European Dictatorships 1918-1945

Stephen J. Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317294214
• Edition: 4
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

European Dictatorships 1918–1945 surveys the extraordinary circumstances leading to, and arising from, the transformation of over half of Europe's states to dictatorships between the first and the second world wars. From the notorious dictatorships of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin to less well-known states and leaders, Stephen J. Lee scrutinizes the experiences of Russia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Central and Eastern European states.

This fourth edition has been fully revised and updated throughout. New material for this edition includes:

• the most recent research on individual dictatorships
• a new chapter on the experiences of Europe's democracies at the hands of Germany, Italy and Russia
• an expanded chapter on Spain
• a new section on dictatorships beyond Europe, exploring the European and indigenous roots of dictatorships in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

• 
  
  

Extensively illustrated with images, maps, tables and a comparative timeline, and supported by a companion website providing further resources for study ( www.routledge.com/cw/lee ), European Dictatorships 1918–1945 is a clear, detailed and highly accessible analysis of the tumultuous events of early twentieth-century Europe.

Chapter 1

The setting for dictatorship

Europe experienced, between the wars, an unprecedented upheaval. Boundaries were altered in the most drastic way and numerous new states came into existence. Old-fashioned empires and the last remnants of autocracy had been swept away, to be replaced by constitutional democracies and the principle that each major ethnic group should be given the right to form its own nation. Naturally there was a heady optimism about the future and many shared the belief of H.G. Wells that the struggle between 1914 and 1918 had been the war to end wars. Yet the collapse of the old order was also a precondition for movements that were anti-democratic, and there was no guarantee that the new constitutions or boundaries would be indefinitely preserved.

The overall argument of this chapter is developed in six stages. First, Europe before the First World War was in a state of uncertainty, in many places in crisis. Trends were already in place that were released by the First World War and the peace settlement which followed it. The events of 1914–20 acted as a powerful catalyst, second, for internal change and, third, for the redrawing of boundaries. Fourth, these developments were in most cases associated with constitutional democracy and national self-determination. Such ideals were, however, soon threatened by serious underlying problems that, fifth, gave a boost to alternative systems in the form of left- or right-wing dictatorship. Finally, this process was accelerated by the worst economic crisis in recent history and by a complex international situation that saw the eventual association of dictatorship with militarism and war.

THE PERIOD BEFORE 1914

There has always been a tendency to see the period to 1914 as the climax of an order that was fundamentally stable when Europe had experienced the longest period of peace between major powers in its history. This was destroyed by the upheaval of the First World War, the radical effects of which created the environment for instability and dictatorship between 1918 and 1939. This picture is partly true, but it conceals major changes that were already taking place beneath the surface in pre-1914 Europe, and that were to provide at least some of the roots for inter-war developments. From this approach, the First World War cleared the way for changes that were already in progress. These affected economies, societies and political trends.

The pre-war period saw rapid technological development which amounted to a second wave of industrialization, along with an acceleration of communications and transport and an enhancement of scientific and medical knowledge. At the same time, there was also a massive population growth within Europe which more than offset the emigration from it. In most countries the most obvious social change was the growth of the working class, the result of industrialization. This class was becoming increasingly politically aware, as was the more traditional peasant class. Both exerted increasing influence, either through being enfranchised and participating in the early stages of mass politics or by the way in which the upper levels of society tried to shape policies to contain them. Either way, the politicization of the masses was proceeding before 1914.

So far, there has been little to dispel the positive image of the pre-war era. A great deal of attention, however, has been given by historians to a phenomenon associated with the so-called ‘fin de siècle’. According to Sternhell and others, there was a far-reaching ‘intellectual crisis of the 1890s’.¹ This was beginning to shake the established thought of most of the nineteenth century which had been based on liberalism and materialism and which had pointed towards rational and progressive change. Examples of the new wave of anti-rationalism in philosophy and political thought are to be found in the works of Nietzsche in Germany, Bergson in France, Croce in Italy – all showing a reaction against positivism. The arts were also affected in a new wave of romanticism, epitomized by the operas of Wagner in Germany and by the departure from the accepted harmonic system in concertos and symphonies. There was a new interest in social psychology, especially in the emotional behaviour of the masses: the leading influence here was Le Bon in France. Throughout society, and especially in the universities, there was a growing emphasis placed on youth and renewal: this had enormous potential for the mass involvement of youth movements.

Politically, there were powerful critics of liberal parliamentarism, especially among Italian writers such as Mosca and Pareto. Even Marxism was affected by the trans formation of ideas. Before the 1890s most Marxist organizations had aimed at a progressive change to a workers’ state through the medium of social democratic parties. By the turn of the century, however, there was a growing force advocating violent revolution, which meant a pre-war split within many social democratic movements. The most obvious case was the crisis of the Russian Social Democrats in 1903 and the separation of the moderate Mensheviks from the more radical Bolsheviks under Lenin. Another major influence emerging on the far left was revolutionary syndicalism, developed by Sorel in France as an alternative to Marxism and using trade unionism as a revolutionary device to achieve political objectives. One of its early pre-war converts was Mussolini.

The far right also had its roots in this period. This adapted ideas relating to biology and evolution to generalized conceptions of humanity. The resultant social Darwinism transformed the more traditional patterns of racism and anti-Semitism. Especially influential were writers like Haeckel in Germany, Soury in France, and H.S. Chamberlain in Britain. Many far-right movements were already developing before the outbreak of the First World War. Action Française, set up in 1899, appealed to the masses in the form of ‘integral nationalism’. Social Darwinism was highly influential elsewhere: for instance, in the Portuguese Integralismo Lusitano, and also in Spain and Greece. Germany experienced a series of movements and leagues which grew up during the 1890s, especially the Pan-German League and the Society for Germandom Abroad. There was also strong pressure for expansionism into eastern Europe and for the achievement of a continental Lebensraum as well as an overseas empire. Almost all of the far-right influences were völkisch and anti-Semitic: pre-1914 examples included the Anti-Semitic People’s Party. Similar parties developed in Austria-Hungary, a diverse empire which comprised a dozen different ethnic groups. Particularly active were pan-German groups which favoured union between German-speaking Austria and Germany itself; Hitler came under the influence of these when he scratched out a living in pre-war Vienna.

Another, and even more complex, pre-1914 development was the convergence of the far left and the far right. This occurred especially in France, where the revolutionary syndicalism of Sorel synthesized with the radical nationalism of Maurras. The result was a dynamic conception of the state which would combine a corporatist society with expansionist militarism. This synthesis was to prove important in the development of Fascism in Italy as the syndicalism of Mussolini came eventually to fuse with the activism of D’Annunzio.

Traditional influences in Europe were also changing before the First World War. There was far more general instability than is often thought, especially in those regimes which were to become dictatorships during the 1920s and 1930s. As can be seen in Chapter 3, Tsarist Russia was in crisis in the sense that it was threatened by social and political upheaval. Austria-Hungary was also confronted by the possibility of internal collapse as the German and Magyar ruling groups were coming increasingly under pressure from the Slavs. Although more secure politically than Russia and more homogeneous than Austria-Hungary, Germany too had problems in the form of an increasingly assertive and numerous working class: this was considered intolerable by the ruling industrial and agricultural aristocracy. Italy’s liberal regime had become increasingly unstable during the 1890s and attempted an unsuccessful experiment with a more authoritarian political structure. Even France and Britain were vulnerable – the former to pressures from the radical left and right, the latter to an unprecedented combination of constitutional and social crises between 1910 and 1914.

Since 1870, new states had come into existence in south-eastern Europe, while others struggled to be born. The whole process influenced the post-war settlement between 1919 and 1920. Already independent were Greece (1830) and, since 1878, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. Each of these considered itself incomplete and aimed for territorial fulfilment. There were also nationalist movements for independence among the Poles in Russia and among the different Slav groups in Austria-Hungary. Whether or not these aspirations were achieved depended on which side they found themselves on during the First World War. The Balkan states had also alternated between constitutionalism and political upheaval which produced periods of autocracy, a pattern which was similar to developments in Spain and Portugal.

All of these changes placed a strain on the structure of Europe, creating fissures and fault lines which would give way under the pressure of the First World War and its aftermath. There were, however, much darker forces at work. Although the glamorization of violence, the use of terror and the appeal of racial hatred are rightly associated with the later period, they all had their origins in pre-war Europe. Already war was considered by some a natural and desirable state. For example, Enrico Corradini and Giacomo Marinetti wrote in the Italian Futurist Manifesto in 1909: ‘We want to glorify war – the only cure for the world’, and they also extolled ‘the beautiful ideas which kill’.² It is not difficult to see where Fascism and Mussolini derived some of their martial vigour. The targeting of minority groups was also in evidence. Anti-Semitism was rife in Tsarist Russia, with a series of violent pogroms occurring during the reigns of Alexander III (1881–94) and Nicholas II (1894–1917). It was also on the increase in Austria-Hungary, under the influence of prominent politicians and leaders such as Karl Lueger, Georg von Schönerer and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The young Hitler, then an Austrian subject, was certainly influenced by their ideas. There had even been evidence of genocide, although this had not yet been associated with anti-Semitism. The Ottoman Empire, the capital of which was in Europe, was the scene of the massacre of 200,000 Armenians between 1894 and 1896 and of a further 20,000 in 1909. Admittedly, the states of western and central Europe escaped the sort of scenes witnessed in eastern Europe and Anatolia. But all was by no means well in their overseas colonies. Overall, millions of indigenous peoples were killed through exploitation or massacres in areas like the Congo Free State, South West Africa and Tripoli. Europe was already becoming brutalized for the most brutal period in its history.

Far from experiencing underlying stability before 1914, Europe was therefore seething with unresolved problems and tensions. These were subsumed in 1914 by the greater emergency of war, only to re-emerge, considerably strengthened, in the peace which followed.

THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War was fought between the Entente powers and the Central powers. The former comprised Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Portugal and Montenegro, joined by Italy (1915), Romania (1916) and Greece (1917). The Central powers were Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Both sides expected at the outset a swift victory after a limited, nineteenth-century-style war. What in fact occurred was a massive onslaught, with a mobile front in eastern Europe and stalemate in the trenches of the western front. The total losses amounted to 13 million dead, of whom 2 million were Germans, 1.75 million Russians, 1.5 million Frenchmen, 1 million British and half a million Italians. Economies were drained, resources depleted, armies exhausted. Europe proved incapable of ending the conflict and it took the eventual involvement of the United States to tip the balance in favour of the Entente powers.

The impact of the struggle was considerable. During the 1920s the First World War epitomized all the evils to be avoided in the future. Twenty years later, however, it seemed to be eclipsed by the Second World War, particularly since the latter involved considerably greater loss of life and destruction. Then, as J.S. Hughes has argued, the further passage of time restored the original perspective. The First World War now appears fully as important as the Second – indeed, in certain respects, still more decisive in its effects.³ It was, for example, a catalyst for revolution. It has long been accepted that military failure destabilizes a political system, destroys economic viability, mobilizes the masses, and undermines the normal capacity of the regime to deal with disturbances. The European state system was profoundly altered by the collapse of three empires, induced by defeat and privation.

The first of these was Tsarist Russia. By 1916 the German armies had penetrated deep into Russian territory on the Baltic, in Poland and the Ukraine. The Russian military response proved inadequate, and the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials was severely disrupted by communications difficulties. The government proved unable to cope, badly affected as it was by the periodic absences of the Tsar at the front. In February 1917 food riots erupted spontaneously in Petrograd, to which the official response was entirely inadequate; the regime’s stability was destroyed by desertions from a destabilized army. The result was the abdication of the Tsar and the emergence of a Provisional Government which aimed eventually to operate a Western-style constitutional democracy. But this also made the mistake of seeking to snatch victory from defeat; further military disasters severely reduced its credibility and assisted the Bolsheviks in their revolution of October 1917. Within eight months, Russia had moved from autocracy, via a limited constitutional democracy, to communism: a remarkable transformation for a state which had historically been renowned for its resistance to political changes. Lenin made peace with the victorious Germans at Brest-Litovsk. The price he had to pay was to abandon Russian control over Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – a very considerable loss of territory.

Of similar magnitude was the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This had been Europe’s most heterogeneous state, comprising thirteen separate ethnic groups, all of whom pulled in different directions. Two of these, the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary, had benefited most from the Ausgleich of 1867 which had created a Dual Monarchy, effectively under their control. The majority of the population, however, had been excluded from this agreement; Austria-Hungary contained a large proportion of Slavs, who could be subdivided into Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ukrainians, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. These were already pressing for full political recognition, even autonomy, by 1914. The First World War wrecked the Austro-Hungarian economy and tore apart the political fabric of the empire as the various Slav leaders decided in 1918 to set up independent states rather than persist with a multiracial federation. By the time that the emperor surrendered to the Allies on 3 November 1918, his empire had dissolved into three smaller states – Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia – while the remaining areas were given up to Italy, Romania, Poland and the newly formed Southern Slav nation, eventually to be known as Yugoslavia.

The third empire to be destroyed as a direct result of the First World War was the Kaiser’s Germany, or the Second Reich. The German war offensive, so successful against Russia, had been contained on the western front. The Western Allies, greatly assisted by American intervention, came close to breaking through the German lines in September 1918. Meanwhile, the German economy was being strangled by a British naval blockade. Under the threat of military defeat, the Second Reich was transformed into a constitutional republic, the Kaiser having no option but to abdicate on 9 November, two days before the German surrender.

By the end of 1918, eleven states covered the area once occupied by the three great empires (see Map 2). All but Russia were trying to adapt to Western-style parliamentary systems and this seemed to justify the belief of many that the war had become a struggle for democracy. Victory carried with it an element of idealism. The different peoples of Europe would be guaranteed separate statehood and given democratic constitutions. These, in turn, would ensure lasting peace by removing the irritants which had caused so many of Europe’s most recent conflicts: harsh autocracy and unfulfilled nationalism. There is, therefore, a strong case for arguing that the First World War had a liberating effect. Further evidence for this can be seen in the profound social changes that occurred in all the states which took part. Particularly important was the increased influence of the middle class at the expense of the traditional aristocracy, the possibility of agrarian reforms and improved conditions for the peasantry, allowance for a greater political role for the working class and trade unionism and, finally, the emancipation and enfranchisement of women.

There is, however, another side to the picture. The First World War may well have created the conditions for the establishment of democratic regimes. But, at the same time it produced a series of obstacles which these new democracies proved unable to surmount. One of these was an underlying resentment of the terms of the peace settlements, which particularly affected Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia; there was, from the outset, a powerful drive to revise them. Another obstacle was the prolonged economic instability which was aggravated by war debts and reparations payments. Even the destruction of the three empires had unintended side-effects. Some of the new dictatorships which emerged between the wars were built upon the mobilized masses and upon the ideologies which these autocracies had helped restrain – especially communism and fascism. It is arguable, therefore, that the war cleared the way for twentieth-century dictatorships by smashing nineteenth-century autocracies without providing a viable alternative.

Map 2 The collapse of three empires and the emergence of the successor states

Was the First World War more important for inter-war changes than the developments which were already under way before 1914? The consensus is very much that it was. Bracher, for example, argues that ‘In spite of their ideological prehistory, there can be no doubt that the new dictatorships of our century were principally a result of the 1914–18 war’.⁴ Payne maintains that the war introduced ‘a new brutalization of public life, a routinization of violence and authoritarianism, and a heightening of nationalist conflict and ambition, without which fascism could not have triumphed in key countries during the generation that followed’.⁵ Kershaw goes even further. ‘Without the First World War and its legacy’, he argues, ‘a Hitler would have been unimaginable as a leader of Germany.’ He adds: ‘Before 1914, Germany was a relatively non-violent society. After 1918 violence was one of its main features.’⁶ A similar argument could be made for Lenin. It took the First World War to destroy both the Tsarist regime and the Provisional Government which followed it; it is possible that, without it, Russian autocracy might have evolved into a constitutionalist system instead.

But, in the cases of Germany and Russia, it is perhaps more appropriate to see the war as an acceler...