president often seemed in a daze; well, not exactly a daze, Carlucci said, but very preoccupied. At National Security Council (NSC) meetings, said Richard Pipes, a renowned Soviet expert, Reagan sometimes seemed āreally lost, out of his depth, uncomfortable.ā William Webster, who headed the CIA at the end of Reaganās presidency, one day approached Colin Powell, then the national security advisor, and confided, āIām pretty good at reading people, but I like to get a report card. I canāt tell whether Iām really helping him or not because he listens and I donāt get a sense that he disagrees with me or agrees with me or what.ā Powell replied, āListen, Iām with him a dozen times a day and Iām in the same boat. So donāt feel badly about that.ā7
Nonetheless, there has emerged an interpretive trend praising Reaganās strategy for winning the Cold War. There is abundant evidence for this, say its proponents, and they highlight National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) 32 and 75. Those directives, formulated in 1982 and early 1983, do outline a strategy: build strength, constrain and contract Soviet expansion, nurture change within the Soviet empire (to the extent possible), and negotiate.8 The sophisticated analysts who rely on these NSDDs and who regard Reagan as a grand strategist do acknowledge the disarray in the administration, the feuding between the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security staff, and the internal bickering inside the White House between James Baker, Michael Deaver, Ed Meese, and Nancy Reagan (to some extent). Yet they claimāwith a good deal of evidenceāthat when Judge William Clark, Reaganās close friend, took the role of national security advisor in 1982, he sorted this all out, imposed discipline, and orchestrated a polished and refined strategy that triumphed over the evil empire.9 Judge Clark himself, in a lengthy interview at the Miller Center in 2003, took pride in forcing the Soviets to reshape their behavior through economic warfare, an ideological crusade, and military power.10
These interpretations in the hands of sophisticated scholars such as Hal Brands, Will Inboden, and John Gaddis appear persuasive.11 But when the evidence is examined closely, there is room for skepticism. Coherence was often lacking even when the directives were drafted. At a key meeting of the NSC, for example, when NSDD-75 was being discussed and approved, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger interjected impatiently, āYes, we are clear about our policy, it does not matter what is in the paper.ā But then Reagan concluded the meeting by stating: āTo summarize, our goal [regarding technology transfers] is not to facilitate a Soviet military buildup, but at the same time I donāt want to compromise our chance of exercising quiet diplomacy.ā12
So, just what was the strategy? In November 1983, soon after Pipes left the NSC, General Alexander Haig left the State Department, and Clark left the White House, Jack Matlock, Pipesās successor, began organizing Saturday morning breakfasts for senior officials to clarify the administrationās policy. George Shultz, the new secretary of state, attended, as did Bud McFarlane, the new national security advisor, as well as Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Vice President George H. W. Bush. There were sharp differences of opinion, Matlock subsequently wrote, ābut nobody argued that the United States should try to bring the Soviet Union down. All recognized that the Soviet leaders faced mounting problems, but understood that US attempts to exploit them would strengthen Soviet resistance to change rather than diminish it. President Reagan was in favor of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, but his objective was to induce the Soviet leaders to negotiate reasonable agreements, not to break up the country.ā13
These senior officials outlined the key goals: reduce the use and threat of force in international disputes, lower high levels of armaments, and establish minimal amounts of trust with the hope of verifying past agreements and effectuating progress on human rights, confidence-building measures, and bilateral ties.14 These top policymakers also agreed that they should not challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet system, seek military superiority, or force the collapse of the Soviet system (āas distinct from exerting pressure on Soviets to live up to agreements and abide by civilized standards of behaviorā).15 They also agreed that they should pursue a policy of realism, strength, and negotiation. Realism meant āthat our competition with the Soviet Union is basic and there is no quick fix.ā Strength was necessary to deal with the Kremlin effectively. Negotiations aimed to reduce tensions, not to conceal differences.16
So, what should we conclude? We have Judge Clark and NSDD-75 on the one hand, and we have Ambassador Matlock and the November 19 Saturday morning breakfast memo on the other. We also know that Secretary Shultz presented his own memorandum to the president on Soviet-American relations shortly after he replaced General Haig, and that that memorandum resembled the Saturday breakfast memo.17 What should we make of this? Was there a strategy to win the Cold War? Was there a strategy to end the Cold War?
While pondering these questions, we should consider two of the most famous quotations and stories about Ronald Reagan and the Cold War. In 1977, in a private conversation with Richard Allen, the man who would become his first national security advisor, Reagan explained that his theory of the Cold War was simple: āWe win, they lose.ā Allen was stunned by the simplicity and brilliance of this formulation. And others have cited it as the most cogent framework for illuminating the evolution of Reaganās strategy.18
Thomas Reed, a special assistant to President Reagan for national security and a former secretary of the air force in the Ford administration, narrates the other story. Reed reports that Stuart Spencer, Reaganās political consultant, accompanied the candidate in July 1980 on a flight from Los Angeles to the Republican nominating convention in Detroit. Spencer asked, āWhy are you doing this, Ron...
