Fighting in Hell

The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front

Peter Tsouras

• Publisher: Frontline Books
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781848326514
• eBook ISBN: 9781783469550
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History

Detailed reports by German commanders: "Powerful testimony to the Germans' lack of preparation for the harsh climatic conditions of the Russian winter." — Military Machines International
 
When their troops invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the initial success convinced the German high command that the Red Army could be destroyed west of the Dnepr River and that there would be no need for conducting operations in cold, snow, and mud. They were wrong.
 
In fact, the German war in Russia was so brutal in its extremes that all past experience paled beside it. Everything in Russia—the land, the climate, the distances, and above all the people—were harder, harsher, more unforgiving, and deadlier than anything the German soldier had ever faced before. One panzer-grenadier who fought in the West and in Russia summed it up: In the West war was the same honorable old game; nobody went out of his way to be vicious, and fighting stopped often by five in the afternoon. But in the East, the Russians were trying to kill you—all the time.
 
The four detailed reports of campaigning in Russia included in this invaluable book (Russian Combat Methods in WWII, Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps and Warfare in the Far North) were written in the late 1940s and early 1950s as part of the US Army program to record the German strategies and tactics of World War II directly from the commanders. The authors were all veterans of the fighting they described, and frankly admitted that the soldiers sent to Russia were neither trained nor equipped to withstand the full fury of the elements. Fighting in Hell shows what happened on the ground, through firsthand accounts of the commanders who were there.

Part One

Russian Combat Methods in World War II

By GENERALOBERST ERHARD RAUSS
Commander, 4th and 3rd Panzer Armies

Preface

Russian Combat Methods in World War II was prepared by a committee of former German officers at the EUCOM Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany, in late 1947 and early 1948. All of these officers had extensive experience on the eastern front during the period 1941 – 45. The principal author, for example, commanded in succession a panzer division, a corps, a panzer army, and an army group.

The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view. For instance, the ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusions’ to Russian Combat Methods in World War II present the views of the German author without interpretation by American personnel. Throughout this pamphlet, Russian combat methods are evaluated in terms of German combat doctrine, and Russian staff methods are compared to those of the German General Staff. Organization, equipment, and procedures of the German and Russian Armies differed considerably from those of the United States Army. Tactical examples in the text have been carefully dated, and an effort has been made to indicate the progress of the Russian Army in overcoming the weaknesses noted in the early stages of the war.

In the preparation of this revised edition, the German text has been retranslated, and certain changes in typography and chapter titles have been made to improve clarity and facilitate its use. The revised edition is considered to be just as reliable and sound as the text prepared by the German committee. The authors’ prejudices and defects, whatever they may be, find the same expression in the following translation as they do in the original German.

Department of the Army
November 1950

Introduction

The only written material available for the preparation of this manuscript consisted of a few memoranda in diary form and similar notes of a personal nature. Russian Combat Methods in World War II is therefore based to a preponderant degree on personal recollections and on material furnished by a small group of former German commanders who had special experience in the Eastern Campaign. For that very reason, it cannot lay claim to completeness This report is limited to a description of the characteristic traits of the Russian soldier, and their influence on the conduct of battle. The political, economic, and social conditions of the country, although influential factors, could only be touched upon. Detailed treatment of climate and terrain – indispensable to an understanding of Russian methods of warfare – has been omitted intentionally since those subjects are discussed in other manuscripts.

Russian combat methods have more and more become a topic of vital concern. Propaganda and legend already have obscured the facts. The most nearly correct appraisal will be arrived at by knowing the peculiarities of the Russian territory and its inhabitants, and by analyzing and accurately evaluating the sources from which they derive their strength. There is no better method the a study of World War II, the struggle in which the characteristics of country and people were thrown into bold relief. Although the passage of time may have diminished the validity of these experiences, they nevertheless remain the soundest basis for an evaluation. The war potential of the Soviet Union may be subject to change; no doubt it has increased during the last few years and will increase further, at least until the end of the current Five Year Plan. The very latest implements of war are known to have been further developed and produced in quantity, and new offensive and defensive weapons perfected. Technological advances will alter the external aspects of warfare, but the character and peculiarities of the Russian soldier and his particular methods of fighting remain unaffected by such innovations. Nor will the characteristics of Russian topography change during the next few years. In these decisively important aspects, therefore, the German experiences of World War II remain fully valid.

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER AND RUSSIAN CONDUCT OF BATTLE

CHAPTER 1

Peculiarities of the Russian Soldier

It is possible to predict from experience how virtually every soldier of the western world will behave in a given situation – but not the Russian. The characteristics of this semi-Asiatic, like those of his vast country, are strange and contradictory. During the last war there were units which one day repulsed a strong German attack with exemplary bravery, and on the next folded up completely. There were others which one day lost their nerve when the first shell exploded, and on the next allowed themselves, man by man, literally to be cut to pieces. The Russian is generally impervious to crises, but he can also be very sensitive to them. Generally, he has no fear of a threat to his flanks, but at times he can be most touchy about flanks. He disregards many of the old established rules of tactics, but clings obstinately to his own methods.

The key to this odd behavior can be found in the native character of the Russian soldier who, as a fighter, possesses neither the judgment nor the ability to think independently. He is subject to moods which to a Westerner are incomprehensible; he acts by instinct. As a soldier, the Russian is primitive and unassuming, innately brave but morosely passive when in a group. These traits make him in many respects an adversary superior to the self-confident and more demanding soldiers of other armies. Such opponents, however, can and must, by their physical and mental qualities, achieve not only equality, but also the superiority necessary to defeat the Russian soldier.

Disregard for human begins and contempt of death are other characteristics of the Russian soldier. He will climb with complete indifference and cold-bloodedness over the bodies of hundreds of fallen comrades, in order to take up the attack on the same spot. With the same apathy he will work all day burying his dead comrades after a battle. He looks toward his own death with the same resignation. Even severe wounds impress him comparatively little. For instance, a Russian, sitting upright at the side of the street, in spite of the fact that both lower legs were shot away asked with a friendly smile for a cigarette. He endures cold and heat, hunger and thirst, dampness and mud, sickness and vermin, with equanimity. Because of his simple and primitive nature, all sorts of hardships bring him but few emotional reactions. His emotions run the gamut from animal ferocity to the utmost kindliness; odious and cruel in a group, he can be friendly and ready to help as an individual.

In the attack the Russian fought unto death. Despite most thorough German defensive measures he would continue to go forward, completely disregarding losses. He was generally not subject to panic. For example, in the break-through of the fortifications before Bryansk in October 1941, Russian bunkers, which had long since been bypassed and which for days lay far behind the front, continued to be held when every hope of relief had vanished. Following the German crossing of the Bug in July 1941, the fortifications which had originally been cleared of the enemy by the 167th Infantry Division were reoccupied a few days later by groups of Russian stragglers, and subsequently had to be painstakingly retaken by a division which followed in the rear. An underground room in the heart of the citadel of Brest Litovsk held out for many days against a German division in spite of the employment of the heaviest fire power.

The sum of these most diverse characteristics makes the Russian a superior soldier who, under the direction of understanding leadership, becomes a dangerous opponent. It would be a serious error to underestimate the Russian soldier, even though he does not quite fit the pattern of modern warfare and the educated fighting man. The strength of the Western soldier is conscious action, controlled by his own mind. Neither this action on his own, nor the consciousness which accompanies the action, is part of the mental make-up of the Russian. But the fact must not be ignored that a change is taking place also in this respect.

The difference between the Russian units in World War I and those in World War II is considerable. Whereas in the earlier war the Russian Army was a more or less amorphous mass, immovable and without individuality, the spiritual awakening through communism showed itself clearly in the last war. In contrast to the situation at the time of World War I, the number of illiterates was small. The Russian masses had acquired individuality, or at least were well on the way to acquiring it. The Russian is beginning to become a perceptive human being, and hence a soldier who is able to stand on his own feet. The number of good noncommissioned officers was still not large in World War II and the Russian masses had not yet overcome their sluggishness. But the awakening of the Russian people cannot be far off. Whether this will work to the advantage or disadvantage of their soldierly qualities cannot yet be determined. For along with awareness flourish criticism and obstinacy. The arbitrary employment of masses resigned to their fate may become more difficult, and the basis of the typically Russian method of waging war may be lost. The force bringing about this change is communism, or more precisely, a spiritual awakening of the people directed by a rigidly centralized state. The Russian is fundamentally non-political; at least that is true for the rural population, which supplies the majority of soldiers. He is not an active Communist, not a political zealot. But he is – and here one notes a decisive change – a conscious Russian who fights only in rare instances for political ideals, but always for his Fatherland.

In judging the basic qualities of the Russian it should be added that by nature he is brave, as he has well demonstrated in his history. In 1807 it was the Russian soldier who for the first time made a stand against Napoleon after his victorious march through Europe – a stand which may be called almost epic.

In line with this awakening, another determining factor has been introduced into the Red Army by the political commissar – unqualified obedience. Carried out to utter finality, it has made a raw mass of men a first-rate fighting machine. Systematic training, drill, disregard for one’s own life, the natural inclination of the Russian soldier to uncompromising compliance and, not the least of all, the real disciplinary powers available to the commissar, are the foundations of this iron obedience. In this connection, it must be remembered that Russia is an autocratically ruled state – an absolute dictatorship demanding and compelling the complete subordination of the individual. That blind obedience of the masses, the mainspring of the Red Army, is the triumph of communism and the explanation of its military successes.

In addition to the simplicity which is revealed in his limited household needs and his primitive mode of living, the Russian soldier has close kinship with nature. It is no exaggeration to say that the Russian soldier is unaffected by season and terrain. This immunity gave him a decisive advantage over the Germans, especially in Russian territory where season, temperature, and terrain play a decisive role.

The problem of providing for the individual soldier in the Russian Army is of secondary importance, because the Russian soldier requires only very few provisions for his own use. The field kitchen, a sacred institution to other troops, is to the Russian soldier a pleasant surprise when it is available, but can be dispensed with for days and weeks without undue hardship.

During the winter campaign of 1941, a Russian regiment was surrounded in the woods along the Volkhov and, because of German weakness, had to be starved out. After 1 week, reconnaissance patrols met with the same resistance as on the first day; after another week only a few prisoners were taken, the majority having fought their way through to their own troops in spite of close encirclement. According to the prisoners, the Russians subsisted during those weeks on a few pieces of frozen bread, leaves and pine needles which they chewed, and some cigarettes. It had never occurred to anyone to throw in the sponge because of hunger, and the cold ( – 30° F.) had not affected them.

The kinship with nature, which the Russians have retained to a greater degree than the other peoples of Europe, is also responsible for the ability of the Russian soldier to adapt himself to terrain features, and actually to merge with them. He is a master of camouflage, entrenchment, and defense construction. With great speed he disappears into the earth, digging in with unfailing instinct so as to utilize the terrain to make his fortifications very difficult to discover. When the Russian has dug himself into his native soil and has molded himself into the landscape, he is a doubly dangerous opponent.

The utmost caution is required when passing through unknown terrain. Even long and searching observation often does not reveal the excellently camouflaged Russian. Frequently, German reconnaissance patrols passed through the immediate vicinity of Russian positions or individual riflemen without noticing them, and were then taken under fire from behind. Caution must be doubled in wooded areas. In such areas the Russians often disappear without a trace, and must be driven out individually, Indian fashion. Here, sniping from trees was particularly favored by the Russians as a method of fighting.

The industrialization of the country, carried out in a comparatively short period of time, has made available to the Red Army a large number of industrial workers with full command of technical skills. The Russian has mastered all new weapons and fighting equipment, all the requirements of machine warfare, with amazing rapidity. Soldiers trained in technical subjects were carefully distributed through the ranks where they taught the necessary rudiments to their duller urban comrades, and to those who came from rural areas. The technical skill of the Russian was especially notable in the field of signal communications. The longer the war lasted, the better the Russians became at handling this type of equipment. Their communications improved steadily, and with noteworthy skill the Russsians soon made themselves familiar also with German signal communications. Monitoring and tuning in, jamming and deception, all were arts which they understood very well. Whereas in World War I the telephone was still magic to the average Russian, in World War II he regarded the complicated radio as an amusing toy. In the field of signal communications, he also maintained his iron discipline, thereby propounding many a riddle for German signal intelligence.

In contrast to the good side of the Russian soldier there were bad military aspects of equal significance. To the Germans, it was one of the imponderables about each Russian unit whether the good or bad would predominate. There still remained an appreciable residue of dullness, inflexibility, and apathy which had not yet been overcome, and which probably will not be overcome in the near future.

The unpredictability of the mood of the Russian soldier and his pronounced herd instinct at times brought on sudden panic in individual units. As inexplicable as the fanatic resistance of some units, was the mystery of their mass flights, or sudden wholesale surrender. The reason may have been an imperceptible fluctuation in morale. Its effect could not be counteracted by any commissar.

His emotions drive the Russian into the herd, which gives him strength and courage. The individual fighter created by modern warfare is rare among the Russians. Most of the time a Russian who has to stand on his own feet does not know what to do. During the war, however, this serious weakness was compensated for by the large mass of men available.

A word about the craftiness of the Russian. He seldom employed large-scale ruses. The usual tricks, such as feigning the existence of troops by increased fire and other means, were just as common with the Russians as with all armies. They seldom carried out feint attacks. The Germans found, however, that they had to be on guard against dishonesty and attempts at deception by individual Russian soldiers and small units. One trick, a particular favorite, was to feign surrender, or come over to the enemy with raised hands, white flags, and all the rest. Anyone approaching in good faith would often be met by sudden surprise fire at close range. The Russian soldier, who can lie motionless for hours on end, often feigned death. An unguarded approach often cost a German his life.

CHAPTER 2

The Russian Command Echelons

The higher echelons of Russian command proved capable from the very beginning of the war and learned a great deal more during its course. They were flexible, full of initiative, and energetic. However, they were unable to inspire the mass of Russian soldiers. Most of the commanders had advanced in peacetime to high positions at a very early age, although there were some older men among them. All social levels were represented, from the common laborer to the university professor of Mongolian languages and cultures. Of course, merit in the Revolution played a part, but a good choice was made with respect to character, military understanding, and intelligence. Purely party generals apparently got positions carrying little more than prestige. The extraordinary industry with which the commanders went about their duties was characteristic. Every day, and far into the night, they sat together to discuss and to record in writing what they had seen and heard during the day.

During the various political purges an appreciable portion of this command strata disappeared. But it is a mistake to assume that a deterioration of the higher command levels resulted. Such great progress had been made in military education in Russia that even the higher commanders available at the beginning of the war were of a stature commensurate with their duties. In this connection it must be noted that a nation as young, energetic, and populous as Russia, was able to draw on an inexhaustible source of strength. In addition, this group of officers was held in high regard by the populace, was extolled in propaganda, and was very comfortably situated econo...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Part One - Russian Combat Methods in World War II
• Part Two - Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia
• Part Three - Warfare in the Far North
• Part Four - Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps