A New Foreign Policy

Beyond American Exceptionalism

Jeffrey D. Sachs

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780231547888
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Internationale Beziehungen

In this sobering analysis of American foreign policy under Trump, the award-winning economist calls for a new approach to international engagement. The American Century began in 1941 and ended in 2017, on the day of President Trump's inauguration. The subsequent turn toward nationalism and "America first" unilateralism did not made America great. It announced the abdication of our responsibilities in the face of environmental crises, political upheaval, mass migration, and other global challenges. As a result, America no longer dominates geopolitics or the world economy as it once did. In this incisive and passionate book, Jeffrey D. Sachs provides the blueprint for a new foreign policy that embraces global cooperation, international law, and aspirations for worldwide prosperity. He argues that America's approach to the world must shift from military might and wars of choice to a commitment to shared objectives of sustainable development. A New Foreign Policy explores both the danger of the "America first" mindset and the possibilities for a new way forward, proposing timely and achievable plans to foster global economic growth, reconfigure the United Nations for the twenty-first century, and build a multipolar world that is prosperous, peaceful, fair, and resilient.

Part I

U.S. EXCEPTIONALISM IN A CHANGING WORLD

Americans tend to view the nation and its foreign policy in exceptional terms, with a history and a future unlike those of any other country. In recent decades, the United States has been seen as the “leader of the free world” and “the world’s sole superpower.” The result has been a kind of hubris, that the United States can dictate the terms of geopolitics and local politics to other parts of the world. Trump’s America First doctrine is an especially crass version of this hubris, as it supposes that the United States can reject UN treaties and decisions, break trade agreements, maintain unrivaled military dominance in all parts of the world, and go it alone when it chooses.

As the old aphorism puts it, this is worse than a crime, it is a mistake. The United States lacks the economic and technological advantage to thumb its nose at the world. American economic power, in relative terms, has declined markedly in recent decades, most importantly because of the economic rise of Asia, especially China. The world is converging economically, meaning that gaps in income per capita and technological know-how are shrinking. No country in the world, neither the United States nor China, will dominate the rest in the twenty-first century.

As America’s relative power has waned and others have begun to catch up, the United States has taken the increasing pushback as an affront. When the United States pushes NATO toward Russia’s borders, and Russia reacts, the United States blames Russia for its belligerence, rather than also noting the provocations of its own policies. When the United States intervenes in Iraq, Syria, and Libya to overthrow regimes, and China and Russia rebuke the United States, the U.S. position has been to accuse those countries of being obstructionist.

What look like offensive actions by America’s counterparts are often viewed as defensive actions by those same countries, a phenomenon known to political scientists as the “security dilemma.” Defensive actions by one country look offensive to the other, thereby provoking escalation. Throughout this book, I’ll invoke the security dilemma to encourage deeper scrutiny and understanding of world conflicts—from the world’s point of view, as well as America’s.

American exceptionalism could leave the United States on the sidelines as other parts of the world move forward. One notable case is the increasing economic and infrastructural integration of Eurasia, the giant land mass that is home to Europe and Asia. China has proposed the One Belt One Road initiative to link Asia and Europe in their common geographical home. The United States has so far stood aloof. Over time, Eurasia is likely to strengthen its economic, environmental, and investment cooperation. Instead of looking for dynamic new partnerships like these, the United States is falling back into old exceptionalist patterns—exemplified by revived tensions with Russia.

In this part, I will look at the history of American exceptionalism, its current manifestations, and what this vision misses.

1

FROM EXCEPTIONALISM TO INTERNATIONALISM

American foreign policy today is uncertain and heatedly contested. The challenges of U.S. foreign policy are of fundamental significance for U.S. national security and well-being, and for global peace and prosperity. Americans must understand how the world has changed, and how we must change our attitudes and approaches along with it.

The new National Defense Strategy of the United States (which I’ll consider in detail in chapter 9) takes a dark view of the world scene today: “We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory.”¹ The world indeed seems to be a sea of problems: the ongoing Syrian war, the related European refugee crisis, ISIS and terrorist attacks across the globe, Russia’s brazen hacking of the U.S. election, China’s rising territorial claims in the South China Sea, North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, and more.

Yet I will argue that this dark view is far too deterministic and pessimistic. The world also offers a host of new positive opportunities, if we understand them and build on them. China, India, and the African Union are each home to more than a billion people with rapid economic growth and a rising middle class. The information revolution continues to advance at a dazzling rate. Robotics, artificial intelligence, and ubiquitous broadband offer the chances for dramatic breakthroughs in health care, education, and renewable energy, at home and globally.

If U.S. foreign policy is only about the threats and not the opportunities, the United States will miss out on the rapid advances in well-being that the new technological revolution can deliver, and that would help to stabilize today’s conflict zones. The fundamental challenge facing U.S. foreign policy is to keep America safe without stumbling into needless wars, busting the military budget, breaking the world trade system, or diverting our attention and resources from the vital challenges of sustainable development.

The fiery debates around foreign policy, both today and throughout American history, are stoked by three competing visions of America’s place in the world. These camps have fundamentally different views of what is possible and desirable in our interactions with other nations.

The first group, whom I call the “exceptionalists,” argues that the United States should continue to aim for global dominance, maintained by unrivaled U.S. military superiority. This group sees U.S. military dominance as both feasible and necessary for global stability. One leading American exceptionalist, Ambassador Robert Blackwill, puts America’s strategy this way: “Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally.”² Blackwill and other exceptionalists argue that America’s foreign policy, indeed its grand strategy, should be to preserve America’s dominant power in the world. Trump’s America First ideology is a variant of exceptionalism, adding xenophobia, racism, and protectionism to more traditional exceptionalist approaches.

The second group, whom I call the “realists,” argues that the United States must accept a realistic balance of power rather than U.S. dominance. So far so good, in my view. Yet like the exceptionalists, the realists argue essentially for “peace through strength.” They believe a new arms race is the necessary and inevitable price to pay to keep the balance of power and preserve U.S. security. I am adopting the term “realist” from its usage in political science. I don’t mean that “realists” are necessarily more realistic, only that they adhere to the “Realist School” of international relations. As I will explain, I find realists to be unrealistic in crucial ways.

I am part of the third group, whom I call the “internationalists.” Internationalists argue that global cooperation between nations is not only feasible but also essential to avoid war and to sustain American and global prosperity. In their view, global cooperation would spare the world a costly and dangerous new arms race between the United States and the emerging powers, one that could easily spill over into open conflict. Moreover, global cooperation would enable the United States and the world to seize the opportunities opened by today’s technological revolution to boost economic growth while overcoming ills that include global warming, emerging diseases, and mass migration.

The term “internationalist” is sometimes used disparagingly. One might hear the gibe, “You’re no patriot, you’re an internationalist” as a typical gibe. The idea is that those who believe in global solutions are not really siding with the United States. By embracing the term “internationalist,” I want to underscore the basic idea that global cooperation boosts America’s best interests along with those of the rest of the world. Internationalists believe strongly in win-win cooperation rather than in the win-lose competition emphasized by the exceptionalists and the realists.

The coming foreign policy battles will pit these three visions against each other, most likely in a fierce pitched battle for the hearts and minds of the American people. I am firmly in the internationalist camp. I believe that American exceptionalism is a dangerous illusion for America in the twenty-first century and that balance-of-power realism is excessively pessimistic about the potential for cooperative diplomacy.

Consider the current U.S. policy debate regarding China.

American exceptionalists see China’s rise as an unacceptable threat to U.S. dominance. They argue that the United States should invest trillions of dollars in a new arms buildup in Asia, including ballistic missile defense for American allies. They argue that the benefits to the United States of a unilateral U.S. arms buildup would far exceed the costs, with benefits in the form of enhanced U.S. prestige, global leadership, national security, and the safety of overseas investments. They call for trade and technology measures to limit China’s future economic growth. They call for a strengthened network of alliances.

Blackwill and Tellis put it this way:

Because the American effort to ‘integrate’ China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.³

To offer a simple numerical illustration: exceptionalists, I will suppose, call for a $5 trillion investment in new armaments, believing that this will enable the United States to extract $10 trillion in geopolitical advantages from China, for a net U.S. benefit of $5 trillion and loss to China of $10 trillion. For an American exceptionalist, the advantages of an arms buildup seem obvious, a no-brainer.

The realists agree with the exceptionalists that a unilateral U.S. military buildup will give the United States a net gain, but they believe that China will match the U.S. arms buildup. Even so, the realists argue that the United States should make the investment. Here is their reasoning.

If China invests $5 trillion in arms while the United States does not, then China will gain $10 trillion in geopolitical advantage. If both sides arm, each spending $5 trillion, neither side gains a geopolitical advantage or suffers a geopolitical loss. They arrive at a standoff, a balance of power. If the United States arms while China does not, the United States garners a net gain of $5 trillion, equal to $10 trillion in geopolitical benefits minus the $5 trillion cost of arms.

Using the jargon of game theory, the realists argue that an arms buildup is America’s (and China’s) “dominant” strategy. If China arms, then the United States should do so as well. If China does not arm, then the United States can secure a geopolitical advantage through its own military buildup. No matter what China does, therefore, the United States should arm. Since China reasons symmetrically, both countries end up arming, and each incurs a $5 trillion cost but ends up at a geopolitical standstill. According to the realists, the $5 trillion is the unavoidable cost to pay to ensure America’s geopolitical parity with China.

Hold on, say the internationalists. Surely our two countries can come to their senses. The $5 trillion to be used for an arms race could be put toward more urgent needs, like education, health care, renewable energy, and infrastructure. Rather than an arms race, let’s agree with China that neither side will arm. Better still, let’s agree to pool some resources into new high-tech ventures to advance cutting-edge global solutions for low-carbon energy, quality education, health care for all, and other mutual goals, to achieve the kind of “smart, fair, and sustainable societies” that I wrote about in Building...