Islamic State's Online Propaganda

A Comparative Analysis

Miron Lakomy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000379679
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica mediorientale

Explaining the means utilised by the editors of the Islamic State's online magazines to win the "hearts and minds" of their audiences, this book is a result of a multidimensional content analysis of two flagship periodicals of the Islamic State: Dabiq and Rumiyah.

Drawing from a number of theoretical concepts in propaganda studies, the research uses comparative analysis to understand the evolution of the modus operandi employed by the editorial staff. The volume evaluates the types of arguments used in these magazines, as well as the emotions and behaviour that these triggered in readers. This book concentrates on the formats and thematic composition of a variety of the Islamic State's e-periodicals, including Dabiq, Rumiyah, Dar al-Islam or Konstantiniyye, from the viewpoint of the constantly changing strategic situation and priorities of the "Caliphate." The e-magazines of the post-territorial phase of the Islamic State, e.g. From Dabiq to Rome and Youth of the Caliphate, were also taken into consideration.

Overall, this book does not only offer new insights into the propaganda methods of the Islamic State's periodicals, but it also summarises their rise and fall between 2014 and 2019. The volume is dedicated mostly to academics and postgraduate students specialised in terrorism studies, political violence, and security studies.

1 Going virtual

Islamic State’s shock and awe campaign on the Internet

1.1Origins of the “virtual Caliphate”

The emergence of the Internet as a global communication network since the turn of the 1990s was surely one of the most important technological breakthroughs in history.¹ Aside from the great benefits that this invention has brought for humankind, it has also created significant – but mostly unexpected – challenges for international security. One of them is strictly related to terrorist organisations. The emerging Web 1.0 environment combined with constantly increasing access to the Internet proved to be a huge opportunity for these groups to move beyond the classic constraints of their modus operandi. Cyberspace became a “promised land” for Islamist terrorists in terms of safe communication, coordination, and financing. Moreover, it allowed them to undertake new types of hostile activities, namely cyber-attacks. Last, but not least, the World Wide Web initially had tremendous potential in terms of gaining direct access to millions and later to billions of Internet users.² As Sageman argued:

the nature of this relationship between individuals and the Internet favors the Salafi message. The Internet both appeals to and fosters disembeddedness […] it appeals to isolated individuals by easing their loneliness through connections to people sharing some commonality […] it leads them to spend more time with this virtual community at the expense of interaction with the immediate social environment.³

According to Sageman, the Internet “can help bridge the gap from the isolated potential mujahed to the global jihad.”⁴ Overall, jihadis gained instruments that circumvented the traditional barrier of public communication being controlled by the mass media and governments. Holtmann accurately summarised this trend by stating that their major goal was to “make the divide between the virtual and the physical more permeable with the help of elaborate media strategies.”⁵

At the beginning of the 1990s this tremendous opportunity was yet to be recognised. It took more than half a decade before the first Islamist terrorist organisations could grasp the rising potential of cyberspace. The breakthrough took place between 1995 and 1996, when they slowly began to realise that the Internet allowed them to influence global audiences without committing acts of terrorism. Surprisingly, their archaic, medieval-like and radical ideology was no obstacle to adopting new technologies of Western, “crusader” as they frequently refer to it, origin. Political Islam, as well as Salafi-jihadis, proved to be very keen to exploit these technologies for the purposes of furthering their agenda.⁶ As Kosmynka noted, Salafi violent extremist organisations (VEOs) primarily recognised the usability of the Internet to manipulate the beliefs and opinions of online audiences, present a twisted interpretation of the religious texts of Islam, distort the reality surrounding Muslim communities, and exploit visual symbols to generate affective states among their target groups, which would inspire them and channel their activities in a desired direction.⁷

Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) from Algeria were among the first Islamist terrorist organisations to “test the waters” when they published their first online bulletins (al-Kital, al-Ansar). Additionally, Hamas and Hezbollah established their first websites and also created anti-Semitic and anti-American comics dedicated to indoctrinating children.⁸ The most compelling and comprehensive experiments were, however, undertaken by al-Qaeda, as well as its affiliated groups, such as the Chechen Salafi militants of Shamil Basayev and Thamir Samir Saleh Abdullah (bearing the nom de guerre of ibn al-Khattab).⁹ They were probably behind the early – somewhat rudimentary – attempts at creating various forms of text propaganda, which were distributed through traditional Web 1.0 channels, namely in the form of standalone websites. These usually contained news and articles which were enriched with rather simplistic visuals, including all sorts of banners, logos, and images of leaders (sheikhs). Interestingly, some of them stood in line with the latest trends in developing websites at the time, such as dedicated guestbooks. At the turn of the century, online radios broadcasting in Arabic also emerged as a tool of influencing Internet users. This was visible, among others, on the al-Qaeda-affiliated jehad.net webpage. Salafi-jihadis also utilised increasingly popular message boards, such as Ansar, Hanin, Shumukh, al-Buraq, Sinam al-Islam, at-Tahaddi,¹⁰ as well as dedicated communication software.¹¹ As Sageman noted, they allowed radicalised young Muslims to

share their hopes and dreams with their virtual friends […] Some might have joined a given forum out of a sense of alienation, of feeling alone […] This mutual sharing makes them feel ever closer to each other, in a virtual process similar to the one previously described as in-group love with face-to-face interactions. This provides them with a sense of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in common, Islam.¹²

In this context, according to Weimann, in 1998 around half of the 30 terrorist organisations recognised by the United States had websites. Two years later all of them had established an online presence.¹³

As for the early audiovisual propaganda, its birth probably took place in the North Caucasus. Accessible data suggests that – once again – the Chechen Salafi militants were the first to record low quality videos attempting to promote jihad against Russian “crusaders.” Having a good opportunity to do so, due to two military conflicts with the Russian Federation between 1994–1996 and 1999...