Armoured Warfare in the Battle of the Bulge, 1944–1945

Anthony Tucker-Jones

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781526701756
• eBook ISBN:
  9781526701770
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The Battle of the Bulge took the Allied armies by surprise in 1944. It was a result of the extraordinary recovery of Hitlers panzer divisions following crushing defeats on the Eastern and Western fronts. In a daring offensive he hoped his panzers would unhinge the American and British push on the Rhine by charging through the Schnee Eifel, thereby prolonging the war. The consequence was one of the best-known battles of the entire conflict, and Anthony Tucker-Jones's photographic history is the ideal introduction to it. The story is told through a sequence of revealing contemporary photographs and a concise text. They give a sharp insight into the planning and decision-making, the armored forces involved, the terrain and the appalling mid-winter conditions, the front-line fighting and the experience of the troops involved. The armored battle, which was critical to the outcome, is the main focus. Through a massive tank offensive the Germans aimed to cut through the US 1st Army to Antwerp and Brussels, in the process trapping three Allied armies. The confusion and near collapse of the Americans as their defenses were overrun is vividly recorded in the photographs, as is their resistance and recovery as the German spearheads were slowed, then stopped.

Chapter One

Hitler’s Miracle

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s attempt to seize a crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem in the Netherlands had ended in embarrassment. Although American airborne troops had successfully secured the bridges at Eindhoven and Nijmegen, the British paras were thwarted by the quick-thinking Waffen-SS at Arnhem. This had forced Montgomery to shift the emphasis of his operations to the west and the Scheldt estuary in an effort to clear the approaches to the vital port of Antwerp. As the weather deteriorated, it soon became apparent that General Dwight Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, was going to lose his wager with Montgomery that the war would end by Christmas.

The Allies advance began to get slower and slower. Between late September and mid-December 1944 the Allied position along the entire front was broadly the same. To the north Monty’s 21st Army Group, with the British on the right and the Canadians on the left, had bogged down on the River Maas, with a small salient just to the south of Arnhem. Further to the south was General Omar Bradley’s US 12th Army Group, which was struggling towards the Roer and Aachen. In particular, the battle for the Hürtgen Forest had cost the Americans 33,000 casualties in the space of two months. The need to take the Roer dams before the Germans blew them up had contributed to Major General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps being spread so thinly in the Ardennes sector.

Only to the very far south had any real progress been made, with Lieutenant General George Patton’s US 3rd Army advancing through Metz and to the Saar river. This acted to protect the flank of the US 6th Army Group that had reached the Rhine at Strasbourg after fighting its way up through southern France. Even this success, though, was threatened by the stubborn German Colmar Pocket. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy had essentially resulted in a dangerously weakened Allied centre since the end of the summer.

Despite all Germany’s setbacks, General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the German Operations Staff, had begun planning for a major counteroffensive in the west. On 6 September 1944 at a meeting at OKW (Armed Forces High Command) headquarters in Rastenburg Hitler had identified three problems facing such an operation: secrecy, supplies and Allied air power. The first was to be ensured by instigating a vigorous need-to-know policy; for the second, Germany’s weapons industries under the very capable Armaments Minister Albert Speer would have to step up production and the offensive forces would be prioritised; but the issue of the Allied air forces could only be tackled by launching an attack under the cover of bad weather. In order to meet all these criteria it was concluded that 1 November 1944 would be the earliest a counterblow could be struck.

Over the next few weeks Hitler and Jodl examined their maps showing the Allied advance. It was obvious that Eisenhower’s broad front was soaking up all his resources to the extent that he lacked a strategic reserve that could counter any German breakthrough. This meant that the squabbling Allies would be very slow to react to an assault as they sought to redeploy forces from elsewhere. Hitler and Jodl’s eyes kept coming back to the region where the Allied centre was plainly poorly defended.

By 20 September 1944 Hitler had convinced himself that the Ardennes region was the answer to all his problems on the Western Front. The almost mountainous Eifel region was very heavily wooded, which made it ideal for concealing his gathering forces. Five days later an energised Hitler outlined his vision to Jodl’s staff. He argued that a substantial breakthrough would ensure that the panzers could get across the Meuse river between Liège and Namur, followed by an advance to Antwerp that would split the Allies. He explained how the panzers would attack in the centre while the infantry protected their flanks to the north at Monschau and to the south at Echternach.

The main blow would come from his two rejuvenated panzer armies, consisting of both armoured and infantry divisions. The plan was that a preliminary artillery bombardment would be followed by the infantry advancing across a 50-mile front who would seize all the Americans’ forward positions. This would then open the way for the panzers to strike. The latter, adopting 1940 Blitzkrieg tactics, would bypass any enemy pockets of resistance, leaving them to be mopped up by the infantry. The tanks were to cross the Meuse on the second day, hooking north-eastwards around Brussels and on towards the coast before the Allies realised what was happening.

It was at this point that Hitler’s aspirations became a little hazy, clearly clouded by wishful thinking. Getting to Antwerp was ambitious enough, but on top of this he seems to have assumed that the Anglo-American alliance would collapse into chaos. Whilst there certainly were ongoing military and political tensions between the two leading Allies, having got this far since D-Day it seems fanciful to imagine they would simply give up, even if they received a major military shock. In part Hitler was desperate to stall the Allies so that he could concentrate his forces on the Eastern Front. Since late June 1944 Joseph Stalin’s Red Army had made enormous gains following its destruction of Hitler’s Army Group Centre.

In Hitler’s mind he wanted to emulate the Prussian hero Frederick the Great, who in 1762 had miraculously snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. The problem was that Hitler alone was the driving force behind his Ardennes offensive; he set the agenda, not his experienced generals. Had they been involved in the planning they would doubtless have pointed out that attacking along a narrow corridor without air superiority was a recipe for disaster. On the occasions when his generals were allowed freedom of manoeuvre, they could achieve quite remarkable victories, but this required a great degree of flexibility and thinking on your feet.

Hitler’s victories in 1939–1941 had been partly due to his armed forces being able to respond to a fluid battlefield. The conditions in which the Ardennes offensive was to be conducted were simply too restrictive. The weather and the wooded hills were not conducive to the rapid advance of his armoured and mechanised divisions. Nor were there sufficient reserves to handle any major problems in the path of the attack or on the flanks. Hitler’s generals should have warned him that if the Americans clung to the major road junctions and communication centres then the attack’s timetable would inevitably come off the rails. But Hitler would not listen to any objections, branding them defeatist; instead he carried the day with his overriding conviction they would succeed.

In the meantime, while the German planners struggled to solve their problems, there was also the issue of massing sufficient forces. As was increasingly the case by this stage of the war, Hitler looked to his elite Waffen-SS to blaze a path for the army. In late September 1944 Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West, was instructed to recall both I and II SS Panzer Corps so they could be refitted. Whilst they did need re-equipping, they were also to secretly form the core of a newly created SS Panzer Army. Under the command of the highly experienced SS Oberstgruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, the 6th SS Panzer Army was to form the key strike force on the German right. It was responsible for the attack between Monschau and St Vith.

This formation’s infantry units, along with the bulk of those assigned to the other participating armies, were to be provided by the newly raised Volksgrenadier divisions. These were built around a cadre of infantry divisions destroyed in Normandy or on the Eastern Front. Although fleshed out with new recruits, they also included army veterans returned from hospital as well as large numbers of Luftwaffe and Navy personnel. The plan was that ten of these divisions would be ready by 20 November, with a further three available by the end of the month. The intention was that a total of twenty Volksgrenadier divisions could be in the field by 10 December 1944. They would bolster the existing infantry divisions already defending the Ardennes sector with the 7th Army in the south and the 15th Army to the north.

The second armoured assault force was to be General Hasso von Manteuffel’s 5th Panzer Army. This was to cut its way through American lines between St Vith and Wiltz. It was withdrawn from the front line in late October for refitting. All four armies were to come under Field Marshal Walther Model’s Army Group B. Technically Model was responsible to Rundstedt, but in reality he answered to Hitler at OKW. The whole operation was codenamed Wacht am Rhein (‘Watch on the Rhine’) – which implied that it was of a defensive nature. It was also dubbed Operation Herbstnebel (‘Autumn Mist’).

On 21 October 1944 Hitler briefed his special forces’ thug, SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, about the supporting operation known as Greif (‘Griffon’). Skorzeny was to infiltrate American lines using the so-called 150th Panzer Brigade. This was recruited from English-speaking German troops who were to pretend to be Americans using US uniforms and vehicles. Once behind enemy lines they were to create as much chaos as possible to impede American movements and assist the German advance. The brigade was also to capture at least two bridges over the Meuse.

The following day Hitler laid his plans before Generals Siegfried Westphal and Hans Krebs, the Chiefs of Staff to Rundstedt and Model respectively. Both men came to the same conclusion: that this was a rushed job and the objectives were too broad. In response to their concerns, their superiors were quick to offer critiques to Hitler. Both Rundstedt and Model understood perfectly well what was achievable and what was not. Both were sceptical about Hitler’s notions of a war-winning grand slam.

Rundstedt argued that they should set their sights on fighting their way to the Meuse with the intention of trapping those American forces facing the Siegfried Line. This would help ease some of the pressure on their defences during the winter. Model also proposed that they should scale back their plans, with the 5th Panzer Army striking in the Ardennes and the 15th Army from Aachen with the intention of trapping as many American divisions as possible. Predictably, Hitler was not receptive to the idea of smaller operations.

Hitler’s only concession was to delete the 15th Army’s role in Wacht am Rhein.In fact, he had little choice as Allied attacks at Aachen and the Hürtgen Fore...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter One: Hitler’s Miracle
• Chapter Two: 6th SS Panzer Army Strikes
• Chapter Three: 5th Panzer Army Breaks Through
• Chapter Four: 1st SS Thrusts West
• Chapter Five: Battle for St Vith
• Chapter Six: Battered Bastogne
• Chapter Seven: Patton Strikes Back
• Chapter Eight: Drive on the Meuse
• Chapter Nine: Defeat
• Further Reading