The Nixon Administration and Cuba

Continuity and Rupture

Håkan Karlsson, Tomás Diez Acosta

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000384130
• Subtopic: Latin American & Caribbean History
• Index: History

This book presents a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy that was adopted toward Cuba by the Richard M. Nixon administration between January 20, 1969, and August 8, 1974. Based on governmental, as well as other, sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, this book examines the rupture where the policy of "passive containment" was complemented with a policy of "dirty war." President Nixon attempted to reestablish a confrontational and violent path of action, and once again, Cuba was exposed to a "dirty war" consisting of different forms of aggressive terrorist activities. Since the conditions for this violent route had changed dramatically both in the U.S. and in Cuba, a policy characterized by a continuity of the economic and psychological warfare came to be the central one for the Nixon administration. This book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective, and it therefore complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.–Cuban relationship during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and the policy adopted by the Nixon administration. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue, and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of history and political science.

Part I
The Context

The victory of Richard Milhous Nixon—in the elections of November 5, 1968¹—raised expectations within the Cuban counterrevolution based in the U.S. for a more aggressive change in the U.S. policy toward Cuba. This is in comparison with the policy of a “passive containment” of the Cuban Revolution that had been executed by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his administration during the past two years of his term.²

These expectations were based in the promises made by Nixon during the electoral campaign, in his economic ties with the most aggressive sectors of power in the Cuban exile groups and, even more so, in his background. Nixon had been one of the initiators—since his position as vice president ten years earlier—of the strategy of hostility and of the “dirty war” by violent means toward Cuba. In April 1959, after a three-hour conversation with the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, he wrote a confidential memorandum for the president, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) where he declared his conviction that “Castro was either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline […]”³; therefore, he recommended acting accordingly. Nixon acted accordingly—from the Capitol or from the White House—by promoting anti-Cuban laws in the U.S. Congress and driving the government’s undercover action program of March 17, 1960,⁴ that a year later would lead to the mercenary invasion at the Bay of Pigs. He blamed Cuba for his electoral failures, when he in 1960 aspired to the U.S. presidency and, in 1962, to the governor of the state of California, since the Cuban issue was an important subject of debate in those elections. This was a sign predicting the end of his political career.

It seemed that in 1969 the hour of revenge had arrived, but the reality was very different from that existing a decade before, since it occurred in one of the most tragic moments in the history of the U.S. In 1969 the moral collapse of the U.S. political system was evident, and the Vietnam War was a decisive factor in that moral crisis. The continued U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam, and the sustained bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, could not stop or crush the will of resistance and struggle of the Vietnamese people.⁵

The prolongation of the conflict and the rise of the U.S. war casualties—despite the monumental financial and military efforts employed—were creating an increasing domestic reaction of doubts about the need to participate in that conflict, the capacity of its leaders and the fairness of that policy. The horrendous acts of genocide committed by U.S. troops against Vietnamese villages and defenseless populations (for instance at Song My), disclosed by their own written, radio and television media, put to question within the U.S. population the traditional image of the U.S. armed forces as “the defenders of justice” and custodians of the “honor and respect of the nation.” To this was added, as one of its consequences, the deterioration of the domestic U.S. economy and the standard of living of the population. A colossal movement against the war in Vietnam and for the immediate exit from that conflict shook the foundations of the U.S. society. It also led to the breakdown of the internal consensus achieved in foreign policy during the 1950s and the policy of confrontation with international communism.

An image of that existing malaise in the U.S. upon the arrival of the Republican administration in 1969 is described in the memoirs of Henry Kissinger, who functioned as adviser on National Security Affairs and, later, as Secretary of State, when he stated that:

I cannot yet write about Vietnam except with pain and sadness. When we came into office over a half-million Americans were fighting a war ten thousand miles away. Their number were still increasing on a schedule established by our predecessors. We found no plans for withdrawals. Thirty-one thousand had already died. Whatever our original war aims, by 1969 our credibility abroad, the reliability of our commitments, and our domestic cohesion were alike jeopardized by a struggle in a country as far away from the North American continent as our globe permits. Our involvement had begun openly, and with neraly Congressional, public and media approval. But by 1969 our country had been riven by protest and anguish, sometimes taking on a violent and ugly character. The comity by which a democratic society must live had broken down. No government can function without a minimum of trust.⁶

But the war in Vietnam did not end with the arrival of the presidency of Richard Nixon, despite this being the main promise that gave him the electoral victory in the fall of 1968. On the contrary, it lasted for several more years and spread to other Southeast Asian countries such as Laos and Cambodia.

However, the Nixon administration was forced to develop a new doctrine that could neutralize the powerful peace movement that was developing in the U.S. and, at the same time, maintain its imperial geopolitical control, not at least in Latin America and the Caribbean. This policy also needed to contain a way to handle the U.S. relationship with the USSR and China.

1 From Saigon to Havana

On July 25, 1969, President Nixon—during a stopover on his trip to Southeast Asia—on the Island of Guam, announced at a press-conference what was later known as the Guam or the Vietnamese doctrine. This doctrine was referring to the U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam, since Nixon hoped, from that moment on, that the U.S. allies “would take over their own military defense,” without abandoning the U.S. commitments made with them.⁷ This meant that the puppet government of Saigon had to continue the war with its own troops, but with economic support from the U.S. and with U.S. air forces. Using this formula, the Nixon administration began to withdraw U.S. ground troops from Vietnam, and in February 1972, 150.000 U.S. troops remained, although the bombings continued. This meant that Nixon did not end the war; he was ending the most unpopular aspect of it—the participation of U.S. soldiers in a war in a distant country.⁸

Figure 1.1 President Richard Nixon with U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division troops during visit to Dian, South Vietnam, July 30, 1969. WHPO 1631-03. White House Photo Office.

In the spring of 1970, the military high command, with the approval of the president and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, ordered the invasion of Cambodia, after a major bombardment that was not disclosed to the public. That aggression did not only lead to a wave of protests in the U.S. and the world, but it turned out to be yet another military failure, and the U.S. Congress decided that Nixon could not use troops to extend the war without approval of the Congress. Contrary to this legislative ban, the following year the Nixon administration supported the military invasion of South Vietnam into Laos, without U.S. troops, which also failed. The resistance and the will to fight of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could not be undermined, despite the 100.000 tons of bombs dropped against those countries.⁹

While all this was happening in Southeast Asia, in the U.S. a new scandal broke out linked to the war in Vietnam. In June 1971, the New York Times newspaper began publishing a selection of secret Defense Department documents—known as the “Pentagon Papers”—that explained the causes, origin and military involvement of the U.S. in the war in Vietnam that shocked the nation.¹⁰ In that year the opinion polls reflected the low confidence the U.S. population had in the foreign policy of its government, and the insignificant disposition that existed to render aid to other countries, even if they were attacked by forces backed by the communists.¹¹

At the same time that the peace movement was gaining strength in the U.S. society, the Nixon administration tried to justify the criminal bombings, resumed in late October 1972, after the failure of the first round of peace talks. With these bombings the U.S. tried to force North Vietnam to the negotiating table under the terms imposed by the U.S., and the aim was also to demonstrate that South Vietnam continued to be supported by the U.S. despite the withdrawal of the U.S. troops. Nixon also wanted a “honorable” exit from what would be the first military defeat for the U.S., a circumstance that influenced the increase in these bombings.

To achieve that “honorable” exit, the U.S. threw 338.000 tons of napalm and close to 100.000 herbicides—blue, orange and white chemical agents—in the rural areas of South Vietnam in an attempt to destroy the food resources and the shelters of the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam). The horrific death and injury numbers caused by that U.S. chemical war left a legacy of almost 500.000 children who, years after the conflict ended, have suffered serious physical deformations. However, the determination of the people of Vietnam could not be broken. On December 30, 1972, Nixon suspended the bombings and, nine days later, talks resumed in Paris. Despite all the pressures, the Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, did not depart from the points that his country had maintained before the bombings and did not accept the changes proposed by the U.S. Given this position of principles, on January 27, 1973, the U.S. delegation was forced to sign the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam”; in large part these accords contained the same terms set forth in October the previous year.¹²

The peace accords involved a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the U.S. within 60 days, the realization of elections in South Vietnam and the exchange of prisoners. However, the Saigon government refused to accept the agreement, and the U.S. decided to make a last attempt to compel North Vietnam to submit. It sent a wave of B-52 bombers over Hanoi and Haiphong that destroyed houses and hospitals and killed a large number of civilians. The attack did not work and many U.S. aircrafts were shot down and the North Vietnamese government did not surrender. This event sparked fierce waves of global protest, and also U.S. allies criticized these bombings, and Kissinger had to return to Paris and sign a peace agreement very similar to the previous one.

In late 1973, the U.S. withdrew its forces from Vietnam, although the U.S. continued to send aid to the Saigon government.¹³ The fight continued for a complete national emancipation, and the North Vietnamese were not intimidated and their units advanced across the country, increasingly rescuing territories and launching attacks against the most important cities in southern Vietnam. The continuous offensives of the patriotic forces, that began in early 1975, could not be stopped by the Saigon army, causing its complete demoralization. In late April 1975, North Vietnamese and national liberation troops entered Saigon,¹⁴ and thus ended that long war, which was the first military defeat of the U.S. since the 1940s....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part I The Context
• Part II The Nixon Administration’s Policy toward Cuba
• Part III The CIA and the Secret Economic War against Cuba, and a New “Missile Crisis” (1969–1970)
• Part IV Other Secret Actions toward Cuba
• Part V The Decline of the Counterrevolutionary Groups
• Part VI The U.S.–Cuba Agreement on the Hijacking of Aircrafts, Sea Vessels and Other Offenses
• Part VII The Debacle of a President
• Index