Challenges, risks and threats for security in Europe

11th Network Europe Conference Warsaw 19th - 22nd May 2019

Andreas Kellerhals, Tobias Baumgartner

• Publisher: buch & netz
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9783038053064
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This publication brings together talks from the 11th Network Europe conference. The conference explored the conditions for security in 21st-century Europe and the key elements of an appropriate security architecture. Discussions focused on major security challenges such as cybercrime and migration, as well as institutional aspects, including the concept of a European army and the role of neutral states in an evolving security landscape. The publication features contributions from Vadym Barskyy, Tobias Baumgartner, Jelena Ceranic, Viorel Cibotaru, Aleksei Dolzhikov, Alena F. Douhan, Darina Dvornichenko, Itay Fishhendler, Andreas Kellerhals, Verena Murschetz, Przemyslaw Saganek, Jürgen Scheffran, and Attila Vincze. Network Europe was founded in 2003 by the Europa Institute at the University of Zurich with support from the Swiss government. It serves as a forum for scholarly exchange on legal and political aspects of European integration, bringing together researchers from across Europe.

Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on Security Policies in Europe

Darina Dvornichenko and Vadym Barskyy

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. The Annexation of the Crimea: Background and Implications
3. The EU’s Response to the Annexation of the Crimea
   1. EU Non-recognition policy
   2. EU Sanctions Policy
4. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the EU Member States
   1. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of Germany
   2. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of France
   3. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of Italy
   4. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of Greece
   5. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of the Visegrad Group
   6. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the Security Policy of the Baltic States
5. Conclusion
6. Recommendations
7. Bibliography

Introduction

Five years have passed since the Russian Federation annexed the Crimea. The annexation of the Crimea by the Kremlin turned out to be the most serious breach of European borders since the Second World War. Russia violated the fundamental principles of international law, its international obligations and bilateral agreements with Ukraine. The annexation has sharply increased instability of the European security environment, created new dividing lines and greatly enhanced the risk of the destruction of the existing world order. A proper understanding of how the annexation of the Crimea affected Europe’s policy and shaped its response can provide essential insights to measure the effectiveness of its approach to ensuring the European security.

The following paper will assess how the annexation of the Crimea affected the EU and its member-states policy. By taking an interdisciplinary and critical look at the impact the annexation of the Crimea made on Europe, the paper aims to provide answers to the following questions:

1) How coherent and effective is the non-recognition and sanction-based policy of the EU?

2) How has the annexation of the Crimea impacted the narrative and political decisions in security field adopted by Russia understanders and Russia opponents among the EU member states?

3) How do the EU response and the EU member states’ position contribute to the European security?

At the end of the paper particular recommendations on how to ensure Europe’s own political, energetic and informational security are presented.

The Annexation of the Crimea: Background and Implications

The strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula was realized thousands of years ago. Its geopolitical location almost in the centre of the Black Sea between the Caucasus and Southern Europe as well as the wealth of natural resources makes its strategically important. A significant portion of Russia’s navy stationed in Sevastopol and the ethnic diversity of the Crimea with the largest population of ethnic Russians within Ukraine and a strong Muslim minority of the Crimean Tatars turned it into the most sensitive issue in Ukraine-Russia relations which could easily explode.

At different times the Crimea was owned by the Tauris, Cimmerians, Greeks, Scythians, Romans, Huns, Goths, Bulgarians, Tatars, Slavs and other peoples. Its history as part of the Russian Empire started in 1783 when Catherine the Great annexed it from the Ottoman Empire. In 1921, the Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Soviet Union. Thirty-three years later, in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimea to Ukraine in a move hailed as a “noble act on behalf of the Russian people. When Ukraine held a referendum in December 1991, 54 % of the Crimean residents favoured the independence from the Soviet Union. It was a majority, but the lowest one found in Ukraine. Thus the Crimea became part of independent Ukraine with significant autonomy including its own constitution and parliament. In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, which formally allowed Russia to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. From 1997 to 2014, the sitation in the Crimea was considered under control.

However, the second decade of the XXI century has marked a shift in Russian military mindset. A refusal to accept Western dominance alongside with a more active form of resistance has been deeply embedded in a new doctrine articulated by Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov in his article “The Value of Science is in the Foresight”. Based on the lessons of the Georgia conflict, he described a framework of the new operational concept as the role of “Non-Military Methods in the Resolution of Interstate Conflicts”.^[1] According to V. Gerasimov, Russia heavily relies on proxy forces, both paramilitary and cyber, supported by media institutions and companies, Spetsnaz and Cossack fighters to conduct different types of operations, like unconventional, information, psychological and cyber operations, as well as security forces assistance and strategic communication. Due to the fact that the proxy forces consist of a mixture of Russians and ethnic Russians abroad, Russia not only exploits social conditions, but also cultural and linguistic factors in former Soviet states and at home to create proxy forces.^[2] The open use of forces often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation is resorted to only at a certain phase, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict. Altogether, the new generation warfare concept by V. Gerasimov has six phases which proved to be a successful approach in taking over the Crimea from Ukraine.

Main part in the Russian operation was the media campaign to gain support in the Crimea and Russia and to isolate the government of Ukraine. Television and the Internet were the dominant news media in Ukraine. The Russian information campaign started with the comparison of the Ukrainian government and their Western allies to Nazis, gays, Jews and other groups of people that Russia claimed were part of the conspiracy.^[3] Russia showed swastikas on billboards and in the media to compare the government to Nazi Germany. Russian media used past events to emphasize how aggressive NATO and the West were and how these powers violated agreements on NATO expansion restrictions into Eastern Europe.

The annexation of the Crimea has serious implications for Ukraine and Europe in all areas. In the economic area, the annexation of the Crimea and further Russia’s military actions in Donbas led to the displacement of 1.5 million registered Ukrainians, who have become a challenge not only for Ukrainian economy but also for the neighbouring EU member-states. In the energetic area, the annexation of the Crimea led to the breakdown of energetic ties between Ukraine and Russia which might pose a challenge to the energy security of the other European states benefitting from transit routes via Ukraine’s and their territory. In the military area, Russia can now block the Black Sea Straits in the South-West strategic direction, using forces located on the Crimean peninsula. In the geopolitical area, the annexation of the Crimea demonstrated that European states security might be also challenged by Russia. Although the Crimean scenario is unlikely to be repeated in other European countries, Russia’s efforts to interfere in their internal affairs (especially in those countries which either have Russian-speaking population or common energetic and economic interests) via disinformation campaigns with the purpose to destabilize the situation and challenge the unity of the EU will be more unwearying. That actualizes the search for a proper response of the EU to the Kremlin’s actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The EU’s Response to the Annexation of the Crimea

EU Non-recognition policy

The EU has demonstrated its strong commitment to support Ukraine since 2014. The EU conclusions, high-level statements and declarations ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Table Of Contents
• Preface
• Authors
• Concept of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU)
• EU-NATO Cooperation Today and Tomorrow
• East meets West - The Idea of European Integration and Security
• Migration and European Security – with a Special Emphasis on Serbia as a Transit Country
• Taking Public Interests Seriously? Security as a Legitimate Aim in Constitutional Adjudication in Russia
• Human Rights Dimension of Cybersecurity
• Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on Security Policies in Europe
• How Energy Dependency Becomes a Punitive Mea-sure in Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel and Gaza
• Cross-Border Cooperation in The Fight Against Terrorism and Organised Crime
• Climate Security and Environmental Conflict: European Perspectives
• Combating Cybercrime: Challenges and Strategies on the International and EU Level