The Grand Alliance

Winston S. Churchill

• Publisher: RosettaBooks
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9780795311444
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia britannica moderna

The British, Soviets, and Americans unite in this chapter of the six-volume WWII history by the legendary prime minister and Nobel Prize recipient. The Grand Alliance describes the end of an extraordinary period in British military history, in which Britain stood alone against Germany. Two crucial events brought an end to Britain's isolation. First was Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union, opening up a battle front in the East and forcing Stalin to look to the British for support. The second was the bombing of Pearl Harbor. US support had long been crucial to the British war effort, and here, Winston Churchill documents his efforts to draw the Americans to aid, including correspondence with President Roosevelt. This book is part of the six-volume account of World War II told from the unique viewpoint of a British prime minister who led his nation in the fight against tyranny. In addition to the correspondence with FDR, the series is enriched with extensive primary sources. We are presented with not only Churchill's retrospective analysis of the war, but also memos, letters, orders, speeches, and telegrams, day-by-day accounts of reactions as the drama intensifies. Throughout these volumes, we listen as strategies and counterstrategies unfold in response to Hitler's conquest of Europe, planned invasion of England, and assault on Russia, in a mesmerizing account of the crucial decisions made as the fate of the world hangs in the balance. "A masterly piece of historical writing... complete with humor and wit." — The New Yorker

BOOK I

GERMANY DRIVES EAST

CHAPTER I

THE DESERT AND THE BALKANS

The Onset of Events in 1941—A Secure Foundation—The Hinge of the War—False Dawn in the Desert—My War Appreciation of January 6—A Firm Flank at Benghazi—The Campaign in Abyssinia—The Spanish Riddle—Vichy Obscurities—Threat of German Air-Power in Sicily—Overriding Danger in the Balkans—The Need to Support Greece—Our Main Task—Hitler’s New Year Thoughts—His Letter to Mussolini, December 31, 1940—Coincidence of Our View about Spain—Hitler’s Conclusions about Russia and Africa—Mr. Eden’s Anxieties—Need to Limit Our Desert Advance—General Smuts’ Telegram of January 8—Directions to General Wavell of January 10—Wavell Flies to Athens—My Telegram to Wavell of January 26—My Reply to General Smuts of January 12.

Looking back upon the unceasing tumult of the war, I cannot recall any period when its stresses and the onset of so many problems all at once or in rapid succession bore more directly on me and my colleagues than the first half of 1941. The scale of events grew larger every year; but the decisions required were not more difficult. Greater military disasters fell upon us in 1942, but by then we were no longer alone and our fortunes were mingled with those of the Grand Alliance. No part of our problem in 1941 could be solved without relation to all the rest. What was given to one theatre had to be taken from another. An effort here meant a risk there. Our physical resources were harshly limited. The attitude of a dozen Powers, friendly, opportunist, or potentially hostile, was unknowable. At home we must face the war against the U-boats, the invasion threat, and the continuing Blitz; we had to conduct the group of campaigns in the Middle East; and, thirdly, to try to make a front against Germany in the Balkans. And we had to do all this for a long time alone. After shooting Niagara we had now to struggle in the rapids. One of the difficulties of this narrative is the disproportion between our single-handed efforts to keep our heads above water from day to day and do our duty, and the remorseless development of far larger events.

***

We had at any rate a solid foundation in Great Britain. I was sure that provided we maintained the highest state of readiness at home, and the necessary forces, a German attempt at invasion in 1941 would not be to our disadvantage. The German air strength in all theatres was very little greater than in 1940, whereas our air fighter force at home had grown from fifty-one to seventy-eight squadrons, and our bombers from twenty-seven to forty-five squadrons. The Germans had not won the air battle in 1940. They seemed to have little chance of winning it in 1941. Our army in the Island had grown far stronger. Between September 1940 and September 1941 it was raised from twenty-six active divisions to thirty-four, plus five armoured divisions. To this must be added the maturity of the troops and the enormous increase in their weapons. The Home Guard had risen from a million to a million and a half; and now all had firearms. Numbers, mobility, equipment, training, organisation, and defence works were vastly improved. Hitler of course had always a superabundance of soldiers for invasion. To conquer us he would have had to carry and supply across the Channel at least a million men. He could by 1941 have had a large though not a sufficient quantity of landing-craft. But with our dominant Air Force and naval power giving us the command of both elements we had no doubt of our ability to destroy or cripple his armada. All the arguments therefore on which we had relied in 1940 were now incomparably stronger. So long as there was no relaxation in vigilance or serious reduction in our own defence the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff felt no anxiety.

Although our American friends, some of whose generals visited us, took a more alarmist view of our position, and the world at large regarded the invasion of Britain as probable, we ourselves felt free to send overseas all the troops our available shipping could carry and to wage offensive war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Here was the hinge on which our ultimate victory turned, and it was in 1941 that the first significant events began. In war armies must fight. Africa was the only continent in which we could meet our foes on land. The defence of Egypt and of Malta were duties compulsive upon us, and the destruction of the Italian Empire the first prize we could gain. The British resistance in the Middle East to the triumphant Axis Powers and our attempt to rally the Balkans and Turkey against them are the theme and thread of our story now.

***

The Desert victories cheered the opening days of the year. Bardia, with more than forty thousand men, surrendered on January 5. Tobruk seemed certainly within our grasp, and was in fact taken, with nearly thirty thousand prisoners, in a fortnight. On the 19th we reoccupied Kassala, in the Soudan, and on the 20th invaded the Italian colony of Eritrea, seizing the railhead at Biscia a few days later. On that same day the Emperor Haile Selassie re-entered Abyssinia. But all the while the reports accumulated of the German movements and preparations for a Balkan campaign. I drew up for the Chiefs of Staff an appreciation upon the war as a whole, with which I found them in general agreement.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 Jan 41

I

The speedy destruction of the Italian armed forces in North-East Africa must be our prime major overseas objective in the opening months of 1941. Once the Italian army in Cyrenaica has been destroyed the Army of the Nile becomes free for other tasks. We cannot yet tell what these will be.

2. The fall of Bardia should enable an advanced base to be established there for the capture of Tobruk. With Bardia and Tobruk in our hands it should be possible to drop the land communications with Alexandria almost entirely and to rely upon sea transport for our further westward advance. Every plan should be made now to use Tobruk to its utmost capacity.

3. The striking force to be maintained west of Bardia and Tobruk need not be large. The 2nd and 7th British Armoured Divisions, the 6th Australian Division, the New Zealand brigade group, soon to become a division, with perhaps one or two British brigades, comprising not more than 40,000 to 45,000 men, should suffice to overpower the remaining Italian resistance and to take Benghazi. The distance from Tobruk to Benghazi by the coastal road is not much above 250 miles, compared with about 370 from Alexandria to Tobruk. Thus, once Tobruk is established as the base, and our land communications begin from there, no greater strain should be thrown upon the land transport than at present, and it should be possible to start afresh from Tobruk as if Tobruk were Alexandria, and to maintain the moderate but adequate striking force required. With the capture of Benghazi this phase of the Libyan campaign would be ended.

4. The question is, how long will this take? Having regard to the very heavy Italian losses in their best troops and in their vehicles and equipment, and to the fact that we have the command of the sea, the collapse in Cyrenaica might be very rapid. Indeed, all might go with a run at any time. The need for haste is obvious. It would however suffice for our general strategy if Benghazi and everything east of it were effectively in our possession and occupied as a military and naval base at any time during March.

5. The aforesaid Libyan operations need not therefore at all affect the simultaneous pushing of the campaign against the Italians in Abyssinia. General Wavell has already withdrawn the 4th Indian Division. The 5th Indian Division is also available, and it should be possible to carry out the Kassala operation and to spread the revolt in Abyssinia, while at the same time the Kenya forces press northwards by Lake Rudolf. At any time we may receive armistice proposals from the cut-off Italian garrison in Abyssinia. This army must have been buoyed up with hopes of an Italian conquest of the Delta and of the Canal, enabling communications to be restored and supplies to reach them by the Nile and the Red Sea. These hopes are already dead. On the other hand, the vast size of Abyssinia, the lack of all communications, especially sea communications, and the impossibility of nourishing large forces may bring about an indefinite delay. It is however not an unreasonable hope that by the end of April the Italian army in Abyssinia will have submitted or been broken up.

6. The moment that this is apparent the northward movement of all the effective forces in Kenya, as well as those in the Soudan and Abyssinia, will become possible. These forces will thenceforward become a reserve available for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. If we take the present total strength of the armies in the Middle East at about 370,000 (including convoys W.S.5 and 6), it might be reasonably expected that the equivalent of ten divisions would stand in the Nile Valley, together with two additional divisions from home, a total of twelve, after providing the necessary garrisons and security troops for Abyssinia, Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Palestine. These twelve divisions should thus be free (apart from new distractions) by the end of April.

II

7. To invade and force a way through Spain to the Straits of Gibraltar against the will of the Spanish people and Government, especially at this season, is a most dangerous and questionable enterprise for Germany to undertake, and it is no wonder that Hitler, with so many sullen populations to hold down, has so far shrunk from it. With the permission of the Spanish Government it would of course be a short and easy matter for the Germans to gain control of Lisbon and of the Algeciras and Ceuta batteries, together with appropriate airfields. According to Captain Hillgarth [our Naval Attaché in Madrid], who has lived long in Spain and is fresh from contact with our Ambassador, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that the Spanish Government will give Hitler passage or join the war against us. General Wavell’s victories in Libya have played, and will play, an important part in Spanish opinion. If the Germans are refused permission it is most unlikely that they will try to force their way into and through Spain before the month of April. From every point of view this delay is helpful to us. We have the use of Gibraltar; we have the time for our strength in the Middle East to accomplish its task there and again to become free; above all, there is the possibility of events taking a favourable turn in France and at Vichy.

8. We must now be most careful not to precipitate matters in Spain, or set the Spanish Government against us more than it is already, or provoke Herr Hitler to a violent course towards Spain. All these matters are highly speculative. There can be no certainty about them. But the fact that Hitler has not acted through Spain as we feared, when conditions, both political and climatic, were more favourable to him, makes it on the whole a reasonable working assumption that any German adventure in Spain will at least wait for the spring.

III

9. The probabilities of delay in Spain until the spring give rise to the hope that the Vichy Government, under German pressure or actual German incursion, may either proceed to North Africa and resume the war from there, or authorise General Weygand to do so. If such an event could be brought about before the Straits of Gibraltar fell into German control we should have a very good chance of resisting a German attempt against the Straits indefinitely. We could move troops into Morocco by the Atlantic ports; we should have the use of the French air bases in North Africa. The whole situation in the Mediterranean would be completely revolutionised in our favour. The position of any Italian forces remaining in Tripoli would become impossible. We might well be able to open the Mediterranean for supplies and reinforcements for the Middle East.

10. We have therefore thought it right to assure Marshal Pétain and General Weygand that we will assist them with up to six divisions, substantial air forces, and the necessary naval power from the moment they feel able to take the all-important step we so greatly desire. We have also impressed upon them the danger of delaying their action until the Germans have made their way through Spain and become masters of the Straits and of Northern Morocco. We can but wait and see what Vichy will do. Meanwhile we enforce the blockade of France fitfully and as naval convenience offers, partly to assert the principle, partly to provide a “smoke-screen” of Anglo-French friction, and especially not to let the Vichy Government feel that if they do nothing life will be tolerable for them so far as we are concerned. It is greatly to our interest that events should develop rapidly in France. Presumably Herr Hitler realises this. Nevertheless the probabilities are that the French climax will come about before anything decisive happens in Spain.

IV

11. We must continually expect that Hitler will soon strike some heavy blow, and that he is now making preparations on a vast scale with customary German thoroughness. He can of course easily come down through Italy and establish an air-power in Sicily. Perhaps this is already taking place.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee are requested to press on with their study of “Influx” [a scheme for the occupation of Sicily], which may conceivably require emergency treatment. It is not seen however how “Influx” can be accorded priority over the operations in Libya; certainly not, whatever happens, until Tobruk has been taken and a good forward base made there—if not farther west—to protect Egypt.

V

12. All the foregoing shows that nothing would suit our interest better than that any German advance in the Balkans should be delayed till the spring. For this very reason one must apprehend that it will begin earlier. The exploits of the Greek Army have been an enormous help to us. They have expressed themselves generously about the extremely modest aid in the air which was all we could give. But should their success be followed by a check or a deadlock we must expect immediate demands for more aid. The only aid we can give quickly is four or five more squadrons from the Middle East, perhaps some artillery regiments, and some or all of the tanks of the 2nd Armoured Division, now arrived and working up in leisurely fashion in Egypt.

Furious has reached Takoradi, and forty Hurricanes, etc., will soon raise Air Marshal Longmore’s strength to well over a hundred Hurricane fighters. His losses in the offensive have been singularly small. His action in withdrawing squadrons from Aden and the Soudan has been vindicated. Tobruk may soon be in our hands, and thereafter it would seem that a strong reinforcement of air-power for Greece should be provided. This should include Hurricane squadrons. Have the aerodromes in Greece been lengthened and adapted to them? Has the airfield in Crete yet been made suitable for their landing on passage? The call when it comes, may be very urgent. Everything must be set in train now. We must know also how long it would take to move the 2nd Armoured Division to the Piræus, and what numbers are involved.

13. All accounts go to show that a Greek failure to take Valona will have very bad consequences. It may be possible for General Wavell, with no more than the forces he is now using in the Western Desert, and in spite of some reduction in his Air Force, to conquer the Cyrenaica province and establish himself at Benghazi; but it would not be right for the sake of Benghazi to lose the chance of the Greeks taking Valona, and thus to dispirit and anger them, and perhaps make them in the mood for a separate peace with Italy. Therefore the prospect must be faced that after Tobruk the further westward advance of the Army of the Nile may be seriously cramped. It is quite clear to me that supporting Greece must have priority after the western flank of Egypt has been made secure.

VI

14. The attitude of Yugoslavia may well be determined by the support we give to Greece and by their fortunes before Valona. While it is impossible to dogmatise, it would be more natural for the Germans to push on through Roumania to the Black Sea and to press down through their old ally Bulgaria to Salonika, rather than to force their way through Yugoslavia. Many troop movements and many more rumours would seem to point to this. Evidently there is a great building up of German strength, and improvement of German communications towards the south-east. We must so act as to make it certain that if the enemy enters Bulgaria Turkey will come into the war. If Yugoslavia stands firm and is not molested, if the Greeks take Valona and maintain...