Concepts and Theories of Human Development

Richard M. Lerner

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781136674075
• Edition: 4
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Geschichte & Theorie in der Psychologie

Concepts and Theories of Human Development is the most comprehensive and in-depth overview of the foundational theoretical contributions to understanding human development and the influence of these contributions for contemporary research and application in developmental science. Since its initial publication in 1976, it has been an essential resource for students and professionals alike, and has become the go-to book for graduate students studying for their comprehensive exam on human development. In this new Fourth Edition, Richard M. Lerner concentrates his focus on advanced students and scholars already familiar with the basic elements of major psychological theories.

The book discusses the assumptions involved in such topics as stage theories, the nature-nurture issue, the issue of continuity-discontinuity, and the important role of philosophical ideas about theories – in particular, metatheories – in understanding the links between theory and research. It particularly focuses on relational developmental systems (RDS) metatheory, exploring its roots in the 1930s, following its development into the present day, and contrasting it with the fundamentally flawed genetic reductionist models that continue to be circulated by scientists, the media, and the general public. It discusses implications of theory for research methods and for applications aimed at the promotion of health, positive development, and social justice among diverse people across the life span.

CHAPTER ONE

On the Primacy of Concepts and Theories

A collection of data no more makes a science than does a heap of bricks make a house!
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 1933, biologist and inventor of General Systems Theory

What builds the bricks of a science into a house? I believe it is the conceptual and theoretical issues of a science. Certainly, the listings in a telephone directory are facts. But a knowledge of the names in the phone book would certainly be, to quote singer–songwriter and Nobel Laureate Bob Dylan (1964), “useless and pointless knowledge.” However, if one could relate such data to some conceptual framework, then perhaps some meaning could be provided.

I believe that science advances best when research is derived from good questions and, in turn, when good questions are theory-predicated. Answers to theoretically predicated questions provide data that are useful for understanding how facets of the empirical world may be best assembled to construct an understanding of the phenomena in which a scientist is interested. Theory-predicated research in developmental science has the best potential for enabling researchers to understand the process of development, that is, to better describe, explain, and optimize the bases and characteristics of development across the life span.

Suppose that a developmental scientist had a theory-predicated hypothesis that ethnic identity develops most strongly when individuals of specific ethnic and cultural backgrounds grow up in neighborhoods wherein there is close proximity to other people with the same specific backgrounds (e.g., Leventhal, Dupéré, & Shuey, 2015). How might a researcher test this idea? He or she might spread out a large street map of the city and cut out each name and address in the phone book and place it on the appropriate place on the map. After a while, a pattern may begin to emerge. The researcher might find some areas of the city (neighborhoods) where people with Italian names seemed to cluster, areas where people with Irish names clustered, areas where people with Latino names clustered, areas where people with Chinese names clustered, areas where people with Jewish names clustered, etc. In turn, the researcher might find neighborhoods that have a mix of names associated with these ethnicities and, as well, with names associated with other ethnicities, for instance, African, Indian, Muslim, or Korean. What the researcher might then do is sample children in each of the identified neighborhoods and study the development of their ethnic identities. If children living in the ethnically more homogeneous neighborhoods develop stronger ethnic identities than children in the more ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, then the data would support the hypothesis.

This finding would not only support the hypothesis, however. It would also illustrate the point that a study derived from a theory-predicated question provides a way of organizing a seemingly meaningless or obscure body of data—the names in a phone book—into a meaningful and, perhaps, important body of factual knowledge.

A major function of theory is to integrate existing facts; to organize them in such a way as to give them meaning. A second function of theory is to provide a framework for the generation of new information. A theory may be defined as a system of statements that integrates existing information and leads to the generation of new information.

Developmental scientists studying the human life span may often have numerous facts available to them (e.g., facts relating to children’s thinking at various ages). The results of empirical studies might indicate that young children tend to use relatively general, global, and concrete categories to organize their thinking, but older children use more differentiated, specific, and abstract categories (e.g., see Raeff, 2011, 2016). For instance, younger children might label all furry, four-legged creatures as “doggies,” whereas older children might have different labels (e.g., “dogs,” “cats,” and “horses”) and a shared, superordinate label (“animals”). Older children might also recognize that all these creatures share the common but abstract quality of “life.” Whereas such facts are interesting in and of themselves, their meaning is not obvious; certainly, the implications of such facts for more general psychological development and functioning may not be clear.

Thus, when scientists such as Heinz Werner (1948, 1957) or Jean Piaget (1950, 1970) offer a theory of the development of thought that allows such facts to be integrated and understood, and, moreover, specifies the empirically testable implications of such theoretical integrations for other areas of human development, the importance is obvious (Chapter 8 discusses Werner’s work). Such theories are useful to developmental science because they integrate existing factual knowledge and lead to the generation of new information that advances understanding.

The point is that, although facts are important, they alone do not make a science. The development of science, I would argue, relies more fundamentally on the advancement of theory (Overton, 2015a; Raeff, 2016). As surveys of the history of developmental science bear witness (e.g., Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Looft, 1972), the scientific study of human development has itself evolved through an increasing emphasis on theory and conceptual integration. In Chapter 3, I review this history. As I move through a historical account, from the prescientific, philosophical discussions of development to (at this writing) current theoretical discussions, I explain that a few issues continue to be central, for example, issues about the roles of nature and nurture in human development or about whether constancy or change characterizes specific portions of the life span.

Yet, although the scientific status of theory per se and the need for, and the roles of, theory remain essentially invariant across this history of developmental science, research cannot be ignored. If there were no research, theories would be empty exercises. If there were no way to test a given theoretical integration, the formulation would be scientifically useless. There would be no empirical observation capable of falsifying, verifying, or moderating the theoretical statements. Empirical observation is the primary defining feature of science, and if theoretical ideas cannot ever be empirically tested they are essentially scientifically useless. They become speculations or unfounded opinions. Although I discuss the role of research in developmental science at several points throughout the book, it is appropriate to indicate here some of the important interrelations that exist between research and theory.

Research is often done to try to answer the questions raised by science. Such issue-based research results in data, as does all research. A theory may exist or be devised to integrate the facts of a science—the first role of a theory—and to lead to the generation of new facts—the second role of a theory. Someone, however, may think that these same facts can be integrated in another way—that is, with another theory. Theoretical arguments come about from such differences. Yet, because each different theory attaches different meanings to the same facts, research is done in order to clarify the differing theoretical interpretations. Even if such theoretical differences did not exist, research would be done to see whether ideas (i.e., questions, hypotheses) derived from the theory could be shown to be empirically supported. Simply, then, research is needed to show the integrative usefulness of a theory or its usefulness in leading to new facts.

Thus, in the abstract, theory and research are inextricably bound; nevertheless, some concrete interrelational problems exist. Because of the complexity and abstractness of many of the controversies of a science, the interrelation of research and theoretical issues is not always evident or unequivocal. A complaint of some researchers is that there seems to be a widening gap between theory and research (e.g., see Overton, 2015b). There is certainly some truth to this statement. However, I suggest that, if one looks at the relation between research and theory at a more basic level, an interrelation may be seen (Overton, 2015a).

PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, AND RESEARCH

Everything a scientist does involves at least three points:

1. Assumptions about the nature of the subject matter.

2. Preferences for the topic of study within the subject matter.

3. Preferences for the methods of study.

Many researchers are interested in studying how human behavior develops. If I assume, for purposes of illustration, that all behavioral development can be regarded as the acquisition of a series of responses to specific stimuli, then I would look for the stimuli in a person’s environment that evoke these responses. Consistent with Point 1, I would assume that even complex adult behaviors could be understood on the basis of these stimulation-produces-responding relationships, and my job as a scientist would be to tease out the basic stimulus–response relations.

Accordingly, and in regard to Point 2, the topics that my work would bear on could perhaps be best subsumed by a term such as learning or, more precisely, conditioning. Moreover, as suggested by Point 3, the methods I would employ would be those involved with, for instance, classical or operant conditioning (e.g., Bijou & Baer, 1961; Skinner, 1938, 1950). I would probably prefer not to study topics such as “alterations in the relations among the Id, Ego, and Superego in determining changes in the development of people’s object relations” (e.g., Freud, 1954), or “the need for the development of a sense of trust in the first year of life in order for healthy personality development to proceed” (e.g., Erikson, 1959). The methods used to study these non-preferred topics (e.g., clinical interviews and retrospective verbal reports) would not rank very high on my list of preferred methods.

If another developmental scientist asked me how my work related to general issues in human development, I would point out that all scientific research, no matter what topic it bears, is underlain by a particular philosophy of science or of human beings. The developmental scientist querying me could then ask where my assumption—that behavioral development can be viewed as the cumulative acquisition of responses—came from. Could other assumptions be made, for example, that there is something inborn (innate) in human beings that serves to shape their behavioral development? The answer is yes. The point here is that the particular assumptions I make are influenced by the philosophical views I hold about the nature of human development (e.g., Kagan, 1980, 1983; Kantor, 1959; Kuhn, 1962, 1970; Overton, 2015a; Overton & Reese, 1973; Pepper, 1942; Reese & Overton, 1970).

These assertions lead to a second response to the question of how my work is related to general conceptual issues in development. I have noted that research is underlain by theory and, more primarily, by a philosophy of science or of humanity. Therefore, the work of a developmental scientist would be related to general conceptual issues in that it would lead to a determination of the tenability (the defensibility) of his or her position. As the developmental scientist continued to work from a particular point of view, he or she would eventually be able to see how well this viewpoint accounted for the phenomena of behavioral development. The developmental scientist would be able to see if his or her research, based as it is on an underlying philosophical premise, continued to account for these phenomena. For instance, was the theory useful? Did it lead to statements or hypotheses that helped explain substantial amounts of the differences among—the variance in—the scores constituting a particular set of data? Ultimately, the developmental scientist would learn whether the variables being studied were capable of explaining behavioral development or whether other variables necessarily entered the picture.

The developmental scientist would learn whether the exclusive study of the functioning of environmentally based variables—stimuli and responses—could usefully explain behavioral development. If he or she found this not to be the case—if the developmental scientist found, for example, that hereditary-related variables seemed to play a crucial role—he or she would be forced either to give up the initial philosophical/theoretical position and adopt another one or to revise the position so that it could account for the functioning of these other variables with ideas consistent with the original philosophical/theoretical position.

In a third way, too, the outcome of my research can be seen to have general theoretical relevance. This third way, however, can be indirect, and its relevance to general issues or theory may not even be intended. Another developmental scientist might be able to use the facts that a first researcher has found. To explain this third way more completely, I consider some of the reasons why a scientist might conduct a research study.

Some Reasons for Doing Research

The reason why particular scientists conduct particular studies may be idiosyncratic and, in general, diverse. However, three reasons illustrate the ways in which the outcomes of research can have conceptual relevance.

First, a scientist may be interested in illuminating some theoretical controversy. For instance, as I just noted, there may be an observed phenomenon that is accounted for by two different theoretical positions. In adolescent development, for example, it is typically found that there is a marked increase in the importance (saliency) of the peer group. Why does this occur? Both Anna Freud (1969) and Erik Erikson (e.g., 1950, 1959, 1968) have devised theories.

Consistent with the work of her father, Sigmund Freud (e.g., 1954), Anna Freud took what is termed a psychosexual position and tied the occurrence of changed (and increased) salience of peers primarily to a biological change in the person (i.e., the emergence of a genital drive). Erikson (1959, 1968), however, diverges somewhat from strict psychoanalytic (i.e., Freudian) theory (he was an ego psychologist; Rapaport, 1959). Erikson explained increased peer group salience in what he termed a psychosocial model, and he specified some possible relations between the developing person and his or her society. For instance, the need to find and test roles that may be played in society, and not only a new, sexual motive, may promote relationships between a young adolescent and his or her peer (who, for instance, may tolerate role-testing behaviors more so than parents, perhaps because he or she too may need an accepting audience for enacting such behaviors). Such relationships may provide a youth with opportunities to “try on” different roles with other young people without having to make a full or long-term commitment to them.

Which theory can best account for the empirical facts? This question constantly arises in the course of scientific inquiry. A clever researcher may be able to devise a study that would put the two different interpretations to a so-called critical or crucial test—a study whose results would provide support for one theoretical position and non-support for the other. If the results came out one way, Theory “A” would be supported; if they came out another way, Theory “B” would be supported.

It is important to note, however, that whether a scientist can perform a crucial test of two theories, or only a test of specific competing hypotheses derived from these theories, is itself a controversial issue. According to Hempel (1966), a philosopher of science, two hypotheses derived from two different theories can neither be proved nor disproved in any absolute sense. Hempel argues that this situation is true even if many tests of these two hypotheses are performed by the most sophisticated researchers using the most careful and extensive methods available to them, and even if all test outcomes result in completely favorable results for one hypothesis and completely unfavorable results for the other. Such results would not establish any absolute, conclusive validity for one hypothesis, but rather only relatively strong support for it. It is always possible that future tests of the two hypotheses would result in favorable outcomes ...