Zeebrugge

The Greatest Raid of All

Christopher Sandford

• Publisher: Casemate
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781612005041
• eBook ISBN: 9781612005058
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

"A gripping new history of the British naval raid in April 1918 on the German-held Belgian port of that name" ( Chronicles).
 
The combined-forces invasion of the Belgian port of Zeebrugge on April 23, 1918, remains one of the most dramatic stories of the First World War, and in this book, it's recounted in vivid detail. A force drawn from Britain's Royal Navy and Royal Marines set out on ships and submarines to try to block the key strategic port in a bold attempt to stem the catastrophic losses being inflicted on British shipping by German submarines. It meant attacking a heavily fortified German naval base. The tide, calm weather, and the right wind direction for a smoke screen were crucial to the plan.
 
Judged purely on results, it can only be considered a partial strategic success. Casualties were high and the base only partially blocked. Nonetheless, it came to represent the embodiment of the bulldog spirit, the peculiarly British fighting élan—the belief that anything was possible with enough dash and daring.
 
The essential story of the Zeebrugge mission has been told before, but never through the direct, firsthand accounts of its survivors—including that of Lt. Richard Sandford, VC, the acknowledged hero of the day and the author's great uncle. The fire and bloodshed of the occasion is the book's centerpiece—but there is also room for the family and private lives of the men who volunteered in the hundreds for what they knew to be, effectively, a suicide mission.

CHAPTER 1

The Sea Churned Red

The night was pitch black, though with silvery flashes of lightning sometimes pulsing over the inky water and silhouetting the shore to the west. It soon became a matter of increasingly miserable weather, and even more miserable visibility, for the British naval force making its way out to sea off the coast of Scotland. Persistent rain squalls soaked the convoy of 30 warships of various classes and sizes, along with their dozen accompanying support vessels. A petty officer on the cruiser HMS Courageous complained that ‘nothing could be kept dry on board’ and if an enemy attack had occurred ‘they could have been on us before we saw them, so thick was the mist and low cloud’. Years later, he compared the whole exercise to ‘rid[ing] on the Ghost Train at a seaside resort – you’d be bumping along, turning blind corners, braced for a collision, and then suddenly there’d be this blinding sheet of light, with huge shapes rising up all around you, and then total darkness again. I have never been so terrified in all my life’.

It was the night of Thursday, 31 January 1918, and the British ships were on their way from their home base in Rosyth to take part in Operation EC1, a fleet exercise due to begin early the following morning off Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. The force was under the overall control of 47-year-old Vice-Admiral David Beatty, commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet, whose reputation for audacity at sea was matched both by his colourful personal appearance, illustrated by his rakishly tilted cap and non-regulation three-button ‘monkey jacket’, as well as his increasingly complex domestic life, which by now included an affair with the wife of a senior colleague who also happened to be naval equerry to the king. Beatty was widely thought to have distinguished himself twenty months earlier at the Battle of Jutland, where he is remembered for his comment that ‘there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today’ after two of his squadron had exploded. He later remarked that ‘a display of leadership was essential’ under the circumstances.

As well as Courageous, Operation EC1 included no fewer than seven other battlecruisers with their destroyer escorts, three cruisers and, bringing up the rear, two flotillas of submarines, each led by a light cruiser. The whole force was to proceed in a single line down the Firth of Forth and out into the North Sea, where it would rendezvous with other Royal Navy detachments before steaming north to Orkney. It was a large-scale and complicated enough manoeuvre to undertake at the best of times, requiring the highest standards of seamanship, quite apart from the twin challenges posed by the threat of marauding enemy U-boats and the abysmal weather. Although conditions were relatively calm when the main force left Rosyth shortly after dusk on the 31st, a steady drizzle and sea mist soon set in. As the Courageous petty officer recalled many years later: ‘In those days, navigation was almost unchanged since Nelson’s time, and we had to grope our way in the dark. There was no radar, and no signalling was allowed. Looking back, they were terrible conditions.’ On went the litany:

Per orders, each ship in the line showed only a dim blue light to the one behind it, while maintaining strict radio silence. So now imagine you’re travelling on a motorway in the fog with no headlights, and thirty other cars are right behind you with nobody knowing for sure where anyone else is, or whether there’s someone waiting up ahead to ambush you. Nobody got a wink of sleep that night, not just the lookouts, and you didn’t dare go below to rest and wash your face – no hot food or drink – and all this time in a great state of mental anxiety.

That was certainly the case among the crews of the nine steam-propelled K-class submarines accompanying the fleet that night. Dirty, cramped and notoriously prone to break down, these particular vessels had earned the nickname of ‘Kalamity class’ since first entering service in 1916. Of the 17 K submarines built, six were eventually lost in accidents. ‘That was their reputation in a nutshell,’ one survivor wrote. Just two months before Operation EC1 got underway, the submarine K1 had collided with her sister K4 while on patrol off the coast of Denmark. Her commander had then scuttled her to avoid capture.

The whole concept of British underwater naval strategy remained in its infancy at the outbreak of the European war in August 1914, and even then only proceeded in the face of the hostility of most of the service’s more traditionally minded officers. While serving as First Sea Lord in 1910–11, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, VC – known to his subordinates, generally affectionately, as ‘Old ’ ard ‘art’ – had judged the submarine to be ‘Underhand, unfair and damned un-English’. The sort of men who volunteered for K-class duty in the years 1916–18 (when the boats themselves were still given only numbers, rather than the dignity of actual names) were widely seen as somewhat eccentric, bearded figures who operated in damp, claustrophobic quarters that smelled of tar and corticene, and whose preferred dress of sweaters and oilskins contrasted with their upstairs colleagues’ pressed dress uniforms and decorations. At an unwieldy 339 feet long, the K boat was difficult to steer, and normally required fully 30 minutes to submerge to its maximum depth of 200 feet. Even then, there were frequently problems in doing so. In one early sea trial with Prince George – the future King George VI – aboard as an observer, K3 had lost control and buried herself nose first in a sandbar while her propellers continued to wildly scythe the air above. The commander of the boat later informed an Admiralty court martial that he had not been aware of his exact position at the time because ‘rats had eaten my charts’.

Each K submarine was equipped with eight 18-inch torpedo tubes, four in the bow and four on the beam, with a spare pair located on a swivel mounting on the superstructure, though the last proved all too liable to jam or backfire in heavy seas. In 15 years of service, only one K-class vessel ever directly engaged an enemy target, when on 16 June 1917 K7 fired five torpedoes at a passing U-boat. Only one of the five hit its mark, and even that failed to explode.

In fairness, the K submarines were not quite a full-scale disaster of design. With a top speed of 24 knots, and eight knots when submerged, barring technical mishaps they were capable of comfortably matching or outrunning most of their potential attackers. At least in theory, under emergency conditions a K boat could secure her main engines, shift to battery power and execute a crash-dive in just three minutes, though few of the crews attempting this particular manoeuvre later spoke of the experience fondly. Within the confines of being thrown together in a steel-enclosed tube roughly the length of a football field, the ship’s company of around six officers and 53 ratings was at least relatively comfortable while at sea: there was a proper deckhouse, built over the conning tower rather than the canvas awning fitted in previous British submarines; they were also the first vessels of their kind to be equipped with a diesel generator to charge the batteries, an advanced ventilation system (though they could still be stiflingly hot), a comparatively large mess room for the ratings, and even a small, carpeted officers’ lounge which included an iron bathtub discreetly tucked away behind a screen in the corner. On paper, the K boats gave the Royal Navy a submarine force of the most advanced type, and one which should have been a match for its German opponents.

In practice, this was not always the case. All 17 of the completed K boats had serious operational issues. As we’ve seen, collisions, explosions, torpedo failures and groundings were common. One K submarine sprang a leak while at anchor at Gareloch in the west of Scotland, flooded her batteries, and came close to asphyxiating her crew with chlorine gas. In January 1917, her sister boat K13 sank in the same location when seawater entered her engine room while she was preparing to dive; 34 crew members and civilian dockyard workers perished as a result. The wreck was eventually salvaged and recommissioned, without significant design changes, as K22, just in time for her to take part in Operation EC1 six months later. Meanwhile, K5 would suffer repeated mechanical breakdowns during her four years of service, only to be lost with all 57 hands during a mock battle held after the war in the Bay of Biscay. Just a few weeks after this tragedy, K15 sank at her mooring in Portsmouth when her diving vents opened without warning. The K boats often leaked, and in the words of the Admiralty a number ‘submerged prematurely, producing losses’.

The most common complaint about the K class as a whole was that the submarines had ‘too many damned holes’ – the various hatches, valves, vents, hull penetrations, intakes and tubes made them excessively vulnerable when starting a dive, and even while operating on the surface the boats had an unfortunate tendency to ship water through their funnels and flood their boiler rooms, leaving them adrift on the open sea. They were simply unable to function at anything close to their peak efficiency except under ideal weather conditions and with unlimited time for their various diving and surfacing procedures, not circumstances likely to obtain in the typical north European waters of the war years 1916–18.

In September 1910, the Admiralty had appointed as its inspecting captain of submarines a 37-year-old Indian army general’s son named Roger John Brownlow Keyes. A supremely self-confident individual, even at that relatively early stage in his career, he had remarked shortly after taking up his duties that the Germans deserved ‘a thorough hiding’. Having joined the service as a 12-year-old cadet on the training ship HMS Britannia, Keyes had gone on to distinguish himself by leading a series of daringly irregular raids to harry the Chinese troops during the British intervention in the Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901. In July 1900, he’d personally destroyed the heavily defended Chinese fort at Hsi-cheng while at the head of a landing party of 32 sailors armed with pistols, cutlasses and coshes. After the raiders had put the fort’s garrison to flight, Keyes had stayed behind to methodically lay an explosive charge directly under the building’s ammunition depot. Lighting the fuse, he then walked unhurriedly back down an otherwise deserted towpath to his waiting ship, HMS Fame, which was tied up on a nearby river. Keyes’s biographer wrote of the ensuing events: ‘The magazine went up with a roar that shook the countryside. Two of the landing-party were injured by the falling masonry. But these were the only casualties, and the Fame returned home without further incident.’

Slim and pale, with a clipped speaking style, rather over-prominent ears, and a permanently crooked left forearm as a result of a childhood accident, psychologists would later speculate whether these physical shortcomings had somehow driven Keyes on to almost suicidal acts of personal valour. To a naval colleague named Edward Renouf, ‘He clearly fancied himself as a man of action, divorced from the routine world, free to concentrate on the sort of piratical missions that appealed to his jolly midshipman’s personality.’ In fact, Keyes was in some ways the beau ideal of the British fighting man of the period. ‘His natural temper [was] both stoic and combative,’ George VI later said of him. A newly arrived officer on Keyes’s post-China command HMS Venus remembered being brought up short by a colleague for wondering if ‘the old man’ really deserved his heroic reputation. ‘Captain Keyes,’ he was told, ‘is the one man in the Royal Navy who the men will follow into the jaws of hell … He is audacity personified.’ That had concluded the exchange. As the navy’s inspector of submarines, Keyes had come to envision a ‘line abreast of highspeed submersibles that would work ahead of a main strike force – one that would engage the enemy even before the latter knew it was in a fight’. This fundamental shift in strategy from one that saw the submarine as an essentially defensive asset, conducting offshore patrols or leading occasional feints into the North Sea, hoping to draw the enemy out, to one that emphasised the submarine’s hostile, first-strike potential would be a significant factor when it came to the Admiralty’s decision to commission the K-class flotilla just a few years later.

*

The men of K force were not the only ones with misgivings as they put to sea at the start of Operation EC1 on that dark January night in 1918. Commodore Ernest Leir, on the bridge of the cruiser HMS Ithuriel, would also remember looking back uneasily over his shoulder and seeing only ‘the dimmest of lights, haloed like street lamps in a thick London fog’ as the convoy reached open water and increased speed to 22 knots. Leir added that there had been a ‘lot of dust and pieces flying around’ as his 1,700-ton ship’s steam turbines began to quicken, and that even so Ithuriel had soon lost sight of her guide Courageous, though she was only a minute’s sailing time behind her. Ithuriel herself lay at the head of a mile-long convoy of five submarines – K11, K12, K14, K17 and K22, the former K13. To their rear came the battle cruisers Australia, New Zealand, Indomitable and Inflexible, followed in turn by the light cruiser Fearless and four more submarines, K3, K4, K6 and K7. Several smaller surface boats bobbed and swerved between them, and the heavy rain squalls as night descended, accentuated by banks of patchy fog, led Commodore Leir to think of the whole exercise in terms of ‘juddering along a very bumpy, insufficiently lit road, towards an unseen and ill-defined destination’. Behind the last of the submarines bulked a flotilla of three battleships accompanied by their screening destroyers. ‘The lights up ahead,’ wrote a sailor on Indomitable, ‘were so dim that it became obvious to every man of us that the utmost vigilance was required, not only to dodge the enemy but to avoid collision with our own side.’

These were prescient words. As Ithuriel and her submarine flotilla left the estuary and headed northeast on a course that took them close to the small, uninhabited Isle of May, some five miles off the Scottish coast, a lookout reported seeing a cluster of lights off the starboard beam, apparently closing in on their position. The sudden appearance of traffic ahead of him, combined with his natural fears of possible U-boat activity in the area, seems to have come as an unpleasant shock to Commodore Leir, who ordered a sharp turn to port to avoid a collision with the mysterious shapes that lay about a mile and a half distant. It’s now thought that these were nothing more sinister than a convoy of British minesweeping trawlers, oblivious to the fleet manoeuvres, and that the two groups of ships would have gone on to pass by without incident had each simply maintained its course. In theory, at least, Operation EC1 had been devised as a series of carefully coordinated advances from one neatly drawn map grid to another, ‘with adequate separation maintained at all times in the light of visibility and [sea] conditions’. But in practice it also involved sending a large, mixed-class fleet into some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, sailing at close quarters and at high speed in the dark. Given the K boats’ known technical deficiencies and tendency to break down at inopportune moments, it might now reasonably be thought that the potential for disaster had existed from the time the move order had first been drafted on 28 January, and then been communicated down the line two days later. ‘It may have sounded like a good idea on paper,’ one submariner wrote, ‘but to me it was just a stupid order coming from men sitting on their backsides in front of the fireplace at the Admiralty. My mates and I all thought something would go wrong.’

It did: the moment the unidentified lights appeared in the haze about two minutes’ sailing time ahead of Ithuriel was the beginning of a chain reaction of misadventures that later became known as the ‘Battle of May Island’.

The first intimation of real trouble ahead came when the officer of the watch on K14 saw the vague shape of K11 swing to port ahead of him, and communicated this fact to his senior colleague, Commander Thomas Harbottle. ‘Then the game began [as] our helm jammed tight from being put hard over at 20 knots,’ a crew member wrote. ‘We pushed on into the blackness, but now in a circular motion, tak[ing] us far out of our rightful position in the dance … Soon the hissing and grinding of the engines was terrific, and bitter words were exchanged among those in the deckhouse attempting to alleviate the problem.’

With little more to do than frantically spin the wheel from port to starboard and back again, ‘cursing richly’ as he did so, Commander Harbottle ordered that K14 turn on her main navigation lights ‘so that some damn fool doesn’t run us down in the dark’. A moment or two later, the boat’s helm righted itself and she again appeared to be alone on the sea. Harbottle then ordered that K14 turn back to starboard and without further ado resume her place in the line behind K11. But before she could do so a voice from the conning tower called out ‘Ship astern!’ and simultaneous with the last syllable ‘there was a fearful thud and a roar like that of an exploding volcano’. K14 had begun her turn just in time to be rammed by the last submarine in the line, the refurbished K13, now designated as K22, which was travelling at some 21 knots at the time of the collision. She hit K14 squarely on the rear por...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1. The Sea Churned Red
• 2. Total War
• 3. ‘A Daring and Arduous Stunt’
• 4. The Suicide Club
• 5. Into the Cauldron
• 6. ‘The Firing was a Bit Severe …’
• 7. Eight VCs Before Dawn
• 8. Aftermath
• Sources and Chapter Notes
• Bibliography
• Plate section