In February 1921, Antun, together with his siblings Edward, Salim, and Grace, left their uncle in Springer, New Mexico, and traveled to SĂŁo Paulo, Brazil, where they were reunited with their father, Khalil. The siblings had emigrated from Shuwayr in late 1919 or early 1920,1 traveling first to Marseilles, France, and then to the United States, arriving at Ellis Island in New York on 28 March 1920 before continuing to Springer.2 SaÊżadeh and his younger siblings had endured the years of hardship and suffering brought about by the famine, deprivation, and oppression visited upon Greater Syria under the rule of Cemal Pasha and experienced firsthand the tumult and uncertainty brought about by the end of Ottoman rule. The experience, Antun would later recall, prompted him to reflect on the state of the Syrian nation and ask, âwhat was it that brought all this woe on my people?â3 It was not, however, until he arrived in SĂŁo Paolo at the young age of seventeen that he became openly engaged and active in the Syrian national cause, first assisting his father in the publication of al-Jarida (SĂŁo Paolo, 1920 â 1923) â the newspaper co-founded by Khalil â as an editor, writer, and printer. Over the following five years, the two worked together closely to oppose French colonial rule and the territorial division of Geographic Syria and promote the Syrian national cause among their compatriots in the South American diaspora.
When Antun arrived in Brazil, the Syrian diaspora community in South America was ever more divided, polarized over French rule and its military occupation of Syria and Lebanon, and the establishment of Greater Lebanon. The SĂŁo Paolo-based, pro-French JÄmiÊżat al-Naháža al-LubnÄniyya, established in 1914, championed Franceâs role in Syria and Lebanon and supported Franceâs establishment of an âindependentâ Greater Lebanon, while the SĂŁo Paolo-based, pro-French ComitĂ© Patriotique Syrien-Libanais supported a unified, federal Syria that included Lebanon. Anti-French political associations and periodicals, such as Khalilâs, opposed the establishment of Greater Lebanon and Franceâs mandate. Meanwhile, France continued to implement its divide and rule policy in Syria and Lebanon, consolidating its grip over its new territories. Having already declared the âindependenceâ of Greater Lebanon and divided it into four sanjaks in September 1920, the French also established the state of Aleppo, the state of Damascus, and the territory of the ÊżAlawis in the fall of 1920 and granted autonomy to Jabal Druze in March 1922, essentially partitioning the Syrian hinterland into areas that reinforced sectarian and communal divisions.4 In time, France would alter these administrative divisions as needed to ensure its authority over the territories under its mandate.5 French policies encountered resistance from some locals in certain areas, particularly in the coastal region inhabited by the ÊżAlawis and in the northern region around Aleppo.6 However, armed opposition to French forces was unsustainable and did not pose a serious threat to Franceâs pacification of the territories, ultimately achieved in 1921.7
After several months of working with his father, Antun penned his first article on Syrian national issues for al-Jarida. He would contribute five other articles directly addressing national issues and only several others on different subjects until the newspaper ceased publication in early 1923.8 Together, the essays constitute the first explicit expressions of themes and ideas that would pervade Antunâs nationalist discourse for the remainder of his life and serve as the bedrock for his unique conceptualization and articulation of Syrian nationhood and Syrian nationalist ideology. His nationalist discourse was developed under his fatherâs watchful eye and tutelage and borrowed heavily, though not entirely, from Khalilâs foundational nationalist convictions. Differences of opinion would develop between the two, but, at the time, Khalil and Antun were inseparable partners in the Syrian national struggle, and their writings reflected their shared concerns regarding the state of the Syrian nation and its future. As editors and contributors, they filled the pages of al-Jarida with articles voicing opposition to Greater Syriaâs territorial division and criticizing French colonial rule, and critiques of Lebanese particularism and the dismal state of the Syrian nation and the national movement.
Like his father,9 Antun maintained that âreligious fanaticismâ was a curse plaguing the Syrian nation and the source of its woes while asserting other calamities would befall the nation should Syrians fail to address it.10 Not only was religious fanaticism and division the source of the nationâs woes, but the calamities of French occupation and âZionist oppressionâ (al-iážáčihÄd al-áčŁahyĆ«nÄ«) were the reward for it and an obstacle to Syriaâs independence and advancement, preventing it from taking its place among the âliving nationsâ (al-umam al-áž„ayÄ). Using similar language as his father, Antun likened religious intolerance to disease and a âcancer eating away at its [the Syrian nationâs] flesh and bones.â11 Yet, the Syrian nation remained consumed by religious intolerance, and his fellow countrymen seemed to not care about the threats facing their nation, preferring instead to argue amongst themselves over trivial matters. The âidle state of the people,â characterized by ignorance and a general lack of concern, worried Antun and his father, who questioned how long Syrians would remain silent under French rule and divided as a people.12
To shake the nation out of its âidle state,â Antun and Khalil believed a patriotic spirit needed to be kindled among their fellow countrymen. For Antun, the absence of patriotism (waáčaniyya) was an underlying reason for a nationâs underdevelopment and decay. In contrast, the presence of patriotism was an underlying reason for a peopleâs advancement (sirr taqaddum al-shuÊżĆ«b huwa al-waáčaniyya. wa Êżadam wujĆ«d al-waáčaniyya huwa sirr taÊŸakhkhur wa ináž„iáčÄáč al-umam).13 Therefore, Syriaâs lack of progress and independence was due to a lack of patriotic sentiment within society, and patriotism, thus, was the foundation upon which Syria must depend if it hoped to gain independence and advance.14 Antun hoped that a new sense of patriotism, together with a growing awareness of the tyranny of French colonial rule, would inspire Syrians in the mahjar to aid their brethren in the homeland and spark âa true revivalâ (naáž„da áž„aqÄ«qiyya). Neither had yet to occur, a situation Antun believed resulted from Syrians prioritizing economic concerns and success over the national causeâs success.15
Syriansâ failure to appreciate the national causeâs importance raised Antunâs ire, particularly since some of these same individuals tended to portray themselves as dedicated nationalists sacrificing for the cause. Antun panned their hypocrisy and lamented the dire and disorganized state of the Syrian national movement.16 In his estimation, Syrian political activism in the diaspora had not moved beyond giving speeches and sending protest cables to the League of Nations, which were of limited effect or entirely useless. In the homeland, the opposition had failed to confront French rule effectively. Organized action was needed if Syrian independence was to be achieved and recognized.17 This action would require Syrians everywhere to stand with determination, prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to obtain their rights, and free themselves from colonial rule. Indeed, love and jealousy for oneâs country and acknowledging and sharing in the sorrows of its suffering would not suffice in securing Syriaâs freedom.18
Antunâs legitimate criticism of the effectiveness of Syrian political activism on behalf of the national cause and the general lack of concrete, organized action notwithstanding, his reproach was somewhat hypocritical. He had only just become politically engaged, and his activism was and would be until at least 1925, limited to writing articles and publishing periodicals rather than undertaking the organized, sacrificial political activity he was demanding his fellows engage.19 Moreover, his criticism was dismissive of Syrian nationalistsâ efforts, such as those of his father, to bring about Syrian independence and confront the French colonial rule, even dismissing armed attempts to do so. To be sure, all these efforts failed, but not for lack of determination and willingness to struggle for the nation. Thus, while correctly recognizing the need for organized action beyond speeches and letters of protest, he himself only heeded his advice several years later, suggesting his harsh criticism reflected more the zealousness of youth than an entirely objective analysis of the national situation.
In addition to lamenting the dismal state of the nation and the national movement, Antun also addressed the territorial division of Geographic Syria, mainly Lebanese independence. Like his father, Antun believed in the unity of Geographic Syria and that all its constituent territories â Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria â should be united in one independent state.20 Though it is unclear if Antun accepted his fatherâs position that such a state should be in the form of a federal union comprised of the three territories, it is evident that Antun believed Lebanon was an integral part of Geographic Syria and that he considered the Lebanese and Syrians to be one people. Yet, according to Antun, many Lebanese mistakenly had come to believe Lebanonâs separation from Syria was advantageous, fearing that union with Syria would mean losing their rights and privileges, thereby enslaving them and making them a colony of a foreign state, i. e., Syria.21 Khalil expressed concern that certain âfactionsâ among the Lebanese spoke of Syrians as though they were strangers and foreigners, suggesting a lack of a common bond or any relation between Syrians and Lebanese.22 These beliefs, however, were misguided. Syria, Antun asserted, had no intention of robbing Lebanese of their rights, nor was there any reason why Lebanon and Syria should not be united. Indeed, a united Lebanon and Syria would be even stronger and more formidable than if they were separate entities, with a vast territory and army capable of thwarting French colonial designs.23 Yet, many Lebanese (predominately Maronite Christians) had been convinced that Greater Lebanon, separate and independent from Syria, was strong and formidable. However, many Lebanese had failed to realize that their âindependenceâ was beholden to French colonial interests and, thus, that Lebanon was not truly independent.
For years, Khalil had sought to convince the Lebanese that the road leading to their true independen...