Minuteman

A Technical History of the Missile That Defined American Nuclear Warfare

David K. Stumpf, David Stumpf

• Publisher: University of Arkansas Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781682261545
• eBook ISBN: 9781610757355
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

In Minuteman: A Technical History of the Missile That Defined American Nuclear Warfare, David K. Stumpf demystifies the intercontinental ballistic missile program that was conceived at the end of the Eisenhower administration as a key component of the US nuclear strategy of massive retaliation. Although its nuclear warhead may have lacked power relative to that of the Titan II, the Minuteman more than made up for this in terms of numbers and readiness to launch—making it the ultimate ICBM.

Minuteman offers a fascinating look at the technological breakthroughs necessary to field this weapon system that has served as a powerful component of the strategic nuclear triad for more than half a century. With exacting detail, Stumpf examines the construction of launch and launch control facilities; innovations in solid propellant, lightweight inertial guidance systems, and lightweight reentry vehicle development; and key flight tests and operational flight programs—all while situating the Minuteman program in the context of world events. In doing so, the author reveals how the historic missile has adapted to changing defense strategies—from counterforce to mutually assured destruction to sufficiency.

1

THE AIR FORCE AND STRATEGIC MISSILES

Nuclear weapons alone did not change the landscape of strategic warfare at the end of World War II. True, a single nuclear weapon wrought enormous devastation. Each of the major powers had large fleets of long-range bombers for delivering the weapons. They had to address command-and-control issues and advanced radar capability, but the initial solutions were essentially modernized World War II systems, with early computer technology making them robust.

However, when all was said and done, the potential existed for another breakthrough in strategic technology—the long-range guided missile. Could it feasibly replace the manned bomber? If so, was it wise to spend money on improving bomber and fighter forces, both for strategic attack and for continental defense against enemy long-range bombers? Much to the chagrin of traditionalists within each service, the long-range guided missile concept could not be ignored.

The Debate

Strong advocates inside and outside the military existed on both sides of the issue. Among the strongest adversaries were Dr. Vannevar Bush, who led the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, and Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold, who commanded the Army Air Forces. Among the nation’s leading scientists, Bush also chaired the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and the National Defense Research Committee and oversaw creation of the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) during World War II. Arnold became Air Corps chief in September 1938 and advocated for B-17 bomber development and jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) research. With creation of the United States Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941, Arnold became its chief and acting deputy chief of staff for air, with authority over both the Air Corps and Air Force Combat Command. Throughout his career Arnold emphasized research and development as second only to training.¹

As early as 1943, Arnold saw the future in remarkable detail:

Someday, not too far distant, there can come streaking out of somewhere (we won’t be able to hear it, it will come so fast) some kind of gadget with an explosive so powerful that one projectile will be able to wipe out this city of Washington. . . . I think we will meet the attack alright and, of course, in the air. But I’ll tell you one thing, there won’t be a goddam pilot in the sky! That attack will be met by machines guided not by human hands but by devices conjured up by human brains.²

In September 1944 Arnold met with Professor Theodore von Kármán, perhaps the world’s leading aerodynamist. They had first met a decade earlier during Arnold’s visit to the California Institute of Technology. Arnold considered von Kármán a mentor in physics and aerodynamics; now he needed him to form a group of the nation’s eminent scientists and engineers to generate a comprehensive report on what aviation’s evolution should be in the postwar years. Arnold wanted von Kármán to look well beyond present technology.

Eleven months later, in August 1945, after extensive tours of Europe and Japan with a team of scientists and engineers, von Kármán delivered a comprehensive first look at the future of aviation technology. This preliminary document, “Where We Stand,” summarized the team’s findings as eight basic tenets that would govern future aerial combat, two of which implied ICBMs:

1. Aircraft, manned or pilotless will move with speeds far beyond the velocity of sound.

2. Due to improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion, and electronic control, unmanned devices will transport means of destruction to targets at distances up to several thousand miles.³

The final 12-volume report contained papers by 25 authors who covered aviation topics that included guided missiles and pilotless aircraft.⁴

During congressional testimony in October 1945, Arnold stated:

The V-2 as we now see it, is a 250-mile weapon. But there is no reason why, with the scientific knowledge now available, the V-2, with the addition of wings, might not develop into a 3,000-mile weapon. It might also be made a great deal more powerful by the addition of new types of explosives. It might be made a great deal more accurate with the application of certain principles of electronics. . . . Those weapons can come through the air unheralded and unannounced. . . . The defense cannot be against the weapon itself, against the missile itself once it is in the air; the defense has to be an offensive mission against the source.⁵

Although not discounting the manned-bomber mission, Arnold emphasized preparing, in the not-too-distant future, for long-range ballistic missiles.

In December 1945 Vannevar Bush, referring to Arnold’s earlier testimony, told the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy:

My point is simply that we have plenty enough to think about that it is very definite and very realistic, enough so that we do not need to step out on into some of these borderlines which seem to be, to me, more or less fantastic. . . . They have been talking about a 3,000-mile-high-angle rocket, shot from one continent to another, carrying an atomic bomb and so directed as to be a precise weapon which would land exactly on a certain target, such as the city. I say, technically, I don’t think anybody in the world knows how to do such a thing, and I feel confident that it will not be done for a very long time.⁶

Bush also mentioned Army Air Forces Gen. Carl Spaatz’s article that appeared in the 8 December 1945 issue of Collier’s Weekly, which described German plans for a V-2 with transcontinental range.⁷ Characterizing Spaatz as no engineer, Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT), the committee chairman, asked for Bush’s opinion of the article. Bush replied:

If you were talking about 400 or 500 miles, I would say by all means. That is what the Germans did with their V-2 . . . But 3,000 miles? That is not just a single step beyond, it is a vastly different thing, gentlemen. I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American people would leave it out of their thinking.⁸

In February 1946, in a National Geographic article, Arnold reviewed the wide-ranging Army Air Forces’ accomplishments during World War II, emphasizing how World War I biplane technology metamorphosed into the B-29 Superfortress. He described how jet-propelled fighters and bombers soon would supersede propeller-driven aircraft. Much to Bush’s bemusement, Arnold claimed:

It is now entirely possible, with the engineering information attainable, to build a ground-to-ground missile capable of traveling more than a thousand miles, and it is probable that in the not-distant future it will be possible to send remote-controlled missiles to any spot on the earth’s surface.⁹

In Modern Arms and Free Men, published in 1949, Bush discussed the role of science in preserving democracy and repeated his lack of concern about intercontinental missiles:

We may need to fear intercontinental bombing by manned aircraft at high altitudes . . . But there need be little fear of the intercontinental missile in the form of a pilotless aircraft, for it is not so effective from the standpoint of cost or performance as the airplane with a crew. Can such a missile be made to hit anything at the end of its flight? The V-2 could be made to hit with reasonable frequency within 15 miles of a point of aiming at a range of 200 miles. A similar missile flying 2,000 miles could be depended to hit within 150 miles of its target with reasonable frequency. This probability could certainly be improved. Its costs would be astronomical. For the near future, the really important and significant field of guided missiles lies in much shorter ranges, above those readily handled by guns but not so large as to run up size and costs to prohibitive heights.¹⁰

Exploring Solutions

Truman Administration 1945 to 1953

The Truman administration was the first to confront decision-making about long-range missile development. Spurred into action by the Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic bomb on 29 August 1949 and outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, President Truman asked Kaufman T. Keller, Chrysler Corporation board chairman, to be the Defense Department’s director of the Office of Guided Missiles. Appointed on 30 October 1950, Keller and a small staff reviewed the status of major US missile programs. He obtained approval and funds for establishment of production lines of several high-priority missile programs—Nike, Terrier, and Sparrow—a major expansion of flight test programs. The Atlas ICBM program, after being funded in April 1946, only to be canceled in July 1947, regained favor as MX-1593 on 16 January 1951. By January 1952 his evaluation of 22 programs had resulted in their approval for special development by the secretary of defense.

Eisenhower Administration 1953 to 1961

Keller’s final report, released on 17 September 1953, described Atlas as “a highly complex and long-term project still in the study stage.” On 12 November 1953, the individual service secretaries received authority to approve guided missile programs within their departments.¹¹

The ICBM concept and concomitant funding for development spawned numerous congressional and military committees. Eisenhower became the first president faced with a decision to acquire and deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ICBMs. He pondered several questions before deciding. Was the Soviet Union building and deploying similar missile forces? What was an appropriate response, sheltering the population from attack through developing early warning systems or a strong retaliatory response? Could the United States afford both?

Eisenhower began his first term by reorganizing the National Security Council (NSC) to provide “an integration of views which would be the product of continuous association between skilled representatives of all elements germane to national security.”¹² He appointed a special assistant for national security affairs, expanded NSC membership, and made it clear the organization should frequently use outside civilian experts with fresh viewpoints.¹³

Concerned about the Truman administration’s militaristic approach to the Soviet Union and its consequences for the US economy, on 9 May 1953, Eisenhower directed the NSC to create three panels to review national security policy alternatives. Code-named Project Solarium, the panels spent six weeks investigating current policies and proposing future directions. Task Force A, led by George Kennan, studied containment policy, essentially a continuation of Truman administration ideas. Task Force B, led by Air Force Gen. James McCormack, studied explicitly stated areas the United States would automatically defend against Soviet attack. Task Force C, led by Adm. Richard Conolly, studied “rolling back” Communism. On 16 July 1953, each task force presented its final report to the NSC. Several more months of analysis by the NSC staff led, on 30 October 1953, to NSC Report 162/2, which introduced a massive retaliation policy that relied on strategic nuclear weapons.¹⁴

In October 1953 Trevor Gardner, assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development, established the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Group, nicknamed the Teapot Committee, to focus solely on strategic missiles then being developed: Snark, Navaho, and Atlas...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Air Force Acronyms
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. The Air Force and Strategic Missiles
• 2. Evolution of the Minuteman Force Levels
• 3. Minuteman in Context
• 4. Solid Propellant Comes of Age
• 5. From Polaris Came Minuteman
• 6. Siting and Facility Design
• 7. Construction and Activation
• 8. Motors and Airframe
• 9. Mark 5 and 11 Series Reentry Vehicles
• 10. Guidance and Control
• 11. Targeting Minuteman
• 12. Research and Development Flight Programs
• 13. Operational Flight and Evaluation Programs
• 14. Operational Base Missile Test Programs
• 15. Aspects of Command and Control
• 16. Keeping Pace: Modernization and Upgrades
• 17. Force Reduction
• Epilogue
• Appendix A: Construction, Acceptance, and Activation Summaries
• Appendix B: Flight Test Programs
• Appendix C: Operational Flight Test and Evaluation Programs
• Appendix D: Airborne Launch Control Center Panels
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index