Functionalist Construction Work in Social Science

The Lost Heritage

Peter Sohlberg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000370904
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia sociale

An understanding of the complex consequences of social processes and social design activities necessitates a holistic systemic perspective, systematised in the classic structural-functional research tradition, which is presented in Functionalist Construction Work in Social Science.

In contrast to fragmented discussions of functionalism and functional analyses, the approach here covers a span ranging from ontological, epistemological and primarily methodological aspects of functionalism. The functionalist tradition in social science is placed in a historic context, and problematised from a philosophy of science perspective. Unique here is a detailed account of four classic functionalist research programmes with a discussion of functionalism, not primarily as a worldview, but as systematic knowledge-generating research strategies. In addition to descriptive and causal questions, the importance of a further research question is demonstrated, i.e., the identification of crucial problems of social organisation.

Functionalist research strategies and functional analysis are of interest for social scientists and students in sociology, political science, and social anthropology. Moreover, the book is relevant for researchers and students of philosophy of science and social science methodology

Part I

The functionalist tradition

Chapter 1

The designed world

Introduction: do functions exist?

The purpose of this chapter is to place the functionalist tradition in social science in a wider context, philosophically and historically. This context is necessary, not only to understand the complexity of functionalist reasoning, but also to understand the permanence of functionalist reasoning in social science, in spite of heavy criticism.

This book deals with a classic problem in science. The problem is how to understand and (possibly) to use the concept of “function”. An overarching theme is whether it is possible to use the idea of function as a theoretical tool for understanding and explaining processes in social life. In social science discourses, functionalist analysis is often associated with a particular worldview, an understanding of the world as constituted by social systems characterised by supportive interrelations, consensus and a striving for equilibrium (see Chapter 2). It is, however, important to distinguish between an ontological question of worldviews and a methodological perspective of how to acquire knowledge. My focus is primarily on what is socially, theoretically and cognitively done with the concept of function and not what functions essentially are. Questions to be asked and discussed are: can functionalist analysis contribute in a legitimate way to the understanding of social life and processes? How would social life and the understanding of social processes look without functions? This is an attempt to tell this story in a way that describes the structural-functionalist approaches in social science as comprehensive and timeless research designs and not as a naïve set of postulates of the functionality of everything and the harmony of social structures.

When making the distinction between a functionalist worldview and a functionalist methodology, this is done from a critical view of what I call the “ontologisation” of social science. By “ontologisation” I refer to the tendency in social science discourse, without specific argumentation, to postulate categorically a variety of properties of what characterises social life and society. The social researcher’s role is then transformed from a curious investigator of the conditions of social life to a herald of insights and dogmas about the nature of social reality. All research is situated in the tension between “!” (what is taken for granted) and “?” questions to be answered and researched. The ontologisation, as I use the term, means a stress on “!”, without so many questions asked. Much of the criticism of functionalism is concentrated on the functionalist worldview. If we would take this ontological approach to functionalism seriously and the following criticism, it would mean that functions do not exist. So, this is a question to be discussed, but with the rephrasing: “in what way do functions exist”?

Functions and the beginning of finality

The chapters in this book revolve around the concept of “function” from a variety of angles. As will be evident in the coming discussion, this is an extremely complex concept with many connotations, possibilities and problems. In everyday language, we often speak about functions in various ways. It can, for example, refer to a role in an organisation, or be used to describe an operation to be performed by humans, machines or organs. An interesting aspect of functions is that they are often related to purposes, goals and design. This is reflected in the quotation from Aristotle below, in the phrase “the end ….” Or “what something is for”. We will see that this linkage of intentions, goals, design and functions has profound implications. There is also often an evaluative moment associated with functions, as we often declare that something functions well or badly, and we have the antonym dysfunction.

In contrast with the everyday use of language, the concept of function is a controversial concept in science, particularly in social science. The reason for this controversial status in social science, and also in science generally, has deep roots in the history of philosophy. It is no great exaggeration to argue that the controversial status of functions has a historical background in a conflict between two worldviews, that is, an ancient teleological worldview versus a modern mechanistic worldview. To make a sharp distinction in substance and in time between these worldviews is problematic and there are different interpretations to which I will return. It is less controversial to say that the extremely influential ancient philosopher Aristotle (c. 384 to 322 bc) set the stage for this controversy between worldviews when he formulated a typology of the concept of causes. According to Aristotle, a cause could be a:

•Material cause: “for that from which a thing is made and continues to be made-for example the bronze of a statue” (Aristotle, Physics II.3).

•Formal cause: “for the form or pattern …\… For example, the ratio 2:1”.. (ibid.).

•Efficient cause: “for the original source of change or rest. For example, a deviser of a plan is a cause …\.. a producer causes a product” (ibid.).

•Final cause: “A fourth way in which the word is used is for the end. This is what something is for, as health, for example, may be what walking is for” (ibid.).

There is a huge literature and still lively and probably never-ending debate on how to interpret Aristotle and his view on final causes and teleology (see, for example, Mix, 2016; Johnson, 2005; Mayr, 1992). I will not relate to exegetic details of interpretation but will concentrate on a received view that has become particularly important for the self-understanding of the social sciences. Independently of how to understand the teleological perspective of Aristotle and its application, we have with his typology a distinction between efficient and final causes, with great importance for understanding scientific development, particularly from the period when special sciences came to “replace” philosophy.

What we nowadays usually identify as a cause is what Aristotle labelled an efficient cause. For Aristotle it was, however, the final cause that was more important. With important reservations for oversimplification and anachronisms, the final cause could in contemporary vocabulary be called the function. In modern scientific language, the concept of function is, however, much more restricted than the final cause in Aristotle’s interpretation. Nevertheless, we here have the stage set for a conflict between two worldviews, that is, the teleological worldview of Aristotle based on a final cause and the modern mechanistic worldview based on the efficient cause.

Leaving aside for a while the discussion of how to understand Aristotle’s idea of end (telos), and finality, it is obvious that “end” in everyday English contains a complexity that has important consequences for social science. End can refer to an individual’s and the collective’s purposes or goals and it can also refer to a final state of a process. This end state of a process can be merely a description that the process has reached its final state, whether this state is desired or not and it can also mean a desired goal. This desired goal can be achieved, or it can never be realised, as in utopias.

Referring to the simple distinction between two worldviews and their corresponding preferences, that is, the teleological worldview with its emphasis on the final cause and the mechanistic view with its emphasis on (efficient) cause, it follows that there are consequences for concept formation. The potential candidates of (efficient) causes are much more scattered, unpredictable and unsystematic than the potential candidates of ends or goals. This has consequences for the research strategies of the respective approaches. Ends or goals often have a cognitive or theoretical quality, not necessarily shared by all potential causes. It is reasonable to state that goals and ends often are theoretically and cognitively more meaningful than the set of potential causes. In any case, it is certain that goals, ends and final states are more closely tied to human agency and intentions than potential causes. This is a matter of meaningfulness and it also opens up the problem of anthropomorphism, that is, giving human embodiment to abstract phenomena.

A basic rationale for this book is that sociologists and anthropologists active in the functionalist tradition have tried to handle the question of meaningfulness and functions in a systematic way. The question of meaning includes the perspective of social actors as well as the theoretical understanding of social systems. Ultimately, this has to do with how different aspects of society are interrelated. It also has to do with understanding the strange and relative permanence, which is a characteristic feature of most societies in a short time perspective, as well as understanding the importance of tensions and conflicts for social change (cf. Lockwood, 1992). Those active in the functionalist tradition have seen it as their task to analyse society as a theoretically integrated entity. What has been a fundamental problem, and not an assumption, for the functionalist tradition is the classic problem of social order. An important distinction to be elaborated later is whether this social order is regarded as an ontological order, or whether it is regarded rather as a reference point for analysis.

Through its interest in supra-individual meaningfulness, social wholes and, above all, the systematic interest in social utility, the functionalist tradition has come to be associated with teleological reasoning and the ancient teleological tradition. This is not flattering company. The teleological tradition dominated the ancient worldview and had a massive influence on philosophy and science up to the breakthrough of modern natural science. The teleological perspective is nowadays not generally accepted and teleological explanations are on good grounds not considered legitimate.

The meaningful order of the world: The teleological perspective

Prior to the renaissance, the teleological tradition emphasised the overall “aims”, goals or “purposes” of phenomena and processes.¹ Central to the teleological perspective was one of the four types of causes identified by Aristotle, namely the final cause, mentioned above. Andrew Woodfield states of Aristotle’s final cause:

… the final cause of an artifact is its intended function. But Aristotle thought that final causes operate in nature too. For him, it is an obvious fact that natural objects and processes are for something, just as much as artifacts. The clearest cases are to be found in biology. Who can doubt that the eye is for seeing, the ear for hearing, and so on?

(Woodfield, 1976, p. 4)

This type of cause or function thus seeks to explain something by identifying “what something is for”. With Aristotle, the final cause of a process is a goal or end-state (telos), which is not conscious or calculated by a human being, since he regarded nature as working towards a certain determination.² Thus, in order for an explanation to be complete it required a clarification of a goal or an end. In the teleological perspective, there is generally some form of principle or supra-individual goal or end-state with the mystic power to control the process in direction to it. This end-state also constitutes a reference point for the world order.³ In problematic religious reinterpretations of Aristotle the teleological problem transcends the boundaries between science and religion, or between magic and science as the social anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski would put it (Johnson, 2005). Different stories of creation, almost by definition, involve the idea of a creative force with “intentions” and also the power to implement the desired order. This is as often an order in the structure of the social world as it is a moral order. To relate the end (telos) in final causation to some agent is, however, not Aristotle’s idea.

In his novel, The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoevsky has Ivan Karamazov say that if God did not exist, everything would be allowed. This means, to put it bluntly, that without an overarching Subject there would be no basis for moral principles. If we humans stand alone, there would be no foundation for morality. In other parts of the existentialist tradition, we are left alone before our fate, as with Jean-Paul Sartre. The formula often associated with him as part of his existentialist programme and which states that existence precedes essence, denies in a fundamental sense the existence of a superior determination. In the world of humans, there is in this understanding no specific determination (essence) or predetermined potentiality to be actualised in our lives. Our destiny is to live without anchoring in an overarching purpose (essence) and to fulfil the purpose and our destiny ourselves. This way of regarding the essence or goal as a creation of our own is a negation of the teleological principle of an overarching determination – the essence. These problems of existential, religious or moral purpose and meaning lie outside the scope of this book. However, analogous problems concerning social meaning and utility are relevant as analytic aspects in the social context. The functionalist tradition is, for example, strongly associated with the idea of the systematic study of religious and normative ideas and their role in the social context.

Other aspects of ancient and medieval thinking also have direct relevance for the functionalist tradition as well as for social science in general. Historically there have existed several examples of hypothetical “social engineering”, which elaborated with thought experiments ideas about how the ideal society would be constructed, that is, in modern terminology a matter of studying functionalities.⁴ Aristotle’s discussion of various forms of government and social organisation in Politics involves a very detailed and comprehensive account of the consequences and functions of different kinds of political organisation. The ultimate final cause of the city-state is to provide the good life:

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature ….

(Aristotle, 2013, p. 13, 1252h30, my emphasis).

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