Trump and the Politics of Neo-Nationalism

The Christian Right and Secular Nationalism in America

Jeffrey Haynes

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9781000389869
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Arms Control
• Index: Politics & International Relations

No analysis of the Donald Trump phenomenon and American neo-nationalism is satisfactory without examining the impact of both the Christian Right and the secular nationalist right, both in the USA and abroad. This book analyses the political impact of both strands in relation to America's culture wars at home and the clash of civilisations in the USA's foreign policy.

Each strand – religious and secular – has had different issues to pursue during the Trump presidency: religious liberty and associated issues, on the one hand, and 'America's place in the world', on the other. This book demonstrates how both strands overlap and draw on each other's concerns to exhibit a pronounced, multifaceted neo-nationalism which was ideologically important for the Trump presidency. The author emphasises that the Trump phenomenon has been building for decades, and the Trump presidency has used significant political, social, economic, and cultural disquiet, and the post-2008 economic crisis and associated global turmoil, to fashion and progress policies which appeal strongly to both the Christian Right and many secular nationalists.

This book will be of interest to students, researchers, and policy-makers interested in American politics, American political history, religion and politics in America, and religion and IR with a focus on the USA.

1 From nationalism to neo-nationalism

The Trump presidency is characterised by political polarisation and partisanship, which feed its ideology of neo-nationalism. Drawing on both Christian nationalism and secular nationalism, the Trump administration’s neo-nationalism is not altogether new. It is reminiscent of the ideology of the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) who also thrived on political division between conservatives and liberals (Wiebe, 2002). The eight years of the Reagan presidency in the 1980s occurred during a period of major social and political changes, both at home and abroad. At home, the decade saw the political rise of the Christian Right. Internationally, America’s culture wars with the Soviet Union came to a head in the 1980s, a decade which saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, followed in 1991 by the collapse of the USSR.

Following the Reagan presidency, the Christian Right came to dominate the Republican Party. In the early 2020s, the Christian Right/Republican Party was on one side of America’s culture wars. On the other side were religious liberals and secularists, as well as many in the LGBTQ community, greens, and feminists. To understand today’s culture wars in the USA, it is useful to trace the rise of neo-nationalism in America. This we do in the current chapter. We examine the USA’s culture wars in more detail in Chapter 2.

The chapter begins by tracing the emergence and development of nationalism, a secular ideology, in the 19th century. This was a time when European nations sought to make themselves great via colonialism. Later, nationalism fell from favour, inextricably linked to the hyper-nationalisms of Nazi Germany, Mussolini-era Italy, and Japan during the reign of Emperor Hirohito. The chapter explains that in the decades after World War II, conflictual nationalisms re-emerged, for example, in the civil wars of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Over time, nationalism developed into neo-nationalism, which combines religious, cultural, and secular concerns. Finally, the chapter explains that neo-nationalism is not the same everywhere: for example, in Europe neo-nationalism is often culturally rather than religiously focused, because of the advanced state of secularisation in most regional countries. On the other hand, in the USA during the Trump presidency, neo-nationalism was fuelled by both Christian nationalism and America First nationalism.

Emergence and development of nationalism

Europeans created an ‘international society’ in the 19th and 20th centuries (Haynes, Hough, Malik, and Pettiford, 2017: 20–36). Consequential to acquisition of extensive foreign territories, European powers, notably the French and British, sought to spread their political institutions and values via colonialism and imperialism. Their stated aim was to spread their ‘civilisation’ by undermining ‘barbarism’ and teaching ‘savages’ how to be ‘civilised’. Many Europeans believed that such international society-building activities were not only legitimate but also necessary to enable power balancing, following a long period of nationalist turmoil in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. These efforts were rarely welcomed by emerging national elites in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere after World War I and particularly following World War II. The European powers were especially weakened by the latter conflict. Decolonisation after World War II was a crucial component in the globalisation of nationalism, as dozens of post-colonial countries sought to build a sense of national identity in newly independent states. Lind explains that after the Cold War, it was very widely agreed in

the North Atlantic democracies that there was a new struggle between … enlightened, progressive forces of internationalism – symbolized by the global market and/or supranational regional blocs like the European Union – and nationalists … dismissed contemptuously as racists, xenophobes, and protectionists who failed to understand economics.

(Lind, 2001)

Lind is highlighting the main differences between ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’, which became especially apparent after the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. As he notes, nationalists were typically regarded by liberals and ‘progressives’ as regressive, out of sync with the internationally orientated North Atlantic democracies and their pursuit of universal goals, including democracy and human rights. “ ‘In most elite circles”, he claims, “one who had anything favourable to say about nationalism met with suspicion or contempt” (Lind, 2001). For such people, internationalism was widely believed to be the way of the future, crucial for the development of a progressive and cooperative ‘new world order’ led by the liberal democracies of the North Atlantic region. Internationalists regarded nationalism as decidedly old hat: the way of the past. It was seen as insular, backward looking, and unsuited for the challenges of the post–Cold War world. Internationalism was the way of the future.

Despite their distaste, internationalists would find it hard to disagree that historically nationalism has been a potent force, both nationally and internationally. Nationalism is variously interpreted as ideology or political movement.¹ I understand a ‘political ideology’ to comprise an entity’s ethical ideals, principles, doctrines, myths, and/or symbols. They are used both to explain how society should work and to offer a political and cultural plan for a desirable social order. The ideology of nationalism asserts that a nation has the political right to constitute itself as an independent, sovereign political community, because of both a perceived shared history and a common destiny. As a political movement, a nation is a group of people of indeterminate but normally considerable size often but not always living in the same country, who believe themselves distinctive and unique, manifested by community ties that are both significant and persistent. When forming a political movement, nationalists believe that it is only right and proper that state borders should dovetail, as precisely as possible, with a nation’s boundaries. In extreme cases, such as that demonstrated in the extremist ideology of Nazi Germany, the state regards the nation as the supreme facet of a person’s identity, superior to all other relevant attributes, such as religion, class, race, and gender.

Some scholars of nationalism, such as Walker Connor (1994) and Anthony D. Smith (1972), assert that national sentiment has both deep roots and persistent power. Others, such as Elie Kedourie (1993) and Eric Hobsbawm (2021), predict that nationalism is destined to fade away, replaced by internationalism. For Hobsbawm, nationalism is a kind of false consciousness. He believes that nationalist sentiments that arose among different ethnic groups in Europe in the 19th century, later extending to much of the rest of the world via colonialism, were not authentic popular movements. Instead, they were the result of elites’ effective propaganda. They wanted to create new states and, often, to lead them. The elite strategy to create cohesive nation-states out of fragmenting empires was to persuade members of their own ethnic group into believing in the existence of a historic ‘nation’, even when they had not necessarily thought of themselves in that way before.

Wiebe (2002) expresses a different view. He argues that the rise of nationalism in the 19th century was a sensible human adaptation to the travails of modernisation. During that phase of development, people moved in great numbers from small to large population centres. Under the circumstances, it seemed logical and natural for them to rely on family, kin, and/or ethnic and religious networks to aid them in their brave new world, with, for example, news, jobs, and money. Wiebe contends that these networks of trust and affection grew both demographically and geographically, to encompass not only people from one’s home community but also from one’s region and, eventually, to all those who spoke the same language. From there, he suggests, it is a short step to nationalism. For Wiebe, “[e]thnicity turned into nationalism when cultural consciousness acquired a political objective, such as the aspiration for self-government or removal of oppression”. As a result, “[e]thnicity and nationalism … solved problems migration posed” (Lind, 2001).

Secular nationalism and religious nationalism

The nation-building process in post-colonial states continued during the Cold War. Some sought to develop by linking ideologically, diplomatically, militarily, and financially with one of the superpowers, either the USA or the Soviet Union. These relationships, however, were fundamentally thrown into question by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the sudden demise of the USSR in December 1991. It appeared to many that the Cold War would be followed by the universal triumph of Western-style liberal democracy and capitalism, presaging a new cooperative phase of international relations: a new world order based on ‘Western values’ with increasing, maybe universal, legitimacy. In the mid-1990s, however, it became clear that a newly cooperative new world order based on the spread of perceived Western values was not occurring; instead, a new world disorder was developing, marked by serious clashes of nationalisms in several countries, notably former Yugoslavia and Ethiopia. A decade later, the events of 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) emphatically ended the brief period of internationalist liberal utopianism. It was followed by a Manichaean struggle between the forces of what some refer to as ‘enlightened globalisation’ – represented by, for example, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organisations – and ‘anti-globalists’, whom progressives regard as advocates of self-interested ‘reactionary’ nationalism, including Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Narendra Modi, as well as the transnational religious fundamentalisms of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Haynes, 2005a, 2019a).

In addition, 9/11 highlighted the often-close relationship of religion to secular nationalism. This was clear, for example, within the Arab Muslim world, “especially where”, as Wiebe (2002) notes, “shallow-rooted, kleptocratic states presided over impoverished Moslem populations”. The appeal of Osama bin Laden’s brand of Islamist extremism owed a great deal to the failure of Nasser’s secular pan-Arabism (Haynes, 2005b). More widely, the post-9/11 world highlighted the unclear relationship between religion and secular nationalism. Some renowned scholars of nationalism, including Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (2021), do not include religion when discussing nationalism. Instead, they highlight in the growth of nationalism the importance of various secular – that is, historical and economic – factors. It is now however widely recognised following the civil war in former Yugoslavia, 9/11, and the Arab Spring events that to develop a comprehensive understanding of nationalism, it is necessary to factor in religion’s direct and indirect influences (Reiffer, 2003).

Anthony D. Smith is comparatively rare among scholars of nationalism in that he discusses in depth the relationship between religion and (secular) nationalism. Smith claims, “perhaps more detrimental than anything to our understanding of these phenomena has been the general trend to dismiss the role of religion and tradition in a globalizing world, and to downplay the persistence of nationalism in a ‘post-national’ global order” (Smith, 2003: ix). In relation to the USA, for example, it is impossible to understand American nationalism both historically and today without considering formative Christian – primarily, mainline Protestant – beliefs and values (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2003).

‘Religious nationalism’ refers to a close or synonymous relationship between religion and nationalism. It is an important component of present-day international life, because today many nations define themselves at least in part in terms of their ‘national’ religious beliefs, which are frequently connected to related components of identity, such as culture, race, ethnicity, and language. Some countries have a state ideology of religious nationalism, for example, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan (under the rule of the Taliban [1996–2001]) and perhaps Russia under Putin, where the state and the Orthodox Church have a symbiotic relationship. When a regime seeks to derive its political legitimacy primarily from public adherence to religious, not secular, doctrines, then we have a theocracy: that is, a state dominated by those who believe themselves, or are widely thought to be, divinely guided. This is the case in both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Beyond these countries, Reiffer notes several ways that religion and nationalism typically interact, albeit with varying degrees of influence. Whereas religious nationalism in Iran and Saudi Arabia refers axiomatically to an inseparable relationship between religion and nationalism, many other nationalist expressions also draw on religious beliefs, without necessarily playing a pivotal role: this is when religion “assist[s] the more prominent nationalist movement as a cohesive element” (Reiffer, 2003: 215). Many extant examples of such a relationship between religion and nationalism can be noted, especially in the Global South, including in Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Tibet. In these countries and territories, religion and culture are important markers of group identity. They are not necessarily a fundamental driver of nationalist political claims; that is, religion does not inevitably occupy a central position in the nationalist movement. The primary concern is the political goal of achieving or consolidating a nation-state which, if achieved, is likely to draw importantly on religion and culture as significant ideological components of wider nationalist aspirations.

Some religious nationalists want to do away with the secular state and replace it with one whose values, beliefs, rituals, and processes emanate from their religious beliefs. Juergensmeyer argues that this is when the secular state is regarded not only as both dysfunctional and morally and spiritually bankrupt. For many, however, such a religious state would be inherently ‘anti-modern’, because both legitimacy and authority of the state would be based on traditional religious principles, not modern secular principles. Juergensmeyer (2005) contends that religious nationalism is likely to continue to expand both geographically and in terms of its influence, especially but not only in the Global South. The target of some religious nationalists in the Global South would likely be the West in general or individual Western governments in particular, as shown by the events of 9/11 and assorted terrorist outrages over time in several Western countries. To counteract these actors, Juergensmeyer argues that Western governments need to adopt a strategy of cooperation, not confrontation, with religious nationalists. Thus, to counter religious nationalists of al-Qaeda and ISIS it makes sense for their target – the USA and the West more generally – to work cooperatively against them. More generally, the examples of al-Qaeda and ISIS highlight that while religion can make essential contributions to human development it can also have a strongly malign influence. On the plus side, religion can help people by (1) giving life greater metaphysical meaning and hope of improved well-being, (2) moulding individual and group behaviour cooperatively in relation to culture, way of life, and work, and (3) facilitating development of positive social, developmental, and political values to encourage more cohesive communities. In short, religion can be a powerful, benign sociocultural force, encouraging motivation, inclusiveness, participation, and sustainability. On the other hand, religion can be instrumentalised by those seeking to acquire or retain power, and sometimes their ends seem best served by extremism and terrorism, as in the case of modern jihadi groups (Haynes, 2005b).

Neo-nationalism: causes and consequences

The political importance of the coalescing of secular and religious and/or cultural concerns is illustrated by the recent emergence and political clout of neo-nationalism in the USA, Europe, and many other regions and countries. Neo-nationalists are characteristically vocal about and defensive of their religion and/or culture. Contemporary neo-nationalists are often opposed to liberal policies on gender equality and immigration. In the 2010s and 2020s, such...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction: Trump and the politics of neo-nationalism
• 1 From nationalism to neo-nationalism
• 2 Culture wars and neo-nationalism
• 3 Neo-nationalism and politics in the USA
• 4 Neo-nationalism and America’s international relations
• 5 Conclusion: Donald Trump and neo-nationalism in America, 2016–2020
• References
• Index