Constructing Social Reality

An Inquiry into the Normative Foundations of Social Change

Michael Karlberg

• Publisher: Association for Baha'i Studies
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9780920904336
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Some of the most significant obstacles to human well-being today are habits of Western thought that have been exported around the world. These habits include dichotomous conceptions of truth and relativity, cynical conceptions of knowledge and power, and conflictual conceptions of science and religion. Michael Karlberg articulates a framework for reconciling each of these false dichotomies in a critically informed and constructive manner. He does this, in philosophical terms, by reconciling ontological foundationalism and epistemological relativism within a moderate social constructionist framework. Karlberg's timely and accessible argument is offered with a spirit of humility and open-mindedness, inviting dialogue characterized by the same spirit, born out of genuine concern for the betterment of humanity at this critical juncture in history.

Chapter 1

Reconciling Truth & Relativity

The introduction to this book asserts that humanity needs to learn its way forward to adapt to conditions of heightened global interdependence, that this learning entails the generation and application of knowledge about emerging social phenomena, and that such knowledge has a normative dimension. Whether these assertions seem rational and compelling hinges, in part, on how we understand the relationship between truth and relativity. To appreciate why this seemingly abstract relationship is so relevant to the exigencies of this age, we can begin by thinking about some of its concrete implications. Two examples should suffice.

Consider, first, the issue of global warming or climate change. As climate science matures, it is becoming evident that the impacts of a warming climate, if the process is not quickly halted and ultimately reversed, will be devastating for many populations who bear the least responsibility for it and who can least afford to cope with it.⁹ As sea levels rise, hundreds of millions of people living on low-lying islands and coastal plains in some of the world’s poorest and least industrialized countries will be displaced. As glaciers disappear, hundreds of millions of small farmers who depend on glacial run-off will also be unable to irrigate their crops. As climate-sensitive terrestrial species experience drastic population declines or extinctions, millions more will be deprived of traditional foods and livelihoods. And as pH-sensitive aquatic species experience drastic population declines or extinctions, further millions will be deprived of foods and livelihoods. Meanwhile, the world’s wealthiest populations from the most industrialized countries who bear the greatest responsibility for global warming will be in the best positions to adapt and survive.

What moral obligations, if any, should fall on the shoulders of privileged populations who are most responsible for these looming humanitarian crises? Are there any normative truths upon which such questions can be decided? Or are the answers to these questions merely relative to the values and interests of diverse stakeholders? If we believe the latter, then all normative questions can be decided only by the exercise of power and privilege. If so, global warming is likely to reduce us to the crude dynamics of social Darwinism—the signs of which we can already see clearly in the world today.

Or consider the issue of human rights. The global discourse on human rights ultimately revolves around the issue of whether diverse cultural or religious traditions, along with assertions of unfettered national sovereignty, can be reconciled with the application of any universal standards of human rights. This issue raises challenging questions. For instance, do all children have the right to be free from exploitation? Do they have the right to an education? Do girls have the same rights as boys to develop their latent capacities through education and access to opportunity? Do all individuals have the right to freedom of conscience and belief so long as their beliefs are not harmful to others? Do peaceful minorities have the right to be free from discrimination or violent persecution? Do populations displaced by civil war or natural disasters have a right to resettle in new lands? Do the poor have a right to health care? Or to food? Or to shelter?

If any of these rights exist, upon what normative foundations do they rest? What obligations might the nations of the world have that require them to safeguard or ensure such rights—within their own borders and beyond? Or are human rights mere social constructs that reflect the relative values and beliefs of specific cultures, religious traditions, nations, or social groups? And are global human rights frameworks merely attempts by powerful social groups or nations to impose their values and beliefs on others? If so, by what justification can marginalized social groups struggle to overcome oppression within the context of their own cultures, religious traditions, and nations? Do oppressed groups even have the right to struggle for change? If so, upon what normative foundation does this right rest?

Questions such as these are not merely academic. They are of profound practical concern. Billions of lives depend on how they are answered. Ultimately, the answers to such questions will depend on whether normative truths are “real” or not. Are some normative principles akin, in any way, to other principles that govern reality, such as the principles of physics? If so, might we learn to explore and apply such normative principles to the betterment of the human condition? Or are all normative truth claims merely relative to our subjective preferences, cultural values, or ideological predilections?

REALITY AS ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING PERCEPTIONS OF TRUTH

As a first step in this inquiry, we need to consider what it means to perceive or “know” anything about “reality.” As the introductory chapter mentioned, epistemology is the branch of philosophy that explores this question. Associated with the field of epistemology has been a perennial tension over the basic question of whether we can ever know anything about foundational aspects of reality. Richard Rorty describes this as a tension between vertical and horizontal approaches to knowledge.¹⁰

Vertical approaches assume that through the right methods, human minds can come to know aspects of reality that exist independently of our mental and linguistic efforts to represent those aspects of reality. According to this approach, valid truth claims are envisioned, metaphorically, as having a vertical relationship with a foundational reality that underlies them. Viable bodies of knowledge are thus presumed to uncover the hidden workings of, and thus correspond to, basic features of existence.

Horizontal approaches to knowledge, on the other hand, assume that truth claims are nothing more than mental or linguistic constructs with no direct correspondence to foundational reality. Internally coherent sets of truth claims are thus envisioned, metaphorically, as merely hanging together with each other in a horizontal manner, reflecting culturally and historically specific patterns of thought and language use. Such truth claims can serve practical, functional, or even ideological purposes, but they are always social constructs that have no grounding in a reality “out there” that is independent of human minds. Rather, such truth claims are considered “true” only insofar as they are consistent with a network of truth claims deemed viable within a particular tradition of inquiry.

Variations on the vertical and horizontal themes can be seen in epistemological arguments between objectivism and subjectivism, foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, absolutism and relativism, realism and anti-realism, essentialism and anti-essentialism, modernism and postmodernism.¹¹ A review of the particularities and nuances that characterize each of these opposing traditions of thought would fill an entire volume and distract from the discussion at hand. Rorty’s distinction between vertical and horizontal epistemologies will suffice for our purpose.

In a previous publication, Todd Smith and I articulate a set of premises and concepts that reconcile the perennial tension between vertical and horizontal epistemologies.¹² In short, we posit that many phenomena have a real existence that is independent of human thought. Moreover, while human minds can never know the essence of phenomena, we can gain insight into their manifest expressions, such as their observable or measurable attributes, properties, and effects. Even at this manifest level, however, many phenomena are complex and multifaceted. And in relation to this multifaceted complexity, human comprehension is partial, limited, and divergent. This is because human thought and perception are paradigmatically conditioned by the cognitive lenses, or conceptual frameworks, we internalize as we learn languages, are socialized, receive formal education, gain life experiences, and so forth. Such conditioning influences which phenomena, or which aspects of phenomena, we notice, as well as how we interpret them.

These ideas are not new. Variants of some can be found in vertical epistemologies and variants of others can be found in horizontal epistemologies. However, what neither vertical nor horizontal epistemologies take seriously enough is the dynamic relationship between foundational reality and the social construction of knowledge.¹³ In our article, Smith and I illustrate how foundational reality both enables and constrains the range of ways we can construct knowledge regarding different phenomena.

One way we explain this is through a simple metaphor that draws on Paul Feyerabend’s insight that scientists “are sculptors of reality.”¹⁴ Extending this analogy, we point out that sculptors need materials with which to work; otherwise, they cannot sculpt. Materials retain properties; otherwise, they are not materials. Properties involve conditions; otherwise, they are not properties. Conditions impose demands; otherwise, they are not conditions. Demands impose constraints; otherwise, they are not demands. Thus, the social construction of knowledge, like sculpting, is conditioned by the “stuff” with which it works. Or, as Helen Longino puts it, ultimately “there is ‘something out there’ that imposes limits on what we can say about it.”¹⁵

Even as reality constrains the construction of knowledge about it, it simultaneously enables that same process of construction. One cannot sculpt unless there is something, with properties, to sculpt. By analogy, we explain in the original article, the only reason a sculptor can effectively chisel a piece of marble is because the sculptor is addressing, upon impact, some aspect of “the way marble is”—such as the way it breaks. Using a chisel effectively to chip away marble requires some knowledge, on the part of the sculptor, of various properties of the marble. Thus, the sculptor does not mistake “the way marble is” with “the way water is” in the process of sculpting. Moreover, the reason sculptors have been able to make better chisels over time is because upon repeated encounters with marble, they have become increasingly attuned to its properties and the way it responds to their chisels. In these ways, the marble simultaneously enables and constrains the sculptor while he or she is working.

The enabling and constraining nature of reality affirms that it is foundational. However, some aspects of reality—or some aspects of different phenomena—are more enabling or constraining than others. In other words, different aspects of reality enable or constrain, to different degrees, the extent to which we notice them at all, along with the range of truth claims that can viably be made about them. We refer to this as the relative tangibility of different phenomenal aspects. Relative tangibility can be illustrated with the following three examples.

First, tooth decay is a highly tangible phenomenon. The pain caused by a toothache is hard to ignore, and a tooth falling out is even harder to ignore. Both tend, more so than other phenomena, to demand attention regardless of the paradigmatic lenses through which we perceive them. Furthermore, as we begin to empirically investigate the cause of tooth decay, the phenomenon permits a relatively narrow range of viable interpretations of it. We can thus say that tooth decay is highly tangible and that the physiology of a tooth is, compared to other phenomena, a highly tangible object of inquiry.

Second, the subjective experience of human consciousness is a less tangible object of inquiry. Philosophers and scientists debate whether consciousness even “exists” in any meaningful sense or whether it is simply a temporary illusion conjured by biochemical processes in the brain. Even those who accept its independent existence debate the nature and “location” of that existence. The nature of human consciousness thus enables the construction of a wide range of viable truth claims.

Third, the ephemeral images and feelings that flash through many dreams when we sleep are extremely intangible phenomena. The fact that humans dream is not in doubt. But the nature, cause, or meaning of the specific images and feelings we experience in a particular dream—if we remember them at all once we wake—is almost impossible to probe in any rational or empirical manner. Such dreams offer almost no substance with which to construct credible truth claims.

These three examples illustrate relative tangibility. The sculptural metaphor Smith and I invoke in our article provides further insight into this concept: This time, imagine sculptors who work with clay. On one occasion, they come across hardened pieces of clay that have already been through the kiln. The hardness of this clay—its extreme tangibility—prevents the sculptors from molding it in diverse ways. On another occasion, the sculptors come across a tub of water containing scraps of mostly dissolved clay. Now the liquidity of the clay—its extreme intangibility—prevents the sculptors from molding it at all. On a third occasion, the sculptors find a stock of pliant, supple clay. This clay’s plasticity—or its semi-tangibility—allows the sculptors to mold it in diverse ways. But the different ways they mold it depends on their respective training and on how their training interacts with specific properties of the kind of clay they are now molding, such as its mineral content.

In our article, Smith and I go on to explore how divergent forms of intellectual training—that is, our paradigmatic conditioning or the conceptual frameworks we internalize—come to bear on efforts to construct knowledge about different phenomena given their varying degrees of tangibility. We discuss how this insight enables us to transcend the debate between vertical and horizontal epistemologies by taking seriously the dynamic relationship between foundational aspects of reality and the social construction of knowledge. We then describe various ways in which different paradigms are, or become, attuned to any given phenomenon or phenomenal aspect, and we conclude by outlining the need for a consultative epistemology capable of sifting through and integrating the potentially complementary insights into a given phenomenon that are yielded by diverse cognitive lenses.¹⁶

For a deeper discussion of these themes, the reader can refer to our original article.¹⁷ The preceding overview is meant only to introduce and clarify some basic premises underlying the argument I articulate in this book. To recap, those basic premises are as follows:

Many phenomena have a real existence that is independent of human thought. Human minds can never know the essences of such phenomena. We can gain insights only into manifest expressions of these phenomena, such as their observable or measurable attributes, properties, and effects. Even at this manifest level, however, many phenomena are complex and multifaceted. In relation to this multifaceted complexity, human comprehension is not only limited and partial; it is often divergent. This divergence is, in part, because much human cognition is paradigmatically conditioned. In addition, different features of reality enable and constrain what we can know of them in different ways due to their relative tangibility. Our cognitive conditioning interacts with this relative tangibility, and this interaction affects what aspects of reality we notice, how we interpret those aspects, the extent to which we can become attuned to them, the ways we can become attuned to them, and thus the range of truth claims we can viably construct about them.

In our initial article, these premises are offered as a way of rec...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Table of Figures
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Reconciling Truth & Relativity
• Chapter 2: Reconciling Knowledge & Power
• Chapter 3: Reconciling Science & Religion
• Chapter 4: Bahá’í Discourse & Practice
• Chapter 5: Materialist Frames of Reference
• Chapter 6: Looking Forward
• Conclusion
• Acknowledgements
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index