âI SAW THROUGH TIMEâ: FALLING INTO OTHER HISTORIES
From the beginning of his career, Kim Stanley Robinson has used the genre of alternative history to explore the ways that science fiction reframes crucial questions about politics, economics, and social organization. By the time he began writing fiction in the 1970s, alternative histories had spilled over from science-fiction classics, such as Ward Mooreâs Bring the Jubilee (1953), Philip K. Dickâs The Man in the High Castle (1961), and, later, Bruce Sterling and William Gibsonâs The Difference Engine (1991), to âmainstreamâ bestseller lists with works including McKinley Cantorâs If the South Had Won the Civil War (1962) and Philip Rothâs The Plot against America (2004). Although there are surprising twists and turns and wrenching changes of perspective throughout his alternative histories, Robinson focuses less on the shock value of rewriting history for its own sake than with asking wide-ranging questions about how our stories of the past have shaped our sense of our possible futures. In such groundbreaking stories as âThe Lucky Strike,â âA Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions,â âA History of the Twentieth Century, with Illustrations,â âVinland, the Dream,â and âRemaking History,â and in novels such as The Years of Rice and Salt and Shaman, he explores how history writing faces both back in time, reconstructing the past to serve a variety of present purposes, and forward to challenge our assumptions about reshaping the future for characters who initially see themselves trapped by their individual and global crises. In his epic of an alternative world history, Years of Rice and Salt, Robinson expands the conventional limits of the genre by imagining a world marked by the sociopolitical dominance of Asian empires and the moral authority of Buddhist and indigenous ideas of tolerance and something approaching gender equality.
RETHINKING HISTORY
Robinsonâs early short fiction, published during the late 1970s and early 1980s, emerged at an important juncture for science fiction in the United States.1 Two decades on, the countercultural movements of the 1960s seemed either a path not taken or a naĂŻve form of escapism that had faded into history. In the wake of liberatory dreams deferred, critics such as Darko Suvin and Fredric Jameson argued for the significance of science fiction as a mode of critique of contemporary politics, culture, and economics. For Jameson, science fiction reverses the values and assumptions of classical historical fiction. If the historical novel, as the Hungarian critic Georg LukĂĄcs argued, emerged in the nineteenth century as a way to imagine âa determinate pastâ for the modern nation-state, Jameson maintains that science fiction imagines the present as âthe determinate past of somethingââa future or range of futuresââyet to come.â2 Robinsonâs early fiction brings pressure against traditional ideas of a âdeterminate pastâ in terms of alternatives to the history that we are living through and to the future histories that we cannot (yet) know. While many of his contemporaries between 1975 and 1985 turned to the dystopian chic of cyberpunk, Robinson offered a different perspective on Cold War tensions, endemic racism and gender discrimination, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and (in the years before graphic boards and the World Wide Web) the widespread adoption of personal computers.3 Often focusing on the relationships between moral decision-making and the potential for utopian action, his short fiction asks readers both to reimagine the past and to rethink the possibilities for bettering the future.
In his remarkable short story, âA History of the Twentieth Century, with Illustrationsâ (1991), Robinson explores the enervating sense of being trapped in and by a dreary present. Frank Churchill, a popular historian suffering from depression in the aftermath of his divorce, is commissioned to write a coffee-table history of the twentieth century.4 Working his way through various sources in the British Library, he grows obsessed with the violence and catastrophes of world wars, atomic bombs, and genocide, until he comes across a 1902 volume titled A History of the Nineteenth Century, with Illustrations. This book concludes with a burst of heroically naĂŻve optimism: âI believe that Man is good. I believe we stand at the dawn of a century that will be more peaceful and prosperous than any in history.â5 Churchill leaves the British Library, rents a car, and drives north to Scotland, eventually taking the ferry to the Orkney Islands. There, on the windswept and wave-lashed coast, he visits the Neolithic ruins at Skara Brae and finds five-thousand-year-old stone houses, with stone shelves, cabinets, beds, and utensils. Although the inhabitants disappeared after six hundred years, Churchill realizes that what they have left âlook[s] deeply familiarâ and reflects âthe same needs, the same thinking, the same solutionsâ as people in his own time (55â56). His experience of a neolithic history, before and oddly beyond the violence of modernity, brings him back from contemplating âend[ing] the pain and fearâ by jumping off a cliff at âthe End of Europeâ (59). Instead, he recognizes intuitively that to live in the history of the present requires thinking beyond and living for the differenceâthe possibilityâthat the future holds. At the end of the story, makeshift camping in his car in a parking lot at the âEnd of Europe,â Churchill writes a postscript to his reading notes for his coffee-table history of the twentieth century: âI believe that man is good. I believe we stand at the dawn of a century that will be more peaceful and prosperous than any in historyâ (62). This is (as Jacques Derrida might say) repetition with a difference: in citing the century-old historian, the hero finds not a faith in but a way toward a âgoodâ that exists beyond the tyranny of the present.
âThe History of the Twentieth Century, with Illustrationsâ is suggestive of the ways that Robinsonâs fiction distances itself from the kind of postmodernist ironies that abound in alternative histories written during the last decades of the century. As Philip Wegner and Jameson imply, postmodernism and modernism imagine the âgoodâ primarily as a negation of the negative, alienated experience of the present, even as this negation often is treated cynically as a form of romantic rebellion or naĂŻve complicity.6 If postmodernism tends to reject master narratives as either bad-faith modes of repression or as confirmations of a broad and deep skepticism, it tends to cast the future as a projection or extension of its own cynicism.7 In contrast, Robinson encourages readers to imagine the present as neither determined by the past nor determining a dystopian future. Instead, as Years of Rice and Salt suggests, the present itself is a kind of back formationâa negation of the utopian possibilities for a future potentially âmore peaceful and prosperous than any [previous era] in history.â In this regard, to look back at the present from imagined futures becomes an incentive to keep striving to make things better, what Cartophilus in Galileoâs Dream describes as our efforts âto crab sidewise toward the goodâ (556).
In his early short fiction, Robinson shows us what is at stake in âRemaking History,â the title of his engaging story that rewrites the Iran hostage crisis (1979â80) as parodic farce. In the twenty-first century a burgeoning film industry on the moon remakes Hollywood blockbusters in the surreal context of a low-gravity, space-suited environment. In updating a 1980s classic (starring Robert DeNiro, among others) about the successful rescue of the American hostages from Teheran in 1980, the actors wonder if the rescue and Jimmy Carterâs subsequent reelection as president were all that important to late-twentieth-century history. One of them is not really âsure that Carterâs reelection hinged on [the rescue of] those hostages anyway. He was running against a flake, I canât remember the guyâs name, but he was some kind of idiotâ (217). Although this sort of irony is familiar to readers of alternative histories, dating back to Murray Leinsterâs âSidewise in Timeâ (1934), Robinsonâs dig at Ronald Reagan clarifies the political dimensions of his alternative histories. Rather than an after-the-fact analysis that makes Reaganism the irrevocable outcome of ostensibly larger forces at work in American politics and culture, the ârealâ history that we know becomes contingent: the writing of history forges random and unpredictable events into seemingly inevitable chains of causes and effects. In âRemaking Historyâ the recognition that âactual events [emerge at] the nexus of multiple causal pathways and chance perturbations,â8 however, does not entail a surrender to a world run by idiots but an opportunity to rethink both the past and present.
In this context, Robinsonâs linked stories, âThe Lucky Strikeâ (1984) and âA Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditionsâ (1991), create alternative histories of the dawn of the atomic age, reimagining the moral and ethical implications of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The earlier story is set in 1945 and begins with the bombardier selected to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima waking from a nightmare about catastrophic destruction. Frank January realizes that âwar breeds strange dreams,â but his nightmares seem, at once, both inevitable (as his readers know) and tragically unnecessary. They are full of the horrors described by John Hersey in his nonfiction book Hiroshima (1946): blinded and faceless victims, a river clogged with corpses, and survivors struck deaf by the atomic blast. Hovering in Januaryâs future (and our collective past), the destruction of Hiroshima marks the horrific and logical extreme of technomodern violence. In the days leading up to the bombing run, January is enraged with both President Truman for ordering the strike and âthe scientists who had designed the bombâ (81). To cope with his anger and guilt, he imagines alternative strategiesâalternative futuresâas a way to deal with the moral dilemma he faces. The generals, he daydreams, might arrange a demonstration blast, ordering January and his crew
to go to Tokyo and drop the bomb in the bay. The Jap War Cabinet had been told to watch this demonstration of the new weapon, and when they saw that fireball boil the bay and bounce into heaven theyâd run and sign the surrender papers as fast as they could write, kamikazes or not. They werenât crazy, after all. No need to murder a whole city. (79)
January tries to conjure into being a world of rational self-interest in which neither Americans nor Japanese warmakers are âcrazy.â This dream world of rational cause and effectâdrop the atomic bomb in the harbor and watch Japanâs inevitable âsurrenderââis not the past that we know and ultimately not a future in which January can believe.
Written in the shadow of the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction, âThe Lucky Strikeâ foregrounds Januaryâs fears that endless war and insane violence are encoded in the DNA of the men who command him and the men in his crew. He realizes that âthe war would always remain the central experience of their livesâa time when history lay palpable in their hands, when each of their daily acts affected it, when moral issues were simple, and others told them what to doâ (83). Their nostalgia for this âcentral experienceâ of shaping history, he imagines, would lead a postâWorld War II military leadership âunconsciouslyâ to âpush harder and harder to thrust the world into war againâ so that, in their minds, they might return in a future war and âmagically be again as they were in the last [war]âyoung, and free, and happyâ (83). In this psychosexual nostalgia for the âgoodâ war of their youth, January imagines a nightmarish future with âmore planes, more young crews like [his], flying to Moscow no doubt or to wherever, fireballs in every capital, why not? And to what end? To what end? So that old men could hope to become magically young again. Nothing more sane than thatâ (83). In the alternative timeline of 1945, January becomes an unwilling symbol of moral resistance to the institutionalized, multigenerational violence of the atomic ageâa mindset dissected in Joe Haldemanâs sf classic, The Forever War (1974). But where Haldemanâs characters are caught in the paradoxes of time travel, fighting endlessly, although not mindlessly against aliens, January takes (in)action by dropping the bomb too late to destroy Hiroshima. Initially, he lies about a supposed malfunction, but when he learns the generals have ordered another bombing run to destroy Nagasaki, he confesses that there âwasnât a malfunctionâ and justifies his disobedience by arguing that because the Japanese have witnessed the bombâs destructive force, âYou donât need to do it, it isnât necessaryâ (92). Although he is proved right when the Japanese see the destruction near Hiroshima and the emperor orders his generals to surrender, January is executed for treason without knowing that he has saved countless lives and that his martyrdom sparks a global disarmament movement.
Yet even as January resists the logic of nuclear annihilation, Robinson emphasizes the unpredictable and unknowable consequences of his decision. In âA Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions,â Robinson explores what he calls his own âsecond thoughts about the postwar alternative historyâ (383) described at the end of âThe Lucky Strikeâ by focusing on the complex variables that affect individual actions and their consequences. His story stretches the generic boundaries of alternative history by filtering the politics of historiographyâwhat Jameson calls âthe political unconsciousââthrough the lens of Richard Feynmanâs ânotion of a âsum over historiesââ in quantum theory.9 As the narrator of âSensitive Dependenceâ phrases the problem, Feynmanâs version of quantum theory âproposes that a particle does not move from point A to point B by a single path, as in classical mechanics, but rather by every possible path within the waveâ (102). This âpath integral formalism,â filtered, in turn, through the work of the mathematician Roger Penrose, means that âquantum effects in the brain take overâ (108) and cycle the mind through an âextraordinarily largeâ number of âparallel and simultaneous calculationsâ before reaching a decision:
And in the act of deciding, the mind attempts the work of the historian: breaking the potential events down into their component parts, enumerating conditions, seeking covering laws that will allow a prediction of what will follow from the variety of possible choices. Alternative futures branch like dendrites away from the present moment, shifting chaotically, pulled this way and that by attractors dimly perceived. âŚ
And then, in the myriad clefts of the quantum mind, a mystery: the choice is made. We have to choose, that is life in time. ⌠And at the moment [of choice] the great majority of alternatives disappear without trace, leaving us in our asymptotic freedom to act, uncertainly, in timeâs asymmetrical flow. (108)
Quantum theory in this passage is less a metaphor for history or consciousness than the basis for both. The quest for covering laws, for ways to sift through all possible outcomes while recognizing the epistemological complexities of reaching a decision, is always quixotic. All of us, like January, are thrown back to the realization that initial conditions are never fully known: âThe butterfly may be on the wing, it may be crushed underfoot. You are flying toward Hiroshimaâ (108). Robinsonâs shift to the second person âyouâ makes clear the stakes in alternative histories: our âasymptotic freedomâ means that we are always condemned to make decisions without the impossible luxury of being able to foretell the consequences of our actions. Reader and character merge less through empathy or identification than in recognizing a shared dilemma: âYou are the bombardier. ⌠You know what the bomb will do. You do not know what you will do. You have to decideâ (107). But, of course, any decision is contingent. The narrator offers us competing future histories that stem from Januaryâs decision not to bomb Hiroshima: by sparing the city, through a complex chain of events, the Hiroshima Peace Party bans nuclear weapons, an independent Palestine peacefully emerges, and the world enters a new era of prosperity. Or, the ban on nuclear weapons fails, and, by the mid-twenty-first century, Januaryâs decision results in a world that has âvery little to distinguish [it] from the one in which January had dropped the bombâ: massive social and economic inequality persists, âmultinational corporations [rule] the world,â and âgigantic sums of money [are] spent on armamentsâ (106). Robinsonâs âsecond thoughts,â though, do not result in a dystopian rewriting of âThe Lucky Strikeâ but in a new narrative that encourages readers to rethink what it means to confront alternative futures.
In this respect, Robinsonâs use of quantum theory to explore the complexities of both ethical decision-making and sociohistorical reality dovetails with the work of, among others, Karen Barad, a theoretical physicist and feminist cultural critic, who argues there is no sharp dividing line, no fundamental distinction, between quantum reality and lived experience: because pathintegral formalism means that there is an infinity of all possible outcomes, the âasymptotic freedomâ that troubles January is the inescapable condition of existence: we are all flying toward Hiroshima and all condemned to act freely without the ability to peer into alternative futures to foresee the consequences of our actions.10 âHistory,â says the narrator in âSensitive Dependence,â âis a particle accelerator. Energies are not always normal. We live in a condition of asymptotic freedom, and every history is possible. Each bombardier has to chooseâ (103). Certainty, it seems, is the first casualty of history.
Such questions of historical truth and individual responsibility are a focal point for Robinsonâs fiction in the 1980s and figure prominently in Icehenge (1984).11 The novel examines the problems of memory, history, and autobiography in an age when people routinely live to be five hundred y...