Contemporary âmainstreamâ psychoanalysis has been described by sympathetic scholars as in crisis.1 As Marshall Edelson reflects, psychoanalysis is a âtheory in crisisâ characterized by âprofound malaiseâ (1988, p. xiv), while Nathan G. Hale describes the psychoanalytic crisis as âa crisis of clashing theories, competing modes of therapy, and uncertainties of professional identityâ (1995, p. 360). Twenty-three years after Haleâs comment, the editors of the impressive anthology Psychoanalytic Trends in Theory and Practice: The Second Century of the Talking Cure (Etezady, Blon, & Davis, 2018) made a similar assertion: âPsychoanalysis has become a very diverse field with multiple schools of thought, each of which has its own theory and praxis (ibid., p. 476) ⌠[there is no] unified theory of psychoanalysisâ (ibid., p. 478). The great W. R. Bion appears to have been aware of the aforementioned when he ironically quipped in 1990, âIn the practice of psycho-analysis it is difficult to stick to the rules. For one thing, I do not know what the rules of psychoanalysis areâ (1990, p. 139).2
Not only does psychoanalysis lack what Thomas Kuhn called a disciplinary matrix for its activities as a science, it âis too fragmented to be constituted as a unitary disciplineâ (Weinstein, 1990, p. 26),3 but it has not been hospitable to heretical and dissident thinkers, thus âsucking the lifeâ out of the psychoanalytic institute training experience (including some authoritarianism that has penetrated and blunted creativity (Kernberg, 1996)). As the great psychoanalytic theorizer of narcissism and borderline conditions, Otto Kernberg, recently noted in an interview, psychotherapy training in the United States is in serious decline (www.psychotherapy.net/interview/otto-kernberg, retrieved 5/12/19).4 Psychoanalysis is hardly represented in the university training programs of psychiatrists and doctoral-level clinical psychology psychologists; it has instead been marginalized to institutes.5 The average age of a trained American psychoanalyst is 66, which suggests cultural aging (four years ago it was 62), and the number of daily analytically oriented patients is 2.75 (i.e., at least three times a week) compared to 8 to 10 in the psychoanalytic glory days of the 1950s and 1960s (Leonard, 2015).
This book attempts to improve the dismal landscape of contemporary psychoanalysis by suggesting that a psychoanalysis that is animated by the powerfully evocative spiritual (and moral/ethical) insights of two great contemporary, deeply religious existential philosophers, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel,6 can help reinvigorate a discipline and profession that is in a dire state, both in the âmarketplace of ideasâ and in terms of clinical practice. Indeed, Buber was a âbelievingâ Jew (though not a religiously practicing one), and Marcel a âbelievingâ Christian (a practicing one of a sort),7 who were both trying to reach âbelieversâ and ânon-believersâ in their writings. Their dialogical personalist philosophies provide a mighty intellectual and moral/ethical resource that can move psychoanalysis from its aspirational objectives to inspirational ones (Van Deurzen, 2012, p. 181). By claiming that human existence is fundamentally dialogue, I mean that it is âaddress and response, claim and counter-claim, pledge and promise.â That is, the human person âis the only being who can address another, who can make promises, who is united with other men in bonds of covenantâ (Pfuetze, 1967, p. 530).8
My book is a small contribution to the ârevitalizationâ of psychoanalysis from its cultural aging, bringing it back into the light by communicating its vitality and power when viewed as a spiritual discipline. Buber and Marcel have a spiritual sensibility that is in many ways in sync with a psychoanalytic outlook: it can empower people to quest for truth actively, mindfully, and thoroughly through the challenging experience of critically reflecting on their own existential âsituated-nessâ in the world and the untapped, unrealized possibilities of their everyday lives (Van Deurzen, 2012, p. 181). Similar to philosophy, psychoanalytic theory and technique have not yet adequately assimilated the profundity of Buber and Marcelâs insights into the ontological structure of human experience,9 for example, the nature of relation/encounter and the act of distancing/detachment. Buber and Marcelâs contribution to the I-Thou and I-It realms,10 and to other central human experiences like love, hope, fidelity, and faith, has been regarded as so significant that it has been recently described as a âCopernican Revolutionâ in philosophy (Sweetman, 2008, p. 135).
Why use Buber and Marcel to enhance psychoanalysis?
As the philosopher/psychoanalyst (and member of a convent for 17 years in a previous life) Donna Orange, who highlights Buber in a short appreciative chapter, noted, âdialogic philosophy is a better resource than âpostmodernismâ for our clinical practiceâ (2010, p. 12). Michael Eigen, a prolific analytic writer who approvingly cites Buber, also noted, âClinically postmodernism hasnât added all that much for meâ (1998, p. 184). Indeed, I wholeheartedly agree with Orange that Buberâs (and even more so Marcelâs) contribution âhas gone largely unnoticed in the psychoanalytic worldâ (2010, p. 12).11 This is especially noteworthy when we call to mind that Freud commented that the psychoanalyst can be described as a âsecular pastoral workerâ (Hoffman, 1998, p. 5).
Buberâs notion of âhealing through meetingâ (Agassi, 1999 p. 17)12 (aka, âdialogical psychotherapyâ or some such variant, which has very low visibility as of late)13 and related issues pertinent to clinical practice have been extensively written about, for example, by Leslie Farber (1956, 1966, 1967) and Maurice Friedman (1985, 1998),14 and I have written the only book on Marcel that discusses psychoanalysis and the sacred (Marcus, 2013a; 2018). Yet no one has used these two religious existentialists in conversation with contemporary psychoanalysis or with each other, on such vitally important psychological themes to psychoanalysis as love, work, faith, and suffering, especially to the analyst/analysand interchange, as contained in this book. While there is much about which Buber and Marcel agree (there is a âspiritual convergence,â says Marcel (1967, p. 41)), they differ too, as they are lodged in different intellectual traditions (unlike Marcel, Buber came from the Germanic intellectual atmosphere) and religions, and such a juxtaposition of outlooks makes for lively debate about summoning personal issues relevant to psychoanalysis.15 These similarities and differences as they pertain to âthe ontology of being human,â as Buber called it (Mendes-Flohr, 2019, p. 50), or the âmystery of beingâ (the irreducible mystery of singularity, of the relation to the Thou), as Marcel called it, that is, the âinterhumanâ or âintersubjectiveâ respectively, are common concerns of both of these path-breaking religious existentialists.16 In addition, Buber and Marcel agreed on âthe distinction between I-Thou and I-It relation, the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge to describe human experience in its fullness, and the identification of the transcendent dimension of human existenceâ (Sweetman, 2011, p. 132). Wood noted that âthere is a remarkable parallelismâ between Buber and Marcel on the âbasic directionâ of their thought, mainly because they were both âdeeply religious thinkersâ (1999, pp. 83, 94). Levinas concurs that âthere is a remarkable commonality in the essential views ofâ Marcel and Buber (1994, p. 21), while most recently Treanor noted that âBuber remains philosophically close to Marcelâ (2006, pp. 189â190).
For Buber, the âinterhumanâ is âthe interactive region between persons in a genuine relationship [like the analyst/analysand], it is the spirit of âthe between,â through which a person can glimpse the unsayable ground, the âeternal Thou,ââ Buberâs term for God (Kramer & Gawlick, 2003, p. 203). The âbetweenâ refers to âthe immediate presence of unreserved, spontaneous mutuality common to each person yet beyond the sphere of either [as in the psychoanalytic interchange at its best]. Impossible to objectify, âthe betweenâ is the most real reality of human existence, of being wholly and uniquely âhumanâ with humansâ (ibid., p. 202). âIntersubjectivityâ is defined by Marcel as âopening ourselves to others and the capacity to welcome them without being effaced by themâ (Marcel, 1973, p. 39); as in a âloving heart,â it is the starting point of his philosophy and my version of psychoanalysis (just as Freud advocated, Marcus, 2019). Intersubjectivity can be further described as âthe infrastructure of spiritual life, an original human solidarity preceding the emergence of the ego and the conditions for its possibilityâ (Schmitz, 1984, p. 164). âWe are not alone,â says Marcel, and âthat whatever we do we are responsible for what happens to othersâ (Marcel, 1973, p. 234). In fact, Marcel defined the human person as âhomo viator,â an âitinerant beingâ or âspritutal wandererâ on a âwinding journeyâ in search for âsomething more,â âsomething higher,â and âsomething betterâ (Gallagher, 1962, p. 11). Marcelâs preferred term for God was the âAbsolute Thou.â
In other words, for both Marcel and Buber, intersubjectivity and the interhuman, the bailiwick of all versions of psychoanalysis, are the opposite of self-centeredness and selfishness (i.e., inordinate narcissism and egocentricity, as analystâs would call such a way of being-in-the-world). Rather, they point to transcendence, to a âbeyond,â though not a literal supra-terrestrial, ânot some other place, but an unknown and higher dimension of reality, attainable in and through human experience and existenceâ (Cain, 1979, p. 115). Transcendence is mainly a subjective sacred experience, where one apprehends what lies beyond creation and infinitely transcends it.17 To âmaster othernessââor at least become empathically attuned to animate and inanimate others, to the unseen and unevidenced God, and to the unconscious in oneself, âin a lived unityâ as Buber noted (Mendes-Flohr, 2019, p. 188)ârequired fashioning a way of being-in-the-world that is other-directed, other-regarding, and other-serving, this being one of the key animating values in Marcel and Buberâs oeuvres.18 Indeed, Levinas thought that Marcel and Buberâs âessential discoveryâ consisted of âaffirming that human spiritualityâor religiosityâlies in the fact of the proximity of persons, neither lost in the mass nor abandoned to their solitudeâ (1994, p. 21).
The fact that Buber and Marcel are deeply religious thinkers who are also steeped in secular philosophical thought is exactly why I chose them as my two intellectual touchstones to critically evaluate psychoanalysis, and ultimately to expand and enhance it as a spiritually animated discipline.19 Both thinkers point to the possibility of transcendence, whether as a âbelieverâ or a secularist, via critically reflecting on experience, rising above it and making it intelligible (Van Deurzen, 2012, p. 176). They do so by judiciously embracing a set of transformative valuative attachments and correlated actions that bring out the best in human relatedness. It should be noted that while Buber gave a set of lectures at the Washington School of Psychiatry and had a dialogue with Carl Rogers in 1957, he âwas not a friend of psychoanalysisâ (Friedman, 2013, p. 14). In fact, Friedman describes Buber as having a âdistaste for Freudian theory,â and claims that Buber confided to him that âmost psychoanalysts, knowing me to be an âadversary,â will deny having learned anything from meâ (ibid., p. 88). Marcel respectfully mentioned Freud and psychoanalysis in passing (usually when talking about his own psychic pain as a child), but never in any depth or systematically as it pertains to his philosophical reflections.
By describing Buber and Marcel as religious, I do not mean I am advocating a return to formalized religion and the moralizing that is associated with the worst of institutionalized religion. Rather, by religiosity I mean to point to a form of faith, what Marcel calls âcreative attestation,â an act of creative witnessing to Beauty, Truth, and Goodness.20 This mainly involves being ready, receptive, responsive, and responsible for and to the other, whether the other is a person, animal, thing, or the otherness of oneself (e.g., the other of internal dialogue, or the unconscious, the ground of being). Such faith is any act of putting oneself âat the disposal of something,â âof giving oneself to, rallying toâ (Marcel, 1964, p. 134) an act to which âI pledge myself fundamentally.â That is, faith always has an âexistential index,â as it fully engrosses a personâs power of being (Marcel, 2001, pp. 77â78). Faith thus involves a personâs real-life, here-and-now promise to give oneself to and, says Marcel, âto followâ someone or something that one cherishes. Such opening up to, giving oneself, and following can be in the service of Beauty, as in the artistâs courage to create; Truth, as in the whistleblowerâs courage to speak out against authority; Goodness, as in the soldierâs courage to throw himself on a hand grenade to save his comrades; and in countless other less dramaticall...