Civil Society Organizations Against Terrorism

Case Studies from Asia

Rohan Gunaratna, Mohd Mizan Aslam, Rohan Gunaratna, Mohd Mizan Aslam

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367712792
• eBook ISBN: 9781000356991
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

With recent changes in social and political landscapes around the world the focus of preventive counter-terrorism has shifted in many places from government to civil society.

The contributors analyze the different approaches of Civil Society Organizations in preventing and countering violent extremism in various countries in South and Southeast Asia. The cases examined include, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The key emphasis is on understanding the context within which each example was initiated, and the factors that determined their relative success or failure. The evidence from these cases suggests that much can be achieved through empowering communities to engage in aiding both the indoctrinated and those who pose the greatest risk of radicalization.

A valuable contribution to the literature on preventing and countering violent extremism.

1 Counter-terrorism in Asia

The state partnership with civil society organizations

Rohan Gunaratna

Introduction

In the spectrum of conflict in ASEAN space, insurgency and terrorism is preceded by extremism and exclusivism. The strategy to prevent violent extremism (PVE) is to engage extremists living amidst communities. Likewise, the strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE) is to engage in rehabilitation to deradicalize terrorists. Working in the pre-insurgency and pre-terrorism space is complex but cost-effective. Implementing PVE and CVE strategies requires governments to collaborate with a range of partners, especially civil society organizations, to reach out, influence and shape the human terrain.

An indispensable weapon in the fight against terrorism and extremism is rehabilitation and community engagement. Unless governments work with partners to rehabilitate terrorists and extremists, they will pose a threat to security, spread their ideology, and will be hailed as heroes. With terrorism and extremism emerging as the tier-one national security threat, it is vital for governments to restore stability and security by developing rehabilitation programmes for inmates and engagement programmes for radicalized individuals in the community.

The Southeast Asian region has recognized the significance of rehabilitation, but not all the countries challenged by terrorism have succeeded in developing rehabilitation capabilities. While Malaysia and Singapore developed comprehensive and structured programmes, Indonesia and the Philippines developed ad hoc and unstructured programmes. Although the capabilities differed from country to country, ten modes of rehabilitation are practiced in the region. These are: (1) religious; (2) social and family; (3) educational; (4) vocational; (5) entrepreneurial; (6) cultural; (7) financial; (8) creative arts; (9) recreational; and 10) psychological.

The context

A new wave of terrorism and extremism is currently affecting Southeast Asia. From the western edge of the Rakhine to the eastern edge of Mindanao, ethnopolitical, politico-religious and left-/right-wing ideologies challenge the security landscape of the region. Unprecedented in its scale, magnitude and the intensity of threat, governments alone cannot cope with the present-day situation. The key is for government to build partnerships with the community organizations, the private sector and academia to prevent the radicalization of communities and build community resilience among its vulnerable segments.

As Southeast Asia has no coordinated policy, plan, and strategy, this project will research the current and emerging developments of IS in Southeast Asia following the siege of Marawi. Although ASEAN leaders were determined to fight terrorism, Southeast Asians have not yet understood that terrorism is a vicious by-product of extremism. If we are to prevent terrorism in the region, we need to map the relationships between exclusivism and extremism and, in turn, between extremism and terrorism. In the region, governments and non-governmental partners have done some work but much more has to be done.

Today, Southeast Asia’s military forces, law enforcement authorities and national security agencies are overwhelmed. The Islamic State (IS) is transforming from a caliphate-building group to a global terrorist movement. Despite its defeat in Mosul, Iraq on 9 July 2017 and Raqqa, Syria on 17 October 2017, IS is evolving into a deadly movement by linking up with local groups across the world. In Southeast Asia alone, 63 groups pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-styled “caliph” and IS leader. Operating in both the physical and virtual spaces, IS cells, networks and groups have a different risk threshold (Gunaratna 2018).

In Southeast Asia, Muslims are moderate, tolerant and value coexistence. However, a fraction of Southeast Asians embraced foreign ideologies from the conflict regions of South Asia and the Middle East. The Southeast Asian recruits entering Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and other theatres are diminishing. In its strategy of decentralization, as the Marawi siege (May–November 2017) demonstrated, IS seeks to destabilize Southeast Asia. Although IS was unable to replenish its core battlefield losses and wastage, every month Indonesians and Malaysians continue to travel to the Philippines to join IS-centric groups. Although IS is primarily an Arab movement, Arabs constitute only 20 percent of the Muslim world, and IS is now expanding into Asia, a region hosting 63 percent of the world’s Muslim population. To assert wherever Muslims live, IS-designated and unofficial propagandists are reaching out to vulnerable segments of the Muslim communities. Exploiting encrypted communication platforms and harnessing its returnees, IS is making inroads into existing and emerging conflict zones, including Mindanao, Sulawesi, Pattani and Rakhine. After networking and uniting disparate groups, IS created groupings appointing leaders. Through its local entities, IS is either consolidating in or expanding to parts of Southeast Asia.

Contrary to public perception, the rising regional threat is not confined to politico-religious extremism. Although Muslim threat groups present a formidable threat, the Buddhist extremists in Myanmar have displaced a million Rohingya. Both Al-Qaeda and IS seeks to radicalize and recruit Rohingyas. Similarly, the communist insurgents in the Philippines present a challenge comparable to those posed by the Muslim and Buddhist extremists. To manage the existing and emerging politico-religious, ethnopolitical and left-/right-wing conflicts, the region needs to adopt a comprehensive counter-terrorism framework. Southeast Asian governments need to think regionally and ASEAN needs to develop a regional policy, plan and strategy which should include strengthening existing and fostering new rehabilitation and community engagement initiatives.

Background

With the rise of contemporary terrorism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Southeast Asia faced two waves of Jihadist threats – the Al-Qaeda-centric wave in the 1990s and 2000s and the IS-centric wave in 2010s. Southeast Asians participated in the insurgent and terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and later in Iraq and Syria. Southeast Asia suffered from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, notably JI after Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia trained Southeast Asian recruits. However, the returnees were not monitored and not rehabilitated. They formed a dozen threat groups and posed a threat by working with Al-Qaeda and IS. The region dealt with the Al-Qaeda-centric threat reactively in the 2000s. This framework of response continued all the way up to 2017. Thus, until the siege of Marawi in May 2017, the governments in the region fought the IS-centric threat using the same foundation that they had established to battle the Al-Qaeda-centric threat.

However, as the threat landscape has demonstrated, this mode of response is outdated due to IS’ remarkable ability to adapt to an evolving situation. With a depleting strength of an estimated 5000 IS fighters in Syria today, down from 50,000 fighters in 2015, the group is no longer capable of holding territory in its heartland in Iraq. However, to compensate for its battlefield losses, IS is reinventing and expanding globally, in both cyber and physical space. In Southeast Asia, IS has evolved from a semi-conventional force in Marawi to an above-ground extremist and an underground terrorist network. With its continuous recruitment both in the real and virtual spaces, IS will sustain itself.

The threat in Southeast Asia is an extension of the developments in South Asia and in the Middle East. With the IS centre of gravity shifting from Iraq and Syria to overseas, IS is decentralizing by forging ideological and operational affiliations with regional cells, networks and groups. With IS fragmenting, multiple centres of IS power are emerging in the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus and in Asia, including in Southeast Asia. In addition to consolidating the groups that pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS seeks to survive in the established external wilayats (provinces) in Libya (Barqa, Fezzan and Tripoli), Egypt (Sinai), Nigeria (Gharb Iriqiyyah), Afghanistan and Pakistan (Khorasan), Russian Caucasus (Qawqaz), Yemen (Al-Yemen), Algeria (Al-Jazair) and Saudi Arabia (Najd, Hijaz and Bahrain). Operating out of these hubs, foreign fighters are likely to cross borders and strike the enemies of IS. Over a dozen foreign fighters operated in Southeast Asia during the Marawi Siege, many originating from these IS bastions.

Apart from IS, it is also important to note that AQ still plays an important role in the region given that Southeast Asia has been the traditional playing field of Al-Qaeda. Several threat groups, from JI to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), are active. Although JI appears dormant, through its factions including neo-JI, the ideology of the group persists. Despite the fact that Southeast Asians do not serve in the Al-Qaeda in Syria coalition, together with Al-Qaeda central and its affiliates, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) provides inspiration and hope to Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the region. Led by the former Al-Qaeda in Syria commander Abu Mohammed Al-Julani, HTS maintains a strength of at least 20,000 fighters and competes with IS. Al-Qaeda central, led by Aymen al Zawahiri, is operationally weak but ideo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Counter-terrorism in Asia: The state partnership with civil society organizations
• Chapter 2: The critical role of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in combating terrorism
• Chapter 3: Separatism, terrorism and public safety: A retrospective look at the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state
• Chapter 4: Combating terrorism through community engagement: Experiences from Malaysia and Indonesia
• Chapter 5: Collaborative governance in the terrorist rehabilitation programme in Indonesia
• Chapter 6: The case of Malaysia Post-GE 2018: Society–state partnership in combatting terrorism
• Chapter 7: Counter violent extremism: A collaboration between the University and the Government of Indonesia
• Chapter 8: The role of civil society in preventing and countering violent extremism in Bangladesh
• Index