1.1. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The US productivity slowdown is generally known to refer to the period of time when total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the private business sector in the United States was declining. The decline came in two waves. The first was in the early 1970s and the second wave was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By most accounts, those in the US Congress dismissed the slowdown in the early 1970s as being little more than an industrial reaction to the global energy shortage and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo.1 When the productivity slowdown reared its head again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the US Congress was more diligent in terms of the timing and scope of its responses.
The structure of the Congressional responses might be dated formally to the 1978 Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation that was initiated by President Jimmy Carter. The Domestic Policy Review was embargoed from the Office of the White House Secretary to Congress on October 31, 1978. Therein (Carter, 1979):
I am today announcing measures which will ensure our country’s continued role as a world leader in industrial innovation. These initiatives address nine critical areas [one of which is] clarifying anti-trust policy. … By spurring competition, anti-trust policies can provide a stimulant to the development of innovation. In some cases, however, such as in research, industrial cooperation may have clear social and economic benefits for the country. Unfortunately, our anti-trust laws are often mistakenly viewed as preventing all cooperative activity. The Department of Justice, at my direction, will issue a guide clearly explaining its position on collaboration among firms in research, as part of a broader program of improved communication with industry by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. This statement will provide the first uniform anti-trust guidance to industrial firms in the area of cooperation in research.
Within a relatively short period of time for new legislative action to occur (November 1980), the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures. DOJ’s position about joint research could not have been made clearer (DOJ, 1980, pp. 1–3):
Research itself presents a broad spectrum of activity, from “pure” basic research into fundamental principles, on the one hand, to development research focusing on promotional differentiation of a product or marketing issue on the other extreme. In general, basic research is undertaken with less predictability of outcome, and thus more risk, than developmental research. Moreover, the outcomes of basic research are less likely to be appropriable and thus more likely to be widely diffused in the economy, with the possibility of there being the basis of future advance and competitive opportunity for all.
The intensity of antitrust concerns about joint research will vary along the research spectrum: less intense about “pure” basic research, undertaken without ancillary restraints on use of the results, to more intense at the developmental end of the research spectrum, particularly if ancillary restraints has never been challenged by the Antitrust Division. … Nevertheless … concern has been expressed that valuable joint research efforts, particularly in basic research, might be deterred by fear, possibly unwarranted, of exposure to antitrust attack.
In general, the closer the joint activity is to the basic end of the research spectrum – i.e., the further removed it is from substantial market effect and developmental issues – the more likely it is to be acceptable under the antitrust laws [my emphasis].
After a series of bills introduced during the 98th session of Congress, the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984, Public Law 98-462, was passed in October of that year. The stated purpose of the NCRA was:
To promote research and development, encourage innovation, stimulate trade, and make necessary and appropriate modifications in the operation of the antitrust laws.
This is an important purpose statement. I revisit the purpose of the NCRA in Chapters 4 and 7 when I consider whether the NCRA has been successful or not. To bound the Act, the following definition of what joint research entails was stated:
Any group of activities … by two or more persons for the purpose of –
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of phenomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or technical nature into practical application for experimental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental production and testing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or
(E) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), and may include the establishment and...